LEASE-Continued.

LIQUOR LAW-Continued.

A covenant in a lease, "it is hereby further agreed entitled, as a matter of right, to a distiller's license, for
that the said lessee shall have the privilege and option any place he may see fit to designate, upon filing a regu-
of renting the said premises for the further term of three lar petition and bond. (Super. Ct.) Lauck's Appeal,
years from the expiration of the lease," must be regarded 42.
as a covenant for a renewal, that is, that the lessee has a Only an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discre-
right to another lease containing the same terms and tionary power by the Court of Quarter Sessions, as
stipulations as the original lease, except the renewal shown by the record, will justify a reversal in a license
agreement, no matter what language was used, if the in-matter by an appellate tribunal. Id.
tention be reasonably apparent. (Super. Ct.) Cairns v.
Llewellyn, 251.

A distiller's license confers the privilege of a whole-
sale dealer, so far as liquor manufactured by himself is
See LANDLORD AND TENANT. Oakford v. Nixon, concerned. He is not limited to sell to other dealers,
49.

See OIL LEase.

LEGACY CHARGED ON LAND. The juris-
diction to enforce payment of a legacy charged on land
is exclusively in the Orphans' Court, the form of remedy
being by bill or petition by the legatee, or legatees jointly.
Hartzell's Appeal, 257.

LIBEL. A publication impeaching the character of
a person in his private, individual and personal capacity,
although he is an official, is libelous and not privileged.
Wood v. Boyle, 125.

To impute corrupt or dishonorable action to an attor-
ney in his professional conduct is actionable per se.
Wallace v. Jameson, 387.

but may sell to any one, in quantities not less than one
gallon. He may have these privileges without proving
that his place is necessary for the accommodation of the
public. Id.

The Act of May 13, 1887, P. L. 108, is a licensing
Act and does not refer to the use of liquors in clubs, any
more than to their use in a family. Klein v. Livingston
Club, 93.

In the furnishing of liquors by a club to its members,
the usual incidents of sale, such as bargain, profit, etc.,
are wanting, and such furnishing is only a method of
distribution of common property. (Super. Ct.) Com-
monwealth v. Smith, 181.

Where a club is not organized and conducted in good
The character and conduct of a candidate for public faith, for proper and legal purposes, to which the furnish-
office are proper subjects for public discussion, and a pub-ing of liquor to the members is merely incidental, and
lication of facts, throwing light on his qualifications or the object of the organization is solely to provide the
disqualifications, is privileged. This privilege may be members with a convenient method of obtaining liquor,
lost, if the manner in which the publication is made, or it is an illicit traffic, and falls within the terms of the law.
the comments therein, are improper, and, in such case, it Klein v. Livingston Club, 93.
is for the jury to determine whether the privilege has
been exceeded. Id.

In an action for damages for publishing a libel, the
plaintiff may show, as evidence of express malice, that
defendant, after challenging plaintiff to explain his con-
nection with the matter referred to, refused to publish,
even as a paid advertisement, an offered explanation for-
tified by affidavits. Id.

LIEN OF DECEDENTS' DEBTS. See DECE-
DENTS' ESTATES. Reese v. Wildman, 193.

The question whether a club is a bona fide organiza-
tion, really owning property in common, and formed and
carried on for purposes, to which the furnishing of li
quors to its members is merely incidental, is a question
for the jury. Commonwealth v. Smith, 181.

Where there is sufficient evidence to justify the jury
in finding a club to be a bona fide organization, it is the
duty of the court to charge the jury that, if they believe
such to be the case, the furnishing of liquor to a member
would not be an illegal traffic, for which any one could
be convicted under the liquor license law of 1887. Id.

