OIL LEASE-Continued.
lessor, and no advantage can be taken of it by the lessee
until a forfeiture is declared by the lessor. Mathews v.
Peoples Natural Gas Co., 544.

The fact that the lessor in an oil lease erects, sub-
sequently to the lease, a building upon the lots de-
mised, is not such an eviction as to terminate his right to
demand rent, when the lease is to enable the lessee to
drill wells for oil or gas, and it does not appear that the
action of the lessor in any way interferes with the exer-
cise of this right by the lessee. Id.

A conveyance by the lessor of the land demised in an
oil lease, without reserving the rights of the lessee un-
der the lease, amounts to an election on the part of the
lessor to terminate the lease. He cannot thereafter de-
mand rent. Id.

ORPHANS' COURT. The conclusiveness of a
judgment or decree of the Orphans' Court depends upon
the jurisdiction of said Court. Reese v. Wildman, 193.
The existence of debts is a jurisdictional fact; if there
are no debts an administrator cannot sell land, and the
Orphans' Court cannot give him power to sell. Id.

PARTNERSHIP. An agreement between W.
and B., of the firm of W. B. & Co., and H., C., J., H.
and W., the other partners of said fi. m, reciting that W.
and B. have become partners in the firm of G. B. H. &
Co., under an agreement by which they were to receive
56 5-10 per cent, of the profits, and to be responsible for
the same percentage of the losses of the latter firm, and
providing that H., C., J., H. and W. should indemnify W.
and B. for losses which they might thus sustain, to an
amount equal to 28.2 per cent. of such losses, in consid-
eration of W. and B. agreeing to pay the others a sum
equal to 28.2 per cent. of profits realized by W. and B.
out of the firm of G. B. H. & Co., is an agreement of
indemnity, and not of co-partnership. Estate of Haines
& Co., 17.

The distinction between participation in profits, as
such, and compensation or consideration, merely meas-
ured by a proportion of profi.s, is authoritatively estab-
lished. Id.

Where it appears that a proposition was made by two
partners, to which their five co-partners objected, that it
was then informally discussed and a decision arrived at,
which decision, with the aid of counsel, was formally
embodied in a written agreement, the case is clearly one
in which to apply the rule that all prior negotiations are
merged in the writing, which is the sole evidence of the
intention of the parties. Id.

An unauthorized decree of the Orphans' Curt for the
sale of land will not stand until reversed in a regular
course of appeal, but may be questioned in a collateral
suit, by or against a person claiming under that decree. Id.
A. died intestate in 1862, leaving a widow and chil-
dren. He was then the owner of certain land, and was
It appearing that money of W. B. & Co. was used by
indebted to B. in the sum of $500, for which there was W. and B. as their contribution to the capital of G. B.
no security. The widow and the children who were of H. & Co., that the former firm was debited on the books
age transferred the land to B. under an arrangement of the la ter for that purpose, without the consent of the
whereby she was to pay herself the debt. B. being unable other partners, such use and debiting were unauthorized.
to sell the same, on account of defective title, an admin- Subsequently, charging W. B. & Co. in the same way
istrator was appointed of A.'s estate, in 1872, who pre- upon the books of G. B. H. & Co. with $100,000 worth
sented a petition for leave for a sale to pay debts. The of goods, which the former firm never bought or re-
petition recited the death of A. but not its time, the exceived, was equally unauthorized, and no subsequent
istence of the debt to B. and eleven years interest on the
same and that no personalty existed to pay the debts.
The Orphans' Court made an order of sale, a sale was
made to D. and confirmed. Ejectment was brought by
the children of A. against D. on the ground that the or-
der of sale was void. The lower Court held that the de-
cree of confirmation of the same was conclusive and en-
tered judgment for D.: held, the decree of sale was void
for want of jurisdiction, because there was no debt prop-
erly chargeable upon the land of A. at the time of the
petition.

juggling with the accounts in the books could make
these anything else than debts, or amount to payment.
Both the firms being insolvent, the assignee for creditors
of W. B. & Co. could claim as a creditor of G. B. H. &
Co., the amount due by the latter firm, to the former, in
spite of the fact that W. and B. were co partners in both,
because, by the insolvency of W. B. & Co., their creditors
became entitled to urge their claims against G. B. H. &
Co., and the right was not changed by the insolvency of
the latter firm; as to their respective creditors, the two
firms were separate and distinct entities, and the assets
of each a separate fund for its own creditors. Id.

