Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

able gift to that person. But this arrangement falls short of even this, because in law it was merely a contract between two persons that one should open an account in the name of a third person, the original depositor having a reserved right to draw the sums credited. At common law no one could sue on an express contract, except the parties to it. Under the equitable action for money had and received, a beneficiary may sometimes sue, but this can only be where the parties have given him such a right as transfers the fund to his control. The money belonging to one person can not cease to belong to him until he does some act to dispose of it. The cases heretofore determined in this court are stronger cases than the present in favor of plaintiff's rights. See Burtnett v. Bank, 38 Mich. 630, and Bank v. Burrows, 34 id. 153." To the same effect, Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bk., 104 Mass. 228; S. C., 6 Am. Rep. 222.

public use of the plaintiff's book. But copyright is the right, by printing or otherwise, to multiply copies. To multiply copies of a material portion of a work which is entitled to copyright is as much a breach of the law, though differing in degree, as to multiply copies of the whole work; and it has long been settled that multiplying copies for private distribution among a limited class of persons is just as illegal as if it were done for the purpose of sale. Take, for example, a valuable copyright like Lord Tennyson's poems. No one could print them and distribute the copies among his friends, or among the boys at a school, or any limited class of persons, any more than he could print them for sale. Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. O. S. 177. Therefore I have no hesitation in saying that the circumstance that the defendants do not sell their books, or that they only give them to their own agents, and to merchants with whom they correspond, would not justify this multiplication of copies. But the defendants' main In Ager v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Naviga-iff's book, they are doing no more than the plaintiff argument is, that in making this use of the plainttion Company, Limited, Chan. Div. June 14, 1884, 50 intended they should do, and Mr. Giffard ingenL. T. Rep. (N. S.) 477, the plaintiff published and iously compared the case to that of a copy-book

copyrighted a book consisting of 100,000 words arranged alphabetically, selected from eight languages, and specially compiled with a view to correct telegraphic transmission. To each of the words was ascribed a different combination of five of the ordinary numerals 0 to 9. The book could be used by

any one to make a code of cypher telegraphy of his

own by attributing to any of these words, or to the
equivalent numerals, whatever meanings he might
please, and communicating these significations to
his correspondents. The defendants printed a book
containing the bulk of the words comprised in the

plaintiff's book, and taken from it, but appending
to them numbers aud meanings of their own. They
distributed these books, marked "private," gratu-
itously to their own agents, and to merchants with
whom they corresponded by telegraph. Held, an
infringement of copyright. The court, Kay, J.,
said: "The defendants admit that they could not
sell, or even distribute gratuitously, their book to
any one who might wish to have it, without infring-
ing the plaintiff's copyright. But they do not do
this. What they do is to give not sell their
books, and only to their own agents and merchants
with whom they correspond by telegraph, and for
this purpose they have printed about 150 copies,
and have distributed about fifty at present. I have
no doubt-
- that
indeed that is scarcely denied
enough of the plaintiff's book is copied to constitute
a serious invasion of his rights, unless the defend-
ants can justify the manner in which they take it.
One justification attempted is the circumstance that
they only give the books to their own agents and
correspondents, and do not publish or use them
otherwise than privately, and they point to the
word 'private' printed conspicuously on the cover,
and to the fact that the object would be defeated if
their code were made public, as sufficiently showing
that it is out of the 'question that they make any

[ocr errors]

with the usual slips printed at the top of each page. These are intended to be copied, and he argued that if any one bought one, he might fill up that book, and as many blank books besides as he chose, writing, without infringing the owner's copyright, with facsimile copies if he could make them in hand

because that sort of use was intended by the owner.

