continue during the tenancy, and may be assigned or transmitted in any legal way (t). to rule as to estoppel. In some exceptional cases a defendant who has been let Exceptions into possession by the plaintiff, or has occupied the position of tenant to him, is not estopped from denying the plaintiff's title, for instance, if he has been let into possession under a lease which the plaintiff had no power to grant, and which is void, unless he has paid rent or done some other act acknowledging him as landlord (u). A person who has taken a conveyance of a freehold subject to a void lease is not estopped from ejecting the tenant under such lease as a trespasser (x). Though a tenant is estopped from disputing his landlord's right to demise or title to the reversion, he is not estopped from proving that the title of his landlord has expired, or has been merged or extinguished (y) since the date of the demise. He may show that his landlord was only a tenant for a term of years which has expired (≈); or that the original lessor was tenant for life and is dead (a); or that his landlord was tenant pur autre vie, and that the cestui que vie is dead (b); or that his landlord was a tenant from year to year, or at will, or on sufferance, and that such tenancy has been determined (c); or that his landlord was a mortgagor in possession, and that Tenant may show expiration of land lord's title. Eviction by title paramount. Expiration of landlord's title after the mortgagee has entered into possession and demanded the rent (d); or that the plaintiff has parted with his reversion by sale, mortgage, or otherwise (e); or has become bankrupt, and that the reversion has vested in his trustee (f). The tenant may prove that he has been evicted by title paramount, for that shows that the landlord's title has expired; the eviction must be actual and genuine, and without any collusion with the person who has evicted (g). If the plaintiff had a good title at the date of the writ, which has, however, expired before the trial, the defendant action begun. is estopped from setting up such expiration as a bar to the issue of a writ of possession (h); unless the defendant prove affirmatively that it would be futile to issue such a writ because someone else, and not the plaintiff, has a right to the possession (i). Estoppel when tenant acknowledges landlord's title after expiration. Estoppel o. landlord. If, however, the tenant has, after the expiration of the landlord's title, with knowledge of that fact, paid rent to him or otherwise acknowledged his title, he is estopped from showing that his title has expired (k); but he is not thereby estopped if he was ignorant of such expiration, or has been misled by his landlord on that point (l). As between landlord and tenant the estoppel must be (d) Doe v. Barton, 11 A. & E. 307; but see Delaney v. Fox, 2 C. B. N. S. 768. (e) Doe v. Watson, 2 Stark. 230; Doe v. Edwards, 5 B. & Ad. 1065; Agar v. Young, Car. & M. 78. (f) Doe v. Andrews, 4 Bing. 348. (g) Delaney v. Fox, 2 C. B. N. S. 768; Poole v. Whitt, 15 M. & W. 571. As to what amounts to an eviction, see post, p. 233. (h) Gibbins v. Buckland, 1 H. & C. 736; Buckland v. Gibbins, 32 L. J. Ch. 391; Knight v. Clarke, 15 Q. B. D. 294. (i) Knight v. Clarke, supra. See pp. 266, 278. (k) L. & N.-W. Rlwy. v. West, L. R. 2 C. P. 553. (1) Claridge v. Mackenzie, 4 M. & Gr. 143; Fenner v. Duplock, 2 Bing. 10; Doe v. Barton, 11 A. & E. 307. mutual; if the landlord is not estopped, neither is the tenant (m). The lessor (n), and all persons claiming through or under him (0), are estopped during the continuance of the demise from denying that he had any estate in the land, or that he had a right to dispose of the possession (p). A landlord is estopped from claiming to treat as his own tenant a person whom he has required to enter into that relationship with another instead of himself (q). A tenant is estopped from denying the title of his landlord to all the premises comprised in the demise, but he is not estopped from showing that the land sought to be recovered, or any part thereof, was never comprised in the demise at all (r). All encroachments made by a tenant during the continuance of his tenancy, upon adjoining waste or land of a stranger or of the landlord himself, are presumed to have been made on behalf of the landlord, and to have been held as part of the demised premises, and the tenant is estopped from setting up any title to such encroachments adverse to the title of his landlord (s). To raise this presumption it is not necessary that the encroached land should be contiguous or adjoining to, in the sense of conterminous with, the land held by the tenant under the (m) Howe v. Scarrott, 4 H. & N. 723. (n) Darlington v. Pritchard, 4 M. & Gr. 783. (0) Sturgeon v. Wingfield, 15 M. & W. 224; Trevivan v. Lawrance, 1 Salk. 276; Goodtitle v. Morse, 3 T. R. 365, 371. (p) Doe v. Oliver, 5 M. & Ry. 202; Doe v. Thompson, 9 Q. B. 1037, 1043; Right v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad. 278; see II. Smith's W.Y.E. L. C. 803 (9th ed.). (q) Downs v. Cooper, 2 Q. B. 256. (r) Doe v. Burt, 1 T. R. 70; Clark v. Adie, 2 App. Cas. 423, 435, per Ld. Blackburn. (s) Doe v. Jones, 15 M. & W. 580; Andrews v. Hailes, 2 E. & B. 349; Doe v. Tidbury, 14 C. B. 304; Lisburne v. Davies, L. R. 1 C. P. 259; Whitmore v. Humphries, L. R. 7 C. P. 1. D In respect of what premises estoppel operates. Encroach ments by tenant. demise; it is enough if it be so near thereto that it may be presumed that the position of the tenant, as such, enabled him to take it (t). This presumption is equally strong although the landlord has known of, and assented to, an encroachment upon his own land (u). This presumption, however, is one of fact in all cases, and may be rebutted by clear evidence that at the time of making the encroachment the tenant intended to make it as his own (x). No such presumption will be made against a person who, having made an encroachment, has subsequently become tenant of adjoining lands though they belong to the true owner of the encroachment; he will not be presumed to have held such encroachment as part of the subsequently demised land, or as tenant (y). (t) Lisburne v. Davies, L. R. 1 C. P. 259. (u) Whitmore v. Humphries, L. R. 7 C. P. 1. (c) See the cases in the three last notes, and Doe v. Rees, 6 C. & P. 610. (y) Dixon v. Baty, L. R. 1 Ex. 259; Berney v. Bickmore, 8 L. T. 353. A NOTICE to quit is a certain reasonable notice required by law, by custom, or by special agreement, to enable either a landlord or a tenant, without the consent of the other, to determine certain tenancies. Tenancies, which require a notice to quit to determine them, would never determine unless such notice was given, but would pass to the representatives on the death (a), or bankruptcy (b), of landlord or tenant. Nature of a notice to qui!. as to notice Where there is any express agreement as to the notice Agreement to be given by either party in order to determine the to quit. tenancy, such notice must be given and will be sufficient (c); the terms of the agreement as to notice must be strictly complied with (d). The length of such notice, and the time at which it must expire, will depend upon the terms (a) Birch v. Wright, 1 T. R. 378; Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159; Doe v. Wood, 14 M. & W. 682. (b) Doe v. Ridout, 5 Taunt. 519; Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), ss. 54, 55. (c) Doe v. Baker, 8 Taunt. 241; Doe v. Raffan, 6 Esp. 4; (d) Cadby v. Martinez, 11 A. 475. |