NATURALIZATION. The following ar ethe statutory provisions under which Mr. Cannon was naturalized: "Any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or any of them, on the following conditions, and not otherwise: "First. That he shall have declared, on oath or affirmation, before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of some one of the States, or of the Territorial districts of the United States, or a circuit court or district court of the United States, three years at least before his admission, that it was, bona fide, his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whereof such alien may, at the time, be a citizen or subject. "Secondly. That he shall at the time of his application to be admitted, declare, on oath or affirmation, before some one of the courts aforesaid, that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state, or sov. eignty whereof he was before a citizen or subject; which proceedings shall be recorded by the clerk of the court. "Thirdly. That the court, admitting such alien, shall be satisfied that he has resided within the United States five years at least, and within the State or Territory, where such court is at the time held, one year at least; and it shall further appear to their satisfaction that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same, provided that the oath of the applicant shall, in no case, be allowed to prove his residence." (2 Stat., 153.) "Any alien, being a free white person and a minor, under the age of twenty-one years, who shall have resided in the United States three years next preceding his arriving at the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have continued to reside therein to the time he may make application to be admitted a citizen thereof, may, after he has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and after he shall have resided five years within the United States, including the three years of his minority, be admitted a citizen of the United States, without having made the declaration required in the first condition of the first section of the act to which this is in addition, three years previous to his admission; provided such alien shall make the declaration required therein at the time of his or her admission; and shall further declare, on oath, and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that for three years next preceding it has been the bona fide intention of such alien to become a citizen of the United States, and shall, in all other respects, comply with the laws in regard to naturalization." (4 Stat., 69.) The last paragraph was enacted May 26, 1824; the others, April 14, 1802. The record of the court is in these words: United States first district court for the Territory of Utah. "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "Territory of Utah, Great Salt Lake County, 88: "Be it remembered that on the seventh day of December, A. D. 1854, George Q. Cannon, a subject of Queen Victoria, made application and satisfied the court that he came to reside in the United States before he was eighteen years of age, and thereupon the said George Q. Cannon appeared in open court and was sworn in due form of law, and on his oath did say that for three years last past it has been his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce and abjure, forever, all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, and sovereignty whatever. And thereupon, the court being satisfied by the oaths of Joseph Cain and Elias Smith, two citizens of the United States, that the said George Q. Cannon for one year last past has resided in this Territory, and for four years previous thereto he resided in the United States; that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character; that he is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order of the inhabitants thereof, admitted him to be a citizen of the same; and thereupon the said George Q. Cannon was in due form of law sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and absolutely and entirely to renounce and abjure, forever, all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, and sovereignty whatever, and particularly to Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, whose subject he heretofore has been. "In testimony whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the seal of H. Mis. 35- -42 said court, this seventh day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States the seventy-ninth. "[L. S.] W. I. APPLEBY, Clerk." The certificate of naturalization granted to Mr. Cannon is in the same form, with the exception that instead of the words " Queen Victoria," which appear in the second line of the record, the words "Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland," are used in the certificate. The certificate bears the seal of the first district court of Utah. The record does not. The doctrine that the judgment of naturalization is conclusive on the question of residence, as upon all similar preliminary questions, is not only clear upon principle, but is well settled by the authorities, from which, to avoid repetition, full citations will be made at this point for use on other questions as well as that now under consideration. In the case of Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176, the Supreme Court of the United States held as follows: "In support of the first objection it is contended that, although the oath prescribed by the second section of the act of Congress entitled 'An act to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject,' passed the 29th of January, 1795, was administered to the said William Currie, by a court of