But the question is, whether the use made in this
case by the defendants was intended by the plaint-
iff. By bringing this action he declares it was not.
He has printed on the title-page of his book the
usual intimation in a work intended to have copy-
right, that it is entered at Stationers' Hall. Is
there any thing in the nature of the case which
makes it necessary or proper to infer that his con-
tention is wrong? In the first place, the use the
defendants are making of his book is not absolutely
essential even to the defendants' mode of availing
themselves of the plaintiff's research. They might
print their own code, referring to the words or
numbers in the plaintiff's book, without reprinting
one of such words, so that any one having a copy
of the plaintiff's book, and placing the de-
fendants' code beside it, might employ that code
with little, if any, trouble more than is involved in
the use of the defendants' book, while the advant-
age to the plaintiff would be, that which he must
be blind to his own interest if he intended to
very
give up, viz., that so many more copies of his book
must be bought. On the other hand, if the de-
fendants be right, any one to whom they give one
of their books could from it, without betraying any
secret of the defendants, inform the whole world
what were the words selected by the plaintiff, and
thus render his books comparatively useless. In the
illustration of the copy-book it is not denied that
no one could print a copy even for private use. It
can only be copied in the mode and to the extent
intended by the owner. Copying to a certain ex-

i

tent is the very object which the owner of the copy-
book intended, but any copying beyond that
extent would be illegal. The illustration is inapt,
unless it be clear that such copying as the defend-
ants have made was intended by the plaintiff, and
I have no difficulty in believing that he never in-
tended any thing of the kind, Applying the usual
tests (Scott v. Stanford, 16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 51, 53;
L. Rep., 3 Eq. 718, 723; Kelly v. Morris, 14 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 222; L. Rep., 1 Eq. 697), it seems to me
that the plaintiff must have expended a great deal
of time and labor on this compilation; that what
the defendants are doing is to avail themselves very
largely and unnecessarily of the labor and research
of the plaintiff without adequately recompensing
him;
that the use which the defendants make of
their book is calculated to interfere seriously with the
sale of the plaintiff's book; that it is a multiplying
of copies of the plaintiff's book within the words of
the Copyright Act (5 & 6 Vict., c. 45); and that it is
therefore an invasion of the copyright of the plaint-
iff against which he is entitled to be protected."

WE

COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES.

[ocr errors]

a

LL

musical entertainments, furnishing meals for its members, and keeping a small stock of liquors for their exclusive use, affording no profit, but partly paid for by their monthly dues, each member paying for what he uses as it is taken, is not subject to tax as a retail liquor dealer' as other merchants." Tennessee Club of Memphis v. Dwyer, 11 Lea, 452. The court cited Seim v. State, 55 Md. 566; S. C., 39 Am. Rep. 419; Graff v. Evans, 8 Q. B. Div. 373. The court said: "We think it is clear from the statements of the bill that the mode of sale as it is termed, to the members at a rate fixed by the governing committee of the club, is only in fact an equitable mode of distributing refreshments to its members, which are provided by the club for them exclusively. It cannot be controverted but that the complainant would have a right to purchase and keep liquors at its club rooms for the use of its members, and to distribute them among them in any method it might deem proper, and to raise funds for the purpose of replenishing by assessments upon its members, and the mode adopted of the form of a sale alone to its members of such a quantity for so much money can be nothing more than a mode adopted of assessing each member in proportion to the amount he consumes. In the case of State v. Smith, 5 Humph. 394, this

* * *

stitute a merchant in the meaning of the revenue laws, the business of buying and selling should be the pursuit and vocation by which the party makes his living. In that case the preceptor and proprietor of an extensive female school had between fifty and a hundred pupils and tutoresses boarding with him and members of his family. To supply these persons with clothes, books, etc., he kept on hand a supply of such articles of clothing and stationery as they might need, and furnished these articles not with a view of profit, but to accommodate his pupils and keep up his school. He sold to no person not a member of his family. Held that he was not a merchant, or subject to be taxed

as such."

"me

HOLESALE LIQUOR DEALER. A manufacturer of liquors selling in unbroken pack-court in construing a revenue act held that to conages at his place of business is not a "wholesale liquor dealer," liable to taxation as "other merchants." Taylor v. Vincent, 12 Lea, 282. The court said: "We hold that a dealer is correctly defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Commonwealth v. Campbell, 9 Casey, 386, as a middleman between the manufacturer or the producer and the consumer, or as was said by Judge Black in Norris v. Commonwealth, 3 id. 495, dealer, in the popular conception or sense of the word, is not one who buys to keep or makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again. He stands immediately between the producer and the consumer, and depends for his profits not upon the labor he bestows upon his commodities, but on the skill and foresight with which he watches the markets. In other words, a manufacturer of an article from the raw material, though he sells the article thus manufactured in unbroken packages to dealers, is not a wholesale dealer under these revenue statutes. The added clause and shall be taxed as other merchants' shows that the Legislature had in mind wholesale merchants - men engaged in buying and selling as an occupation, and not the original manufacturer selling as in this case." In State v. Lawenhaupt, 11 Lea, 13, the court said: "We take it, what is meant by retailing is selling by small quantities to suit customers, articles which are bought in larger amounts generally. Now one who sells in this way, or whose business is so to sell is a retail dealer, one who sells by the nature of his business in gross, and not by the small quantity or parcel to consumers, is a wholesale dealer."

