a clause avoiding the policy in case the insured shall die in the "known violation of law," these words do not extend to mere trespasses against property or other infringements of civil laws to which no criminal consequences are attached. render belief, after examination, in the existence of a lode, knowledge of the fact. There may be difficulty in determining whether such knowledge in a given case was had, but between mere belief and knowledge there is a wide difference. The court could not make them synonymous by its charge and thus in effect incorporate new terms into the statute. Knowledge of the existence of a lode or vein within the boundaries of a placer claim may be obtained from its outcrop within such boundaries; or from the developments of the placer claim previous to the application for a patent; or by the tracing of the vein from another lode, or perhaps from the general condition and developments of mining ground adjoining the placer claim. It may also be obtained from the information of others who have made the necessary explorations to ascertain the fact, and perhaps in other ways. We do not speak of the sufficiency of any of these modes, but mention them merely to show that such knowledge may be had without making hopes and beliefs on the subject its equivalent. As well observed by the court, when the case was here before, it is better that all questions as to what kind of evidence is necessary, and we may add sufficient, to prove the knowledge required by the statute, should be settled as they arise." 1. Cluff 7. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 308. "Violation of law,' as used in this policy, means crime; and 'known violation of law' indicates a voluntary criminal act." Cluff v. Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 317. Such a policy is not avoided, if the assured was killed after retreating from an altercation which he had commenced under circumstances which would make the slayer guilty of felonious homicide. Hayer's Admr. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506, where the court said: "It is obvious that, in giving the words of the condition a literal meaning, cases will be embraced which no one will maintain were in the contemplation of the parties. If the person whose life is insured uses offensive language to one whilst they are engaged in unlawful game of chance, an 12 C. of L.-34 For the word which language is concerning the game, and he is shot down for the provocation, it would not be maintained that he died in the known violation of law, within the meaning of the contract. So, if he is riding a race in a public highway, which is forbidden, and his horse falls and he is thrown and his neck broken, he does not die in the known violation of a law of the land, within the meaning of the terms of the condition. So also in a quarrel, if he assaults another with his open hand, and is thereupon instantly shot down, he does not die in the known violation of a law, within the intent of the policy. Many similar instances might be put which, it is clear, were not within the meaning of the parties, and if they were, the contract would be much narrowed in its operation. So, a killing in self-defence is not a "known violation of law." Overton v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 Mo. 122. In Bradley v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. 45 N. Y. 422 (s. c., 6 Am. Rep 115), the court say: "The supreme court of this State, whose decision is now under review, do not agree to the interpretation given to the proviso by the courts of Massachusetts and Missouri, and a difference of opinion exists between the members of this court as to whether the proviso applies only to violations of the criminal law, or whether it embraces all illegal acts of such a character as to lead to violence. But, independently of that question, and whatever be the nature of the violation of law urged by the insurance company, as avoiding the policy, it seems to be clear that a relation must exist between the violation of law and the death, to make good the defence; that the death must have been caused by the violation of law to exempt the company from liability. It cannot be the true meaning of the proviso that the policy is to be avoided by the mere fact that, at the time of the death, the assured was violating the law, if the death occurred from some cause other than such violation." And see dis. op. of Grover, J. So in Cluff . Ins. Co., 13 Aller. (Mass.) 318, it is said: "He must have received the mortal wound during and 529 in other connections see note I. while engaged in the commission of a crime, not merely in consequence of it afterwards. 1. Where a statute excepts from the offence of bigamy the case of one marrying a second time whose husband or wife has been absent for seven years and "shall not have been known" by such person to be living within that time, a finding by the jury that they had no evidence of defendant's knowledge, but were of opinion that she had the means of acquiring knowledge if she had chosen to make use of them, was held not to sustain a conviction. Reg. v. Briggs, Dears. & B. 98. As to facts which render the owner of a vessel "known" to one having a lien against it, see Story v. Buffum, 8 Allen (Mass.) 35. defendant had knowledge of such intemperate habits; and they may infer guilty knowledge on his part from the fact that he had good reason to believe that such were the habits of that person; but this is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not a presumption of law to be brawn by the court. Smith v. State, 55 Ala. 1. "Not known or used before the application," in the patent law, means "not known or used by the public." Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 1. So, in Plimpton v. Malcolmson, 3 Ch. D. 555, it is said: "It was decided, and now, therefore, is the legal sense and meaning of the statute, that he was a first and true inventor within the statute if the invention, being in other respects novel and useful, was not previously known in this country-known' being used in that particular sense as being part of what had been called the common or public knowledge of the country." Quoted in Re Avery's Patent, 56 L. T., N. S. 327. "Personally Known."Where the formula prescribed for the acknowledgment of deeds is "personally appeared "Known creditors," in a statute providing that commissioners on the insolvent estates of deceased persons shall give notices of meetings to all "known creditors," means creditors known to the exectuor or administrator, and not merely those known to the commissioners. Davis' Appeal, 39 Conn. 395. "Known Equivalent."-Where one before me employs known devices which in mechanics are recognized as proper substitutes for the devices used by a patentee to effect the same results, this is an infringement of the patent. "In this sense the mechanical devices used by the defendant are known substitutes or equivalents for those employed in the Morley machine to effect the same result; and this is the proper meaning of the term 'known equivalent,' in reference to a pioneer machine such as that of Morley. Otherwise a difOtherwise a difference in the particular devices used to accomplish a particular result in such a machine would always enable a defendant to escape the charge of infringement, provided such devices were new with the defendant in such a machine, because, as no machine for accomplishing the result existed before that of the plaintiff, the particular device alleged to avoid infringement could not have exexisted or been known in such a machine prior to the plaintiff's invention." Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U. S. 263. "Known Intemperate Habits."-To authorize a conviction for selling liquor to a person of such habits, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence that the with whom I am personally acquainted," etc., an officer's Where a justice took an acknowledgment of the assignment of a mortgage, stating that the assignor was to him "personally known to be the identical person" whose name was signed to the 66 KNUCKLES.-See BRASS KNUCKLES. LABELS-Definition. In the construction of the act of June 18th, 874, ch. 301, 3, 18, stat. 79, the words "engraving," "cut," and, print," shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations and works connected with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright law, but may be registered in the patent office.1 If the label is published prior to its registry in the patent office, it is void.2 instrument, and the assignment proved to be a forgery, it was held that he was not liable on his official bond to a purchaser relying upon the validity of the assignment. Wyllis v. Hann, 47 Ia. 614. DAY, J. (concurring in part), said: "The statute requires that the certificate of acknowledgment shall state that the person making the acknowledgment was personally known to the person taking it. The statute does not require acquaintance. A mere introduction would not make one acquainted with the person introduced. Acquaintance is familiar knowledge, a state of being acquainted, or of having intimate, or more than slight or superficial, knowledge, as I know the man, but have no acquaintance with him. See Webster's Dictionary. No arbitrary time after an introduction can be fixed which will justify a person in saying I know that man. Whilst the statute requires the officer to state that he personally knows the person making the acknowledgment to be the person whose name is affixed to the instrument, yet he is not liable civilly and criminally, from the simple fact that the statement turns out to be untrue. In order to create this liability the false statement must be knowingly made; that is, the officer must certify that the person was personally known to him, when he knows that he was not personally known to him. If an officer, from all the circumstances, has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that he personally knows a man, then he cannot know that he does not know him. It is impossible that a man should really believe a fact to exist, and at the same time know it not to exist." 1. Trade Mark Can be Registered as a Label. The several acts of congress regarding the registration of a label containing matter which might be registered as a trade mark do not exclude from registration a label containing matter which might be registered as a trade mark; nor does the fact that a label bears such distinguishing marks as entitle it to registration as a trade mark, exclude it from registration as a label, if the owner desires it to be registered as such. Whether the commissioner of patents is to regard it as one or the other depends entirely on the will of the owner. U. S ex rel. Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Marble, 1 Mackey (Sup. Ct. D. C.) 284; s. c., 22 Pat. Office Gaz. 1366. The rule in the patent office is the opposite. Shumacher v. Exlinger, 22 Pat, Office Gaz. 1291. What Cannot be Registered as a Label.-A single letter not descriptive. Lorrilard v. Dolean. A device consisting of a single horseshoe, though it might be registered as a trade mark. Lorrilard v. Drummond Tobacco Co., 22 Pat. Office Gaz. 1208. Falsely Marking Label "Copyrighted." Marking an article copyrighted which could be registered as a label but could not be and was not copyrighted, does not make the person so marking liable to the penalty for falsely marking "copyrighted." Contained in section 4963 Revised Statutes. Because neither the right of another can be impaired or the public deceived. Rosenbach 7. Dreyfuss, 17 O. G. (Pat. Office U. S.) 1153; s. c., 2 Fed. Rep. 217. 2. Marsh v. Warren, 13 Pat. Office Gaz. 7; s. c., 24 Pittsb. L.J. 207; s. C., 14 Blatchf. (C. C.) 263. What Is Publication.-The use of a label on bottles containing a certain compound, held publication of label. Marsh v. Warren, 13 Pat. Office Gaz. 7; s. c., Pittsb. L. J. 207; s. c., 14 Blatchf. (C. C.) 263. What Can be Registered as a Label.Printed balloons, intended to be cut apart and manufactured into balloons, are not pictorial illustrations connected with the fine arts, but may be prints or labels designed to be used for another manufacture. Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss, 1 LABORER. -A servant in husbandry or manufacture, not living intra mania (within the walls). One who labors in a toilsome occupation; one who gains a livelihood by manual toil; one who depends on hand work, not on head work, for a living.2 for a living.2 Most of the decisions respecting the word arise upon statutes giving liens or priorities to various classes of workmen. See LIENS and le cognate titles; DOMESTICS; DEBTS OF DECEDENTS.3 17 O. G. (Pat. Office U. S.) 1153; s. c., 2 Fed. Rep. 217. 1. Wharton's Law Lex.; In re Meason, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 167. Contractors and sub-contractors are not "laborers" within meaning of statute giving right of action for labor debts. Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Sturgis (Mich.), 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 619. Word "labor" construed to mean those who perform manual labor, and not members of engineer corps or assistant general manager. Peck v. Rust (Wis.), 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 642. 2. Anderson's Dictionary of Law. In Pennsylvania and Del. R. Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. St. 168, a lien was denied to a civil engineer who claimed under statutes giving the same to contractors, laborers and workmen on railroad and other internal improvements by corporations. GORDON, J., said: "Worcester defines a laborer to be 'one who labors; one regularly employed at some hard work; a workman; an operative; often used of one who gets a livelihood at coarse manual labor, as distinguished from an artisan or professional man.' In like manner a workman is defined as 'one who works; one employed in any labor, especially manual labor.' So, if we consult the older English statutes, as that of 1 Jac., ch. 6, which provides that the statute of 5 Eliz. shall extend to the rating of all laborers, weavers, spinsters, or workwomen, either working by the day, week, month or year, or taking any work by the great, or otherwise,' we cannot doubt but that the terms laborers' and 'workmen' were intended to include only such as were engaged in manual occupations." See also Re Ho King, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 438; Caraker v. Mathews, 25 Ga. 571. In Pennsylvania, the word has been construed in favor of an architect who was employed not only to make plans and specifications, but also to direct and oversee. Bank of Pa. v. Gries, 35 Pa. St. 42. But it has been held not to include an architect who simply provides plans and specifications. Price v. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 47. There is perhaps a conflict as to whether laborer applies to architects who superintend the building. Like Bank v. Gries have been decided: Mulligan v. Mulligan, 18 La. An. 20; Knight v. Norris, 13 Minn. 473: Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Rowand, 26 N. J. Eq. 389, 397; Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50, reversing 10 Hun (N. Y.) 18. Contra, Foushee v. Grigsby, 12 Bush (Ky.) 75. Ames v. Dyer, 41 Me. 397, was a case of moulds for a ship. In Raeder v. Bensberg, 6 Mo. App. 445, the building was erected under the builder's superintendence. The architect was denied lien. The court neither approves nor condemns the cases cited above. Overseer of a plantation is not a laborer. Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. Car. 340. An overseer employed for a year was held to be entitled to exemption, as a mechanic or laborer, from attachment and garnishment of his wages. Caraker v. Mathews, 25 Ga. 571. 3. A Chinese actor or theatrical performer is not a "laborer" within the treaty with China of November 17th, 1880, or the statute, in aid of such treaty, of May 6th, 1882, and therefore he may come to and reside in the United States at pleasure. Ho King, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 438 (1883). As to immigration of Chinese laborers, see act of congress of October 1st, 1888, 25 United States Statutes at Large, that title in index. Joinder of Miner's Liens.-An action to foreclose liens for labor on a mining claim of forty acres, which is a part only of defendant's entire property may be joined with other claims against the entire tract. Malone v. Big Flat Gravel Co., 76 Cal. 578; s. c., 18 Pac. Rep. 772. In this case the various placer claims all adjoined each other, with a ditch as a backbone, and were operated as one mine. See p. 582. LACHES (See also SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; TRUSTS). tions, 555. 5 Fulfilment of Condi [556. 6. Bankruptcy and Poverty, 7. Absence from State, 557. 8. Sickness, 558. 9. Pendency of Suit, 558. 10. Negligence of Attorney, 559. 11. Recognition of Right, 559 12. Delay by Agreement of Parties, 559. 13. Act of Defendant, 560. 14. Negotiations for Compromise, 561. 15. Waiver of Objection, 561. 16. Continuing Influence, 561 VI. Application Dependent on Circumstances, 562. VII. Laches of Sovereign Power, 562. VIII. Laches of Municipal Officers, 565. IX. Laches of Ancestors and X. Executed and Executory In- XI. Continuing Obligations and XII. Limited Estates, 568. XV. Statute of Limitations, 570. 582. XXI. Breaches of Copyright, 582. XXII. Corporate Matters, 583. 1. Subscription to Stock 583. 2. List of Contributors, 585. 3. Breaches of Duty, 586. XXIII. Decedents' Estates, 559. 1. Accounting, 589 2. Suits by Legatees and Distributees, 591. 3. Breaches of Duty by Executors, 593. 4. Suits by Creditors Against Executors, 594. 5. Suits to Charge Heirs and Legatees, 594. XXIV. Breach of Condition Subsequent in Death, 597. XXV. Claims for Dower, 597. XXVI. Setting Aside Fraudulent Conveyances, 598. XXVII. Fraud, 600. 1. General Principles, 600. XXVIII. Guardian's Accounts, 605. XXX. Suits to Set Aside Judg- XXXI. Quieting Title and Removing Cloud, 606. XXXII. Equitable Title to Land, 606. XXXIII. Interest, 608. XXXIV. Costs, 608. XXXV. Evidence, 609. XXXVI. Pleading, 609. I. DEFINITION.-Laches is such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with lapse of time more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.1 1. 2 Abb. Law Dict. 2; Anderson's Brown's Law Dict. 301; 4 Jac. Law Law Dict. 593; 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 40; Dict. 67. |