LIFE ESTATE. In an action of ejectment, the
defendant offered in evidence a deed from himself, of
LUNATIC. While one of the objects of the Act
date prior to the entry of the judgment through which of 1836 is to provide guardianship for the person of the
the plaintiff claimed, to one W., containing the following lunatic, its principal purpose is to protect his estate; all
clause: "Whereas the said party of the second part the proceedings contemplated by the act are against the
agrees that the parties of the first part shall live on said one alleged to be a lunatic, to have him so declared and
tract of land the remaining part of their life, the same to a custodian of his person and estate appointed; it does not
be controlled by the party of the second part," and
showed that no notice had been given in accordance
with the Act of January 24, 1849: held, the Act of 1849
applied only to life estates yielding rents, issues and prof.
its, and subject to sequestration; that, therefore, the only
effect of admitting the deed in evidence would be to set
up an outstanding title in one not a party to the record,
and that the deed was not admissible in evidence.
(Super. Ct.) Marks v. Baker, 12.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. The Act of
May 22, 1895, declaring "that in all civil suits and ac-
tions in which the cause of action shall have arisen with-
in this State, the defendant, or defendants, in such suit,
or action, who shall have become non-residents of the
State, after such cause of action shall have arisen, shall
not have the benefit of any statute of this State, for the
limitation of actions during the period of such residence
without the State," is retrospective and applicable to
suits in which the cause of action arose in this State prior
to the passage of the Act, and is constitutional. Bates
v. Cullum, 145.

LIQUOR LAW. A citizen of the United States,
of temperate habits and of good moral character, is not

afford the proper proceeding, where the party confined,
by petition avers he is not insane, and seeks to be relieved
from an unjust confinement. Rust's Appeal, 141.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. In an action

for malicious prosecution, ordinarily, the first step, in an
attempt to prove probable cause for charging the crime
upon a particular person, is to show the commission of
the crime by some one, and then the circumstances
crime so committed. Gaertner v. Heyl, 393.
which seem to connect the person prosecuted with the

See FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

MARKETABLE TITLE. A title resting on
the statute of limitations is marketable only when it
clearly appears that the entry of the real owner is barred.
Smith's Estate, 88.

MARRIED WOMEN. A holographic paper,
purporting to be the will of a married woman, but in-
valid, at the time of its execution, for want of witnesses,
is not validated by the Act of June 3, 1887, dispensing
with that requirement. Packer v. Packer, 495.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MARSHALLING ASSETS. Where a credito | MECHANICS' LIEN-Continued.
has a lien upon the real estate of his debtor, which has
been assigned for the benefit of creditors, and also upon
his personal property, by a sheriff's levy, made at his
suit prior to the assignment for benefit of creditors, if he
be partially paid by a sale of the personal property, made
after said assignment, he is entitled to a dividend out of
the proceeds of the subsequent sale of the real estate by
the assignee upon the balance only of his debt, and not
upon the whole of it. (Super. Ct.) Assigned Estate of
Wetzler, 514.

ment of the building before taking or entering his mort-
gage, the mechanics' liens are prior liens, and the mort-
gage will be discharged upon a sheriff's sale of the land.
Assigned Estate of Miller and Mack, 142.

See PARTNERSHIP.
Haines' Estate, 17.
MASTER AND SERVANT. When an em-
ployee, after having had an opportunity of becoming ac-
quainted with the risks of his situation, accepts them, he
cannot complain if he be subsequently injured by expo-
sure to such risks. Nuss v. Rafsnyder, 296.

Track clearing after a snow storm, in the vicinity of
moving trains, is essentially a dangerous employment,
and one who enters into it, takes the risk thereof. He
cannot look to his employer to take extraordinary pre-
cautions for his safety, because the storm, after which he
is sent out, is an extraordinary one, for the employer is
entitled to rely on the presumption that the employee will
not unnecessarily incur a danger which, though greater
in degree, is the same in kind as that to which he is or-
dinarily exposed by a storm. Nye v. Pennsylvania R.
R. Co., 209: Darr v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 211.

The facts that a contractor for the erection of a build-
ing abandoned his contract before completion, and that
the building had to be completed by another contractor,
do not deprive a sub-contractor of his right to file a lien
for work which he had completed prior to the abandon-
ment by the original contractor. (Super. Ct.) Burr v.
Mazer, 157.

Where a building contract has been entered into, be-
tween a contractor and an owner, and provisions with
regard to the filing of mechanics' liens have been inserted
therein, one who furnishes material to the building, on its
credit, is bound only by what appears in the writing. If
the terms of the writing are not a sufficient contract
against the filing of liens, the right of the material-man
to file a lien will not be destroyed, although the intention
of the parties to the contract was that the right should be
barred and the scrivener inserted in the agreement, exe-
cuted by the parties, words which did not have the effect
desired. (Super. Ct.) Sullivan v. Hancock, 245.

