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MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.*

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DEED DEFECTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT TION. After a married woman's deed has been delivered, and the officer who certified the acknowledgment had gone out of office, he undertook to correct a defect in her certificate. Held, that this act was void for want of power. Waunell v. Kem, 51 Mo. 150; S. C., 57 id. 478, distinguished. Gilbraith v. Gallivan. Opinion by Winslow, Commr. [See 29 Alb. L. 356.—ED.]

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STATUTE OF FRAUDS-MEMORANDUM-PAROL EVIDENCE. (1) A memorandum offered in evidence was as follows: "Messrs. Parlin & Orendorff: Gentlemen -Please execute the following order for plows, cultivators, * etc., to be delivered on board cars in Chillicothe, Mo., marked for J. F. Lash: No. 6. 14inch cut, medium steel landside old ground plows, iron beam, $22; No. 7 (extra). 16-inch cut, medium steel landside, three-horse, old-ground plows, iron beam, $22; and other items of Plows in detail. Cultivators- - Iron beam, Parlin's patent, with shields, $14.50; wood beam, Parlin's patent, with shields, $13.50. For which I agree to give you my notes payable with exchange, or by express, prepaid, at above list, for plows, less forty-five per cent, and payable all January 1, 1879, with ten per cent interest; cultivators less net per cent, and payable January 1, 1879, with ten per cent interest. Parlin & Orendorff, per Taylor." Held, that though not a complete and perfect contract, this was a sufficient memorandum of a contract between J. F. Lash and Parlin & Orendorff, so as to be admissible in evidence in an action by the former against the latter; and that parol evidence was admissible to explain and apply it to the contract actually existing between the parties. (2) When a written memorandum of a contract does not purport to be a complete expression of the entire contract, or part of it only is reduced to writing, the matter thus omitted may be supplied by parol evidence. O'Neil v. Crain, 67 Mo. 250; Rollins v. Claybrook, 22 id. 407; Moss v. Green, 41 id. 389; Briggs v. Munchon, 56 id. 467; Moore v. Mountcastle, 61 id. 425. Lash v. Parlin. Opinion by Winslow, Commr.

JUDGE DISQUALIFICATION.-In a proceeding to condemn land for a street,a judge who is a party to the record cannot sit in the case even by consent of parties. The statute which authorizes a judge "who is interested in any suit" to try it, if the parties consent, has no application to such a case. R. S., § 1041. City of Kansas v. Knotts. Opinion by Martin, Commr. [See 28 Eng. R. 787.--ED.]

MENT.

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE-WAIVER OF FORFEITURE-RECEIVING ASSESSWhere an insurance company has notice of a breach of the contract which would avoid the same, but fails to cancel the policy, and even receives an assessment on the plaintiff's stock in the company, on account thereof, these acts amount to a waiver of the breach. There could scarcely be any act more strongly indicating the continuance of this policy, after the breach of conditions thereon, than this assessment. It is so held in Viall v. Genesee Ins. Co., 19 Barb. 440. In support of the principle we might cite cases too numerous to mention in this opinion. See Joliffe v. Madison M. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 111; Palmer v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 44 id. 201. Sup. Ct. Wis. March 18, 1884. Osterloh v. New Denmark, etc., Ins. Co. Opinion by Orton, J. (18 N. W. Rep. 749.)

*To appear in 78 Missouri Reports.

