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ported by the national Congress, which is a body recognized by the Constitution, and is an effort toward the re-establishment in the country of a regular and constitutional government. You are mistaken when you say "the Chilians sympathize with it." No such thing. It desires peace in common with the whole country, but it will not sacrifice the national honor nor will it cede territory in order to obtain it. Chili desires and asks for Tarapaca, and it will recognize the government which agrees to its cession. The Calderon government will not cede it. It remains to be seen whether that of Piérola will prove more pliable. Meanwhile, under the system inaugurated in Ayacucho and carried into practice by the prefects, the Peruvians themselves are worse enenies of the Peruvians than are the Chilians, and the efforts of the friends of Peru are paralyzed by their internal dissensions. When the United States asks Chili why it does not arrange peace, the answer is given that in Peru there is no government with which to treat. Would it not be better to put an end to this state of affairs, and that all true Peruvians should unite to support a chief of the state whom all parties and factions would join in supporting for the purpose of saving the country from imminent ruin, restoring peace, and the orderly and pacific reign of the Constitution and laws? S. A. HURLBUT.

A. GARCIA Y GARCIA, Esq., Ayacucho. The first public intimation of the views of our Government in regard to the ineffective negotiations for peace between President Calderon and the Chilian representatives was conveyed in the following communication from Minister Hurlbut to General Patrick Lynch, commander of the Chilian forces in Peru, sent in September, and here given in a translation from the Spanish original:

MR. ADMIRAL: With the object of preventing any misunderstanding as to the conversation I held yesterday with you in regard to the existing state of affairs between Peru and Chili, I thought it would be better to put in writing what I then stated. Without referring to the cause of the war, I understand the opinion of my Government to be, that all the legitimate objects of the war were realized by the disastrous defeat of the Peruvian armies, the capture or destruction of its vessels, and the occupation of the capital and all the coast. When all organized and formidable resistance has disappeared, the state of war should cease. The victory of Chili is so complete that peace is a necessity for the national existence of Peru, and it is to the interest of both countries to adjust a peace as speedily as possible. Commerce and the rights of neutrals have suffered enough, and the large interest owned in Peru by foreigners (many of whom are Americans) should not, for a longer time, be exposed to an unnecessary prolongation of the war. I must also declare that, although the United States recognize all the rights acquired by the conqueror in accordance with the law of civilized warfare, they disapprove of war which has territorial aggrandizement in view, or the violent dismemberment of a country, unless as a last resource, and in consequence of supreme emergency. As a frontier question has never arisen between Peru and Chili, because the two countries do not adjoin, and because Chili has publicly and officially repeatedly denied any intention or design to forcibly annex territory, we are clearly of the opinion that such a proceeding now would be incompatible with the dignity and public faith of Chili, and that it would be calamitous to the future tranquillity of both countries, perpetuating a serious grievance which would constantly lead to trouble. The United States admit as a principle of public right that Chili possesses the right (in consonance with the code of war) to a complete indemnity for the costs of the war, and that Peru should pay such indemnity as might be agreed on by the two parties, or determined by

disinterested arbitration, in the event of disagreement and such means becoming necessary, should a time be stipulated for the payment. But we are also openly of the opinion that Peru should have the opportunity, with full and free discussion of the terms of peace, of offering said indemnity in a satisfactory shape, and that it is contrary to the rules which should prevail among civilized nations to proceed at once, and as a sine qua non condition, to incorporate into Chilian jurisdiction territory which is undoubtedly Peruvian, without having previously proved the incapacity or unwillingness of Peru to meet the indemnity in some other forin. Such conduct on the part of Chili would meet with the most decided disapprobation on the part of the United States. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the act of taking possession of Peruvian territory and annexing it to Chili, whether it be executed simply by force of arms or similarly dictated as an imperative condition of a cessation of hostilities, in open contradiction to former declarations of Chili in this respect, will be justly considered by other nations as an evident sign that Chili has adopted an aggressive and conquering policy for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement. The United States desires, above all things, that peace should exist among the South American republics, and that commerce and industry should jointly serve to the development of their wondrous resources, to their advantage and to the benefit of the world at large; and we can not see any good reason why the state of war should be further prolonged, to the serious detriment of such rightful interests, nor can we see any well-founded cause why peace, under just conditions, should not be brought about, within a short time, without any unnecessary humiliation on the one part, and to the entire satisfaction of all legitimate claims on the other. S. A. HURLBUT. To Rear-Admiral the Hon. PATRICK LYNCH,

