ing disturbed or detained. In general, every vessel may pass freely without any distinction, exclusion, or preference of nationalities or persons, on payment of the dues and under observance of the rules established by the privileged company for the use of the said canal and its dependencies. Exception is made of foreign troops, who may not pass without the permission of Congress, and ships of the nations at war with the United States of Colombia, who have not previously acquired the right of passage in all times by treaty stipulations guaranteeing the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama and the territory where the canal is excavated, as well as the immunity and neutrality of the same canal, its ports, bays, dependencies, and adjacent seas." Article XXI of the same contract declares that the grantees, or whoever in future may succeed to their rights, "may transmit them to other capitalists or financial societies, but it is absolutely forbidden to cede or hypothecate them to any foreign nation or government." A violation of this prohibition would forfeit all the rights granted.

Article XXXV, of "a general treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce between the United States and the Republic of New Granada," which was concluded at Bogota, December 12, 1846, ratifications of which were exchanged at Washington, June 10, 1848, which is still in force, runs as follows:

The United States of America and the Republic of New Granada, desiring to make as durable as pos

sible the relations which are to be established between

the two parties by virtue of this treaty, have declared solemnly and do agree to the following points: For the better understanding of the preceding articles it is and has been stipulated between the high contracting parties that citizens, vessels, and merchandise of the United States shall enjoy in the ports of New Granada, including those of the portion of Granadian territory generally denominated the Isthmus of Panama, from its southernmost extremity until the boundary of Costa Rica, all the exemptions, privileges, and immunities concerning commerce and navigation which are now, or may hereafter be, enjoyed by Granadian citizens, their vessels, and merchandise; and this equality of favors shall be made to extend to the passengers, correspondence, and merchandise of the United States in their transit across the said territory from one sea to the other. The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama, upon any modes of communication that now exist or may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States, and for the transportation of any articles of produce, manufactures, or merchandise of lawful commerce belonging to the citi

zens of the United States; that no other tolls or charges shall be levied or collected upon the citizens of the United States, or their said merchandise, thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by the Government of New Granada, or by authority of the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon and collected from the Granadian citizens; that any lawful produce, manufactures, or merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States thus passing from one sea to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be liable to any import duties whatever, or, having paid such duties, they shall be entitled to

drawback upon their exportation; nor shall the citizens of the United States be liable to any duties, tolls, or charges of any kind to which native citizens are not subjected for thus passing the said isthmus; but, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensation for said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this treaty, the United States guarantees positively to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed to any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantees in the same manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory, etc.

For a better understanding of the subject, and of the discussions relating thereto, it is necessary also to recall the provisions of the agreement between the United States and Great Britain, concluded April 19, 1850, and ratified the same year, known as the ClaytonBulwer treaty. One purpose of this compact was to secure a surrender of all British pretensions to possession or authority in Central America. It was also intended to promote the construction of an interoceanic canal at Nicaragua, to protect it when constructed, and to secure its neutrality. The two governments declared that "neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America." It was further agreed, in the first article of this treaty, that neither the United States nor Great Britain would "take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance, connection, or influence that either may possess with any state or government through whose territory the said canal may pass, for the purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other." Provisions follow defining the privileges which the two governments shall have in case of war; engaging to protect any parties that might undertake the construction of the canal under the authority of the local governments "from unjust detention, confiscation, seizure, or any violence whatsoever "; and agreeing to use influence to induce the governments having authority over the territory to be traversed แ "to facilitate the construction of the said canal by every means in their power," and to secure the establishment of a free port at each end of the said canal. The governments further agreed to protect the canal when completed, and to guarantee its neutrality, to the end "that the said canal may for ever be open and free, and the capital invested therein secure."

This protection might be withdrawn on six months' notice, in case the persons operating the canal made unfair discriminations against either party to the agreement, or imposed oppressive exactions or unreasonable tolls. The contracting parties further engaged "to invite every state with which both or either have friendly intercourse, to enter into stipulations with them similar to those which they have entered into with each other, to the end that all other states may share in the honor and advantage of having contributed to a work of such general interest and importance as the canal herein contemplated." They agreed, also, to enter into the necessary stipulations with Central American states for the promotion and safety of the enterprise, and promised to give their support and encouragement to such persons or company as should first offer to carry it out under certain specified conditions. All this related to a canal by way of Nicaragua; but in the eighth article of the treaty the two governments entered into the following stipulation:

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain, having not only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection by treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama. In granting, however, their joint protection to any such canals or railways as are by this article specified, it is always understood by the United States and Great Britain that the parties constructing or owning the same shall impose no other charges or conditions of traffic thereupon than the aforesaid governments shall approve of as just and equitable; and that the same canals or railways, being open to the citizens and subjects of the United States and Great Britain on equal terms, shall also be open on like terms to the citizens and subjects of every other state which is willing to grant thereto such protection as the United States and Great Britain engage to afford.