STERRETT, C. J., and MITCHELL and FELL, JJ., dis
sented on the ground that all the jurisdictional aver-
In articles of co-partnership, it was stated that G. con-
ments prescribed by the act of 1832 appeared in the peti-tributed ten head of horses and five wagons, with an in-
tion and that the purchaser at an Orphans' Court sale debtedness against them of about $700, one-half of which
was not bound to look beyond that; further, any irregu- the other partner, E., agreed to assume: held, that, with
larity in the petition was cured by the confirmation. Id. out more, this would not make the $700 a firm debt.
The jurisiction to enforce payment of a legacy
charged on land is exclusively in the Orphans' Court, the (Super. Ct.) Larzelere v. Tiel, 320.
form of remedy being by bill or petition by the legatee,
or by the legatees jointly. Hartzell's Appeal, 257.
A decree of the Orphans' Court citing an executor to
account is not a definitive sentence or decree, but an in-
terlocutory decree from which no appeal lies. (Super.
Ct.) Starr's Estate, 462.

PARTIES TO ACTION. Where a fraudulent
representation is made by the owner of premises to two
persons who, to the knowledge of the said owner, intend
to jointly carry on business upon said premises and, on
the faith of the representation, the said persons enter on
the premises and carry on business and suffer loss, through
reliance on the representation, they may maintain a joint
action of deceit against the owner, although the lease,
made in reliance on the fraud, was made to one of said
persons only. (Super. Ct.) Sacks v. Schimmel, 452.

tions, to authorize or ratify the application of firm assets
It is necessary for partners, by their language or ac-
to the payment of the individual debt of one of them in
order to make it a firm debt. Id.

thorize or ratify the application of firm assets to the pay;
Where co-partners, by their language or actions, au-
ment of the individual debt of a partner, all are bound
by such applica ion. This question is primarily one of
consent, which may be gathered or inferred from the at-
tending circumstances. Id.

Notice of withdrawal from. See NOTICE. N. Y. Nat.
Exchange Bank v. Crowell, 228.

PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATION LIMIT.
ED. A schedule of property, filed under the partner.
ship association Act, which contains land at a valuation,
but does not state that it is subject to a mortgage, such
being the fact, is defective, and the members of the as-

easement. (Super. Ct.) Clements v. Philadelphia Co.,
299.

PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATION LIMITED PIPE LINE-Continued.
-Continued.
sociation are rendered liable as general partners. First
National Bank v. Creveling, Miles & Co., 110.
PARTY WALL. A party wall may be created by
statute, prescription or agreement. The Act of April 10,
1849, as to compensation for the use of a party wall, is
applicable in each case. Voigt v. Wallace, 443.

Since the passage of the Act of April 10, 1849, the
right of the first builder to a party wall is an interest in
the realty, which passes to the grantee of the land, unless
otherwise expressed. Voight v. Fisher, 445.

V., being seized of land, erected a warehouse on the
westward part thereof, with side walls 22 inches thick.
He conveyed to F. the east part of the lot, including 11
inches of the 22-inch wall, with a reservation in the deed
that F., or those taking under him, should not use any
part of the wall for any building thereafter to be erected
without paying for the same. V. conveyed to W. the
western part of the lot with the warehouse thereon, the A garnishee's answer is not to be construed with the
east line of which was described as running through the same strictness as an affidavit of defence, and it is not
middle of the party wall. In the last deed, there was no bound to set forth, specifically and at length, the nature
reservation of the wall, or of the right to compensation. and character of his defence to the attachment, but such
Subsequently, F. conveyed the eastward lot to W., recit- facts only as are material to the admission or denial of
ing the reservation in the deed from V. to him. W. then indebtedness to the defendant. McCallum v. Morris,
erected a dwelling on the eastern lot, using the party
wall: held, the effect of the conveyance from V. to F.
was to make the wall a party wall by agreement. (2)
Therefore, by the operation of the Act of April 10. 1849,
the right to compensation passed from V. to W., and
V. could no longer recover from anyone for the use of
the wall. Voight v. Wallace, 443.