The publication of this memorandum occasioned no little excitement on the west coast. Among Peruvians it was believed to portend a forcible interference in their behalf by the United States, and the wildest rumors were soon afloat. By Chilians, on the contrary, Minister Hurlbut's letter was condemned as undiplomatic and improper in form and unwarrantable in tone. The excitement extended

to official circles, and Señor J. M. Balmaceda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, addressed a note on the subject to General Kilpatrick, the United States Minister to Chili. The Chilian Minister expressed his opinion that the declarations of Mr. Hurlbut's memorandum were not the "expression of the circumspect, have observed toward the belligerents in the noble, and loyal policy which the United States Pacific... . The strange publicity given to Mr. Hurlbut's document," the Minister further stated, "compels me to direct myself to your Excellency in order to obtain an answer which shall officially re-establish the truth and the sincerity of the relations which our respective governments honorably cultivate. The speech which Mr. Hurlbut pronounced on presenting his credentials to the now extinct Government. of Garcia Calderon; the memorandum directed to Admiral Lynch, when diplomatic matters were not under discussion; his well-known letter against Piérola, to whom Mr. Christiancy was accredited, and whose plenipotentiaries debated in Arica, in presence and with full consent of the United States, may tend to produce

deplorable perturbation, and to inspire the enemy with vain hopes, or to promote resistance which can not effect the end of the war, but must render it more sanguinary." In reply, General Kilpatrick categorically contradicted his Lima colleague. He wrote:

In the first place, allow me, your Excellency, to assure you in the most emphatic manner that the Chilian Government has nothing to fear either from the intentions or the attitude my Government will assume with respect to the war in the Pacific. The Government of the United States has never interfered officiously in the affairs of other countries, even when its own interests were compromised, and much less would it do so when only the interests are involved of friendly nations, with respect to which no motive can exist which should lead us to favor either one or the other of them. I had read the memorandum of Mr. Hurlbut, also the speech delivered by him at his reception by President Garcia Calderon, both documents having been forwarded to me from Lima, and by me at once brought to the knowledge of my Government. The first of these documents can not be considered of official or diplomatic character, as its author remarks in the note of which your Excellency forwards me a copy. The instructions given me by my Government are certainly the same as those sent to Mr. Hurlbut, and it can be affirmed with certainty that they do not coincide in their spirit with that which predominates in the document referred to by your Excellency. The instructions from Mr. Blaine, the Secretary of State, can not bear a double meaning, and so certain is this, and such confidence was felt in the intelligence, justice, and generosity of the Government of Chili, that I was authorized to place them before his Excellency the President of this Republic, or his Ministers, if a moment should arrive when I might deem it advisable so to do. In order to dispel all doubts from the mind of your Excellency as to the attitude of my Government respecting the conditions of peace between Chili and Peru, and its determination not to interfere in the question, I have no hesitation in here copying a paragraph from those instructions, and which runs as follows: "Since the Arica conference closed, the war has terminated with the complete success of Chili, and with what may be considered little less than the conquest of Peru. This Government can not persuade itself to believe that the offer of friendly intervention in the question now pending would be agreeable to the Chilian Government. But I am certain that Government will appreciate the natural and profound interest which the United States feels in the termination of a situation which is so calamitous in its consequences to the best interests of the South American republics. The Government of Chili should also be aware that, if at any time the interposition of the good offices of this Government can contribute to the reestablishment of friendly relations, the United States would promptly offer such interposition on the desire for such being manifested." These instructions also say: "In all conversations connected with this matter which may be held with members of the Government of Chili, you must conform to the known ruling of international law, and that under no circumstances shall you officially offer any advice to the Government of Chili which shall not previously have been solicited by it." Another clause refers to the provisional government of Señor Garcia Calderon, which the Washington Cabinet hoped to see established, and instructs me to encourage it only in a manner becoming the dignity and neutrality of a plenipotentiary without interfering in any manner which might appear officious. It appears to me that these extracts from the instructions given me by my Government will suffice to convince your Excellency that there is no intention on the part of my Government to interfere arbitrarily in the contest in the Pacific, and that its actions and conduct proceed from a friendly nation, which endeavors to act in the most delicate manner. I con

