In the Navy Pay case, ante p. it was decided that since the act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 110, sec. 5), all appropriations made for paying the salaries or compensation of officers and persons in the naval service have been and are continuous. That is, appropriations made in the annual appropriation acts for "pay of the navy" continue available not only to pay compensation accruing during any one fiscal year, but also that, when made nominally for any one fiscal year, they are available to pay compensation accruing in a subsequent fiscal year. At the time the acts were passed making appropriation for "pay of the navy" prior to Jan. uary, 1885, claims of the class now under consideration were never allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. Until after the decisions made by the Court of Claims in Hawkins' case (19 Ct. Cl., 611) and in Jordan's case (Id., 621), both decided May 26, 1884, such claims were uniformly disallowed. It follows that the estimates (Rev. Stat., 3660-3669) sent to Congress, asking for appropriations for "pay of the navy," were made on a basis, not contemplating the payment of such claims, and accordingly Congress in passing appropriation acts, adopted the opinion of the Attorney-General to which reference has been made, and the rulings of the Second Comptroller against the allowance of such claims. The claims themselves, however, are for services in the navy-the same services for which estimates were submitted to Congress, and for which appropriations were made, but the estimates and the appropriations contemplated payment for such services at a less rate of compensation than that which is now allowed in and covered by the claims in question. In other words, these claims are for additional or increased compensation beyond that which the esti mates and the appropriations were expected to include. Thus the question is presented: whether it is competent to limit the legal effect of a general appropriation, or an appropriation in general terms, by looking into the estimates submitted to Congress asking for such appropriation, and by a consideration of the usage of the accounting officers as to the amount which they regarded as lawfully due to claimants under such appropriations. It is clear, as a general rule, that no such limitation can be made by any such inquiries, or by reason of the facts stated (Artificial-Limbs Case, 2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 384; Audit Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 40). The uniform language of the acts, making appropriations "for the naval service," is that sums therein specified are appropriated "for the naval service of the Government." They then proceed, "For the pay of the navy, for the active list, namely," and, after enumerating naval officers specify a gross sum, but without specifying the amount of pay for any one. (Act August 5, 1882, 22 Stat., 284; Act March 3, 1883, 22 Stat., 472.)

Now when an appropriation is made "for the pay of the navy" and a gross sum is appropriated, without fixing the amount of pay for any officer, the amount of the pay is to be determined by the statutes elsewhere prescribing compensation.

And these statutes are to have, not the

effect which officers making estimates for appropriations, or accounting officers may have erroneously supposed them to have, but their real lawful effect as construed and determined by the judicial or other authority having the power to make an authoritative and final construction thereof. This conclusion rests on a legal principle, which may be stated as follows:

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"The general terms of an appropriation law should always be interpreted in subordination to the [general] limitations imposed by existing and qualifying enactments." (Ellis's case, 5 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 405.)

And the force of "qualifying enactments" depends on their true legal interpretation, not on the mistakes of executive officers or of Congress.

The same result follows from another principle, or substantially the same one, applied in a different form. Thus it is said by a learned writer:

"Except in some few cases where a statute has fallen under the principle of excessively strict construction, the language of a statute is generally extended to new things which were not known and could not have been contemplated by the legislature when it was passed. This occurs when the Act deals with a genus, and the thing which afterwards comes into existence is a species of it. Thus, the provision of Magna Charta which exempts lords from the liability of having their carts taken for carriage was held to extend to degrees of nobility not known when it was made, as dukes, marquises, and viscounts. The 17 Geo. 2 (A. D. 1744), which gave parishioners the right of inspecting the accounts of church wardens and overseers under the poor law of Elizabeth, was held to extend to those of guardians, officers who were created by Gilbert's Act (22 Geo. 3), passed in 1783. The 13 Eliz. c. 5, which made void, as against creditors, transfers of lands, goods, and chattels, did not originally apply to copyholds or choses in action, as these were not seizable in execution: but when they were made subject to be so taken (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110), they fell within the operation of the Act. The Act of Geo. 2, which protects copy-right in engravings by a penalty for piratically engraving, etching, or otherwise, or in any other manner' copying them, extends to copies taken by the recent invention of photography" (Maxwell, Statutes, 93, 94, citing per Bovill C. J. in R. v. Smith, LR. 1 CC. 170; per Holt, C. J. in Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 485; 2 Inst. 35; 17 Geo. 2, c. 38; 22 Geo. 3, c. 83; R. v. Great Farringdon, 9 B. & C. 541; Bennett v. Edwards, 7 B. & C. 586; 6 Bing. 230; Sims v. Thomas, 12 A. & E. 536; Norcutt v. Dodd, Cr. & Ph. 100; Barrack r. McCulloch, 26 LJ. Ch. 105, 3 K. & J. 110; R. v. Smith, LR. 1 C. C. 270; per Bovill, C. J.; Gambart v. Ball, 14 CB. NS. 306; 32 LJ. CP. 166; Graves v. Ashford, LR. 2 CP. 410; Atty.-Genl. v. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. 378; Barber v. Tilson, 3 M. & G. 429. See other instances, Re Taylor, 10 Sim. 291; Exp. Arrowsmith, 8 Ch. D., 96; and cases cited infra, chap. 10, s. 1.)

