Statement of the Case. to indorse upon the same the date of presentation, and this warrant shall bear interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum from and after the date of such presentation and indorsement until paid. Charge Mississippi and Mexican Gulf Ship Canal Company. (Signed) J. G. BROWN, Administrator of Accounts. Presented for payment June 6, 1876. (Signed) E. PILSBURRY, Administrator of Finance. (Indorsed) W. VAN NORDEN, Transferee. See Record, p. 109. And this warrant (a specimen copy of the others sued on, see agreement, page 213 of Record), together with the acknowledgment of presentation by said administrator of finance on the 6th day of June, 1876, was duly offered in evidence in the Circuit Court, as will fully and conclusively appear from complainant's note of evidence taken down by the clerk of said Circuit Court, in open court, to be found on page 205 of this record, item 2d, at the bottom of said page, which reads as follows: 2d. Complainants offer in evidence the drainage warrants sued in this case Nos., together with the presentation of said warrant at the bottom of each. And thus interest at 8 per cent per annum from June 6, 1876 (date of presentation), until paid, was specially set up and prayed for in an amendment to the bill of complaint, duly allowed by the court. See Record, pp. 184 and 185. We therefore submit, that it is perfectly clear that interest, under the contract of the parties, is to be computed from the date of presentation of the warrants on June 6, 1876, and that such presentation for payment was made on that date, is proved by the warrant itself and the indorsement of presentation thereon, and there is not even an intimation of any proof to the contrary, or any absence of the proof here contended for. Statement of the Case. And that the holders of drainage warrants are entitled to interest at 8 per cent per annum from June 6, 1876, has been decided as follows: The suit of Peake v. New Orleans, 139 U. S., p. 342, was based on a judgment at law rendered on warrants issued under the same statute, where interest was allowed at 8 per cent per annum from the date of presentation, and this court, at page 349 of said report, said this judgment was undoubtedly correct. A like judgment at law was rendered on warrants of James Jackson, where interest was allowed from June 6, 1876 (date of presentation for payment to said administrator of finance). See the record of this case, pages 360 to 363. And like judgments at law have been rendered on warrants of the same class here sued on allowing interest from the date of said presentation until paid. And in the efforts of holders of drainage warrants to collect the same, they have always been diligent. Record, pp. 114, 122, 126 (still pending and undisposed of by agreement of counsel), 142, in addition to protracted litigations in the state courts. The matter of the date from which interest was to be computed was not specially considered in our brief, because appellant (petitioner) made no complaint as to this part of the decree, the assignment of error merely setting up want of power in the city to make any contract for interest. We perhaps should have noted the date of demand of presentation with more particularity in our brief. We submit, however, that the decree should be amended so as to allow the interest complainant is entitled to, and he prays that a limited rehearing be granted and that the decree entered may be amended so as to allow interest from June 6, 1876. Respectfully submitted, RICHARD DE GRAY, WILLIAM GRANT. Solicitors for Complainant and Respondent. Syllabus. We certify the foregoing petition is in our opinion well founded and is not made for the purpose of delay. RICHARD DE GRAY, WILLIAM GRANT. Mr. Richard De Gray, Mr. William Grant and Mr. J. D. Rouse filed a brief supporting the petition. Mr. Samuel L. Gilmore and Mr. Branch K. Miller, solicitors for the city of New Orleans, filed an opposing statement. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. On motion for a rehearing upon briefs filed, and upon an affidavit of the death of the petitioner, John G. Warner, on March 21, 1899, it appearing in this case that the court overlooked the fact that the drainage warrants, which formed the basis of this suit, were duly presented for payment on June 6, 1876, it is Ordered that the decree heretofore entered in this case be, and is hereby, vacated and set aside, and that a new decree be entered nunc pro tunc as of March 13, 1899, affirming the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals in all respects. THE NEWFOUNDLAND. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. No. 156. Argued November 8, 6, 1899. Decided January 15, 1900. The question in this case is as to the adequacy of the proof offered on behalf of the Government and the captors to show that the Newfoundland was trying to violate the blockade of Havana, and the court is of opinion that it does not attain to that degree which affords a reasonable assurance of the justice of the sentence of forfeiture in the court below —that it raises doubts and suspicions and makes probable cause for the capture of the ship and justification of her captors, but not forfeiture. VOL. CLXXVI-7 Opinion of the Court. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. W. Theodore G. Barker for appellants. Mr. G. A. R. Rowlings was on his brief. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for appellee. Mr. Joseph K. McCammon and Mr. James H. Hayden, for the naval captors, were on his brief. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. The Newfoundland, a British steamship, was seized off the coast of Cuba on 19th July, 1898, by the United States ship of war Mayflower, on the ground that she was trying to violate the blockade of Havana. She was sent to Charleston, South Carolina, and there libelled with her cargo as prize of war. Testimony was taken in preparatorio, and the court determined it to be insufficient for condemnation, and on motion of the attorney for the United States ordered further proof. Upon that proof a decree was entered condemning and forfeiting the ship and cargo, and they were ordered to be sold. From the decree this appeal is prosecuted. The assignments of error may be reduced to two contentions: 1. That the court erred in making an order for further proof because the testimony taken in preparatorio afforded no legal foundation for doubt, or proof of any overt act to justify the condemnation of the ship. 2. That the additional testimony taken still left the evidence insufficient for condemnation. (1.) Of the testimony taken in preparatorio the court said: "Taking the testimony which alone is now before the court, there is nothing in it which shows or tends to-show that the Newfoundland, at the time of capture or at any other time, was heading for the port of Havana or any other port." And further: "So far as its examination has extended, no case has been found where a sentence of condemnation was passed upon such a state of facts as is presented in this record. How far Opinion of the Court. short the cases cited fall in showing cause for .condemnation, the circumstances hereinabove recited demonstrate. These circumstances do no more than create a suspicion that there was an intention to enter a Cuban port in violation of the blockade; but suspicion, however well founded, is not proof, and cannot be accepted in any court in place of evidence. "There must be some overt act denoting an attempt to do the thing forbidden, some fact in addition to the proved intention to commit the infraction, which shows that the unlawful intent is persisted in and is being carried into execution. "As this court has in a recent case had occasion to remark, the testimony in preparatorio rarely affords opportunity for such proof. From the master's testimony it appears that Commander Mackenzie informed him that he had information, through a letter from the American consul at Halifax, that the Newfoundland sailed with intention to run the blockade. The court can form no opinion as to the probable weight of such testimony. It also appears that Commander Mackenzie thought the movements and conduct of the Newfoundland on the night of the capture suspicious. The court has personal acquaintance with Commånder Mackenzie, and knows that in character, intelligence and attainments he is the peer of any officer of the navy; but, highly as it values his opinion, it cannot accept it in lieu of proof; it furnishes ground for ordering further evidence." It is urged by counsel for appellants that the court, therefore, based its order for further proof upon Commander Mackenzie's opinion, which, even if otherwise competent, was not in evidence. We, however, do not so interpret the remarks of the court. It is explicitly stated that the circumstances created a suspicion of an intention on the part of the ship to enter a Cuban port, but that the suspicion was insufficient for condemnation without some proof in addition showing an overt act, which, as testimony in preparatorio rarely afforded, further proof was ordered. This was not an abuse of discretion, and is clearly within the ruling of The Sir William Peel, 5 Wall. 517, 534. In that case the court said the preparatory proof, which con |