RETAIL LIQUOR DEALER. A social club, organized under statute, maintaining a library, giving

MECHANIC.

A photographer is not a chanic" within the statute of exemption from execution. Story v. Walker, 11 Lea, 515. The court said: "The Legislature of this State has not treated photographers as mechanics, but as photographic artists, and subjected their vocation to a privilege tax. ** * * The words of the statutes of exemptions were used, and intended to be understood in their usual and proper sense. A mechanic engaged in the pursuit of his trade is a workman employed in shaping and uniting materials, such as wood, metal, etc., into some kind of structure, machine, or other object requiring the use of tools. The tools must be such as are used by the workman to shape or change the surface of lumber or other material, or create an object by manual labor. Freeman on Ex., § 226. The photographer is an artist, not an artisan, who takes impressions of things and persons on prepared plates or surfaces. He is n'o more a mechanic than the painter, who by mean s

of his pigments covers his canvas with the glaring images of natural objects, and his tent, bins, camera stand, camera box, head-rest, bath-holder, etc., are no more tools within the meaning of the exemption laws than the tent, stool, easel, hand-rest, | brushes, pigment box, and paints, glaze, etc., of the painter."

* **

NEEDLESS TORTURE OR MUTILATION.-Trapping a trespassing and depredating dog is not "needlessly torturing or mutilating" within a statute against cruelty to animals. Hodge v. State, 11 Lea, 528. The dog in question had annoyed the defendant by invading his premises at night, breaking up his hens' nests, and sucking the eggs. The defendant set a steel trap and caught the dog, and in his struggles to get away part of his tongue was torn out. The dog lost his power of barking, and from inability to eat became very lean. The court said: "There can be no doubt, we think, that in doing so his object was, by catching the animal, to protect his property, and relieve his premises from these depredations, and not for the purpose of inflicting needless torture upon the animal. The defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. A literal construction of this act would seem to indicate that no one is permitted to kill or wound any living creature, however noxious, even a black bird or a crow, or a skunk, or a serpent, unless under some necessity, without being guilty of a penal offense. We do not understand such to be the meaning of this act. Whilst its object was to prevent cruelty to animals, and it was intended as a humane provision for their protection, it was not intended to deprive a man of the right to protect himself, his premises and property, against the intrusions of worthless, mischievous or vicious animals, by such means as are reasonably necessary for that purpose."

* * *

HEIRS. The husband is not the "heir" of the wife. Wilkins v. Ordway, 59 N. H. 378. The court said: "But husband and wife are nowhere included with 'heirs' or 'next of kin' in the statutes. These terms, in their proper and legal signification and acceptation, have reference to relationship by blood." This decision is a reasonable complement of the decisions that hold that the wife is not the "heir " of the husband.

MERCHANT. In Murray v. State, 11 Lea, 218, it was held that a merchant tailor is a "merchant." The court said: "The facts proven on the trial were, that the defendants were copartners and carried on the business of merchant tailors in Memphis. They kept on hand a stock of goods, which they purchased outside of the State, and made them up into clothing and sold them upon orders of their customers. When a customer desired a suit of clothes or a garment they permitted him to select from their stock the particular piece of cloth or stuff he desired them made of, and they took his measure and made up the articles of clothing and sold them to him. They kept in their employ tailors for

the purpose of making up their goods into clothing for their customers, whom they charged for the cloth of which the clothing was made, as well as for the labor and skill of making them up. * * * During the time they had license they would sometimes sell a piece of cloth, or some article of trimming or buttons, to a customer, without being made up, but since they had failed to take out a license they had ceased to sell any articles unless made up into clothing. * We think there can be no question but that the defendants were merchants within the meaning of the statute above quoted, and were bound to obtain a license in order to carry on business in the manner above stated."

