any one, would make the farmers of Ireland, in large numbers, owners of their holdings, and which would give to those who had to continue tenants, fixity of tenure at a fixed rent, and, of course, as a natural consequence, the right of free sale. (See GREAT BRITAIN.)

LANE, JOSEPH, born December, 1801, in North Carolina; died April 19, 1881, in Oregon, aged eighty years. In 1802 his father settled in Kentucky, and in 1821 Mr. Joseph Lane became a resident of Indiana. His talents and ability were so marked that in one year after his settlement in the State he was sent to the Legislature, and, in one House or the other, continued to serve until 1846. He then resigned his seat in the State Senate, and at the head of an Indiana regiment went to the Mexican War. After a time he was appointed brigadier-general, and at the famous battle of Buena Vista commanded the left wing of the American army. After his recovery from a wound received in that battle, he returned to the army, and defeated Santa Anna at Huamantla, following up the victory shortly afterward with the capture of important posts. On the 22d of November, 1847, he took the town of Matamoros, with a quantity of military stores. At the end of the war he was brevetted majorgeneral, and in August, 1818, was appointed by President Polk Governor of Oregon, from which office he was removed by President Taylor. On the admission of Oregon into the Union he was made United States Senator, and in 1860 was put on the same presidential ticket with John C. Breckenridge, being the nominee of one of the wings of the Democracy for Vice-President. His defeat ended his prominent political career. Though he bore so illustrious a part in the war with Mexico, the gratitude of his country was never manifested by a pension or other mark of sympathy, and only a year before his death he declined an invitation to attend a reunion of Mexican veterans, because he was too poor to make the journey. With the modest dignity of true selfreverence he accepted his obscure old age in the Oregon village, where he calmly passed away from the scenes and affairs amid which he had long endeavored to make his life useful to his fellow-men.

LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL: ITS RECENT PROGRESS. In no period of our history have more and greater constitutional questions of vital importance been adjudicated by the highest judicial tribunal of the nation than have recently been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in cases involving the relations existing between the States and the General Government. Most of these questions grew out of the constitutional and congressional enactments following the war, and involved issues raised before, during, and after the war. The post-war amendments to the Constitution made a radical change in the relations borne by the States to the General Government. They carved out a vast extent of State sovereignty,

The

and added it to Federal sovereignty. power of Congress has thus been greatly enlarged, and that of the States correspondingly diminished. In the exercise of this power Congress has made extensive limitations upon State rights. The Supreme Court has frequently been called upon to determine the purport and validity of this legislation, and the meaning of the Constitution on questions of State and Federal sovereignty; and the doctrines it has affirmed, generally on a divided opinion of the judges, have greatly strengthened if not enlarged the sovereignty of the nation. Hence there has been in recent years a steady and extensive development of a central power, or a remarkable advance toward centralization, in our system of government. A striking illustration of this fact is afforded by a brief review of some of the most important constitutional doctrines recently affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The fourteenth amendment declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." It then declares that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This enactment clearly limits the power of a State over its citizens, but in what respects the limitation operates, or how far it goes, is a vitally important question, on which the Supreme Court has divided in every case which has come before it under the amendment. In the SlaughterHouse cases the majority of the court drew a distinction between the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States and those of a citizen of a State, and held that it was only the former which the States were prohibited from abridging. In Strauder against West Virginia (100 U. S. Reports, 306), the majority went further, and declared that the amendment "was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the General Government in that enjoyment whenever it should be denied by the States. It not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to any State the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws, and authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation." But what are the "civil rights" which the States may not withhold? Is it a civil right of a colored person to marry a white person, to attend a school for whites, to follow the same professions and callings followed by whites? The court has held that the privilege of practicing law in the courts of a State is not a right

hand, are conditioned and dependent upon the discretion of the elective or appointing power, whether that be the people acting through the ballot, or one of the departments of their government. The civil rights of the individual are never to be withheld, and may be always judicially enforced. The political rights which he may enjoy, such as holding office and discharging a public trust, are qualified because their possession depends on his fitness, to be adjudged by those whom society has clothed with the elective authority. The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were designed to secure the civil rights of all persons, of every race, color, and condition; but they left to the States to determine to whom the possession of political powers

should be intrusted.

