was mud in the route, and whether it interposed an obstacle to the march, than an official sitting in his study, and evidently bent on showing that there was nothing in the way to impede "the onward march of soldiers determined to do their duty."

1. Griffin.-"I know that the artillery which followed the brigade, that is, a carriage or two of the artillery which followed the brigade, got stuck in the mud, or in a little creek, and had trouble in getting out. (P. 161.)

2. Butterfield. In answer to a question by the Judge-Advocate, he said: "I know that after it had got to be about daylight, I went out to the head of my column, and I found a difficult place to cross-that there was difficulty in getting the troops across. I could see that it had been dark, and the troops had been impeded, but they began to go on more rapidly, as light broke.'

He was then asked again by the JudgeAdvocate to "state the character of the difficulty—the character of the place it mud or water, or what was it?" he answered:

was

And

"It was mud and water both-one of those streams that we almost always have to force troops over. In the daytime you could force them over very well-but at night, when it can not be seen, it is a very difficult thing to get men across such a place." (P. 187.)

This testimony of Butterfield is not even alluded to in the review. Then, unless Griffin and Butterfield swear falsely, (for mistake as to such facts was impossible,) notwithstanding the hypothesis of the Judge-Advocate, resting on the existence of dust on portions of the road, there was mud and water in other portions, and to an extent interposing obstacles "to the onward march of soldiers determined to do their duty." But, finally, on this head. Why is it, that Porter, alone of the command is accused of want of "haste or vigor"?

As commander of the entire corps, his duty was but to issue the necessary orders to his division commanders, for the march. And this they all say, was done. It was their duty to superintend the execution of

the orders. They are equally responsible for disregard of duty, as their immediate chief. He relied, as he had a right to rely, upon them to conduct the march with proper "haste" and "vigor.” He had every reason for such reliance. They had been under his command on many battlefields. He had seen them in the midst of countless perils, ever foremost in danger, unsurpassed in skill, and nobly devoted to duty. "To do their duty," he knew them to be "soldiers determined." If there was any failure, then, in the speed of the march, it is to be referred to them, and not to him." And yet, who has ever called their patriotism, or their efforts in regard to it, in question ? The Government certainly has not. They are now, and have been continuously, from the twenty-seventh of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, in its service, and on duty. To hold Porter responsible for their alleged misconduct, (for which, however, there is not the least ground,) and not only not even to censure them, but to keep them in honored commands, is an unequal measure of justice, that amounts to a gross and palpable wrong. One victim, however, was enough. To have sacrificed to the behest of party, or to the exigencies of an ill-planned campaign, and of an unfortunately selected Commander, Morell, Griffin and Butterfield, would have been too glaringly to have outraged public opinion, and it was not done. But the very omission of passing by these officers, and visiting upon their immediate chief, the sole responsibility for the asserted want of haste and vigor in the march of the twentyeighth of August, which, if it was true, was their fault, and not his, demonstrates the depth and the enormity of the injustice done to Porter.

SECOND SPECIFICATION-FIRST CHARGE.

II. The second specification of the first charge is, Porter's failure to obey the joint order to himself and McDowell of the twenty-ninth August, eighteen hundred' and sixty-two. That order was as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

CENTREVILLE, August 29th, 1862. "GENERALS MCDOWELL AND PORTER: "You will please move forward with your joint command towards Gainesville.

mand the whole," then, at least, in the absence of any direction from himself to the contrary, Pope is to be assumed to have so intended.

The different view taken by the JudgeAdvocate serves to deprive Porter of the defense to this specification, that in what he is charged to have done, or to have omitted, in supposed violation of this order, he acted under the command of General McDowell, his senior in rank.

The very fact that such a view is taken by the Judge-Advocate, satisfactorily shows, that he thought the opposite one would, upon the evidence, be a full answer to the specification. He seeks also to maintain his interpretation upon the further ground, that the article "excludes the idea of the presence of an officer superior in rank to those commanding the different corps of which it speaks." Certainly it does. But was Pope present when he gave the order? when it was received? or was being executed? The Judge-Advocate does not say he was, but does say he " was absent but a few miles." How many miles, he does not inform the President, or how many miles would, in his opinion, constitute absence and not presence. As the fact in this connection was material, he should have stated if he knew, and he ought to have known, the evidence being before him, how far off Pope was, that the President might judge, as he gave no opinion of his own to guide him, whether such distance was absence or not. Pope was at Centreville, a distance of twelve miles.

To

say then that he was present would seem to be absurd. The Article looks to present and immediate joint duty.

