Principles of Legiflation. By Charles Michell, of Forcett, Efq. 8vo. 1796.

S the most useful publications

As are not always the moft en

tertaining, thofe which are calulated chiefly for the inftruction of mankind are rarely perufed, except by the fmall circle of readers who are endowed with a clear underftanding and found judgment; and who, divefted of paffion or party fpirit, feek only for the improvement of the mind, or the means of meliorating the condition of the bulk of their fellowcreatures. The great mafs of men in every nation, though they feel oppreflion with as much fenfibility as the most enlightened, are rendered incapable, through the want of education, of finding out a remedy of precifely that degree of trength which is fufficient to re-move the evils of which they complain, without producing in its place any other grievance of equal or greater magnitude. Thofe who feel pain are unqueflionably beft able to tell in what part they are af fected, and how acute are their fufferings but it does not follow that they best know how to get rid of it without deftroying themselves. The cafe is the fame in the political as in the natural body. The poor can tell, for inftance, when the fcarcity of provifions raifes the price of them, and when the ufual fum with which they go to market will not produce the ufual fupply of food; but we may venture to fay that they are not the beft judges of the cau is of fcarcity, nor of the means either of guarding against or removing it. Some may

think that it arises from too (mall a divifion of farms, others from too great a confolidation of them; Tome from the policy of allowing an exportation of grain, others from want of a bounty on the importation; and fome from a radical defect in the organization of government, while others afcribe it to fome particular meafure purfued by adminiftration. Thefe various caufes having numbers of partizans, each propofing different remedies, and having nothing in common between them but the certain experience of the scarcity, the remedies, if left entirely to thofe who fuffer, must be as various as the parties propofing them; and, confequently, the evil, inftead of being deftroyed, would neceffarily be aggravated.

Fully convinced of the calamities that may be brought on fociety by a departure from found principles of legiflation, or by the adoption of fuch as are fuggefted by the uninformed, the prejudiced, or the defigning, the author of the work before us makes an appeal to the found fenfe of his countrymen, and calls them to the ferions confideration of the grounds on which political conftivations ought to be raised and maintained. Thofe who look into books only for amufement; thofe who are inca-. pable of feeing objects with calm philofophic temper and clearness, or whofe judgments are chained down in adamantine fetters by their paffions or by party connec tions; we advise to throw afide, without reading, the volume that we are going to review: but let it be feriously perufed by thofe who are in fearch only of truth, and who are ready to embrace it under

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whatever form it may prefent itfelf. Let fuch perfons open it, in the fully certainty of meeting with principles, we will not fay in all cafes irrefragably juft, but in general irrefiftibly true. They may be fure of finding calm difcuffion, and a fair appeal to their understanding. They will find the author the steady friend of rational liberty, and the determined enemy of defpotifm, whether arifing from the cold blooded tyranny of an individual, or from general confufion and anarchy. They will fee that Mr. M. combats many opinions which are at prefent extremely popular, not because they are entertained by a great part of the people, but because they are calculated, in his opinion, to injure the public, and to endanger the throne of liberty. There are many points in it on which we differ widely from Mr. M: but what work of equal extent, particularly in the prefent ferment, could be produced, that mutt command the acquiefcence of mankind in all its doctrines? His conceptions, indeed, are generally juft, and his arguments powerful; his knowledge of human nature is profound; his acquaintance with the hiftory of antient and modern times is extenfive and correct; and his powers of reasoning are to be furpaffed only by his moderation and temper-which failed but once (we believe) in the courfe of 513 pages, and that was when fpeaking of Thomas Paine.

Having thus characterized the publication before us, we will now proceed to give a fummary of its contents. It is divided into two books, the former fubdivided into eight, the latter into ten chapters.