FIRE-INFANCY OF INSURED NO DEFENSE TO COMPANY-AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.-It is no defense to an action upon a policy of insurance that the insured, being infants, were not bound by the contract. In the case of New Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N. H. 345, it was held that an infant who had insured his stock of goods was not liable to the company on his premium note, as for necessaries, when the infant interposed the plea of infancy; but the contract of insurance was not held void. Many contracts of infants are not void, but voidable merely, in which case infancy is a personal privilege of the infant, of which no one can take advantage but the infant himself while living. Contracts which are manifestly for the benefit of the infant are not void, but voidable merely. The contract of insurance is of this class, and although entered into between the defendant and the minors jointly with their mother, is binding on the the defendant. There was no fraud or concealment prac ticed upon the defendant with respect to the infancy of the parties it was contracting with; the policy de scribes them as minors. A person to whom a promise is made may sue upon it, though the consideration moves from another. Mallon v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 321. All contractees must join in suing upon a promise made to them jointly, and any defense that is good against one of them personally will defeat the entire action; nor can such person help the others by assigning his claim to them. The interests of parties who have jointly taken out a policy of insurance are not severed by the occurrence of a loss; and any subsequent failure upon the part of one of them to comply with the conditions imposed by the policy will defeat any action that may be brought upon it. In a civil action, when the defense relied upon amounts to the charge of a crime, this defense need only be proved by a preponderance of evidence; but the presumption of innocence exists as in a criminal case, and should be taken into consideration in fixing the preponderance of evidence. Sup. Ct. Mich. April 9, 1884. Monaghan v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Champlin, J. (18 N. W. Rep. 797.)

FIRE-INTEREST OF ASSURED-CONDITION WAIVEDATTEMPT AT FRAUD WORKS FORFEITURE.-(1) Where a policy of insurance provided that if the interest of the assured in the property were not entire and unconditional, it must be so expressed in the written part of the policy, or else the policy should be void, and a part of the property was mortgaged to A., held, that though the mortgage was not originally mentioned in the policy, the company, by indorsing thereon, "loss, if any, payable to A., according to his interest," waived the breach of condition and was bound by the contract. (2) A clause in the policy requiring proofs of loss to be made by the party originally insured, even though the amount should be made payable to a third party, does not entitle the insured in such a case to recover the amount of the loss as his own. (3) Any attempt by the insured, by means of application under oath, to recover the full amount of the loss in such a case, is a fraud upon the company within the meaning of a clause in the policy providing that "all frauds, or attempt at fraud, by false swearing or otherwise, shall cause a forfeiture of all claims." Sup. Ct. Iowa. April 9, 1884. Lewis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. Opinion by Beck, J. (18 N. W. Rep. 885.)

FINANCIAL LAW.

INDORSER-NOT LIABLE-PAPER NOT NEGOTIABLE.— A promissory note bore upon its face a statement that it was issued as collateral to the makers' draft accepted by a third party. In an action against the in

dorsers of this note in their character of indorsers, held, that the undertaking of the makers was a contingent one; that the amount due on the note at its maturity was uncertain; that the note was not negotiable, and that the indorsers, as indorsers, were not liable. Sup. Ct. R. I. American National Bank v. Sprague. Opinion by Tillinghast, J. (To appear in 14 R. I.)

TAXATION-NOTES

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USED FOR CIRCULATION NOTES GIVEN TO EMPLOYEES.-The nineteenth section of the act of February 8, 1875 (18 St. 311), providing that "every association other than national bank associations, and every corporation, *** * shall

pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and paid out by them," does not apply to certificates of indebtedness, bearing interest and payable to bearer on a certain day therein named, issued in denominations of five and ten dollars each, and paid out, by a railroad company to its employees for wages, and providing that they would be received by the company at or before maturity for any debts due the company. These notes or certificates, having been issued only to the employees of the company on account of wages, and when paid | by the company having been cancelled and not reissued, were not used for circulation," and that they were used afterward by those to whom they were issued to discharge their debts to others or to purchase subsistence for themselves, does not affect the character imposed upon them by the company. We are of opinion that this case is ruled by U. S. v. Wilson, 106 U. S. 620; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. In every essential particular the certificates issued there and those in question here are remarkably alike. The former were certificates of indebtedness, good for round sums, payable to bearer at a future day, with interest, and onefourth of their face value was receivable before maturity for freight and debts due the company, and were paid out again at their face value with interest. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was not satisfied that these certificates "were calculated or intended to circulate or be used as money." Now in view of this decision, we cannot hold that certificates of similar form, used by the railroad company, not for circulation, but as evidence of wages due to its employees, are within the scope and meaning of the act of Congress. Cir. Ct., E. D. Penn. March, 1884. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Pollock. Opinion by McKennan, J. (19 Fed. Rep. 401.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-BURDEN OF PROOF-ACCOMMODATION NOTE TRANSFERRED AFTER MATURITY. -When it is a part of the defense that a note was taken after its maturity such fact in general must be proved by the defendant. Duncan v. Gilbert, 5 Dutch. 521; Harger v. Worrall, 69 N. Y. 370. An accommodation note is negotiable after its maturity, and if taken for value will bind all parties to it. The plaintiff was a married woman, and had taken the note in suit in the State of Pennsylvania by indorsement from her husband. There was no proof of the law of Pennsylvania. Held, that the rule of the common law was applicable, and that she showed no title to the note. Sup. Ct., N. J. Nov., 1883. Seyfert v. Edison. Opinion by Beasley, C. J. (To appear in 45 N. J. L.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-PROTEST-DILIGENCE OF NOTARY.-When the maker's name to a note is illegible the notary, in making protest, must make a reasonable effort to ascertain the name. If the notary neglect such duty or misdescribes such name, whereby an indorser is misled, the protest will not be available as to such party. A mistake of that character is not attributable to the negligence of the holder of the paper, or that of his agent, giving notice of its dishonor, but the indorser who passes the paper into circulation must

bear the consequences of such misleading defect. But when the name of the maker is not so fashioned as to suggest to the notary a false name, but he finds it illegible, then it plainly becomes his duty to use reasonable endeavors to ascertain who is the person thus indistinctly signified. He is, when thus placed, put upon inquiry, and must use proper diligence. Such I understand to be the legal rule. Pars. on Bills and Notes, 485. Sup. Ct., N. J. Nov., 1883. McGeorge v. Chapman. Opinion by Beasley, C. J. (To appear in 45 N. J. L.)

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CRIMINAL LAW.

LIQUORS TAX NOT LICENSE-CONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION.-(1) The imposition of the tax upon the business of selling intoxicating liquors supplied from manufacturers out of the State is not a license, and is not a violation of the Constitution of this State. Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; Kitson v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 26 id. 325. It is a restraint upon such traffic through the police power of the State. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 205; Passenger Cases 7 How. 283. (2) The statute (act 226, Sess. Laws 1875) does not prohibit the introduction or sale of liquors made outside the State; it simply taxes the person who carries on the business here by making sales in this State, and is not in conflict with the article of the Federal Constitution regarding the commerce between States. The statute does not prohibit the introduction and sale of liquors made outside the State. It simply taxes the person who carries on the business here by making sales in this State. It in no way interferes with the introduction of the liquors here. It tolerates and regulates, but seeks not to prohibit. 1 think in this case no question can be successfully made under this clause of the Constitution until the point has been reached where regulation ceases and prohibition begins. A State may pass all such laws as she may deem necessary or desirable for the safety, health, or morals of her people, and may use whatever means she may think proper to that end, provided she does not antagonize any law of Congress. Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 363; License Cases, 5 How. 575. The right of a State to tax occupations generally is recognized in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 444; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 80; Pierce v. New Hampshire, 5 id. 593; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676. (3) There is no unjust discrimination in the above act against citizens of other States; the person paying the tax stands on the same footing as the resident dealer, both as to sales made and quantity sold. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 438; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; 18 N. W. Rep. 807. Sup. Ct. Mich., Apr. 9, 1884. People v. Walling. Opinion by Sherwood, J. (See 29 Alb. L. J. 412. - ED.)