scquently trust that the Government of your Excellency will continue to retain faith in the ancient and ship has been of so many years' duration, and which traditional policy of the United States, whose friendnever was more faithful nor intimate than at present.

The republication in this country of the memorandum addressed by Minister Hurlbut to General Lynch and General Kilpatrick's letter to Señor Balmeceda, together with the intimation that Mr. Hurlbut was preparing a rejoinder to the statements in General Kilpatrick's letter which reflected on him, furnished the text for a large number of newspaper articles, in which both ministers were severely censured for the unseemly controversy in which they had engaged. In order that the public might understand the relation of the State Department to a dispute in which the consistency and harmony of its instructions to our Ministers in South America had been called in question, Secretary of State Blaine, on December 11th, furnished for publication copies of the following documents, of which only unessential portions are here omitted:

1.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, May 9, 1881.

I. P. Christiancy, Esq., etc., Lima.

SIR: In your last dispatch you informed this department that the Chilian Government refused absolutely to recognize General Piérola as representing the civil authority in Peru, and that Señor Calderon was at the head of a Provisional Government. If the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru, and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government, with a view both to domestic order and negotiation with Chili for peace, you may recognize it as the existing Provisional Government, and render what aid you can by advice and good offices to that end. Mr. Elmore has been received by me as the confidential agent of such Provisional Government. JAMES G. BLAINE.

[NOTE.-In pursuance of the above, Mr. Christiancy, on June 26th, formally recognized the Calderon Government several weeks in advance of the arrival of General Hurlbut.]

II.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881.

Stephen A. Hurlbut, Esq., etc.

SIR: The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country, render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as I would desire. Judging from the most recent dispatches from our Ministers, you will probably find, on the part of the Chilian authorities in possession of Peru, a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the Provisional Government which has been attempted by Señor Calderon. If so, you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the negotiation of peace. To attain this end it would be far better to accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome, than, by demanding too much, to force the continuance of the military control of Chili. It is hoped that you will be able, in your necessary association with the Chilian authorities, to impress upon them that the more liberal and considerate their policy, the surer it will be to obtain a lasting and satisfactory settlement.

The United States can not refuse to recognize the rights which the Chilian Government has acquired by the successes of the war, and it may be that a cession of territory will be a necessary price to be paid for peace. It would seem to be injudicious for Peru to declare that under no circumstances could the loss of territory be accepted as the result of negotiation. The great objects of the provisional authorities of Peru would seem to be to secure the establishment of a constitutional government, and, next, to succeed in the opening of negotiations of peace, without the declaration of preliminary conditions as an ultimatum on either side. It will be difficult perhaps to obtain this from Chili, but, as the Chilian Government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of conquest, the Government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to a cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States will go in Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilian Government to consent that the question of cession of the territory should be the subject of negotiation, and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall commence.

If you can aid the Government of Peru in securing such a result, you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. Whether it is in the power of the Peruvian Government to inake any arrangements at home or abroad, singly or with the assistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the required guarantee, you will be better able to advise me after you have reached your post. As you are aware, more than one proposition has been submitted to the consideration of this Government, looking to a friendly intervention by which Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which would probably be imposed. Circumstances do not seem at present opportune for such action; but if, upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this Government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, the Government of the United States would be willing to tender its good offices toward the execution of such a project. As a strictly confidential communication, I inclose you a copy of instructions sent this day to the United States Minister at Santiago. You will thus be advised of the position which this Government assumes toward all the parties to this lamentable conflict. JAMES G. BLAINE.