The attitude of the United States Government toward the Isthmus canal, in view of the

provisions of these treaties and the presumed interests of the nation, has been the subject of much serious consideration during the year. President Hayes, in his last annual message, had reiterated the opinion that "it is the right and duty of the United States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus

that connects North and South America as will protect our national interest." In December, 1880, the following resolution was offered in the House of Representatives by Mr. Crapo, of Massachusetts, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs:

Resolved, That the construction of an interoceanic canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by means of foreign capital under the auspices of or through a charter from any European government, is hostile to the established policy of the United States, is in violation of the spirit and

declaration of the Monroe doctrine, and can not be sanctioned or assented to by this Government; that trol and supervision over any interoceanic canal as the United States will assert and maintain such conmay be necessary to protect its national interests and means of defense, unity, and safety, and to advance the prosperity and augment the commerce of the Atlantic and Pacific States of the Union.

The committee gave the subject prolonged consideration, listening to arguments from various quarters, and, toward the end of the session, made a report, in which they reviewed the "Monroe doctrine" and its purpose and application, closing as follows:

Your committee, therefore, as an affirmation of the America, and that as a notice to all the world that the Monroe doctrine, believe that Americans must rule United States, cherishing a friendly spirit to all nations, will adhere to strict neutrality in all transatlantie affairs, and expect a like non-interference in all American affairs, whether on the northern or southern or western hemispheres, we recommend the adoption of the following resolutions:

That the establishment of any form of protectorate by any one of the powers of Europe over any of the independent states of this continent, or the introduction from any quarter of a scheme or policy which would carry with it a right to any European power to interfere with their concerns or to control in any other manner their destiny, or the transfer to any such power by conquest, cession, or acquisition, or in any other way, of those states or any portion thereof, is a measure to which the Government is opposed, and which, should the attempt be made, it will regard and treat as dangerous to our peace, prosperity, and safety.

That the construction of any public works connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific by any European government or power, whether the same be constructed at Panama or elsewhere, would be in violation of the spirit and letter of the Monroe doctrine, and could not be sanctioned by the Government of the United States.

That should a canal be constructed across the Ist:mus of Panama, or elsewhere, this Government will insist that it shall not be under the control of any European government or power; that it shall be free to the commerce of the world, on equal terms, and that no discrimination shall ever be made against the United States in peace or war.

That the President be requested to take the steps necessary and proper for the abrogation of any existing treaties whose terms are in conflict with this declaration of principles.

The session came to a close without the

adoption of this report, or any discussion of the resolution.

. Before the close of President Hayes's Administration, negotiations were opened by the Secretary of State with Santo Domingo Vila, a commissioner of the Colombian Government, for the adoption of a protocol to the treaty of 1846, with a view to securing the exercise of an exclusive guarantee of the neutrality of the canal by the United States. This instrument, which was reputed to be the work of Mr. Deichman, the American Minister to Colombia, and supposed to have the approval of the government to which he was accredited, provided that the United States might establish forts, arsenals, and naval stations at the Isthmus of Panama, the sites to be agreed upon by the two governments. No force was to be kept there in time of peace, except for the

purpose of maintaining these forts and stations in order. It was agreed that United States ships of war and convoys should pass the canal in time of peace without payment of toll. In case the neutrality of the canal should be threatened, the United States would be at liberty to take possession of it by means of ships of war and troops, and the Government of Colombia would co-operate in such military and naval occupation. Ships of war and military expeditions of other nations should have no right to pass in time of peace, but the United States of America and the United States of Colombia might permit the innocent use of the route for such purposes. Colombia agreed to enter into no negotiations concerning the canal, and to make no alteration of the rules and regulations governing it, without the accord of the United States. This protocol was very generally denounced in Colombia, and failed to receive the approval of the Senate of that nation.

The general subject of the relation of the Government to the canal enterprise appears to have received the early consideration of the new Administration. On the 24th of June Mr. Blaine, the Secretary of State, addressed a circular letter of instructions to the American Ministers at the principal courts of Europe, in which he set out with the statement that it had "fallen under the observation of the President, through the current statements of the European press and other usual channels of communication, that the great powers of Europe may possibly be considering the subject of jointly guaranteeing the neutrality of the interoceanic canal now projected across the Isthmus of Panama." The United States, he said, recognized the necessity of a proper guarantee, but it had been abundantly provided for in the treaty with New Granada, concluded in 1846. He maintained that the United States had assumed the obligations and responsibilities of this guarantee, and was prepared to carry it out, and that nothing more was needed.