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

SHIP AND SHIPPING-BILL OF LADING-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-NEGLECT OF DUTY TO PROVIDE SHIP FIT FOR ITS PURPOSE.-Certain cattle were shipped on board a steamer for conveyance from London to New York under a bill of lading which provided that "these animals, being in sole charge of shippers' servants," "it is hereby expressly agreed that the National Steamship Company, or its agents or servants, are as respects these animals in no way responsible either for their escape from the steamer or for accidents, disease or mortality, and that under no circumstances shall they be held liable for more than 51. for each of the animals." Held, that the above clause limiting the liability of shipowners to 51. for each of the cattle did not apply

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to loss or damage arising from a breach of the ship-
owner's duty to provide a ship fit for its purpose, as it
only applied to matters occurring during the voyage.
Steel v. State Line Steamship Co., 37 L. T. Rep. (N.S.)
333; 3 App. Cas. 72; 24 Eng. R. 37. High Ct. Just..
Q. B. Div. March 11, 1884. Tattersall v. National
Steamship Company (Limited). Opinions by Day and
Smith, JJ.

COVENANT-RENEWAL-CONSTRUCTION.-In constru-
ing a covenant in a lease for the purpose of ascertain-
ing whether it is a covenant for perpetual renewal or
not, the same rule of construction applies as in constru-
ing any other contract, and the rule is that the inten-
tion of the parties to the contract is to be ascertained
from the language used. Where the language used is
obscure, the presumption is against a covenant for
perpetual renewal; but where the language is clear
this presumption has no application. When once one
is satisfied, according to the canons of interpretation,
as to the meaning of a document, which the law does
not require to be in any special form of words, the
thing is done. When once the bargain is ascertained
there is no rule, either at law or in equity, that the
parties are to be punished because they have not ex-
pressed themselves more fitly. The object of rules of
construction is to enable the courts to understand con-
tracts. What was said by Sir Edward Sudgen in Shep-
pard v. Doolan, 3 Drew. & War. 1, is borne out by the
observations of Wood, V. C., in Hare v. Burges, 4 K.
& J. 45. See also Ex parte Clarke, Irish R., 6 Eq. 51;
Brown v. Tighe, 2 Cl. & Fin. 416. Ct. of App. Jan.
22, 1884. Swinburne v. Milburn. Opinious by Brett,
M. R., and Bowen, L. J.

A

ODDS AND ENDS.

NAME now almost forgotten by the public is that of Sir John Karslake. Yet in his day-less than fifteen years ago-he was by common consent the first man at the English common-law bar. The brilliant attorney-general of a brilliant government, learned, eloquent and upright, with a physical presence that well supplemented his intellectual gifts, Sir John was the beau ideal of a great advocate. No other man within my recollection had such weight with the judges, and his certain destiny appeared to be either the chief justiceship, or if he remained in politics, the woolsack itself. But sudden blindness struck him, and amidst the universal regret of his confreres he was forced to retire alike from professional and parliamentary life. He may perhaps still be seen at the Temple church, led to his seat by affectionate hands, but the public hears him no more.

He was succeeded by another Sir John, whose career has since been closed by death. Sir John Holker's forensic art was the art that conceals itself. Outwardly rough, heavy and listless, his list of victories spoke for him, and to no one would the attorneys more readily intrust an apparently hopeless case than to this "man from the provinces," as a supercilious critic once called him. In Parliament he achieved a success much beyond that of the average attorney-general The miscellaneous body that represents the British Commons is usually somewhat impatient and incredulous of lawyers. They talk too much and too readily to suit its tastes, but Holker soon gained and kept a place as one of the most valuable debaters in Disraeli's staff. He had a broad way of looking at things, and a certain easy frankness that made his suspicious hearers forget the wig and gown he had left outside. Although a vehement Tory, and a vigorous denouncer of the Liberals and all their ways, yet he made such an impression on Mr. Gladstone that after the fall of the Beaconsfield government he was offered a lord justiceship by his quondam opponent. As a lawyer, Holker was

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not learned, but he had a way of getting at the pith of a thing that made his opinions valuable. His special virtue as an advocate was hit off by Sergeant Parry, who said that he better than any other man knew when to be silent.

But let us leave now the neighborhood of Westminster, and imagine ourselves in the quiet and beautiful city of Worcester. The Worcester courts are an exception to the ordinary dingy, crowded and inodorous abode of justice, being large, lofty and well ventilated. The learned gentleman in the pit arrayed in the neatest of wigs, the most immaculate of frills, and the glossiest of silks, who is just opening his case to the solid, jolly-looking jurors, is Huddleston, the leader of the Circuit, and as good a man at Nisi Prius as any in England. His legal knowledge is not very greatnot more than sufficient to serve his turn-and his opponent, the keen, quiet-looking man beside him, has probably forgotten more than he ever knew; but Huddy" is an advocate all over, and before a jury he will play second fiddle to none. Matthews however has his revenge in banc. There Huddleston's law is listened to with polite indifference mixed with a little of the amusement known at the bar as baiting the badger, whilst Matthews receives the attention his learning deserves. It is however strange to observe the immense advantage Huddleston has over all his opponents before a jury. Matthews is no stick; he is fluent and persuasive in speech, severe in cross-examination, and attentive to the jury. Yet somehow or other Huddleston's cases are half won before they are begun. Does "personal magnetism make the difference? Huddleston is now on the bench, and no doubt makes a good practical judge of the Baron Martin stamp.

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We need not stop to discuss any of the half-dozen Q. C.'s who are on the Assize, and amongst the crowd of juniors only Jelf, the tall young man with the single eye-glass, and Motteram, the burly old fellow, just rising to examine the first witness, are the only ones worth notice. Motteram's career has been one of misfortune pluckily met, and now he is County Court judge of Birmingham, and boasts of clearing off his 23,000 cases per annum without arrears! Jelf was undoubtedly the leading junior of the Circuit, a first-rate lawyer and a clever advocate, but a year or two of this tired him out, as it does most men, and he was glad to seek the comparative ease of silk. What with giving opinions, advising on evidence, drawing pleadings, running small cases alone, and prompting his leader in big ones, the leading junior's lot is indeed "all work and no play." Once arrayed in silk, the drudgery of chamber work is past. A glance at his brief over night (and very often not even that), a five minutes' consultation with the attorney, in which the big man listens condescendingly to the poor fellow's nervous suggestions, and dismisses him with a "Well, Mr. A., I dare say we'll pull it through, but it's a weak case," and then into court he goes, and very likely opens for a reference. The judge is ready enough to meet him, for has he not a heavy list and only two days to clear it in? and before the astonished attorney can say Jack Robinson, the case is referred to Mr. Blank, the learned Q. C. walks off with his forty or fifty guineas, and the junior attends the reference.

This is bad enough, but worse often happens in London, where owing to the multiplicity of courts counsel is sometimes bound to be in two places at once, and not being Sir Boyle Roche's bird, the result is that one cause loses his assistance altogether. The fees must be paid all the same, for the theory is that these are paid for reading the brief, whilst as if to add insult to injury, this same brief, so dearly paid for, and with all its wealth of legal disquisition and argument, in which probably the attorney has felt a secret pride as the result of much and arduous labor, comes back to his hands unaunotated, unread, nay, even unopened.

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The Albany Law Journal.

THE

ALBANY, JULY 26, 1884.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE legal vacation has come, and at this season we always allow ourselves and our contributors a little fooling. At this season alone do we suffer our poetical editor to intrude upon these grave and prosaic columns, although we keep him in pay through the whole year. Last week he tendered some advice to the political candidates on the subject of interviewing. This week he offers a few lines dedicated to those two or three judges of the upper courts in the city of New York, who indulge in the pastime of stock-gambling. He wrote these lines a good while ago, and sent a copy to William Cullen Bryant, among others. Mr. Bryant acknowledged the receipt very courteously, but mildly intimated that they had a suspicious resemblance to his own "Lines to a Waterfowl." Whereupon the writer explained to Mr. Bryant that the resemblance, if any, was purely accidental one of those remarkable coincidences which have sometimes been noticed between men of genius as Charles Reade and Dean Swift, for example. This must have been satisfactory to Mr. Bryant, for the writer did not hear from him again. It is a great resource to be able to diversify law with poetry. Doubtless the great poets have often wished they could diversify poetry with law. These verses were written at a time when a curb-stone broker was known as a "gutter-snipe." The fashion of Wall street may have changed the designation, and we make the explanation for the benefit of our rural readers who do not gamble in Wall street.

LINES TO A GUTTER-SNIPE.

Whither midst falling due

Of notes and checks at two o'clock each day,
Through Wall street's seething depths dost thou pursue
Thy melancholy way?

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Thou'rt gone; in restaurant

For sandwich of Delmonico thou'st vanished; But from my saddened heart thy lesson can't So speedily be banished.

He who hath heard the moan Of ruined "snipe," in search of cent per cent, Would better let all gambling risks alone, With lawful gains content.

A correspondent asks us why Mr. Hun publishes mere memoranda of decisions. Mr. Hun informs us that it is done at the express direction of the judges. That is a complete justification for the reporter, but what is the use of publishing such memoranda?

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The stories that newspapers tell about lawyers and judges are sometimes very extraordinary. We look to see Judge Drummond suing the St. Paul Pioneer Press for libel on account of some 66 dotes" of the judge published by that credulous and imaginative journal. If these "anecdotes” are true it is no wonder that the judge resigned, and the bar would probably be, but our readers will conclude after perusing them that some wag of a lawyer has been imposing on the reporter. But here are the "anecdotes: " "Once Matt Carpenter undertook to play fast and loose in an argument before Drummond. He was interrupted: Mr. Carpenter, you helped to pass this law. A man should be ashamed to quibble over a law of his own making.' As Carpenter went out of the court room, smarting under the rebuke like a whipped schoolboy, he remarked to a brother lawyer: Old Tom Drummond is the ablest legal mind this country has produced. I say it without reserve.' Once Carpenter alluded to an attorney opposed to him as 'that man.' The expression came out several times before Judge Drummond's wrath waxed vocal. frothed at the mouth, and cried out: Mr. Carpenter, sit down. Do you desist calling any lawyer in this court that man.' If you ever again call a brother attorney in my court 'that man' you will cease to have the opportunity for such an insult.' In a lawsuit over the Adams estate in Milwaukee one firm of lawyers put in a bill for $15,000, another lawyer a bill for $5,000, and still another a bill for an equal sum. The estate amounted to but $32,000, and the parties in interest were orphan children. Drummond went over the charges, which as judge he must audit. As he went from item to item his anger increased. It is said by those who were present that no set of men ever received such a Jove-like castigation. 'Gentlemen,' he said, you consider yourselves good lawyers. How much more are your services worth to your clients than mine to the people? You have charged $25,000 for sixty days' service. Could you not be content each of you to take my pro rata for the same time? These charges are infamous. They are such as men who are scoundrels and thieves at heart would make. This charge of $15,000 is cut down to $1,500, those of $5,000 each to $500. Repeat such

a piece of rapine in this court, and I will disbar every one of you." If Judge Drummond can submit to such imputations of bad temper, false logic, and impotent threatenings, it would astonish us indeed, but that he should submit to the charge of expecting the lawyers practicing in his court to work for as little as he got is more than we can believe.

commonest form, was fully sufficient, but proof was required that Mr. Benjamin was a British subject. This was supplied by a statement in his handwriting in the books at Lincoln's Inn, that his father and mother were British subjects of Jewish extraction, and that he was a British subject in virtue of 4 George, II, chapter 21, by which the children of British subjects not born on British soil obtain British nationality by descent. It thus appears that Mr. Benjamin was all his life a British subject, and after being an American senator and Confederate Attorney-General he became domiciled in England, and died a domiciled Frenchman."