The result is that appropriations for "pay of the navy" are available for the payment of the claims mentioned, at least those extending back to 1874.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, February 26, 1885.

IN THE MATTER OF THE OBLIGATION OF A JUDGMENT AGAINST A COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PURPORTING TO BE FOR TAXES BY HIM ILLEGALLY COLLECTED; AND OF THE EFFECT ON SUCH JUDGMENT OF A STATUTE CHANGING THE RATE OF INTEREST PENDING SUIT.-NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD CO.'S CASE

1. The right to interest according to the terms of a contract, express or implied, is a vested right, which, under the Constitution, cannot be divested by a legislative act.

2. But a legislative act may change the rate of interest prescribed by a pre-existing statute on causes of action in tort given by statute, even though an action be pending thereon.

3. Section 3220 of the Revised Statutes gives a right, on proper allowanc, to payment of "the full amount of such sums of money as may be recovered against him [a Collector of Internal Revenue] in any court, # with the cost

and expenses of suit" This creates, on proper allowance, an obligation to pay the amount for which final judgment has been given, but not any interest thereon. 4. When a case has been taken from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error, and the judgment of the former court has been affirmed by the latter, and a mandate has been directed to the court below, the judgment thereon entered is the "final judgment" within the meaning of section 989 of the Revised Statutes.

5. Interest is not allowable in such case during the period of an unnecessary delay in entering the mandate in the court below.

6. When, in the Circuit Court, interest is carried into a judgment, and such judgment is, upon a writ of error, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and a mandate is directed to the court below to carry said judgment into effect with interest thereon, the interest so compounded is generally to be paid.

7. Under the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 481), a claimant, who presents to the Secrotary of the Treasury for payment a claim" duly allowed," and who by compromise assents to a set-off against the same, is not entitled to interest on the residue of his claim, the payment of which is delayed in effecting the compromise.

8. Under said act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 481), interest is only payable, when the Secretary of the Treasury has, on the presentation to him for payment of a claim "duly allowed," claimed a set-off against it of a larger sum than was due from the claimant to the United States, and this has been determined in a suit brought against the claimant to recover the amount demanded by way of set-off.

9. The proper construction of sections 989 and 3220 of the Revised Statutes considered.

10. Whether the United States is under a legal obligation in all cases, to pay the whole amount of a final judgment against a Collector of Internal Revenue, purporting to be rendered in an action defended by the proper officer of the Government, for the recovery of taxes by such Collector illegally collected.-Quære? October 16, 1878, the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York against John Bailey for $499,432.68, and for $19,508.31 costs, in all $518,940.99.

November 6, 1882, upon a writ of error, the Supreme Court affirmed said judgment, "with costs [$44.38,] and interest until paid, at the same

rate per annum that similar judgments bear in the courts of the State of New York" (Bailey v. Railroad Company, 106 U. S., 109).

November 21, 1882, the mandate of the Supreme Court was entered in said Circuit Court. December 1, 1882, it was adjudged by said Circuit Court, "that the judgment of said Supreme Court

made the judgment of this court;" and it was further adjudged:

"That said plaintiff [the Railroad Company]

is

recover of said defendant $518,940.99 with interest thereon from the entry thereof [October 16, 1878] at the rate of seven per cent. per annum; which interest to the date hereof amounts to $149,955.07, together with $445.33 costs, amounting in the aggregate to $669,341.39."