The great change made since the war in the relations between the States and the General Government, and the extent of the power taken from State and given to Federal sovereignty, are nowhere more strikingly shown than by the interpretation given to the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court, in the case of ex parte Virginia, decided in 1879, and reported in 100 United States Reports. The case grew out of the indictment, in the United States District Court, of Judge Coles, a Virginia judge, on a charge of excluding blacks from the jury-lists made out by him. There was no State statute disqualifying colored jurors. The question raised was, whether Congress has any authority to punish a judicial officer of a State for his official acts. The court held that Congress has this power, and the opinion goes to the extent that the power extends to the punishment of any State officer for acts done in violation of Federal laws, though such acts may be in obedience to and required by State laws. The change thus wrought in our constitutional law may be illustrated by a comparison of this doctrine with that affirmed by the same court, in the case of the Commonwealth of Kentucky against Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, decided in 1860, and reported in 24 Howard's Reports. In that case the court held that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court of the United States had the power to compel the chief Executive of one State to deliver to the authorities of another a fugitive from justice. "Indeed, such a power," said Chief-Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the court, "would place every State under the control and domination of the General Government, even in the administration of its internal concerns." The enlarged powers which the court now holds to be in Congress are derived, in the opinion of the court, from that clause of the fourteenth amendment which declares that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." As to the purpose and effect of this clause the court was divided in opinion. Two of its nine members maintained that the prohibition extended only to the Legislature, and applied only to legislation; and hence that it gave Congress no authority over the executive and judicial departments of a State. Jus

The other

tice Hunt did not sit in the case. six justices, constituting the majority of the court, held, in the language of Justice Strong, who wrote the opinion, that the prohibitions have reference to the actions of the political body denominated a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken. A State acts by its Legislature, its Executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the State has clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it " (Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. Reports, 346, 347.)

This view was combated by Justice Field, in a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clifford concurred. "As the State," said Justice Field, "in the administration of its government, acts through its executive, legislative, and judicial departments, the inhibition applies to them. But the executive and judicial departments only construe and enforce the laws of the State; the inhibition, therefore, is in effect against passing and enforcing any laws which are designed to accomplish the ends forbidden. If an executive or judicial officer exercises powers with which he is not invested by law, and does unauthorized acts, the State is not responsible for them. The action of the judicial officer in such a case, where the rights of a citizen under the laws of the United States are disregarded, may be reviewed or corrected or reversed by this court. It can not be imputed to the State, so as to make it evident that she, in her sovereign or legislative capacity, denies the rights invaded, or refuses to allow their enforcement. It is merely the ordinary case of an erroneous ruling of an inferior tribunal. Nor can the unauthorized action of an executive officer, infringing upon the rights of the citizen, be taken as evidence of her intention or policy, so as to charge upon her a denial of such rights." (Virginia against Rives, 100 U. S. Reports, 333, 334.)

"Nothing, in my judgment, could have a greater tendency to destroy the independence and autonomy of the States, reduce them to a humiliating and degrading dependence upon the central Government, engender constant irritation, and destroy that domestic tranquillity which it was one of the objects of the Constitution to insure, than the doctrine asserted in this case that Congress can exercise coercive authority over judicial officers of the States in the dis