The author fets out with a quotation from Mr. Burke's celebrated Reflections on the French revolu tion, "that circumftances alone render every political principle beneficial or obnoxious ;" and he ftrongly controverts the truth of it, or at least thews that it might lead to error from the ambiguity of the term "political." Politics, he obferves, is a word that ferves to exprefs both the whole fcience of government, and the art and practice of adminiftering public affairs. It ought, therefore, to be afcertained in which fenfe it is ufed. Legiflation he employs as a more proper, because an unambiguous term, for exprefling the former. He fays it may be refolv ed into principles that are invariable; and that the mode only of applying them depends on the circumftances of the moment. The doctrine of expediency, he admits, may be ufeful to a statesman actually engaged in the government of a particular nation: but even with him the author would have it operate only negatively.

Circumftances (fays he) may render pernicious a meafure abftractedly good, but no circumstances can render permanently beneficial ameafure abstractedly bad. A vir- . tuous and intelligent ftatefman is influenced by expediency no further, than if occafion requires to defift from action. Unlike the mariner who is ignorant of navigation, and who therefore, for the fake of immediate ease and safety from whatever point the wind may blow, fteers his hip right before it: he proceeds in spite of adverse winds, by an oblique courfe, to his defined port, or at the worst cafts anchor, For from that extremity

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tremity to which the feaman is fome times expofed, of being forced to feud before the ftorm, the statefman is or ought to be exempt. The elements which he has to manage, the paffions, habits, and prejudices of the people, are in fome degree under his controul or guidance; and if ever a political tempeft arifes, it must be afcribed to fome grofs violation, immediate or remote, of the principles of legiflation *.*

Mr. Michell blames thofe who, at the prefent moment, fee in our. political conftitution nothing but perfection, while its affailants are pointing out numberless defects in it. General panegyric oppofed to general cenfure does not, in his mind, convey any idea of ability in the defenders of our own frame of government; and nothing honourable to it can be derived from the arguments of those who defend it only by pointing out greater defects in the French conftitution :

He then proceeds to examine the principles that the French have laid down as fundamental maxims of legislation, which he reduces to

vours either mental or corporeal a difference, however, "and a great one, exifts between individuals of all ranks, and it is produced not by nature but by education, occupation, and exertion. The two former, he obferves, separates by an immenfe fpace the favage from the civilized man, and the clown from the gentleman; the latter produces a diftinction not much lefs between one gentleman and another. He contends that it is only in an age of general corruption and apathy refpecting the duties of citizens, that one man fo far excels his contemporaries; and that, as the depreffion of one wave is neceffary to raise another to the appearance of a mountainous height, he is indebted for his fuper-eminence as much to their indolence as to his own exertions.

Integrity diftinguishes one able man from another, as much as ability diftinguishes an enlightened from an ignorant man. Men, therefore, he concludes, ought not to be placed on a footing of equality in the fervice of the public; the man of fenfe ought to be preferred to the blockhead; and the man of fenfe and honefty united, to him who poffeffes the former without the latter. The chief care of a legiflator fhould be to infure the integrity of thofe who must be trufted; and if that be inflexible, we may be fatisfied that their abilities will prove equal to their duties.'

In his IId chapter, he purfues the confideration of the equality of rights; and he maintains that, in

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the acceptation of the term by the French, it is either inapplicable to or fubverfive of their fyftem of legiflation. Equal protection from the power of government, and from the injuftice of individuals, he admits to be the right of every man in fociety; and on this point he makes this judicious remark:

Civil rights may be as facred in an abfolute monarchy, as in a pure democracy in neither, is there much fecurity that they will continue fo. But the degree of authority which the fovereignty affumes over its fubjects is by no means a criterion of liberty, for perfonal independence is often moft reftrained in conftitutions that are efteemed most free.'

The inequality of rights exemplified in the exemptions from certain burthens of the ftate enjoyed by privileged orders, he traces up to times of conqueft, when the conquerors affumed to themfelves privileges which they did not allow to the conquered.

Latterly indeed, (fays he,) all peasants, whether defcended from the conquerors or their fubjects, became vaffals; but it was because, in those times of confufion and violence, the poor Frank, unable to defend himself, voluntarily furrendered his liberty, in order to obtain protection under the wing of a powerful chieftain. And although all the ftates of Europe may thew privileged orders, exempt from the burthens which bear on the community, this is the remnant of what conquerors formerly arrogated to themfelves, and what no one pretends to justify.'