Where a material-man has contracted to furnish a
quantity of bricks for a building operation, consisting of
several houses, and, at the time of the execution of the
contract, the lot upon which the houses are to be erected
A lad of eighteen, who has been working with a ma- is not actually bisected by a laid out and dedicated
chine by which he was injured, for four weeks before the opened street, which has been accepted by the city, ap-
accident, is sufficiently conversant with the possible danger portioned liens cannot be filed against the houses as di-
of his employment to be bound by the rule that an em-vided into two blocks containing a certain number each.
ployer is only obliged to provide such machinery as is in The contract was entire the time it was made, and its
common use in the trade or business wherein he is en- remedy can be enforced only in this view. (Super. Ct.)
gaged. (Super. Ct.) Fick v. Jackson, 534.
West Philada. Brick Co. v. Johnson, 509.
Where materials are furnished for the alteration of,
and addition to, an existing building, and no notice is
given, as required by the Act of May 18, 1887, of an in-
tention to file a lien, a material-man is not entitled to a
lien. (Super. Ct.) German Fairhill Building Assn.
No. 2 v. Heebner, 573.

An employee who continues to use a machine, which
he knows to be defective and dangerous, takes upon him-
self the risk of any accident that may result therefrom,
unless he continue to do so in reliance upon his em-
ployer's promises to remedy the defect, and the risk is
not such as to threaten immediate danger. Id.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT. Smith v. Reimer, 448.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES. Where tres-
pass results in the ouster of plaintiff from the possession
of a part of a farm, leased by him, the correct measure of
damages is the injury to his leasehold, and should be
measured by the diminution of the rental value, not by
the rental of the fields taken, but by the injury to the
whole. Irwin v. Nolde, 33.

In proceedings in condemnation, under the right of
eminent domain, the actual value of the land taken, not
the personal estate of any kind, must be inquired into
and determined. Neither the profits of business, nor
any kind of injury to any stock, or merchandise, nor
whether a better business could be done with a particu-
lar stock on the premises in question, may be considered.
Becker v. Philadelphia and Reading Terminal Co., 150.
The market value of land as a measure of damages
cannot be ascertained by evidence of particular sales of
other properties, alleged to be situated similarly to the
one in question. Id.

It is not enough to make a structure a new building,
in the eye of the law, that the union of the new and old
building has resulted in "one harmonious whole,"
stamped with a "new and distinctive character." Id.

MERGER. A release of a life estate to the re-
mainder-man, brings about a merger. Lineberger v.
Newkirk, 415.

take of fact has occurred in an alleged settlement, is for
MISTAKE. The question whether a mutual mis-
the jury. (Super. Ct.) Christner v. John, 44.

MORTGAGE. While the purchaser at a sheriff's
sale cannot give parol evidence as to the date when the
building purchased, against which are mechanics' liens,
was commenced, for the purpose of showing that the
lien of the mortgage is divested, if the record of the
mortgage is sufficient to show such fact, he has a right to
presume that the mortgage will be divested. Assigned
Estate of Miller and Mack, 142.

Where the defence to a sci. fa. on a purchase money
mortgage is that one claiming title paramount to that of
the mortgagee has taken possession of part of the land
in question, an affidavit of defence is sufficient which
merely avers that another claims that the title to a por-
tion of said lot or piece of ground is in the said claim-
ant, and not in the grantee of the defendant. Chaffey
v. Boggs, 549.

In the event of a failure of a telegraph company to de-
liver, with reasonable dispatch, a cipher telegram, where
the company is not informed of its contents, the dam
ages are to be measured by the amount paid for its trans-
mission. Fergusonfv. Anglo-American Telegraph Co., 293.
See WARRANTY. Lehman v. Given, 273.
MECHANICS' LIEN. When mechanics' liens,
filed subsequently to the recording of a mortgage, dis- An action of ejectment, instituted by a mortgagor in
close on their face that the date of the commencement of a purchase money mortgage against one claiming title
the building in question was within six months, or if the paramount to the mortgagee's, who has taken possession
mortgagee has received distinct notice of the commence- of the mortgaged premises, does not estop the mortgagor

MORTGAGE-Continued.

MUNICIPALITY-Continued.

from setting up the ouster as a defence in proceedings on city to assert the right founded upon the dedication.
the mortgage. Id.
Quicksall v. City of Philadelphia, 477.