...

III.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881.

Judson Kilpatrick, Esq., etc.

SIR: The unfortunate condition of the relations between Chili and Peru make the mission upon the duties of which you are now entering one of grave responsibility and great delicacy. Difficult as would be any intervention of the United States under ordinary circumstances, our position is further embarrassed by the failure of the conference at Arica, undertaken at our suggestion. It is evident from the protocols of that conference that Chili was prepared to dictate and not to discuss terms of peace, and that the arbitration of the United States upon any questions of difference with the allied powers of Peru and Bolivia was not acceptable and would not be acceptable by the Chilian Government. Since that time the war has closed in the complete success of Chili, and in what can scarcely be considered less than the conquest of Peru and Bolivia. . . . But I am sure the Chilian Government will appreciate the natural and deep interest which the United States feels in the termination of a condition so calamitous in its consequences to the best interests of all the South American republics. It should also know that, if at any time the interposition of the good offices of this Government can contribute to the restoration of friendly relations between the belligerent powers, they will, upon proper intimation, be

promptly offered. While, therefore, no instructions are given you to tender officially any advice to the Government of Chili which is unsought, you will, on such opportunity as may occur, govern your conduct and representations by the considerations to which I shall now call your attention.

Without entering upon any discussion as to the causes of the late war between Chili on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other, this Government recognizes the right which the successful conduct of that war has conferred upon Chili, and in doing so I will not undertake to estimate the extent to which the Chilian Government has the right to carry its calculation of the indemnities to which it is entitled, nor the security for the future which its interests may seem to require. But, if the Chilian Government, as its representatives have declared, seeks only a guarantee of future peace, it would seem natural that Peru and Bolivia should be allowed to offer such indemnity and guarantee before the annexation of territory, which is the right of conquest, is insisted upon. If these powers fail to offer what is a reasonably sufficient indemnity and guarantee, then it becomes a fair subject of consideration whether such territory may not be exacted as the necessary price of peace. But at the conclusion of a war, avowedly not of conquest but for the solution of differences which diplomacy had failed to settle, to make the acquisition of territory a sine qua non of peace, is calculated to cast suspicion on the professions with which war was originally declared. It may very well be that at the termination of such a contest the changed condition and relation of all the parties to it may make readjustment of boundaries or territorial changes wise as well as necessary; but this, where the war is not one of conquest, should be the result of negotiation and not the absolute preliminary condition on which alone the victor consents to negotiate. At this day, when the right of the people to govern themselves, the fundamental basis of repubfican institutions is so widely recognized, there is nothing more difficult or more dangerous than the forced transfer of territory, carrying with it an indignant and hostile population, and nothing but a necessity, proved before the world, can justify it. It is not a case in which the power desiring the territory can be accepted as a safe or impartial judge.

While the United States Government does not pretend to express an opinion whether or not such an annexation of territory is a necessary consequence of this war, it believes that it would be more honorable to the Chilian Government, more conducive to the security of a permanent peace, and more in consonance with those principles which are professed by all the republics of America that such territorial changes should be avoided as far as possible; that they should never be the result of mere force, but, if necessary, should be decided and tempered by full and equal discussion between all the powers whose people and whose national interests are involved. At the present moment the completeness of the victory of Chili seems to render such a diplomatic discussion impossible. The result of the conflict has been not only the defeat of the allied armies, but the dissolution of all responsible government in Peru. Its soil is occupied, the collection of its revenues transferred to the conqueror, and its executive, legislative, and judicial functions are in abeyance. It can neither enforce order within nor assure peace without. An effort, and apparently a very earnest and honest one, has been made to create a provisional governinent which shall gradually restore order and the reign of law. But it is obvious that, for such a government to succeed in obtaining the confidence, either of its own people or of foreign powers, it must be allowed a freedom and force of action which can not be exercised while Chili holds absolute possession and governs by military authority. This Government, therefore, has been glad to learn from its Minister in Chili, whom you succeed, that the Chilian authorities have decided to give their support to the efforts of Señor Calderon to establish on a steady foot

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