competent jurisdiction, still it does not appear by the certificate granted to him by the court, and appearing in the record, that he was by the judgment of the court, admitted a citizen, or that the court was satisfied that during the term of two years, mentioned in the same section, he had behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. "It is true that this requisite to his admission is not stated in the certificate; but it is the opinion of this court, that the court of Suffolk must have been satisfied as to the character of the applicant, or otherwise a certificate, that the oath prescribed by law had been taken, would not have been granted. "It is unnecessary to decide whether, in the order of time, this satisfaction, as to the character of the applicant, must be first given, or whether it may not be required after the oath is administered, and, if not then given, whether a certificate of naturalization must not be withheld. But if the oath be administered, and nothing appears to the contrary, it may be presumed, that the court before whom the oath was taken, was satisfied as to the character of the applicant. The oath, when taken, confers upon him the rights of a citizen, and amounts to a judgment of the court for his admission to those rights. It is, therefore, the unanimous opinion of the court that William Currie was duly naturalized." The certificate of naturalization, granted to Currie, and the record thereof, remaining in the clerk's office, were both in the following words: "At a district court held at Suffolk, October the 14th, 1795, William Currie, late of Scotland, merchant, who hath immigrated into this commonwealth, this day, in open court, in order to entitle himself to the rights and privileges of a citizen, made oath that, for two years last past, he hath resided in and under the jurisdiction of the United States, and for one year, within this commonwealth, and also that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, or other state, whatsoever, particularly to the King of Great Britain. "A copy.-Teste: "JOHN C. LITTLEPAGE." In this case, an authenticated copy of the record of which is filed with the commit tee, the Supreme Court of the United States established the following doctrines: 1. The grant of a certificate of naturalization, showing that the oath of citizenship prescribed by law was taken, is conclusive proof that such oath was taken. 2. The grant of such a certificate is conclusive proof that the court was satisfied that the applicant had, during the period mentioned in the statute, behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. 3. The oath, when taken, confers upon the applicant the rights of a citizen, and amounts to a judgment of the court for his admission to those rights. 4. The fact that the record of naturalization remaining in the clerk's office does not expressly show that the applicant was admitted to citizenship, does not impair the conclusive effect of the certificate granted. 5. The fact that such record does not expressly show that any proof was made or adjudication had upon the question of good character, or of attachment to the prin ciples of the Constitution, or of devotion to the welfare of the country, does not impair the conclusive effect of the certificate granted. This doctrine of the conclusiveness of the certificate of naturalization is supported by the most cogent reasons. Applicants for naturalization in the United States are not generally well informed respecting our laws or the methods of our courts. If irregularity or error should creep into the record not one applicant in one hundred would be able to detect it, even if he had, as he has not, the right enjoyed in ordinary proceedings inter partes to be heard on the form of the record or the mode of its entry. He takes the certificate which the court gives him, and, in the faith that he is a citizen of the United States thenceforth through life, performs acts which, if his naturalization is invalid, are crimes, makes oaths which are unauthorized or false, bargains which are ruinous to others or to himself; exercises without right the functions of the juror in cases involving property, liberty, and even life; and holds offices in which he is a mere usurping interloper. The calamities to which the great body of our naturalized immigrants would be exposed if the validity of their naturalization should be made to depend upon the accuracy or regularity of the official work of clerks of courts would only be equaled by those to which other citizens would be subjected by the blameless but unlawful acts of men who, though citizens by reputation, were only foreigners in law. In re Coleman, 15 Blatchf., 406, the court said: "The main question discussed on the hearing of the writ was whether the certificate of citizenship which Coleman used was unlawfully issued. It was contended by the attorney for the United States that the certificate was unlawfully issued, because there was no matter of record in the superior court on which to found it; and that what has been found in and produced from the books and files of that court does not constitute a record of the naturalization of Coleman. * "It is hardly to be supposed that Congress intended to make the applicant for citizenship responsible for a non-compliance with any other conditions than such as he had the power to comply with. The applicant can declare his intention, and can take the prescribed oath and make the renunciation. But he cannot see to it that the proceedings and renunciation are recorded. He can produce a witness as to his residence and character, and can appear, in person, in the proper court, and be sworn