The copy of the letter, addressed to Mr. Lowell at London, directed him to bring the treaty of 1846 to the attention of Lord Granville, and to "intimate to him that any movement in the sense of supplementing the guarantee contained therein would necessarily be regarded by this Government as an uncalled-for intrusion into a field where the local and general interests of the United States of America must be considered before those of any other power, save those of the United States of Colombia alone, which has already derived, and will continue to derive, such eminent advantages from the guarantee of this Government." In re-enforcing this position, Mr. Blaine dwelt upon the policy of the United States in refraining from all complication with the affairs of Europe, and declared that European nations were equally bound not to interfere with affairs on the American Continent. The United States claimed no exclusive privileges and no

discrimination in its favor in the commercial use of the canal, but would "insist upon her right to take all needful precautions against the possibility of the isthmus transit being in any event used offensively against her interests upon the land or upon the sea." The extent of her possessions and interests on the Pacific coast made the projected canal at Panama virtually a part of her coast-line, and “as truly a channel of communication between the Eastern and far Western States as our own transcontinental railways." Reverting to the guarantee contained in the treaty of 1846, the Secretary said: " Any attempt to supersede that guarantee by an agreement between European powers, which maintain vast armies and patrol the sea with immense fleets, and whose interests in the canal and its operation can never be so vital and supreme as ours, would partake of the nature of an alliance against the United States, and would be regarded by this Government as an indication of unfriendly feeling. It would be but an inadequate response to the good-will we bear them, and our cheerful and constant recognition of their own rights of domestic policy, as well as those resulting from proximity or springing from neighborly interests."

This communication was made public in the latter part of October, and excited some criticism in London. The "Times" made use of the following language:

No one will question the right of the United States to take precautions so that the canal shall not be used in any way hostile to them. So far as Mr. Blaine's letter is an argument for the neutrality of the canal, it is unanswerable; but we fail to see why there should be any repugnance to allow England or France to join in a guarantee, and why it should be contended that an efficaciously perfect neutrality was provided by the treaty with Colombia. Mr. Blaine's assumption that the American possessions on the Pacific coast would supply the larger part of the traffic which would seek advantage of the canal, is very questionable. Indeed, it scarcely admits of doubt that the great bulk of the vessels which for some years to come would pass through the canal would be English. At all events, the dues paid by the American mercantile marine, in its present unhealthy state, are not likely to form at an early date a considerable part of the shareholders' receipts. Great though the interests of America are in this matter, and necessary though it is for her that there should be free communication between her Atlantic and Pacific States, this does not

trace the fact that England also is at once an Atlantic and Pacific power, and that she is bound to have regard for the welfare of her subjects in British Columbia, and to think of securing free access to her Australian colonies. The neutralizing of the canal would be for the benefit of all the states in the world, and we fail to gather from this communication any solid objection to allowing European powers to join in a work universally desirable. Every additional guarantor would strengthen the guarantee. Every new party to the treaty would be a fresh security that the canal would not be blockaded or used as a basis for hostile operations in time of war; and it seems a little inconsistent in one and the same breath to argue for a guarantee, and to insist that the bill shall not be

backed by more than two names. Were England to concede formally that she had no locus standi in regard to such a guarantee, it would be difficult for her to reply to any American statesman who might choose to say hereafter: "The governments of the two re

publics are alone parties to the treaty. What they have made they can tear up. The neutrality of the canal is for the time suspended." It seems, to say the least, to be an unhappy use of language to describe the sincere co-operation of the European governments in a common object as of the nature of an alliance against the United States. Any statement hereafter made by Mr. Lowell, of the views of his government in regard to the matter, which has almost ceased to be purely a matter of abstract politics, will command attention, but he must expect to find Englishmen quite unprepared to see any great difference between the position of Nicaragua and that of Panama; and at a loss to conceive what injury American interests could suffer from a general compact to secure the neutrality of a pathway which, in the interests of the whole world, should be placed outside of the region of warfare.