It is not neceffary, he obferves, to annhilate a conftitution and diforganize a nation, in order to force privileges bodies to make a facri

fice of fuch exemptions; in France, at leaft, it certainly was not neceffary, because, whether from virtue or neceffity, the French nobles were ready to furrender them without a ftruggle. The exemptions and the rank which the nobility enjoyed he confiders in a very different point of view; the former, he fays, ought to be abolished as originating from the arrogance of conquerors oppreffing or guarding against a vanquished nation; the latter ought to be retained as de-rived from found principles of legiflation, tending to the general benefit of the community. The views of the French, when contending for the equality of rights, he infifts, are political powers, the public offices of governments; and the filling of them, he maintains, ought not to be called a right, but a duty. In this fenfe he fhews that, inftead of faying every man has a right to afpire to fuch offices, we ought to fay that the ftate has a right to call on every man, according to his capacity, to take his thare in the fervice of his country. This leads him to confiderations refpecting the army and navy. When citizens with to ferve only in lucrative or eafy ftations, either. the public fervice must stand still, or government must have recourse to meafures the moft harfh and apparently incompatible with liberty, in order to keep up a public force by both land and fea for the general defence.

From the whole he deduces the following inferences:

The various offices of ftate are duties created by fociety, not rights brought by men into fociety, and poffeffed antecedent to it. The object therefore of the focial union could not be as the French legiflaL14

our natural, civil, and political rights";" for this laft right (if they will ufe the term) has exiflence only fubfequent to, and in confequence of, the formation of fociety. The natural rights of men, in which it is allowed all continue equal, are not infringed, although the offices of fate are restricted to particular claffes. And their civil rights may be equally refpected or violated in any form of government whatever; if the latter fhould happen, no more is proved, than that the governors neglect or betray their duty.'

In chapter III, book I. Mr. M. examines another favourite pofition of the French revolutionifts, viz." the will of the majority is binding on the whole;" and he controverts it, if not with complete fuccefs, at leaft with great ingenuity. His firft objection is founded on the difficulty, if not impoffibility, of afcertaining what is the unbiaffed will of the majority of a nation as to any particular queftion:

In cities, (fays he,) a very fmall portion of the inhabitants may, with the advantages of union and preconcerted operations, dictate with uncontrollable authority to the whole. The lefs fanguinary Romans (among whom this principle prevailed) were content to furround the forum, and preoccupy all the avenues to the huftings with an armed mob, by means of which the moft alert faction pailed what laws it pleased. The ferocious Parifians, by a liberal exercife of the lanthorn and pike, awe

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compel them to adopt the fame opinions. As to the will of a great nation, we need only refer to the arguments fo often used by our oppofition, to prove the futility of addreffes, as evincive of the general opinion. The fame arguments may be applied with equal force to petitions or refolutions of any kind, on any particular queftion, from corporate bodies or diftricts. It is more difficult indeed for a faction. to establish a tyrannic fway over an extenfive country, than over a fingle city; but that fway, if once eftablished, is, from the obftacles which the difcontented meet in their endeavours to form a union, far more fecure. The inferior but united force of Paris itself, awed into acquiefcence by a faction, has eafily quelled the fucceflive infurrections in La Vendee, Lyons, Marfeilles, Toulon, and various other places and provinces of France; though there can be no doubt but that the difcontented would, if united, as easily have overwhelmed the city of Paris.'

Suppofing this difficulty about afcertaining the will of the majority to be removed, there would remain a strong objection to the principle itfelf He allows, for argumentation, the right of the majority of a nation to change the conftitution from monarchy to a republic, or its religion from chriftianity to paganifm: but it does not follow that the majority has any right to legiflate for the minority: Such a change as is above stated, be contends, would amount to a diffolution of the compact on which

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