* *

BRIDGE.—In Smith Bridge Co. v. Bowman, Ohio Supreme Court, February, 1884, it was held that a railroad bridge is within the mechanics' lien law. In a dissenting opinion, Granger, C.J., said: "In its widest sense the word 'bridge' applies to any sort of structure extending from one point of support across an open space to another point of support, and of sufficient strength to permit the transit of some material object. But the usage of the people often takes charge of a word, and so applies it, that when uttered, or written, without accompanying words, or context, the hearer or reader understands that the speaker or writer refers to one of a particular class of objects instead of any one of many classes embraced by the fullest meaning of the word. Before any railroad was constructed, the word 'bridge' in connection with roads and highways had, by the people, been thus applied to structures across steams for the passage of travellers in ordinary modes. A road led up to each end of such a structure. The traveler left the road and entered upon the bridge, and again left the bridge and took to the road. Constructively, in a legal sense purely, the road sometimes crossed the bridge, and the bridge was, sometimes, in like manner a part of the road; but actually, in fact, the bridge was distinct from the road. Popularly then the word 'bridge' came to mean a structure whose primary object was the support of persons, animals and vehicles while crossing a stream or ravine. This meaning belonged to the word when the first railroad bridge was built. What is the primary object of such a bridge? What is the thing being constructed while it is being built? A railroad."

ROUNDING A POINT.- In The Margaret, June, 1884, 50 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 447, the court said, Brett, M. R.: "The question to be considered is, what is the meaning of the rule which says that 'steam vessels navigating against the tide shall, before rounding the following points, viz.: Blackwall Point, ease their engines, and wait until any other vessels rounding the point with the tide have passed clear'? It seems to me that the first thing to be considered is, what is the meaning of 'point?' Now it is clear that the officers of this vessel knew what was meant. It is a nautical rule, and is written therefore in nautical language, and it is written with regard to a winding river where there are what sailors call 'points,' that is, where the land goes from a straight

1

counts to one of his creditors. The presumption is that this was done with the intention of giving a preference to such creditor.(5)

5. A married man enters a house of prostitution and remains there all night. The presumption is that he committed adultery while there.(6)

6. A wife who resided in Massachusetts goes to Maine and immediately applied for and obtains a divorce for causes not a ground for divorce in Massachusetts. The presumption arises that her purpose in removing to Maine was to obtain a divorce.(7)

7. A statute provides that certain conveyances made with intent to give a preference to certain creditors shall be void. A. makes a conveyance whose provis ions prefer certain creditors. The presumption is that A. intended to give a preference.(8)

[ocr errors]

line into the river, so that the river is obliged to wind round the point. Therefore the point is not a mathematical point, and it seems to me that the proper way of defining the 'point' under these circumstances, is this: that the point begins where a vessel having to go round it, either up or down the river, would, if there were nothing in the way, be obliged to use its steering gear for the purpose of continuing her course, and that it ends where the necessity of using the steering gear ceases. Therefore the point lies within those limits. The next question is, what is the meaning of 'before rounding the following points'? Is it before a vessel begins to round, or is it before she has finished. The judge said, Tenterden, C. J., in case 1, getting round, what I call the point? It seems to me that it applies from the time when, if there was nothing in the way, a vessel begins to use her steering gear for the above purpose, and ends at the place where she would cease using her steering gear, and would go straight on her course as before. Therefore where the vessel is going against the tide, it seems to me that the words 'before rounding' mean before the vessel has finished rounding the point in the sense in which I have described the point that is to say, that the rule applies, not only before the vessel begins to round the point, but it applies during the whole time that she is rounding it."

[blocks in formation]

1. W. wrote and published of H. that he had colluded with an insolvent tenant in setting up a fictitious distress. In an action of libel brought by H. against W. the judge left it to the jury to say whether W. intended to injure H. by the publication. This was error because the tendency of the libel being injurious to H., W. was presumed to have intended it to be so.(2)

2. A baker is charged with delivering adulterated bread for the use of a public asylum. It is proved that A. delivered the bread. The presumption is that he intended it to be eaten.(3)

3. B. is charged with setting fire to a building with intent to injure the owner. It is proved that B. fired the building. The presumption arises that he intended to injure the owner. (4)

4. A debtor knowing himself to be insolvent, executes a bill of sale and an assignment of his book ac

(1) State v. Hessenkamp, 17 Iowa, 25 (1864): State v. Presell, 12 Ired. (L.) 105 (1851); Hayes v. State, 58 Ga. 47 (1877); Hoskins v. State, 11 id. 92 (1852).