This judgment was rendered in a suit commenced May 23, 1873, against Bailey; for that, on May 13, 1873, he as Collector of Internal Revenue illegally exacted and collected $462,720 tax, and $23,036 as penalty, and other sums, from the railroad company for a tax of five per centum upon the amount of certain dividends declared by said company in favor of stockholders, and evidenced by scrip certificates; which sums so exacted and collected were paid under protest.

December 19, 1882, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, by letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, said that:

"Two suits are pending against the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company for recovery of taxes due the United States, one for $140,458.59, the other for $174,243.00 *. I have, therefore, [for reasons stated] to suggest that, in making payment upon the judgment for $669,341.39, the sum of $150,000 will be an ample sum to be withheld under the requirements of the act approved March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 481). This sum deducted from the $665,996.49 above found due leaves $515,996.49 to be now paid. I propose [after making some deductions named] to allow the claim for $665,996.49."

January 4, 1883, the Secretary of the Treasury, by letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, said that:

"In view of the facts stated I approve the allowance and payment as proposed by you."

January 6, 1883, by Report No. 33,884, the Fifth Auditor adjusted an account against the United States for $665,996.49, his certificate stating:

"For refunding of taxes erroneously assessed and collected, as per schedule No. 909-final judgment rendered December 1, 1882, payable to the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. Pay out of the appropriation under section 3689, Rev. Stat., 'refunding taxes illegally collected ""

January 31, 1883, the First Comptroller certified a balance against the United States of $495,031.57 payable as stated in said report "without prejudice to any further claim of the claimant."

January 21, 1884, the two suits, above mentioned as pending against the Railroad Company, were compromised on the following terms: "$65,000 as tax, [to be paid by the Company,] together with all costs in compromise of the claims of the United States as set up in the two suits against said company provided the said corporation

shall discontinue its suit now pending in said court against late Collector Weber. The $65,000 to be accepted as tax."

The suit against Weber was commenced October 7, 1881, and sought to recover $29,817.89, with interest from June 17, 1881. Said suit was discontinued February, 1884, at the cost of the Railroad Company.

The total costs in the three suits amounted to $1,331.54, which included two per cent. ($1,300) commission (Rev. Stat., 825) to the District Attorney on said sum of $65,000. The compromise contemplated a setoff of said sums of $65,000, +$1,331.54=$66,331.54 against said judg

ment.

March 4, 1884, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, said, in reference to the judgment in favor of the Railroad Company, that:

"It was impossible to determine from any papers or records in this office at the time of the allowance of the claim, what items went to make up the amount of the judgment. One item of two thousand, two hundred and sixty four dollars and twelve cents ($2,264.12), supposed to consist of costs of distraint, was assumed to be included in the judg ment, and was rejected (with the added interest), and the remainder was allowed.

Printed reports of the proceedings on the trial have recently been procured, and, from a careful examination of these, it would seem that the jury made mistakes in the computations upon which their verdict was made up. The most important error consisted in allowing interest on the full amount, four hundred and eighty thousand, four hundred and thirty-nine dollars and eighty five cents ($480,439.85) which the plaintiff insisted upon as having been wrongfully collected, while at the same time the jury found the actual amount wrongfully collected to be only three hundred and thirty-five thousand, six hundred and fifty dollars and eighty-five cents ($335,650.85). The verdict was thus made to include interest at seven per cent. for nearly ten years on one hundred and forty-four thousand, seven hundred and eighty-nine dollars ($144,789.00) which belonged to the United States.

It would seem further that the jury by their verdict returned to the corporation the costs of certain distraints, which should not have been included as damages, (for the reason that the corporation recovered back only a portion of the amount collected on the settlement, and the distraint proceedings were necessary for the collection of that portion of the amount claimed in the suit which the court and jury found was legally due the Government,) to wit: the sum of $2,264.12 above mentioned, which the reports now clearly show to have been included as a part of the sum wrongfully collected.

It was held by the Court of Claims in the case of E. Dunnegan v. The U. S. (17 Ct. Cls., 247), in their examination of a refunding claim presented under section 3220, which was based upon a judgment of court, that:

'The judgment goes, first, to the Commissioner, under advice of the Secretary, for re-adjudication and allowance; then, if allowed, to the accounting officers for examination and payment The ac

counting officers have nothing to do with the judgment until it has been re-adjudicated and allowed by the Commissioner and Secretary. Nor are these latter officers bound by it. It is fully in their discretion to allow or disallow payment. With them the verdict of the jury and the certificate of the judge amount only to persuasive evidence. They can