charge of their duties under State laws. It will be only another step in the same direction toward consolidation when it assumes to exercise similar coercive authority over Governors and legislators of the States. . . . Those who regard the independence of the States in all their reserved powers-and this includes the independence of their legislative, judicial, and executive departments-as essential to the successful maintenance of our form of government, can not fail to view with the gravest apprehension for the future, the indictment in a court of the United States of a judicial officer of a State for the manner in which he has discharged his duties under her laws and of which she makes no complaint. The proceeding is a gross offense to the State; it is an attack upon her sovereignty in matters over which she has never surrendered her jurisdiction. The doctrine which sustains it, carried to its logical results, would degrade and sink her to the level of a mere local municipal corporation; for, if Congress can render the officer of a State criminally liable for the manner in which he discharges his duties under her laws, it can prescribe the nature and extent of the penalty to which he shall be subjected on conviction; it may imprison him for life, or punish him by removal from office; and, if it can make the exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race or color a criminal offense, it can make their exclusion from office on that account also criminal, and, adopting the doctrine of the district judge in this case, the failure to appoint them to office will be presumptive evidence of their exclusion on that ground. To such a result are we logically led. The legislation of Congress is founded and is sustained by this court, as it seems to me, upon a theory as to what constitutes the equal protection of the laws, which is purely speculative, not warranted by an experience of the country, and not in accordance with the understanding of the people as to the meaning of those terms since the organization of the Government." (Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. Reports, 358, 369, 370.)

In the subsequent cases of Siebold and Clarke (100 United States Reports, 371, 399) the court affirmed the doctrine that in the case of an election at which members of Congress are voted for, although State officers may also be then chosen, Congress has the constitutional power to pass an act for the punishment of a State election officer for failing to perform his duty under a State election law, or otherwise violating that law in any matter affecting the election of representatives in Congress. The question arose under section 5515 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which was originally enacted in 1870 in the Enforcement Act, whose declared purpose was "to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union." It provides that "every officer of an election at which any representative or delegate in Congress is voted for, whether such officer of election be

appointed or created by or under any law or authority of the United States, or by or under any State, Territorial, district, or municipal law or authority, who neglects or refuses to perform any duty in regard to such election required of him by any law of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof, or who violates any duty so imposed," shall be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, as prescribed by the act of Congress. Under this law Clarke, a State election officer at an election held in Cincinnati, at which both members of Congress and State officers were chosen, was convicted in the United States Circuit Court for violating a law of Ohio by not conveying the ballot-box, after it had been sealed up and delivered to him for that purpose, to the county clerk, and for allowing it to be broken open. It was contended in his behalf that the act of Congress was unconstitutional for the reason that that body had no power to punish a State officer for the violation of a State law. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation under that clause of the Constitution which provides that "the times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may, at any time, by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators." The following passage from the opinion delivered by Justice Bradley shows the views of the court on this point: It is objected that Congress has no power to enforce State laws or to punish State officers, and especially has no power to punish them for violating the laws of undoubtedly true; but when, in the performance of their own State. As a general proposition, this is their functions, State officers are called upon to fulfill duties which they owe to the United States as well as to the State, has the former no means of compelling such fulfillment? Yet such is the case here. It is the duty of the States to elect representatives to Congress. The due and fair election of these representatives is of vital importance to the United States; the Government of the United States is no less concerned in the transaction than the State government is. It certainly is not bound to stand by as a passive spectator when duties. are violated and outrageous frauds are committed. It is directly interested in the faithful performance by the officers of election of their respective duties. Those duties are owed as well to the United States as to the States. This necessarily follows from the mixed character of the transaction-State and national. A violation of duty is an offense against the United States, for which the offender is justly amenable to the Government. No official position can shelter him from this responsibility. In view of the fact that Congress has plenary and paramount jurisdiction over the whole subject, it seems almost absurd to say that an officer who receives or has custody of the ballots given for a representative owes no duty to the national Government which Congress can enforce; or that an officer who stuffs the ballot-box can not be made amenable to

the United States. If Congress has not, prior to the passage of the present laws, imposed any penalties to prevent and punish frauds and violations of duties committed by officers of election, it has been because the exigency has not been deemed sufficient to require it, and not because Congress had not the requisite power. The objection that the laws and regulations, the violations of which are punishable by the acts of Congress, are State laws, and have not been adopted by

Congress, is no sufficient answer to the power of Congress to impose punishment. It is true that Congress has not deemed it necessary to interfere with the duties of the ordinary officers of election, but has been content to leave them as prescribed by State laws. It has only created additional sanctions for their performance, and provided means of supervision in order more effectually to secure such performance. The imposition of punishment implies a prohibition of the act punished. The State laws, which Congress sees no occasion to alter, but which it allows to stand, are in effect adopted by Congress. It simply demands their fulfillment. Content to leave the laws as they are, it is not content with the means provided for their enforcement. It provides additional means for that purpose; and we think it is entirely within its constitutional power to do so. It is simply the exercise of the power to make additional regulations. (Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. Reports, 387.)