(2) Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 643 (1829); King v. Harvey, 3 D. & R. 464 (1823).

(3) King v. Dixon, 3 M. & S. 12 (1814).

(4) R. v. Farrington, R. & R. 207 (1811).

"ought not to have left it as a question to the jury whether the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff, for every man must be presumed to intend the natural and ordinary consequences of his own act." And Littledale, J., added: "If the tendency of the publication was injurious to the plaintiff, then the law will presume that the defendant, by publishing it, intended to produce the injury which it was calculated to effect."

In case 2 Lord Ellenborough said, that it was a universal principle that when a man is charged with doing an act, of which the probable consequence may be highly injurious, the intention is an inference of law resulting from the doing the act, and here it was alleged that he delivered the loaves for the use and supply of the children which could only mean for the children to eat, for otherwise they would not be for their use and supply.

In case 7, Shaw, C. J., said: "But the statute provides that the acts which it prohibits must be done with an intention to give a preference, The intent to prefer is essential, but every person is to be presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own acts, and if such acts do in fact as this do give a very large preference, it is competent for the jury to infer the intent. It does not rebut this intent to show that the debtor has also another motive to the proceeding, namely, an expectation of pecuniary or other future benefit to himself by means of further loans of money, and being enabled thereby to continue his business."

(B.)

1. A., B. and C. sign a note "as trustees" of a church, it being represented to them that no individual liability could arise from their act. But the law considers a note so signed as binding the signers personally. The presumption is that A., B. and C. intended to bind themselves personally.(9)

2. A. who holds two claims against B. gives him a release under seal of and a simple receipt of payment of the other. The presumption is that A. intended that the former should be conclusive and that the latter should not.(10)

3. A debtor makes a fraudulent preference by assignment of his property. He makes also a "conveyance of his property for the benefit of crediters." The (5) Ecker v. McAllister, 45 Md. 290 (1876); Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gall. 377 (1848).

(6) Evans v. Evans, 41 Cal. 103 (1871); Astley v. Astley, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 720 (1828).

(7) Chase v. Chase, 5 Gray, 157 (1856).

(8) Denny v. Dana, 2 Cush. 160 (1848); Beals v. Clark, 13 Gray, 18 (1859).

(9) Mears v. Graham, 8 Blackf. 144 (1846); Burrit v. Dickson, 8 Cal. 113 (1857).

(10) Jones v. Ricketts, 7 Md. 108 (1854).

law presumes that the intent of the conveyance was to delay or defraud his creditors.(11)

4. A. forges the name of B. to a bill of exchange and negotiates it. The presumption is that A. intended to defraud B., and his intention to pay it when it became due is irrelevant. (12)

5. B. forges C.'s name to a check on the bank of D. C. has no account there. The presumption is that B. intended to defraud C.(13)

6. A. was employed by B. to purchase stock to a certain amount. A. gave B. a forged receipt for stock for that amount. The presumption is that A. did this with the intention of defrauding B., and B.'s opinion that he did not intend to defraud is irrelevant.(14)

7. C. was indicted for issuing a forged bank note with intent to defraud the bank. The note was issued by C. to a third person, and it appeared that its execution was such as to render its spuriousness easily detectable by the officers of the bank who must examine it before paying it; but this an ordinary person would not discover. C. was presumed to have intended to defraud the bank. (15)

8. A. sets fire to a building. The presumption is that he intended to destroy it.(16)

9. A. gives a promissory note to B. The presumption is that A. and B. intended that the note should be paid in legal currency.(17)

10. A statute provides that the failure to pay over money by a public officer shall be punishable; a public officer is indicted for failing to turn over a license fee collected by him. The presumption is that his failure was willful and intentional.(18)

In case 2 it was said: "When the law ascribes to one instrument a conclusive and to another a prima facie character, we must presume that parties using either intend it to operate according to its legal effect. A release will discharge a debt when a receipt will not. Persons may settle in good faith under the impression that the amount paid is all that is due. But it sometimes happens that mistakes occur, and to enable parties to correct them the law has declared that mere receipts are not conclusive."