See SHERIFF'S SALE. Assigned Estate of Miller and
Mack, 142.

See WATER COMPANIES. White v. Meadville, 102;
ROAD LAW. Pittsburgh v. Childs, 425.

NEGLIGENCE. It may be presumed that the
natural instinct of a man, which leads him to avoid
injury, will cause him to stop, look and listen before
attempting to cross the line of a railway; but if he is
struck by a moving train, which was plainly visible
from the spot he occupied when it became his duty to
stop, look and listen, he must be conclusively presumed
to have disregarded this rule and to have gone into obvi-
ous danger. Sullivan v. New York, Lake Erie and
Western R. R. Co., 63.

MUNICIPALITY. A municipality has no power
to erect works for the supply of water, or to supply the
same; except by virtue of a legislative grant, and where,
by virtue of such grant, it enters into a contract for the
supply thereof by another person it is bound by its con-
tract and the terms of the law authorizing it, as would
be a private individual. White v. Meadville, 102.
Where the Legislature has authorized a corporation to
perform a continuous service, within the bounds of a
municipality, by contract therewith, and has also, in the
alternative, authorized the municipality to perform the
same, there is no right to put both methods in operation of a chiffonier, which was used exclusively by the head of
Defendant kept a loaded revolver in an upper drawer
at the same time, for when once the power has been ex-

ercised to supply the city, by contract, through another the family, and, in his absence from the room and while
creation of the same sovereign, the municipal function has his wife was in bed, his five-year-old daughter discov
passed from the city, and must be performed by the other ered and accidentally discharged the revolver, thereby
party, whose rights and obligations are as clearly de-wounding the plaintiff, a nurse employed in the de-
fined and as capable of enforcement, as are those of the fendant's family: held, the injury of the plaintiff was not
city. Id. Metzger v. Borough of Beaver Falls, 108.
Where an improvement is made by a city under an
Act of Assembly which provides an unconstitutional
method of ascertaining the damages, inflicted in the
course of said improvement, and such improvement is of
a character which is authorized by an Act, under which a
Constitutional method of ascertainment of damages is
provided, proceedings to ascertain damages may be had

under the constitutional Act. In re Petition of Cora E.
Fisher, 169.

the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
act, and the defendant was not liable in an action of
negligence. (Super. Ct.) Swanson v. Crandall, 24.
A gas company must not only furnish pipes and fit-
tings of such material and workmanship and lay them
in the ground with such skill and care as to provide
also maintain such a system of inspection as will insure
against the escape of gas therefrom, when new, but must
reasonable promptness in detection of all leaks that may
occur from the deterioration of the material of the pipes,
or from any other cause, within the circumspection of
men of ordinary skill in the business. (Super. Ct.) Pritch-
ard v. Consolidated Gas Co., 28.

The city of Allegheny changed the grade of a street
by virtue of the local Act of April 1, 1870, P. L. 751,
which contained no constitutional method of ascertaining
Where persons passing over a grade crossing of a rail-
damages: held, that as the city might change the grade way, after discussing the chance of crossing in safety,
under the general law of May 16, 1891, and its supple- run directly in front of a moving train and make an at
ment of June 12, 1893, there was jurisdiction in the tempt to cross, without looking or listening for an ap-
courts to determine the amount of damages, by proceed-proaching train, in disregard of a warning of the danger
ings under said Act. Id.

The municipal authorities are the sole judges of the
kind of pavement best adapted to the needs of a street
where it is laid. Pittsburgh v. Childs, 425.

Where a contract is entered into between a borough
and a railroad company, by which the latter is to perform
certain things with reference to the road on which the track
is laid, including sharing in the expense of a pavement
of a certain kind, it is not in the power of the borough to
change the contract by the substitution of a different
kind of pavement, without the consent of the company;
but the effort to impose an additional burden cannot re-
lease the company from its contract and it will be lia-
ble for all expense incurred in accordance with the
terms of the contract. Borough of Shamokin v. Sha-
mokin Street Railway Co., 136.

Under the Act of May 16, 1891, P. L. 80, while a
contract for paving may be subject to an objection
as to irregularity, if the contract be one which the city
could have authorized, it may waive such irregularity,
and the acceptance of the work is such waiver and a rati.
cation of the unauthorized work. Pittsburgh v. Childs,
425.