there in open court, with his witness as to the matters prescribed in the statute. When this is done, he can do nothing more, except to receive such a certificate from the court as that which Coleman received from the court-a certificate which sets forth that it is given by the court, under its seal; that Coleman appeared in the court, on a day named, and applied to it to become a citizen, and produced to it such evidence and made such declaration and renunciation, and took such oaths as are required by the acts of Congress on the subject; and that, thereupon, the court ordered that he be admitted, and he was accordingly admitted by the court, to be a citizen of the United States. When he has done what the certificate says he has done, and when he leaves with the clerk of the court such papers as he has signed, and when the court tells him, as it does by the certificate, that, he having done all that, the court had thereupon ordered that he be admitted to be a citizen, and when the court gives the certificate into his keeping, he has done all he can to comply with the statute. "As said before, there must be an act of admission by the court. But the court has a right to say what it will regard as its order that the applicant be admitted, and what it will regard as his admission. Whatever the court says is its act of admission, and whatever the court says is its order of admission, is such act and such order, whenever the question is brought up in a collateral proceeding, provided there is sufficient to reasonably amount to such act and such order. Here the superior court has said to Coleman by the certificate that he has complied with all the requirements of the statute, and that it has made an order thereupon that he be admitted to be a citizen, and that it has admitted him to be a citizen. "The fact that there is no record in the court of any order directing the establishment and keeping of the volumes containing entries of naturalizations between 1858 and 1874 is of no consequence. The very keeping of them for so long a period is equivalent to an order that they be kept, and the absence of any order or practice, during that period, as to any other form of order of admission or record of admission, shows that what was kept and done is to be regarded as a record and as the record." In Spratt v. Spratt (4 Pet., 393), the court held as follows: "As James Spratt arrived within the United States after the passage of the act of 1802, he is embraced by the second section of that act, and was under the necessity of reporting himself to the clerk, as that section requires. Must this report be made five years before he can be admitted as a citizen? "The law does not in terms require it. The third condition of the first section provides that the court admitting such alien shall be satisfied that he has resided within the United States five years at least, but does not prescribe the testimony which shall be satisfactory. This section was in force when James Spratt was admitted to become a citizen, and was applicable to his case. But the second section requires, in addition, that he shall report himself in the manner prescribed by that section; and requires that such report shall be exhibited 'on his application to be naturalized, as evidence of the time of his arrival within the United States.' The law does not say that this report shall be the sole evidence, nor does it require that the alien shall report himself within any limited time after his arrival. Five years may intervene between his arrival and report, and yet the report will be valid. The report is undoubtedly conclusive evidence of the arrival, and must be so received by the court, but if the law intended to make it the only admissible evidence, and to exclude the proof which had been held sufficient, that intention ought to have been expressed. Yet the inference is very strong from the language of the act, that the time of the arrival must be proved by this report, and that a court about to admit an alien to the rights of citizenship, ought to require its production. But is it anything more than evidence which ought indeed to be required to satisfy the judgment of the court, but the want of which cannot annul that judgment! The judgment has been rendered in a form which is unexceptionable. Can we look behind it, and inquire on what testimony it was produced? "The act does not require that the report shall be mentioned in the judgment of the court, or shall form a part of the certificate of citizenship. The judgment and certificate are valid, though they do not allude to it. This furnishes reason for the opinion that the act directed this report as evidence for the court, but did not mean that the act of admitting the alien to become a citizen should be subject to revision at all times afterwards, and to be declared a nullity if the report of arrival should not have been made five years previous to such admission. The various acts upon the subject submit the decision on the right of aliens to admission as citizens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and, like every other judg ment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." In Ritchie r. Putnam (13 Wend., 524) the court said: "It need not appear by the record that all the preliminary requisites to a naturalization were complied with. The judgment of the court admitting the alien to become a citizen is conclusive evidence upon that point." In McCarthy v. Marsh (1 Seld., 263) the court held: "The second question is whether the respondent was lawfully admitted a citizen of the United States by the court of common pleas of Saratoga County at the Angust term thereof, 