The "Daily News" said:

There probably never was a time when all the European powers were more thoroughly well disposed toward America than now. Mr. Blaine's arguments, therefore, are certain of a patient and, indeed, of a friendly hearing; but as a piece of logic the circular can hardly be considered by his best friends to be very powerful. By the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, America recognized the propriety of what she now regards as an intrusion. All great commercial countries will be deeply interested in the Panama Canal. The maritime powers will be under strong temptations in time of war to violate its neutrality. Their signatures to the guarantee will consequently be absolutely necessary, unless the United States are prepared to take upon themselves an enormous responsibility. Perhaps the most unfortunate suggestion of the circular is that the proposed guarantee would be in the nature of an alliance against America. It is impossible to see how a purely peaceful convention can be an alliance against anybody unless it involves exclusion. It is unnecessary to say that nobody proposes to exclude the United States from the benefit of the proposed neutrality. It is to be hoped that the matter will take a different turn from that suggested in the circular, which must surely have been issued under some misconception.

The "Pall Mall Gazette" contained the following remarks:

It can not be doubted that Mr. Blaine's circular was not actuated by any historical policy, but by the fear that an international guarantee might interfere with the arrangement by which the United States and Colombia reserved to themselves the right to pass their men-of-war and troops through the canal at all times, while providing that the canal should be closed to nations at war with either contracting party. The expedient of America for securing her interest in the Panama Canal by negotiating a treaty by surprise with a small, weak state is not much happier than the British purchase of Suez Canal shares, which aimed at a similar object. European powers might legitimately hesitate to commit the virtual command of one of the very greatest commercial routes in the world to one very strong power and one very weak one. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty may be usefully employed to call to recollection America's former and wiser frame of mind.

Under date of November 19th, Secretary Blaine addressed a communication to Minister Lowell, in which he proposed to the British Government certain modifications of the agreement of 1850, known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. He argued that that convention was made "under exceptional and extraordinary conditions which have long since ceased to exist-conditions which at best were temporary in their nature, and which can never be

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reproduced." The interests of her Majesty's Government, he urged, were insignificant, while those of the United States were paramount, and had been greatly enhanced since the negotiation of the treaty, on account of the development of its possessions on the Pacific coast. Moreover, the effect of the agreement was to give Great Britain a virtual power of control. The insular position of the home Government," he said, "with its extended colonial possessions, requires the British Empire to maintain a vast naval establishment which, in our continental solidity, we do not need, and in time of peace shall never create. If the United States binds itself not to fortify on land, it concedes that Great Britain, in the possible case of a struggle for the control of the canal, shall at the outset have an advantage which would prove decisive, and which could not be reversed, except by the expenditure of treasure and force. The presumptive intention of the treaty was to place the two powers on a plane of perfect equality with respect to the canal; but in practice, as I have indicated, this would prove utterly delusive, and would, instead, surrender it, if not in form, yet in effect, to the control of Great Britain. The treaty binds the United States not to use its military force in any precautionary measure, while it leaves the naval power of Great Britain perfectly free and unrestrained, ready at any moment of need to seize both ends of the canal and render its military occupation on land a matter entirely within the discretion of her Majesty's Government. The military power of the United States, as shown by the recent civil war, is without limit, and, in any conflict on the American Continent, altogether irresistible. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty commands this Government not to use a single regiment of troops to protect its interests in connection with the interoceanic canal, but to surrender the transit to the guardianship and control of the British navy. If no American soldier is to be quartered on the Isthmus to protect the rights of his country in the interoceanic canal, surely-by the fair logic of neutrality-no war-vessel of Great Britain should be permitted to appear in the waters that control either entrance to the canal." He proceeded to disclaim, in behalf of the United States Government, any disposition to adopt an aggressive policy, but maintained that its interests required that it should control the shortest and most convenient route of communication by water between the two shores of its territorial domain, citing the policy of Great Britain in regard to the route to India by way of the Mediterranean and Red Seas through the Suez Canal, as furnishing a parallel to that proposed by the United States.

Great Britain (he continued) appreciates the advantage, and perhaps the necessity, of maintaining, at the cost of large military and naval establishments, nation with hostile intent is compelled to take the the interior and nearest route to India, while any longer route and travel many thousand additional

miles through dangerous seas. It is hardly conceivable that the same great power, which considers herself justified in taking these precautions for the safety of a remote colony on another continent, should object to the United States adopting similar but far less demonstrative measures for the protection of the distant shores of her own domain, for the drawing together of the extremes of the Union in still closer bonds of interest and sympathy, and for holding, in the quiet determination of an honorable self-defense, the absolute control of the great water-way which shall unite the two oceans, and which the United States will always insist upon treating as part of her coast-line. If a hostile movement should at any time be made against the Pacific coast, threatening danger to its people and destruction to its property, the Government of the United States would feel that it had been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful toward its own citizens, if it permitted itself to be bound by a treaty which gave the same right through the canal to a war-ship, bent on an errand of destruction, that is reserved to its own navy, sailing for the defense of our coast and the protection of the lives of our people. And as England insists, by the might of her power, that her enemies in war shall strike her Indian possessions only by doubling the Cape of Good Hope, so the Government of the United States will equally insist that the interior, more speedy, and safer route of the canal shall be reserved for ourselves, while our enemies, if we shall ever be so unfortunate as to have any, shall be remanded to the voyage around Cape Horn.