The purpose of the Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 173, is
to relieve land upon which streets have been laid out by
the owner, but not opened or used for twenty-one years,
from the servitude imposed. So where streets have been
laid out and dedicated forty-four years before the com-
mencement of proceedings, but have not been opened
or used by the public, and beds of the streets have been
in the possession of abutting owners, it is too late for the

given to them, they are guilty of contributory negli
gence. Martin v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 36.

Plaintiff, while walking on the public highway, was
injured by the breaking of a wire cable used by the de-
fendant to control the movement of its cars on a steep
incline. There was evidence that the cable had been
weakened by use and exposure, had once been broken,
and, on the morning of the accident, had been hastily
repaired and used without testing its strength: held, there
was evidence of negligence for the jury. Musser v.
Lancaster Street Railway Co., 37.

Any one knowing of a defect in a sidewalk is bound
to protect himself from injury because of it, if it can be
done by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and
the failure to exercise such prudence and care is con-
tributory negligence. (Super. Ct.) Hentz v. Borough
of Somerset, 66.

A greater degree of care, because of the increase of
danger, is required in stepping upon crossings than in
walking along a continuous and uninterrupted sidewalk.
Id.

One who uses a public road, knowing that it is unsafe,
in preference to taking another road to reach the same
point, is guilty of contributory negligence. Id.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries,
caused by plaintiff's falling at night into a hole in a de
fective crossing, the evidence was that the hole had been
for some time there, that the plaintiff was aware of it,
had noticed it, perhaps, a year before her injury, that
there was sufficient light, at the place, to enable a trav-
eler to see the hole, and that the plaintiff was walking

Track clearing, after a snow storm, in the vicinity of
moving trains, is, essentially, a dangerous employment,
and one who enters into it takes the risk thereof. He
cannot look to his employer to take extraordinary pre-car could safely pass without striking him, the motorman
cautions for his safety, because the storm, after which he
is sent out, is an extraordinary one, for the employer is
entitled to rely on the presumption that the employee will
not, unnecessarily, incur a danger which, though greater
in degree, is the same in kind as that to which he is
ordinarily exposed by a storm. Nye v. Pennsylvania R.
R. Co., 209; Darr v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 211.

NEGLIGENCE-Continued.

not such as to threaten immediate danger. (Super. Ct.)
Fick v. Jackson, 534.

A township maintained a road in close proximity and
parallel to a railroad and without any barricade. Plain-
tiff driving along the road, at a point from which it rose
and extended over a knoll, saw a railroad train approach-
ing, at the distance of 680 feet, and, to avoid danger,
started his horse up the road over the knoll. The horse
took fright, went over the bank, threw the plaintiff
against a car of the train, which passed over his foot.
necessitating an amputation: held, whether the plaintiff
had been guilty of contributory negligence was for the
jury. Sprowls v. Morris Township, 555.

When a person has been put in sudden peril by the
negligence of another, and to escape from that peril falls
upon another peril, it is immaterial whether, under dif-
ferent circumstances, he might and ought to have seen
the latter danger. Id.

NEGOTIATION FOR COMPROMISE. As
a rule, everything said or done by a party to a suit touch
ing the matter at issue, is admissible in evidence against
him. An exception to this rule is, that statements and
propositions made by way of compromise are not ad-
missible, but, to bring the case within the exception, it
must reasonably appear that what it is offered to prove
was said during an attempt at settlement. (Super. Ct.)
Orr v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 213.

The Act of May 29, 1885, section 10, requires a cor-
poration, taking land, to attempt to agree with the owner
of said land as to the damages payable for an easement
therein, and declarations, therefore, made in the course of
such an attempt, are inadmissible in a proceeding to recover
damages, when the land has been entered upon without
an agreement, but the fact that land has been offered to
the corporation by the plaintiff at a certain price, at a time
before the corporation had determined to enter on the
land, does not show an offer by way of compromise, and
is admissible. Id.

NEW TRIAL. The Supreme Court may, by the
Act of 1891, reverse a judgment, set aside the verdict
on which it is based and order a new trial, on the ground
that the damages, as shown by the testimony, are im-
proper, although the court below has been guilty of no
error during the trial. DEAN, J., dissents. Smith v.
Times Pub. Co, 329.