Injury which may be done to land by the removal of
pipe, laid on it by a pipe line company, is not included
within the damages fixed upon the original taking, and,
if any injury be done by said removal, on the abandon-
ment of the easement, the pipe line company is liable for
the damages occasioned thereby, although such removal
be not negligently made. RICE, P. J., and WICKHAM,
J., dissent. Id.
PLEADING. A statement which sets forth that the
defendant ordered plaintiff to manufacture for him “at
his own expense" a metal mould, that plaintiff manufac-
tured the mould and shipped it to the defendant and
that the defendant refused to pay the cost of the manufac-
ture of the mould, and states the amount of said costs,
is sufficient to require an affidavit of defence. (Super.
Ct.) Trenton Rubber Co. v. Small, 281.

The first builder cannot maintain an action for the use
of a party wall after he has parted with the land. Voight
v. Fisher, 445.

PAVING. Where a contract is entered into be-
tween a borough and a railroad company, by which the
latter is to perform certain things with reference to the
road on which the track is laid, including sharing in the
expense of a pavement of a certain kind, it is not in the
power of the borough to change the contract by the sub-
stitution of a different kind of pavement, without the
consent of the company, but the effort to impose an ad-
ditional burden cannot release the company from its con-
tract, and it will be liable for all expense incurred in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract. Borough of
Shamokin v. Shamokin Street Ry. Co., 136.

The municipal authorities are the sole judges of the
kind of pavement best adapted to the needs of a street
where it is laid. Pittsburgh v. Childs, 425.

421.

The rule that a written contract cannot be added to, un-
less there be shown fraud, accident or mistake, is not
avoided by declaring on a contract as partly written and
partly parol. Dickson v. Hartman Mfg. Co., 465.

As there is no general issue upon an avowry, matter of
defence must be specially pleaded. The plea "no rent
in arrears" must be sustained by proof that the plaintiff
has paid to the avowant the rent claimed in the avowry,
not by proof that the avowant has no right to receive it.
(Super. Ct.) Bandel v. Erickson, 490.

Where the avowant omits to require the plaintiff to set
forth at large the ground of defence, which the plea of
payment was designed to embrace, he waives the right
to except to its form, and thereby permits proof of the
payment of the rent to the party entitled to receive it.
RICE, P. J., dissents. Id.

A fault of pleading, which is amendable, will be re-
garded as amended when necessary to preserve an obvi-
ous right. Extreme technicality in pleading must be
subordinated to the higher demands of justice. Id.

POLICEMAN. An arrest by a police officer without
a warrant, where the circumstances are not those of a
dangerous emergency, and the detention of the person
arrested for a period of time are illegal, and render the
officer making the arrest liable in an action for damages.
Burk v. Howley, 473.

Testimony, as to what the proper cost of paving a
street should be, must be confined to what the cost would
justly have been at the time the pavement was laid. Id. POWER OF SALE. A., by will, provided as
PAYMENT. J., owning an equitable title to land, follows: "The balance of my property to remain as it
the legal title of which was in C. to secure certain sums, is under the care of my husband, he to carry on his bus-
agreed to sell to A. and give a clear title. Many years iness the same as if I was here and to reap all benefits
after, A.'s heirs obtained the legal title under a decree so long as he lives. My husband to have power to sell
which required them to pay the sums due to C. J. it at any time, and when sold and all debts on property
claimed a balance of the purchase money as due by the
contract with A. At the time of the decree, C. had been
out of possession for fifty years: held, the amount paid
to C. might be deducted from the balance due J.
MITCHELL, J., dissented. Smith's Estate, 88.

Where the contention that presumption of payment
arises from the lapse of time ignores the decree of the
court and the finding of an auditor, the latter are prima
facie, at least, sufficient to rebut the presumption and to
cast upon the person alleging the payment the burden of
showing it. Id.

PIPE LINE. The right of a pipe line company to
remove its pipe. laid on the land of another, on the
abandonment of the easement, is not an incident of the

paid, he to receive $2000 of my money, and the balance
to be put on interest, under his care, for my son Herbert.
This is my will and to be carried out by my husband:"
held, the power of sale was to be exercised only upon a
contingency, and did not of itself work a conversion;
neither did a sale by the executor to himself. Taylor v.
Haskell, 234.

PRACTICE. It is irregular to make a writ return-
able upon the day it issues, and if the affidavit and bond,
required to be filed before a writ of attachment issues,
are not filed until the return day, the writ will be
quashed. (Super Ct.) Sheip v. Price, 278.