In case 3 Lord Chancellor Cairns said: "It is true that under this as under previous statutes of bankruptcy, two acts are specified which if done by the bankrupt are not only acts of bankruptcy, but are also, if followed by bankruptcy void. One is a conveyance or assignment of the bankrupt's property for the benefit of creditors, and the other is a conveyance or assignment fraudulent or by way of fraudulent prefer

ence. It is to be observed as to one of these acts, namely, a conveyance or assignment by way of fraudulent preference, special provisions have always been made in bankruptcy legislation, making such a conveyance or assignment void by express enactment, and reducing it accordingly; and as to the other, namely, a conveyance in trust for all creditors, it has been held from the earliest times of bankruptcy law, that as the effect of such a conveyance must be to delay or defeat creditors, the law will presume an intention to delay or defeat creditors, and the conveyance would therefore be invalid as against, and perhaps even without reference to the policy of the bankruptcy laws." "The Recorder," said Maule, J., in case 5, seems to have thought that in order to prove an intent to de

[ocr errors]
[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

fraud there should have been some person defrauded or who might possibly have been defrauded. But I do not think that at all necessary. A man may have an intent to defraud and yet there may not be any person who could be defrauded by his act. Suppose a person with a good account at his bankers, and a friend with his knowledge forges his name to a check either to try his credit or to imitate his handwriting, there would be no intent to defraud, though there might be parties who might be defrauded; but where another person has no account at his bankers, but a man supposes that he has, and on that supposition forges his name, there would be an intent to defraud in that case, although no person could be defrauded."

In case 10 it was said: "As men do not generally violate the Criminal Code, the law presumes every man innocent, and this presumption of innocence is to be observed by the jury in every case. But some men do violate the law, and as they seldom do unlawful acts with innocent intentions, the law therefore presumes every act in itself unlawful, to have been criminally intended until the contrary appears. A familiar example is on the trial of a case of homicide. Malice is presumed from the fact of killing, and the burden of disproving the malice is thrown upon the I accused. The same principle pervades the law in civil as well as criminal actions. Indeed if this were not so the administration of the criminal law would be practically defeated, as there is in most cases no other way of sustaining the intent than by establishing the unlawfulness of the act.

RULE II. Where an act is criminal per se a criminal intent is presumed from the commission of the act.(19)

ILLUSTRATIONS.

N. is proved to have been stabbed with a dirk knife by T., from which wound he instantly died. T. is presumed to have intended to kill N. (20)

2. S. shoots at C. who is on horseback. The ball takes effect on C. and kills him. S. testifies that he shot at C. intending only that his horse should throw him. The presumption is that S. intended to kill C.(21)

In Com. v. Webster, (22) Chief Justice Shaw said: "The ordinary feelings, passions and propensities under which parties act are facts, known by observation and experience; and they are so uniform in their operation that a conclusion may be safely drawn that if a person acts in a particular manner he does so under the influence of a particular motive. Indeed this is the only mode in which a large class of crimes can be proved, I mean crimes which consist not merely in an act done, but in the motive and intent with which they are done. But this intent is a secret of the heart which can only be directly known to the searcher of all hearts; and if the accused makes no declaration on the subject, and chooses to keep his own secret, which he is likely to do if his purposes are criminal, such criminal intent may be inferred and often is safely inferred from his conduct and exter

nal acts."

Said Chief Justice Shaw in case 1: "A sane man, a voluntary agent, acting upon motives must be presumed to contemplate and intend the necessary,

(19) People v. March, 6 Cal. 543 (1856); Murphy v. Com., 23 Grat. 960 (1873); McCone v. High, 24 Iowa, 336 (1868); Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142 (1861); Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 (1853). (20) Com. v. York, 9 Metc. 93 (1845); Murphy v. People, 37 Пl. 447 (1865); Riggs v. State, 30 Mass. 636 (1856); State v. Bertrand, 3 Oregon, 61 (1868); State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153 (1873); Conner v. State, 4 Yerg. 137 (1833).

(21) State v. Smith, 2 Strobh. 77 (1847).

(22) 5 Cush. 316 (1850).

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »