to the panel, on the ground that they had just passed upon a similar case between the same plaintiff and others against the same defendant, for burning the grain of plaintiffs on the same day the fence was burned, and that they were not fair and impartial, but had formed and expresed an opinion. The court overruled the objection. Upon error the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, and in the opinion by Baldwin, J., say: "We do not see how the court could determine, in advance of the development of the facts, that the questions involved in this case were the same as in the case before tried by the jury. They might or might not have been. The opinion expressed or implied by the jury in their verdict was merely hypothetical. It was merely the conclusion they drew from the facts in evidence and the law given them in the charge in the particular case before them. It would be absurd to say that if they had rendered a verdict a year before, on facts before them going to establish, or which they supposed established, the liability of a steamer for acts of negligence, they could not now sit upon a case which might involve the same liability; and the question is not different merely because the first trial was immediately before the last. The jury could not possibly know what facts would be brought out in the case, nor what the argument of counsel would be, nor what the rulings of the court * * *If one plaintiff sues a sheriff for not making money on an execution, and the jury find for plaintiff, and if a dozen other plaintiffs should afterward sue for similar malfeasance it would scarcely be contended that a juror was incompetent in every case after the first." See also Com. v. Hill, 4 Allen, 591. Chariton Plow Co. v. Deusch. Opinion by Cobb, C. J.

[Decided Aug. 7, 1884.]

NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY.-G., a boy, between eleven and twelve years of age, while walking on a railroad track at a point where there was no thoroughfare, by accident stepped between the guard and main rail at a switch, and was unable to extricate his foot, and a switch engine being turned on to that line, ran over and crushed his foot. Held, that if the employees of the company, after becoming aware of the perilous condition of the plaintiff, by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care, could have prevented the injury, the company was liable. The rule is well settled that a party who is injured by the mere negligence of another cannot recover for the injury, if he by his ordinary negligence or willful wrong, proximately contributed to produce the injury complained of, so that but for his co-operating fault it would not have occurred, except where the proximate cause of the injury is the omission of the defendant, after becoming aware of the danger to which the plaintiff is exposed, to use a proper degree of care to avoid injuring him. Shear. & Red. Neg.,§ 25; C.,C. & R. Co. v. Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474; Brown v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 50 Mo. 461; Railroad Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. 679; Cooper v. Central R. Co., 44 Iowa, 134; Cooley Torts, 674; Trow v. Railroad Co., 24 Vt. 487; Isbell v. Railroad Co., 27 Conn. 393; Hicks v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 430. If therefore the employees of the defendant in charge of the locomotive, after being aware of the perilous condition of the plaintiff, did not exercise a reasonable degree of care to prevent the injury, the defendant cannot rely on the plaintiff's negligence to defeat the recovery. Burtnett v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided Aug. 6, 1884.]

ADMINISTRATOR LETTERS

ISSUED IN ANOTHER STATE-AUTHORITY.-A citizen and resident of this State died at his home in L. county owning property in this State and the State of Illinois. Letters of administration of his estate were granted by the Pro

bate Court of A. county, in Illinois, to the plaintiff in error, who applied to the District Court of L. county, in this State, for license to sell the real estate. Held, that such administrator had no authority as such in this State, and such license could be granted legally only to an administrator appointed by the Probate Court of L. county, in this State, that being the place of domicile of the deceased at the time of his death. It is a generally recognized legal proposition that the last place of domicile of the deceased is the place where letters testamentary or of administration must issue, and that the Probate Court of that place alone has ju risdiction. In Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 789, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the last domicile of the deceased determines the jurisdiction as to administration. See also Wells Juris., § 275. See also Creighton v. Murphy, 8 Neb. 356; S. C., 1 N. W. Rep. 138; Minkler v. Woodruff, 12 Neb. 270; S. C., 11 N. W. Rep. 296; Cadman v. Richards, 13 Neb. 386; S. C., 14 N. W. Rep. 159. McAnulty v. McClay. Opinion by Reese, J. [Decided Aug. 7, 1884.]

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE-PROOFS OF LOSS-"FORTHWITH "—¿UESTION FOR JURY, -Compliance as to giving notice and furnishing proofs of loss, is a condition precedent to recovery, when the loss is not payable until after such notice is given, etc., and such compliance must be alleged and proved; and a want of such allegations and proof can be taken advantage of under the general issue; it is not necessary to plead such defense specially. Edgerly v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 43 Iowa, 587; St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 11 Mo. 278; Inman v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 452; Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507; Mason v. Harvey, 8 Exch. 819. One required to give notice of loss "forthwith" must give such notice with due diligence and within a reasonable time. St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, and Inman v. Ins. Co., supra; Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v.Lewis, 18 Ill.553; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v.Scammou,100 Ill.644; S. C., 11 Ins. Law Jour. 614; Phillips v. Protec tion Ins. Co., 14 Mo. 220; Edwards v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 3 Gill, 176. And although the notice was given twenty-two days after the fire, it was held to bea question for the jury, whether given forthwith. The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Lockwood v. Ins. Co., 47 Conn. 553, say: "Extreme cases either way may be easily determined. Between them there is a wide belt of debatable ground, and cases falling within it are governed so much by the peculiar circumstances of each case that it is much better to determine the matter as a question of fact." Such being the rule, the defendant had no right to have the question passed upon as one of law, and his request was properly refused. But the refusal did not terminate the duty of the court in the matter. Whether the insured had given notice forthwith, was a point material to the decision of the case; without proof of that fact the plaintiff could not recover. There was evidence upon that point, and it was the duty of the court to charge correctly and fully whether requested to do so or not. Vaughan v. Porter, 16 Vt. 266. A party is entitled to such a charge as the facts in the case require. Hazard v. Smith, 21 Vt. 123. The County Court is always bound to charge the jury according to the rules of law whether specifically requested so to do or not. Redfield, J., in Buck v. Squiers, 23 Vt. 498; and see 16 id. 579; 28 id. 222; 39 id. 565; 40 id. 495. The plaintiffs claim that such notice may be waived; but a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The existence of such an intent is a matter of fact. First Nat. Bank v. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 22;

Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 98 Penn. 280; Dey v. Martin (Va.), 16 Rep. 443; but no question of waiver was brought into the case; had it been, and found against the defendant, there would have been no error in this point. Sup. Ct. Vermout. Donahue v. Ins. Co. Opinion by Taft, J. (56 Vt. 374.)

LIFE-POLICY-PREMIUM NOTE-WAIVER.-A policy of insurance was made September 4, 1879, to run five years, and a note taken for the premium due May 1, 1880. The policy contained a provision that if the note was not paid when due the policy should be void. In October, 1880, a loss occurred. The premium note was paid in April, 1881. Held, that the acceptance of the premium was a waiver of the forfeiture of the policy, and that the company was liable for the loss; that the policy was voidable, not void. Sup. Ct. Neb., May 27, 1884. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lansing. Opinion by Maxwell, J. (20 N. W. Rep. 22.)

FIRE-INTRODUCTION OF NEW PARTNER INTO FIRM AVOIDS.-The sale or transmutation of the various interests between partners themselves, and nobody else having the control, and leaving the possession where it was, does not invalidate the policy; but the introduction of a new partner, with an investiture of an interest in him which he did not have before, does invalidate the policy. Cir. Ct., D. Minnesota, June 26, 1884. Drennen v. London Assurance Corp. Opinion by Miller, J. (20 Fed. Rep. 657.)

FIRE-AUTHORITY OF AGENTS-WAIVER OF PROOFS OF LOSS.-Where the authority of agents of a fire insurance company consists of full power to receive proposals for insurance, to receive moneys, and to countersign, issue, and renew policies, subject to such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the company, and such instructions as may, from time to time be given by the management, they have authority to waive the immediate payment of premiums. Where an insurance company asserts) that a policy has been cancelled previous to a fire, it waives all right to insist that the policy has been forfeited because the proofs of loss came too late. Portsmouth Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 32 Grat. 613; Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Har. & J. 408; Graves v. Ins. Co., 12 Allen, 391; Nor. & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 561; Girard Co. v. Ins. Co. of New York, 97 Penn. St. 15; Bennett v. Ins. Co., 14 Blatchf. 422; 9 How. 196; May Ins., § 469. But whether there was, in this case, a complete waiver or not, it is quite clear, under the circumstances in proof, that the plaintiff should be held to be excused for the neglect, if neglect it was, to forward the proofs sooner. Cir. Ct., Dist. Ind., Feb., 1884. Ball, etc., Wagon Co. v. Aurora Fire and Mar. Ins. Co. Opinion by Woods, J. (20 Fed. Rep. 232.) FIRE-CONDITION-INCUMBRANCE-JUDGMENT IS.A. held a policy of fire insurance for $800 upon certain premises, issued in the usual form, and containing, inter alia, the following condition: "If after insur* the property * *shall be incumbered by judgment, mortgage, or otherwise * and the assured should neglect or fail to give written notice thereof, and pay such additional premium as the company shall determine, and obtain written consent of the company to a continuance of the policy, such insurance shall be void and of no effect." A. afterward gave a bond, with confession of judgment, and the same was entered of record without his knowledge, and without notice to or consent of said company. The condition of the bond was duly complied with, so that at no time could execution have issued upon the above judgment, held, that such judgment was an incumbrance upon the insured premises within the meaning of said policy and that upon a subsequent loss of the premises by fire there could be no recovery. The terms of the policy are not ambiguous, and do

ance

*

* *

*

*

not need construction; hence Insurance Co.v. Berger, 6 Wright, 285, and other cases cited have no application. The argument that the judgment was entered without the knowledge of the assured is without force. It was entered upon his confession, and he is chargeable with knowledge. A man who gives a judgment or mortgage knows that it may and probably will be placed on record. He may not have actual knowledge of the time of its enty, but the act is his, and he must be held responsible therefor. I am aware that it has been held in Green v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 517, and other New York cases, that mechanics' liens are not incumbrances within the

meaning of similar clauses in fire insurance policies. These cases however go upon the ground that the liens were not entered by the consent or procurement of the assured. These cases are not analogous, and do not apply. Sup. Ct. Penn., April 30, 1883. Hill v. Penn. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Paxson, J. [See 37 Am. Rep. 830; 28 Eug. Rep. 161.-ED.] (15 W. Notes, 43.

FIRE--CONDITIONS-WRITTEN AND PRINTED--CONFLICT CONSTRUED AGAINST INSURER.-Insurance being a contract of indemnity, policies must have a reasonable construction in view of that main intent of the parties, having reference to the particular nature and situation of the subject-matter insured. Where the reason of a general condition in a policy of insurance does not exist in a particular case, the condition itself becomes meaningless and inoperative. Where therefore a form of policy is used by an insurance company for the insurance of a peculiar kind of property, peculiarly situated, which policy contains general conditions which are inapplicable to the subject-matter of the insurance, such conditions will be ignored by the court in construing the contract. Where printed clauses in a policy of insurance conflict with written clauses therein, the former must yield to the latter. Harper v. Insurance Co., 22 N. Y. 443. If a policy of insurance be obscure in its meaning, it must be construed, as between the parties, most strongly against the insurance company which issued it. A. owned individually and owned in common with others a certain number of barrels of petroleum placed for transportation and storage in the Tidioute and Titusville Pipe Line, limited. To protect himself from loss by assessment in case of fire, he took out a policy of insurance for $2,500 on petroleum, "his own or held by him in trust for others." One of the printed conditions of said policy provided that "if the insured is not the sole, absolute, and unconditional owner of the property insured, then this policy to be void." An assessment having been made on A. for a loss from fire. Held, that the condition above set forth was not under the circumstances applicable, and that the insurance company was liable to the extent of the policy, upon all oil destroyed in which A. had any interest whatever. The company in the above case was not liable for the loss of oil in which A. had no interest but which the owners had in writing requested him to insure before the issuing of the policy in suit. See Insurance Co. v. Berger, 6 Wright, 285; Insurance Co. v. Mills, 8 id. 241; Hutchison v. Com., 1 Nor. 472. Sup. Ct. Penn., June 9, 1884. Grandin v. Rochester German Ins. Co. Opinion by Paxson, J. (15 Week. Notes, 1.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

LAW OF JUDGMENT DEBTS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

There are certain causes at work, especially in our large cities, which will result, it seems to us, sooner or later, in a great diminution of legal business. In the first place, nearly every large organization, like, for example, the New York Stock Exchange, has a private

tribunal, which consists of one or more arbitrators. Cases involving considerable amounts are thus disposed of in short meter outside of the court-room. In the second place, corporations are in active operation, such as collecting agencies, on a large scale, title companies to search titles and guarantee the result; bond companies to furnish guarantee bonds, etc. In the third place, the expensiveness of litigation prevents many an interesting legal contest; in the fourth place the slowness of such litigation, and lastly the state of the law and statutes in regard to the collection of debts.

We conceive this last to be a serious obstacle in the way of legitimate litigation. The legislation since 1840 has been all for the benefit of the debtor. An examination of the judgment docket in New York shows that millions upon millions of dollars are presumably justly due judgment creditors, not a cent of which has ever been collected. There should be some wholesome legislation in regard to the "wife racket," as it is facetiously called, by means of which a debtor may fail for half a million, may cause any amount of misery and suffering, and still live with his wife, in the same house, drive the same horses, enjoy the same social distinction which wealth brings, purely upon a fiction of law that his property, over which he exercises the same control, is really his wife's, and so cannot be reached.

A gentleman of large wealth said recently in our hearing: "I never sue a debt unless my lawyer can assure me that he can collect it. The result is that I have almost no litigation, my lawyer, who is unwilling to make experiments, and is extremely cautious, seldom assuring me of success."

We would suggest also a reform in the law of executions to sheriffs, by changing the limit of sixty days to six days, or even two days, within which an execution must be returned, satisfied or otherwise. The law as it stands now puts it in the power of a sheriff to first collect a good fee from the debtor for not levying, and then a bigger fee from the creditor for returning the execution within the sixty days, so that the creditor may take proper steps to secure himself, in case the execution is returned unsatisfied. Section 2436 of the Code is practically a dead letter, since it is next to impossible without an examination of the debtor to learn whether he has any personal property or not. Any reform measure directed to the better management of sheriff's offices would facilitate the collection of debts and increase legitimate litigation. A scheme by which the Civil Service Act could be applied to deputy sheriffs would be advisable. Deputies should pass an examination on languages, arithmetic, the Code of Procedure, collection of debts, law of contracts, etc., etc.; they should be paid a good salary, of say $1,500 a year; should be dismissed for intemperance; should be held rigidly to their duties; should be subject to heavy fine and imprisonment on proof of any receipt of money or thing of value from the debtor, except to be applied upon the judgment, and they should, if possible, be chosen from members of the bar. What young starying attorney but would be glad to be the recipient for the first three years of his admission to the bar of a salary of $1,500 a year? Instead of drunken loafers who have obtained their position through some political favoritism we would have a set of honest, active assistants in the collection of moneys due on judgLEX.

ments.

Albany R. Co., respondent; James Ferguson, appel-. lant, v. Fred B. Hubbell, respondent. Judgment of Supreme Court reversed, that of the Court of Sessions of Jefferson county affirmed-People, appellant, v. David Augsbury, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Johauna Voos, respondent, v. Second Avenue R. Co., appellant; Emma F. Temple and another, respondents, v. William D. Sammis, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs, but since the defect in the complaint is capable of correction, the plaintiff should have leave, upon costs of the demurrer, including those of the appeal to the General Term and to this court, to serve within twenty days from notice of entry of this judgment, an amended complaint in the action-Joseph F. Knapp, appellant, v. City of Brooklyn, respondent.-Motion to prefer granted without costs-David P. Newhouse, receiver, etc., respondent, v. Second National Bank of Oswego, appellant. -Motion to amend return denied, with $10 costs-Henry Stedeker, appellant, v. Henry O. Barnard, respondent. Motion to amend remittitur granted without costs-Moses May, respondent, v. Nelson Morris, appellant.--Motion to amend remittitur denied Mechanics and Traders' National Bank v. Mayor, etc., of New York, appellant; Bigelow Blue Stone Company and others, respondents.

WE

NOTES.

E find the following mixed metaphor in a recent volume of law reports. "No inclination is shown to cut loose from the safeguards and well settled rules which have been judicially established for the protection of trust estates, and to launch upon the open sea of speculation and peculation which some trustees and their agents have brought to the management of trust property." We did not know before that trust estates come within admiralty jurisdiction.

-We wish that somebody would send Mr. Justice Scott a supply of "thats." A writer whose style is otherwise good ought not to write: "The position taken on this branch of the case is much weakened by the consideration it appears from the averments of the plea itself the bringing of the defendant into the State * * * was," etc.-Although ducking female scolds has fallen into disuse, yet there are still some legal disadvantages in having the reputation of a scold. Thus in Tompkins v. Staw, Ohio Supreme Court Commission, Oct. 28, 1884 (6 Ohio L. J. 151), where T. claimed and had offered evidence to show that S., her brother, had agreed to furnish her a home as long as she lived, if she would act as his housekeeper, and 8. claimed that by the arrangement T. was to be his housekeeper only so long as they could agree or so long as they could get along together. Held, that it was competent for S. to prove that T. was a person of peevish, nervous, and disagreeable temper, and that none of her relatives who had tried to live with her could do so; and that these facts were known to S. when the arrangement to live together was made.―― In Boston a man has lately recovered $3,025 against the New York Central Railroad Company for injury to a Stradivarius bass viol. The instrument was pronounced by experts to be the only one of that maker they had ever seen.- -Corneilson, the lawyer who as saulted Judge Reid of Kentucky, inducing his suicide, and who was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment, it is said has disappeared. Let us hope he never will enter an appearance again. Canada Legal News sends us the first number of "The Montreal Law Reports," a new series, to be published in connection with that journal, containing decisions of the Superior Court, court of review, and courts of Queen's Bench. The number is very handsomely printed, and apparently well edited.

The

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, DECEMBER 27, 1884.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Bar Association, appointed to urge the rejection of the proposed Civil Code, reported by Mr. Field and his co-workers to the Legislature of this State. We venture to think that the City Bar Association did itself great credit in passing Mr. Vanderpoel's amendment striking the word "adopted" out of the resolution, thus virtually indicating a lack of confidence in the report by the special committee. The fact is that this report fully evinces that a few spirits in the New York City Bar Association propose to array themselves against the organic law of the State, and to oppose all codification; against the progressive spirit of the age, and against what we firmly believe to be the wishes of the majority of lawyers, both in and out of the city of New York, as well as against the hopes of the sentient non-legal portion of our political society. Every thinking person among us must concede that there is something fundamentally wrong in our judicial system, a system which some think does not keep

pace with the advancements either of science or of commerce. Many who feel thus look forward to codification of substantive law as likely in some measure to alleviate recognized evils. They think

the time has come when the inchoate revolution in old conceptions of legal administration should be accomplished. The codes of practice only began the work of reform; they fused the dual system of law and equity in so far as administration was concerned, but no abolition of these contradictory systems can be fully accomplished without a fusion of the principles of substantive law in a code of substantive law. This is not our opinion only, but the opinion of those whose lives have been spent in an exhaustive study of political science. As a legal organ, quite as independent of outside dictation as any member of the committee whose report lies before us, we believe that the signs of the times, and duty to our readers, justify and dictate the upholding of the principles we have enunciated, The report in question is not only reactionary, disputing as it does, through Professor Dwight, the obligation of any further codification whatever, but it is aggressive and decidedly hostile to Mr. Field as a competent codifier. Did we not think what we have already expressed, that the duty of codification is positively obligatory upon the Legisture and the exccutive of this State, and that Mr. Field's large experience, training and accomplishments render him the best exponent of accurate codification, we might have some sympathy with the efforts of the local committee at the southern end of the State. We do not however wish to ignore VOL. 30 No. 26

for codification. He denies by implication that the Constitution even authorizes codification, which conclusion if valid, would destroy every legislative tion. Surely this is a vagary, and not sound law. action, past and present, looking toward codifica

How can it be accounted for? It seems to us in this wise: Professor Dwight's whole active life has been practically the high one of an instructor, and no one can impeach his extraordinary faculty of imparting knowledge to unwilling youths, or youths with legal aspirations. But his vocation has been what the historian of philosophy, Lewes, characterizes as "an objective aim through subjective methods." Now an examination of law in the abstract has an inevitable tendency toward a reaction from codification. Abstraction has but one method of building up a jurisprudence, and that is the method which makes the perfect law conform

to the abstractions. If these abstractions are reduced by the jurist to form, or to a commentary on the existing state of the law, we may as well expect a camel to go through the eye of a needle as to expect the abstraction to be made all over again so as to conform to the revolutions of a revolutionary code. At this writing we have neither time nor space to give a more minute criticism of this practically rejected fourth annual report. It ends with a poem selected by Mr. J. Bleecker Miller as suitable to the solemn occasion. We give it verbatim:

"Plastering our swallow nests on the awful past,
And twittering round the works of larger men,
As we had builded what we but deface."

So say we!

He

Mr. J. Bleecker Miller is the most imaginative of men. He attributes lynching to codification. says: "In Ohio we have just seen the effects of a similar reaction against the effects of this system of wholesale, cheap codification; that State adopted a penal code in 1878; the increase of lynching in other States may be due to the same cause; the same results are to be expected in this State when the Penal Code shall have had time to make

itself felt. And if we adopt this Civil Code we will just as certainly have, first, a great increase of the power of rich and unscrupulous men, acting especially through corporations, and then a socialistic reaction, and a constitution as wild as that of California. Who will not hear must feel." Well,

The queen has commuted the sentence of the Mignonette cannibals to six months' imprisonment. The case involved a question of comparative horrors. It is horrible for a starving man to eat his fellow sufferer. It is also horrible to hang him for it. We think that the clemency of the crown was properly extended, but the prisoners would be more entitled to sympathy and to mercy if they had given their victim a chance for his life. It is a grim subject to legislate upon, but as experience shows that such cases do occasionally arise, would it not be well to compel the survivors of such catastrophes to give one another the chance of lot? Otherwise it will always turn out, as in this case, that might will make right. It was argued, to be sure, that the boy had no one depending on him, while the others had dependents. But then the boy had a natural right to have some one dependent on him in the future, and he had a natural right to live longer than the adults. It was a very selfish and cruel piece of business, this killing of the unresisting and helpless boy, and the killers get off well with this light punishment. The sentence might well have been heavier. It was no more than might have been imposed upon a starving man for stealing a loaf of bread. It would not have been amiss to make more distinction between a loaf and a life.

The right to eat is really getting to be a serious

business in the courts. Hardly have the Mignonette

cannibals been safely settled, when a case arises in this country. Mad. Scalchi, the famous contralto singer, sues Mr. Abbey, the manager, for salary. He defends on the ground that she refused to sing in The Prophet. She replies that he asked her too soon after breakfast, that term meaning a quarter past twelve; that she couldn't rehearse so soon after eating. And now the court is gravely and anxiously examining this question. The lawyers are looking into all the digests for precedents. But there was no disagreement of the jury. They agreed with the

woman.

Mr. R. Vashon Rogers, Jr., of Kingston, Canada, has put forth another of his clever little books. This is entitled "The Law and Medical Men," and is published by Carswell & Co., of Toronto. The "Dentists" was originally published in chapter on this journal. The book is characterized by the author's peculiar research and humor, and contains every thing that it is essential for medical men to know concerning their relations to the law. The case of Commonwealth v. Pierce, just decided in

tle " and "ram-cats" case of Thompson, is too recent for Mr. Roger's book. He might however well have included the English case of Latter v. Bradwell, 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 369, where the servant maid sued her master and mistress and a physician for compelling her to submit to a medical examination on the charge of pregnancy, and her reluctant submission was held to absolve the doctor.

The New York Daily Register, speaking of the recent charge and verdict in the Cleveland oil transis the condemnation of what are known as special The doctrine of the decision portation case says: rates. The railroad company favored the Standard Oil Company by charging it less for a carload transported than it did other shippers, and the plaintiff, who was compelled during a certain period to pay the railroad company some $5,000 more than the rates charged to the oil company during the same season would have amounted to, brought an action against the railroad company to recover back the excess. The defense insisted that it was allowable to charge a very large customer less than others, but the court held, that while it was allowable to

charge less rates in proportion for a large quantity than for a small, the charge for either must be uniform to all customers. It may be that a sliding scale could be adopted which might practically give a large customer a lower rate per load on a thousand loads than any shipper who had not so much to send could get the benefit of, and perhaps this would not be an infringement of the rule; but the rule itself is clear and its justice is plain. Whatever rate the company fix must be fixed for all alike." Special rates to large customers have been approved in several recent cases. See Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea, 609; S. C., 42 Am. Rep. 684: Concord and Portsmouth Railroad v. Forsaith, 59 N. H. 122; S. C., 47 Am. Rep. 181; Johnson v. Pensacola, etc., R. Co., 16 Fla. 623; S. C., 26 Am. Rep. 731. In the latter case the test was held to be the reasonableness of the remuner

ation, and it was held that the same price for all is not essential. These three cases will give the clue to all the adjudications.

Messrs. Sullivan and Greenfield, the pugilists, have triumphed over those craven spirits who would fain keep the peace. The jury have found that their fisticuffs were quite harmless-nothing like a "contention or fight.' To be sure, Professor Greenfica lost a little blood, but he said it was due to his own carelessness in running his eye against Professor Sullivan's head, and it satisfactorily appeared that if he was guilty of any offense it was only that of embracery. "Hugging" is a very serious offense among English barristers, but it does not count among men of science.