It is very doubtful whether a question of privilege in
the service of a writ can be considered on error after a

The rules of court of Allegheny county provide that
no evidence shall be heard upon a trial as to facts not
substantially alleged or referred to in the statements then
If there is no distinct admission in the affidavit of de- on file. This rule is complied with when the affidavit of
fence that the defendant owes the plaintiff any sum what-defence fully apprises the plaintiff of all the facts relied
ever, the case is not within the Act of May 31, 1893, on, and it is not necessary that the affidavit should con-
relative to taking judgment for the amount admitted to tain a distinct allegation of fraud, which is a legal con-
be due; an argumentative admission is not sufficient, clusion. If the facts set forth amount to fraud, evidence
(Super. Ct.) Ganor v. Hinrichs, 271.
of fraud may be introduced at the trial. (Super, Ct.)
Brown v. Eccles, 8.

PRACTICE-Continued.
error. Wallace v. Jameson, 387; (Super. Ct.)
v. Reading City R. R. Co., 356.

Beard

PRACTICE-Continued.

not been passed. (Super. Ct.) Overseers of Elderton
v. Overseers of Plumcreek, 165.

It is not sufficient compliance with rule 17 of Superior
Court, relative to assignments of error, to set forth in an
assignment a question put to a witness, the allowance of
which was excepted to. The answer to the question
should also be set forth. (Super. Ct.) Commonwealth

To make the charge of the court at nisi prius a portion
of the record, it must affirmatively appear that the charge
was filed by the judge himself, or by his express direction,
evidenced by his signature either to the charge itself or
to the bill of exceptions. Smith v. Times Pub. Co., 329.
In order that advantage may be taken of improper re-v. Smith, 181.
marks of counsel, objection must be made thereto at the
trial and, where no such objection has been taken, the
matter will not be considered on appeal. (Super. Ct.)
Commonwealth v. Smith, 181.

Where a party has died after verdict and before judg-
ment, a refusal to arrest judgment for that cause cannot
be averred as error, if not more than two terms intervene,
and a judgment entered on the verdict, as of a term in
which the party was living, will be sustained. Wood v.
Boyle, 125.

In proceedings to open a judgment, that they may be
properly reviewed, the findings of fact and the inferences
therefrom are just as essential as those of a master in
chancery in regular equity proceedings, and should ap-
pear in some way upon the record, or by an opinion.
(Super. Ct.) Pfaff v. Thomas, 570.

A judgment obtained after trial must be
all, during the term at which it is entered.
Hill v. Egan, 267.

opened, if at
(Super Ct.)
On February 6, 1893, plaintiff obtained a verdict, on
which judgment was entered March 14th. An appeal
therefrom was quashed March 5, 1894. On March 20,
1895, the plaintiff issued a sci. fa. against the bail in
error. On April 15th, the defendant obtained a rule for
a new trial nunc pro tunc. On April 12, 1895, this rule
was made absolute: held, it was too late to open the
judgment, and the court exceeded its authority in grant-
ing the rule. Id.

Where a motion for a new trial is granted, the reasons
should appear of record. Id.

Where a judgment has been recovered upon a promise
by the defendant to secure the plaintiff from loss on stock
to which the plaintiff has subscribed, the court may stay
execution, until the plaintiff has executed an assignment
of his right to the stock to the defendant. (Super. Ct.)
McClymonds v. Stewart, 23.

Where, after levy and pending a sheriff's interpleader,
the judgment on which the levy is based is erroneously
satisfied, the court may strike off the satisfaction, and the
claimant in the interpleader is not injured thereby, if he
has taken no action in consequence of the entering of
satisfaction. (Super. Ct.) Paul v. Eurich, 455.

Where an unauthorized alteration of a material matter
of record is alleged, the proper practice is to apply to the
court, whose record it is, to correct and restore it to its
original condition. (Super. Ct.) Sheip v. Price, 278.

Practice (Appellate Courts.) Where the record
shows neither an exception to the charge of the court
nor that the copy filed was approved by the judge, or
filed by his direction, the appellee is entitled to have the
case disposed of upon the record, as it stands at the time
the appeal is heard. The record cannot be supplied by
a general rule of court, or a general practice of the judge,
to direct exceptions to be noted for both parties. (Super.
Ct.) Christner v. John, 44.

Where no harm is done by a question objected to, the
assignment thereto will be disallowed. Id.

Where the court has erroneously held that a witness
offered is not competent, and the party calling him has not
been injured by this ruling, because the specific matters
proposed to be shown by him were established by admit-
tedly competent testimony, and were not disputed, the
Supreme Court will not reverse for this harmless error.
Powell v. Derickson, 378.

The findings of viewers on the questions of fact, ap-
proved by the court, should not be disturbed, except for
clear error. Pittsburgh v. Childs, 425.

The Supreme Court will not review the action of the
Common Pleas under the Act of 1893, except in the case
of manifest abuse of discretion. Ross's Appeal, 427.
Appeal of School Directors of Kittanning Township,
430.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. An agent au-
thorized to receive cash in payment of insurance premi-
ums has no authority to accept promissory notes in lieu
thereof, but the conduct of the insurance company, after
such acceptance by the agent, may be such as to amount
to a ratification of his act and render the payment by
notes a good payment. Imbrie v. Manhattan Life Ins.
Co., 52.

The assertion by an agent for a fire insurance company
that he has effected insurance, when in point of fact he
has not, will not bind him who has employed the agent,
to the extent of pro-rating the amount alleged to have
been obtained in the insurance company with those of
other companies already plac d. Coleman v. Ins. Co.,
178.

Where one engages another to procure insurance for
him, the person thus employed is the agent of the em-
ployer, not of the company. (Super. Ct.) Lennox v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 188,

An agent who receives money paid on account of a
contract for the purchase of real estate, made with his
principal, cannot be held liable in an action by the pur-
chaser to rescind the contract. Kurzawski v. Schneider,
418.

While a tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
lessor, under which he entered, and hold possession
against it, yet he may show that this title has since de-
termined, or, where the lessor is an agent, that the
agency has been revoked and the rent been paid to the
actual owner. (Super. Ct.) Bandel v. Erickson, 490.

The extent of an agent's powers depends upon the
authority under which he acts, which may be shown by
his written instructions or his course of dealing. The
public are not always bound by the private instructions
to the agent, and may hold the principal responsible,
although the particular acts are in excess of his pri-
vate instructions. This applies where the agent has
been held out to the world as such by the principal, has
The statute of 1868 allows a writ of error to the de-been allowed to exercise enlarged powers from time to
cisions of the Court of Quarter Sessions on points of evi-
dence, or of law, which have been specified, excepted to
and brought upon the record; no other change is
made in the law or practice with reference to this class
of cases.
Evidence and rulings of the court, not thus
made of record, remain, with the opinion, beyond the
reach of an appellate court, the same as if the Act had

time, and his acts therein have been ratified by his prin.
cipal. (Super. Ct.) Himes v. Herr, 568.

PRIVILEGE. The prep nderance of authority is
that a defendant in a criminal case is not privileged
from arrest on civil process while attending court to an-
swer the criminal charge. Wood v. Boyle, 125.

In case of libel, see Wallace v. Jameson, 387.

PRIVITY. A release of a life estate to the remain-
der-man does not create privity between them, so as to
render a judgment in ejectment, in a case to which the
life tenant was a party, evidence in an action for the same
land against the remainder-man. Lineberger v. New
kirk, 415.

PROBABLE CAUSE. Probable cause does not
depend upon the state of the case in point of fact, but
on the honest and reasonable belief of the party prose-
cuting. Burk v. Howley, 473.
PROMISSORY NOTE. It is no defence to an
action by a bona fide holder for value that, as between
the endorser and maker, the note was without considera-
tion, and this was known to the endorsee. (Super. Ct.)
Historical Pub. Co. v. Hartranft, 315.

It is no defence, against an endorser, that the endorsee
has in his possession property of the maker, upon which
he has a lien for this and other debts and that he has ob-
tained judgment against the maker for these debts. Id.
In an action against an endorser of a note, it is not
sufficient for the defendant, in his affidavit, to say that he
has not received notice. He must go further, and state
such facts as will justify the inference that no notice was
given or diligence used. Id.

The maker or endorser of a negotiable note cannot
defend, against a bona fide owner without notice, on the
ground that there was fraud in the procurement or use
of the note, and the mere fact that the note was acquired
under suspicious circumstances will not invalidate it, in
the hands of the holder, unless the circumstances are such
that bad faith on his part may reasonably be inferred.
Lancaster County National Bank v. Garber, 55.

An accommodation endorser who, after maturity,
pays a note, can recover thereon against the maker. The
latter cannot set up that the said endorser was a pur-
chaser after maturity, as he comes into possession of the
note by virtue of his fulfillment of his contract of en-
dorsement, in which his right to recover against any
prior party has its inception. (Super. Ct.) Van Brunt
v. Potter, 262.