Lord Coleridge is not going to write a book on America, after all. He writes us: "I cannot see your very kind and cordial words in the LAW JOURNAL, which reached me last week, without inflicting a line upon you to thank you for them. I wish also to say that there is not, and never has been, We have not seen the bill, but from what we hear the slightest foundation for the statement, which I of it we should suppose that Judge Poland's bill, have not thought it worth while publicly to contrarecently introduced in Congress, to regulate comdict, that I am writing a book about America. My visit was too short, too hurried, too pleasant in all merce among the States, and codify the law relatways, to give me any real insight into your wondering to negotiable instruments, would be a very imful country. There must be by-ways I never saw, unscrupulous people I never met; and if I were foolish enough to try to generalize from such very imperfect materials, I have not the power to do so with effect. I cannot knock off a dissertion on a

great country of infinitely complicated elements, and endless variety of social aspects, in half an hour. The incorrigible vanity of such a proceeding would be laughable if it were not sometimes so very mischievous. No; I must be content with the very pleasant memories of my ten weeks' American vision, during all of which I never heard an unkind word, or met an unfriendly person, and which will always warm my heart when I think of it, till it is chilled forever by that which cannot now be very far away. Of course, there were in America, as there are in all countries, things on which one might make unfavorable comment. But then I always said what I thought when I was in America, and did, now and then, presume to find fault a presumption which, as the Americans believed me to be a friend, they in no way resented. I said in fact the little I had to say, in your country, and kept back nothing to say of it after I had

left it."

The late Mr. Benjamin came near proving no exception to the rule that great lawyers are apt to make a mess of it in their wills. The Law Journal says: "It is to be observed that Mr. Benjamin declared his intention of living in Paris for the rest of his life, thus carefully precluding any question as to his domicile, which might easily have arisen, and occasioned much litigation. The testator having thus elected a French domicile at the time of his death, the question arose whether the will, which being a holograph, was duly executed according to French law, ought not to be proved in France. Under the act of 1861, known as Lord Cranworth's act, the will of a British subject wherever domiciled may be proved in England if executed according to the forms of the English law. The attestation clause, although not in the

portant reform.

It proposes to suspend the laws of the several States regulating commercial paper, and to substitute for them one law of the United States to govern such paper throughout the country. The importance of having one kind of commercial cannot be overrated. It would every year save a paper, as we now have one kind of bank notes, greatly facilitate the operations of inter-State comgreat amount of confusion and loss, and would

merce.

quire the assent of three-fourths of the States.
We suppose, of course, that it would re-

NOTES OF CASES.

IN Davis v. Lenawee County Savings Bank, Supreme

of 15 Rep. 50, 4

depositor in a savings bank opened a second account in the name of his wife, being told at the bank that he could not open two accounts in his own name. Upon his wife's death the bank refused to recognize his right to the deposit. Held, the fact

that an account stands in the name of another does not affect the depositor's rights to the depositor. The court said: "In the present case the testimony does not tend to show that the bank ever contracted with anybody but plaintiff, or received funds on this account which were not his funds. The case he made out, and which the jury must have found true, was that while deposited in his wife's name, it was not intended to be for her benefit, or to be beyond the husband's right to withdraw. Any idea of a gift to her was clearly negatived. Her name was only another form for his name, and so agreed. The bank-book is no contract, and is only one of the means of indicating the state of the funds. Whatever presumptions may arise from it, and whatever protection may be given to acts innocently done on that presumption, it can not exclude explanatory evidence. The contract was made with plaintiff, and with no one else, and the bank is answerable to him to fulfill that contract. There is no principle of law which makes the mere placing of money or property in another's name an irrevoc

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