A consideration of controlling influence in this question is the well-settled conviction on the part of this Government that only by the United States exercising supervision can the Isthmus canal be definitely, and at all times, secured against the interference and obstruction incident to war. A mere agreement of neutrality, on paper, between the great powers of Europe might prove ineffectual to preserve the canal in time of hostilities. The first sound of a cannon in a general European war would, in all probability, annul the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic position of the canal, commanding both oceans, might be held by the first naval power that could seize it. If this should be done, the United States would suffer such grave inconvenience and loss in her domestic commerce as would enforce the duty of a defensive and protective war on her part, for the mere purpose of gaining that control which, in advance, she insists is due to her position and demanded by her necessities. I am not arguing or assuming that a general war, or any war at all, is imminent in Europe, but it must not be forgotten that within the past twenty-five years all the great powers of Europe have been engaged in war-most of them more than once. In only a single instance in the past hundred years has the United States exchanged a hostile shot with any European power. It is in the highest degree improbable that for a hundred years to come even that experience will be repeated. It consequently becomes evident that the one conclusive mode of preserving any Isthmus canal from the possible distraction and destruction of war, is to place it under the control of that government least likely to be engaged in war, and able, in any and every event, to enforce the guardianship which she will assume. For self-protection to her own interests, therefore, the United States, in the first instance, asserts her right to control the Isthmus transit; and, secondly, she offers by such control that absolute neutralization of the canal, as respects European powers, which can in no other way be certainly attained and lastingly assured.

Another reason given for the modification of the treaty was, that since 1850 other European nations had extended their commercial connections with South America, and an agreement between the United States and Great

Britain alone could no longer serve the purpose originally contemplated. It was now sought "not only to free the United States from unequal and inequitable obligations to Great Britain, but also to empower this Government to treat with all other nations seeking a foothold on the Isthmus, on the same basis of impartial justice and independence." The modifications proposed were as follows:

1. Every part of the treaty which forbids the United States fortifying the canal and holding the political control of it, in conjunction with the country in which it is situated, to be canceled.

2. Every part of the treaty in which Great Britain and the United States agree to make no acquisition of territory in Central America to remain in full force. As an original proposition, this Government would not admit that Great Britain and the United States should be put on the same basis, even negatively, with respect to territorial acquisitions on the American Continent, and would be unwilling to establish such a precedent without full explanation. But the treaty contains that provision with respect to Central America, and if the United States should seek its annulment it might give rise to erroneous and mischievous apprehensions among a people with which this Government desires to be on the most friendly terms. The United States has taken special occasion to assure the Spanish-American republics to the south of us

that we do not intend and do not desire to cross their borders or in any way disturb their territorial integrity, and we shall not willingly incur the risk of a misunderstanding by annulling the clauses in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which forbid such a step with Central America. The acquisition of military and naval stations necessary for the protection of the canal and voluntarily ceded to the United States by the Central American States is not to be regarded as a violation of the provision contained in the foregoing.

3. The United States will not object to maintaining the clause looking to the establishment of a free port at each end of whatever canal may be constructed, if England desires it to be retained.

4. The clause in which the two governments agreed to make treaty stipulations for a joint protectorate of whatever railway or canal might be constructed at Tehuantepec or Panama has never been perfected. No treaty stipulations for the proposed end have been suggested by either party, although citizens of the United States long since constructed a railway at Panama, and are now engaged in the same work at Tehuantepee. It is a fair presumption, in the judgment of the President, that this provision should be regarded as obsolete by the non-action and common consent of the two governments.

5. The clause defining the distance from either end of the canal where, in time of war, captures might be made by either belligerent on the high seas, was left incomplete and the distance was never determined. In the judgment of the President, speaking in the interest of peaceful commerce, this distance should be made as liberal as possible, and might with advantage, as a question relating to the high seas and common to all nations, be a matter of stipulation between the great powers of the world.

In conclusion, the Secretary said:

In assuming, as a necessity, the political control of whatever canal or canals may be constructed across the Isthmus, the United States will act in entire harmony with the governments within whose territory the canals shall be located. Between the United States and the other American republics there can be no hostility, no jealousy, no rivalry, no distrust. This this project for its own advantage, which is not also Government entertains no design in connection with for the equal or greater advantage of the country to be directly and immediately affected. Nor does the