It was such duty that the order embraced: The two commands were to act together. The officers were told to "move forward with your joint command toward Gainesville." It contemplated its union with the forces of Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, and that that occurring, "the whole force should halt." They were also told, "that the troops (that is, all of them) must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning." In the forward movement of the two corps, who was to command? Who to give the order to halt? Who to de

cide upon the position to be held to enable the command to reach Bull Run that night or morning?

The Article contemplates this very state of things, and provides for it. "If on marches," or "doing duty together" different corps of the army shall happen to join, the officer highest in rank of the line of the army, "shall command the whole, and give orders for what is needful to the service." No matter how the junction is brought about, when it exists, the Article embraces it, and establishes a positive rule, that "the officer highest in rank in the line of the army" is to command the whole with the single exception that it shall be "otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States." To hold that, under the circumstances of this joint command, what was to be done in executing the joint order, was to be done by Pope, who was twelve miles distant, upon the theory that he was, notwithstanding, to be considered present, every one will see is wholly untenable. How was he to judge when to move the command? when to halt, or what position to take with a view to retire to Bull Run that night or the next morning? These two corps were placed by the order and the sixty-second Article under the command of McDowell. No one but the President had the authority to take the command out of the operation of that Article. And even if Pope thought that he had the power, he did not attempt to exert it by the joint order.

II. The specification does not state in what particular the order was disobeyed. It only alleges that Porter "did then and there disobey."

and King, was a violation of the joint order to himself and McDowell." (P. 308.)

As this is the only information we have of what was considered by the Court disobedience, it would be sufficient to confine these remarks to that point. But, as the Judge-Advocate has suggested many things, tending to disparage Porter in other particulars, these will be first noticed.

I. It is said, that when the two corps were together, and the front of Porter's column (his corps being in advance) "had reached some three miles beyond Bethlehem Church," "General McDowell then rode forward to the head of the column of the accused, when an interview and conference took place between them. They discussed the joint order, and General McDowell determined, for himself, that there were considerable advantages to be gained by departing from it," and by moving with his forces along the Sudley Springs road toward the field of a battle, then being fought by the main army of General Pope, at the distance of three or four miles. His purpose was to throw himself on the enemy's centre, and he wished the accused to attack his right flank. He then said to Porter: "You put your forces in here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of troops engaged at that point with the enemy." (P. 307.)

From this statement, the reader will suppose that McDowell considered himself entitled to direct Porter's movement. The Judge-Advocate should at least be consistent with himself. If upon the theory that Pope was to be considered as present, Porter was not under McDowell's command, then the latter had no right to direct his movements. Of these Porter had the sole control, subject only to Pope.

If they were to "act independently of each other," (and the Judge-Advocate says they were to do so,) and that such was Pope's "intention," then if McDowell's alleged direction to Porter was given authoritatively, it was but intrusive. If on the contrary, as in this part of his review, the Judge-Advocate implies, a different opinion of their relation toward

each other, is the correct one, Porter was under the command of McDowell, then it is most important to ascertain what order, if any, was given by the latter to Porter. If he was subject to McDowell's command, (as it is confidently believed, and as in this part of his argument, is conceded by the Judge-Advocate,) then his duty in the execution of the joint order was to act in subordination to that officer. And if in doing so, the joint order was disobeyed, the offender was McDowell, not Porter. Where was McDowell, when he gave the order to Porter, and what was that order?

I. He was present with the joint command, and had the control of it. His leaving it afterward, and going with his own corps to another part of the field, in no way impairs the validity or effect of his prior order; whatever that was, Porter was bound to obey it.

II. If McDowell gave an order, what was it?

The Judge-Advocate would have us believe, that it was that Porter should attack "the enemy's right flank"-should put his "force in here," meaning, in front of the then locality of the two corps. He does not intimate even, that a word was uttered by McDowell contrary to this alleged order, and yet the proof is clear, (McDowell to the contrary, notwithstanding,) that there was an order, and not only that, but that the one alleged was not given at all.

I. Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, Chief of Porter's staff, and his Assistant AdjutantGeneral. He saw McDowell on the twenty-ninth, "on the ground where he had taken up our position in the direction of Gainesville, and near the Manassas Railroad," ""where Porter was forming his corps in line of battle." "He had made considerable progress in the disposition of his troops, a battery was in position, and the troops were being deployed. Skirmishers were being thrown out in front." On seeing it, McDowell said: "Porter, you are out too far already, this is no place to fight a battle." (P. 135.)