1834, and this resolves itself into a question of evidence. "The respondent produced the record of his admission, which was in due form and according to law. The appellants claimed that this was not sufficient, and that the respondent was bound to go farther, and prove that he had in due form of law, more than two years before his admission, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, insisting that such declaration was a condition precedent, with which the respondent must show he had complied; and the appellants further claimed that notwithstanding it was stated in the record that it appeared to the court that the respondent had more than two years before declared in due form of law his intention to become a citizen, yet that fact was open to inquiry, and they proceeded to give proof rendering it somewhat doubtful whether the respondent ever had declared his intention in due form of law. "The simple question then is, whether the record is conclusive evidence of the fact that a prior declaration of intention was made in due form of law. The weight of authority is decidedly in the affirmative. (Authorities cited.) "These authorities accord with the general principle that a record of the proceedings and judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive evidence of the facts appearing therein. All courts look with favor upon proceedings to admit aliens to citizenship, and it is just that they should; for the want of acquaintance with our laws and judicial proceedings, the unsettledness of their residences in general for some years, and the consequent liability to lose their documents and papers, should shield them from technical and sharp objections to their naturalization papers whenever there appears to have been an honest intention to become a citizen and comply with the laws of our country." In Priest v. Cummings (16 Wend., 616) the court said: "As to the second objection, the act requires that the court shall be satisfied that the applicant sustains a good moral character, &c., in addition to his residence; but it does not prescribe the kind of testimony to be received, except that his own oath shall not be taken to prove his residence. Beyond this, the species and amount of proof rest entirely in the discretion of the court." In State v. Penny (10 Ark., 616) the attorney-general took this position: "The judgment of the court admitting him as a citizen is not conclusive, and the regularity of the proceedings may be inquired into." In reply the attorney for the defendant said: "It is well settled that the judgment of the court admitting the alien to become a citizen is conclusive proof that the prerequisites of the law have been complied with, and it need not appear by the record of naturalization." The court held : "Until reversed, the judgment rendered, as shown by the transcript, is conclusive of its own validity, and closes the door behind it to all inquiry." There were some other statements made by Contestee Campbell relating to other matters connected with Mr. Cannon's naturalization, but they were of so frivolous a character that no further consideration of them is deemed necessary. We think the judgment of naturalization and the certificate issued thereon is conclusive. POLYGAMY. The grave and important question as to whether polygamy is a disqualification for the office of Delegate from the Territories we think is settled by the Constitution, the laws, and the uniform practice of the Government since its formation, now nearly one hundred years. As to who shall hold seats in Congress, there are two distinct provisions of the Constitution: Section 5, Article I of the Constitution is as follows: Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business. This provision in its operation requires only a majority vote. The other provision is, "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." (Second clause, section 5, Article I.) The qualifications of Representatives are prescribed by the second section of the first article of the Constitution: They shall be twentyfive years of age, seven years a citizen of the United States, and, when elected, be inhabitants of the State in which they shall be chosen. This committee is to report upon "the prima facie right or the final right of the claimants to the seat as the committee shall deem proper." It must be conceded, as we have seen, that Cannon has an overwhelming majority of the votes cast for Delegate to Congress. We think, also, it must be conceded, from the facts evidenced in the case by the record, that Cannon possesses the Constitutional qualifications prescribed by second section of Article I of the Constitution. Mr. Cannon, at the time of his election, was over twenty-five years of age, had been seven years a citizen of the United States, and was an inhabitant of the Territory in which he was chosen. These are the only qualifications to be considered. There is no power, State or Federal, under the Constitution by which these qualifications can be changed, enlarged, or modified in any man ner. The authorities upon this question are all one way. In the report of the Committee on Elections of the House in the Fortythird Congress, in the case of Maxwell against Cannon, and upon this point, the committee say: The practice of the House has been so uniform and seems so entirely in harmony with the letter of the Constitution that the committee can but regard the jurisdictional question as a bar to the consideration of qualifications other than those above specified. This is the rule we think should be applied to the case before the House. The following are some of the authorities on this point: Story on the |