From this doctrine Justices Field and Clifford dissented. Justice Hunt took no part in the case. Hence but six justices concurred in the decision of the court. In an elaborate opinion, in which Justice Clifford concurred, Judge Field maintained: first, that Congress has no power to punish a State officer for the manner in which he discharges duties imposed upon him by the laws of the State, or to subject him, in the performance of such duties, to the supervision and control of others, and punish him for resisting their interference; and, second, that it is not competent for Congress to make the exercise of its primitive power dependent upon the legislation of the States. He did not doubt that Congress might adopt the law of a State, but, in that case, the adopted law must be enforced as a law of the United States. In the case before the court there was no pretense of such adoption. The act of Congress did not say that the neglect or disregard of a duty prescribed by any existing law of Ohio should constitute the defense. It is the neglect or disregard of any duty prescribed by any law of the State, present or future. "The act of Congress," said Judge Field, "asserts a power inconsistent with, and destructive of, the independence of the States. The right to control their own officers, to prescribe the duties they shall perform, without the supervision or interference of any other authority, and the penalties to which they shall be subjected for a violation of duty, is essential to that independence. If the Federal Government can punish a violation of the laws of the State, it may punish obedience to them, and graduate the punishment according to its own judgment of their propriety and wisdom. It may thus exercise a control over the legislation of the States subversive of all their reserved rights. However large the powers conferred upon the government formed by the Constitution, and however numerous its restraints, the right to enforce their own laws by such sanctions as they may deem appropriate is left where it was originally-with the States. It is a right which has never been surrendered. Indeed, a State could not be considered as independent in any matter with respect to which its officers, in the discharge of

their duties, could be subjected to punishment officers, in the execution of its laws, could be by any external authority; nor in which its subject to the interference of others." (Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. Reports, 409.)

In Tennessee against Davis (100 United States Reports, 257), decided at the term begining in October, 1879, one of the most important questions that has ever risen as to the relations between the State and the Federal Government was elaborately discussed and decided by the Supreme Court. It was whether Congress has the constitutional power to authorize the removal from a State to a Federal court of a case in which a revenue officer of the United States has been indicted by the State authorities for a crime against the State committed by the accused in the discharge of his duties as a Federal officer, and whether the Federal courts have the right to try the prisoner when Congress has neither defined the crime with which he is charged, nor prescribed punishment for it.

"A more important question," said Justice Strong, who delivered the opinion of the court, "can hardly be imagined. Upon its answer may depend the possibility of the General Government's preserving its own existence."

The question arose under the act passed by Congress in 1866, and now embodied in section 643 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The statute provides that" when any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any court of a State against any officer appointed under, or acting by authority of, any revenue law of the United States, now or hereafter enacted, or against any person acting by or under authority of any such officer, on account of any act done under color of his office or of any such law, or on account of any right, title, or authority claimed by such officer or other person under any such law," the case may be removed from the State into the United States Circuit Court and there tried. The prisoner, Davis, had been indicted for murder in one of the courts of Tennessee. He petitioned for the removal of his case to the Federal court, alleging that he was a United States deputy collector of internal revenue; that it was his duty to seize illicit distilleries; that while so attempting to enforce the revenue laws of the United States he was assaulted and fired upon by a number of armed men, and that in self-defense he returned the fire, and committed the homicide for which he had been indicted. In behalf of the State, it was contended that murder within a State is not made a crime nor is it punishable by any act of Congress, and hence is not triable by a Federal court; that it is a crime against the peace and dignity of the State, defined and punished by the laws of the State, and a matter wholly within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State. It was further maintained that the act of Congress was intended to apply only to cases involving offenses against the revenue laws, and that if its purpose or effect was to