NON-RESIDENT. Security for costs will be re
quired, in all cases, whether of tort or contract, when
the plaintiff is a non-resident. The fact that the defend-
ant is also a non-resident, will not make an exception to
the rule. (C. P.) Stewart v. Welsbach Light and
General Fire Extinguisher Co., 68.

NON-SUIT. No appeal lies from the
judge at nisi prius to grant a non-suit.
Beard v. Reading City R. R. Co, 356;
Jameson. 387.

refusal of a
(Super. Ct.)
Wallace v.

NOTICE Testimony by a witness that he called
the attention of the director of a car company to the
weakened condition of its cable, is admissible to prove
notice to the company. Musser v. Lancaster Street
Railway Co., 37.

Covenants, of which a purchaser of property has no-
tice and subject to which he takes, may be enforced in
equity in Pennsylvania by mandatory, as well as by pro-
hibitory, injunction. Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. v.
Gettysburg and Harrisburg Ry. Co., 72.

The fact that the business name, used by incorporators
who have failed to record their certificate, is, in form,
the same as one commonly used by corporations, is
not sufficient to put one, dealing with them, upon inquiry
as to the status of the association. New York National
Exchange Bank v. Crowell, 228.

NOTICE-Continued.

In an action on a promis ory note against R., C., and
others as co-partners, the statement averred that R. and
C. carried on a storage business, as the R. and C. Cold
Storage Company; that, in 1892, they applied for a
charter in the name of the R. and C. Cold Storage Com
pany; that R. and C. subscribed for the greater part of
the shares; that the charter was granted and the busi-
ness continued, under the same name and in the same
place, until June, 1894, but the charter was not recorded
in the county, where the business was carried on, until
November, 1893; that, in September, 1893, the plaintiff
discounted the promissory note in suit, which was signed
with the name of the company by one N., treasurer,
drawn to the company's order and duly endorsed. The
statement further averred that the note was discounted
for value before maturity and without any knowledge,
on the part of the plaintiff, of an intention to form a cor-
poration. To this statement R. and C. filed an affidavit
of defence that the note was not given by them, nor
were they connected with the s'orage company, when it
was discounted; that, before it was issued, they had sold
out, to other persons, all their interest in the business
and assigned their shares, upon the books of the com-
pany, to the purchasers; that circulars were issued and
sent to all persons dealing with the concern, stating that
the defendants had no further connection with the busi-
ness. There was, however, no averment in the affida-
vit that the circulars were either sent to or received by
the plaintiff, or that any public notice or advertisement of
the withdrawal of these defendants from the business
had been given; held, the affidavit was insufficient. Id.

Where it appears that easements had become appur.
tenant to certain land, through the action of the com
mon owner of the servient and dominant tenements, the
right cannot be affected by a notice, given by a subse-
quent owner of the servient tenements, to discontinue the
easement. (Super. Ct.) Held v McBride, 284.

A notice given to a predecessor in title is not notice
to the owner of lind, unless he is in some way connected
with it by the evidence. Id.

Where a husband, for valuable consideration and
without prejudicing creditors, conveys land to his wife,
the recording of the deed is notice of her title, and
there ifter her possession of the land is as effectual as if
she had owned it when they entered and made their
home upon it and, while living upon it, the husband
cannot have a possession adverse to hers, or, by payment
of taxes upon it, impair her title. Reagle v. Reagle, 386.

Notice to the supervisor that a road is in bad condi-
tion is notice to the township, within which the road
is situated, as he is one of the officers, or agents, of the
township charged with the care of its highways. Platz
v. McKean Township, 480.

NUISANCE. In an action for trespass for dam-
ages resulting from a continuance of a nuisance, a ver-
dict and judgment for plaintiff in a former action, in
which the matter in controversy was the same, between
the parties, are conclusive evidence as to the existence
of the nuisance. (Super. Ct) Hartman v. Pittsburgh
Incline Plane Co., 27.

OFFICIAL SALARY. The Act of May 6,
1874, permits but one salary to be deducted from the
gros; receipts from fees, when the same person is Clerk
of the Orphans' Court, Register of Wills and Recorder
of Deeds, in order to ascertain the amount payable to
the Commonwealth by said person. Com nonwealth v.
Anderson. 132.

OIL LEASE. A clause in an oil lease, providing
for forfeiture in case of a failure by the lessee to perform
the covenants on his part, is solely for the benefit of the