The maker of an accommodation note cannot set up
against the plaintiff, an endorser of the same character,
who has paid the note, that the property in the note is in
the assignee for the benefit of creditors of the payee,
who had endorsed the note before the plaintiff. Id.

Where the holder of a promissory note secures a re-
newal note from the endorsers upon the representation
that he is an innocent holder for value of the first note,
such representation is material, and, if false, is a fraud
which avoids the note. (Super. Ct.) Brown v. Eccles, 8.
Where it appears that false representations were made
to several of the parties, who became endorsers upon a
promissory note relying on the truth of the representa-
tions, the fact that such representations were not made
to the defendant, who was one of the endorsers, person-
ally, is immaterial. Id.

A federal court has no jurisdiction in an action upon
a promissory note by an endorsee against a remote en-
dorser, notwithstanding diverse citizenship exists between
them, unless the person from whom the endorsee derives
title could have maintained an action on the same note
against the same defendant. (U. S. C. C.) Skinner v.
Barr, 255.

The words "if such instrument be made payable to
bearer, and be not made by any corporation," in the Act
of August 13, 1888, 25 Statutes at Law 434, restrain the
effect of the words "any subsequent holder," and have
no restraining effect upon the general denial to federal
courts of cognizance of suits on promissory notes, or other
choses in action, in favor of an assignee, where suit could
not have been prosecuted in such courts if no assign-
ment or transfer had been made. Id.

PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.
To determine the question of proximate and remote
cause, a valuable criterion is whether any new force or
power has intervened, of itself sufficient to be the cause
of the misfortune. (Super. Ct.) Swanson v. Crandall,

24.

If two distinct causes are successive and unrelated in
their operation they cannot be concurring, one of them
must be the proximate and the other the remote cause.
Id.

In determining what is the proximate cause, the in-
jury must be a natural and probable consequence of the
act, or negligence. A natural consequence is a result
which may reasonably be expected from the act. A
probable consequence one that is more likely to follow
the supposed cause than it is to fail to follow. Id.
Defendant kept a loaded revolver in an upper drawer
of a chiffonier, which was used exclusively by the head
of the family, and, in his absence from the room and
while his wife was in bed, his five-year-old daughter dis.
covered and accidentally discharged the revolver, there-
by wounding the plaintiff, a nurse employed in the de-
fendant's family: held, the injury of the plaintiff was not
the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
act, and the defendant was not liable in an action of
negligence. Id.

PURCHASER. While the purchaser at a sheriff's
sale cannot give parol evidence as to the date when the
building purchased, against which are mechanics' liens,
was commenced, for the purpose of showing that the
lien of the mortgage is divested, if the record of the
mortgage is sufficient to show such fact, he has a right to
presume that the mortgage will be divested. Assigned
Estate of Miller and Mack, 142.

QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT. The
question whether a mutual mistake of fact has occurred
in an alleged settlement, is for the jury. (Super. Ct.)
Christner v. John, 44.

In an action to recover damages occasioned by the im-
perfect work of journeymen, it is the province of the jury
to find whether the action of the plaintiff, in an emer-
gency arising from the improper work, was contributory
negligence or not. Plonk v. Jessop, 156.

Where a policy contains a clause, "the insured, as
often as required, shall produce, for examination, the
books of account, bills, invoices and other vouchers, or
certified copies thereof, if originals be lost, at such reas-
onable place as may be designated by this company, or its
representative," if the defendant, the company, so request
the plaintiff, the insured, to produce certified copies of
such bills, invoices, etc., as were destroyed, for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the amount of loss upon his stock
and materials, it is for the jury to find whether there was
a bona fide effort, on the part of the insured, to comply
with the provisions of this condition. Coleman v. Insur-
ance Co., 178.

When the facts are unquestioned, the court may de-
cide whether an offer comes within the exception ex-
cluding evidence of offers of compromise; but if they
are in doubt, the facts must be submitted to the jury,
with instructions to consider or disregard the subject
of the offer, accordingly as they find it to have taken
place during an attempt at settlement or not. (Super.
Ct.) Orr v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 213.

In a feigned issue, between an execution creditor
and a claimant, where there is in evidence a paper
reciting a lease of the goods levied on, by the claim-
ant to the debtor, and it also appears that, prior to
the date of said paper, the goods were the property of
the debtor and were in the same place as that in
which they were found by the sheriff, to wit, a farm