garded as members in any constitutional sense, because their powers, duties, and privileges on the floor of the House, when admitted, are limited. They may speak for their Territories; they may advocate such measures as they think proper; they may introduce bills and serve on committees; but they are deprived of the right to vote. And we doubt whether Congress could clothe them with the right to vote on measures affecting the people of the States or of the Territories, because they do not represent any integral part of the nation, but simply an unorganized territory belonging to the whole people. Hence Delegates are creatures of statute, and it would be competent at any time for the legislative branch of the Government to abolish the office altogether.

It is in

The writer of this report goes further than that. He holds that it is incompetent for Congress and the Executive to impose on any future House the right of Delegates to seats with defined qualifications. That is to say, when the several laws were passed giving the Territories the right to this limited representation, those laws were binding only on the lower House, which permitted them to be or made it possible for them to be passed, and were persuasive only to the Houses of future Congresses. For some purposes each House of Congress is a separate, independent branch of the Government. It is made so by the Constitution. For example, each house is the judge of the elections and returns of its own members, and neither the Executive nor the Senate can interfere with that constitutional prerogative. Each House is independent in its expenditure of its contingent fund, and in the government of its own officers. dependent in the formation of its own committees, in clothing them with power to take evidence, to send for persons and papers, and to investigate such matters as are within its jurisdiction. Each House is independent in its power to arrest and to imprison, during the session of the body, such contumacious witnesses as refuse to abide its order. In many other instances that may be cited each House acts independently of the other. And with reference to the election of Delegates, who (if they hold any office or franchise at all) can be nothing but agents representing the property and common territory of all the people, it operates only on the lower branch of Congress, for their election extends no right to them to interfere with the business of the Senate or to act as members thereof. This must not be construed into an opinion that the writer holds that the House of Representatives may disregard any law which Congress has the constitutional power to pass. Such laws are as binding upon this House as upon any citizen or court. Nor does the writer of this report mean to be understood that it is not competent for Congress to provide, under the Constitution, for legislative representa tion for Territories, but it is denied that Congress can bind the House by any law respecting the qualification of a Delegate. It cannot affixa qualification by law for a Delegate and bind any House except the one assenting thereto. The qualification of members is fixed by the Consti tution. Hence they may not be added to or taken from by law. But as to Delegates, they are not constitutional officers. Their qualification depends entirely upon such a standard as the body to which they are attached may make. It is urged this means a legal qualification. This is admitted; but that legal qualification is remitted to the body to which the Delegate is attached, because it is the sole judge of that requisite. It is unfettered by constitutional restrictions and cannot yield any part of this prerogative to the other branch of Congress or the Executive. If it could, the right to amend would follow, and the House might find itself in the awkward position of having the Senate fixing qualifications to Delegates, or the Executive vetoing laws fixing them, and by this

means the power which by the Constitution resides alone in the House would be entirely abrogated. It is claimed this is an autocratic power. This is admitted. All legislative bodies are autocratic in their powers unless restricted by written constitutions. In this instance there is no restriction.

It is contended that the act of Congress extending the Constitution and laws of the United States over the Territory of Utah, in all cases where they are applicable, extends the constitutional privilege to Delegates and clothes them with membership as constitutional officers of the House. We cannot assent to that view. The very language of the act itself only extends the Constitution and laws over the Territory in cases where they are applicable. They cannot be applicable to the election of a Delegate; for if they were, then Congress would have no authority to deprive a Delegate of the right to vote. To contend that the applicability of the Constitution in that respect extends to Delegates proves too much. It is clear, therefore, that that clause of the Constitution relative to the expulsion of a member by a two-thirds vote cannot apply to Delegates, because they hold no constitutional office. It is equally clear that the clause of the Constitution relative to elections, returns, and qualifications of members has no applicability except by parity of reasoning; and we do not dissent from the view that, so far as the qualification of citizenship and other necessary qualifications (except as to age) are concerned, they extend to Delegates as well as to members. (Sec. 1906, R. S. U. S.) This is made so, probably, by the statute, expressly so to all the Territories except to Utah Territory, and inferentially to that Territory. It follows, as a logical sequence, that the House may at any time, by a majority vote, exclude from the limited membership which it now extends to Delegates from Territories any person whom it may judge to be unfit for any reason to hold a seat as a Delegate.

It cannot be said that polygamy can be protected under that clause of the Constitution protecting every one in the worship of God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and prohibiting the passage of laws preventing the free exercise thereof.

It is true that vagaries may be indulged by persons under this clause of the Constitution when they do not violate law or outrage the considerate judgment of the civilized world. But when such vagaries trench upon good morals, and debauch or threaten to debauch public morals, such practice should be prohibited by law like any other evil not practiced as a matter of pretended conscience.

The views which we have just expressed render it unnecessary for us to discuss further the various propositions involved. In the face of this admission of Mr. Cannon we feel compelled to say that a representative from that Territory should be free from the taint and obloquy of plural wives. Having admitted that he practices, teaches and advises others to the commission of that offense, we feel it our duty to say to the people of that Territory that we will exclude such persons from representing them in this House. In saying this we desire to cast no imputation on the contestant personally, because in his deportment and conduct in all other respects he is certainly the equal of any other person on this floor.

This leaves one other question for decision, namely: Is Mr. Campbell entitled to the seat, having received only a minority of the votes cast? We are aware that in England authorities are found for the position that votes cast for ineligible persons are simply void, and that those cast for a person qualified (even though in the minority) are effectual, and that thereby the candidate against whom the majority of voters

declared may receive the office. In a few of the States of the Union this principle applies, but the great weight of American authority is to the contrary, and we do not hesitate to say that the better doctrine is that a minority of legal votes does not elect. We therefore say that Mr. Campbell, not having received the majority of the votes cast, is not entitled to the seat.

Resolved, That Allen G. Campbell is not entitled to a seat in this Congress as a Delegate from the Territory of Utah.

Resolved, That George Q. Cannon is not entitled to a seat in this Congress as a Delegate from the Territory of Utah.

Resolved, That the seat of Delegate from the Territory of Utah be, and the same hereby is, declared vacant.

VIEWS OF MR. W. G. THOMPSON.

In the matter of contest in case of Cannon vs. Campbell, Utah Territory.

The undersigned, as a member of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, to whom was referred the matter of contest in the above-entitled cause, not being able to agree fully with the majority of said committee who report herein, begs leave to briefly state the reasons for such disagreement, and while I cheerfully concur in the final conclusion of the majority of the committee, and shall vote with them in sustaining the resolution that Mr. Cannon is not entitled to a seat as a Delegate, I do so not merely because it is clearly proven by the evidence, as well as by his admissions in writing, that he practices, teaches and advises other deluded men and women that plurality of wives, in the face of the laws of Congress prohibiting it, is right, because an alleged revelation, through Brigham Young, so declared it, and that such pretended revelation was to be observed before the laws of the land, thereby affording a pretext for the commission of a felony, and under the guise of religion demand immunity from punishment, and with brazen effrontery defy the laws of the land, which all others are bound to obey, and for a breach of which the penalties provided are speedily enforced against them.

The days of inspiration have passed, and murder or other crimes can not be justified because a claim that some new revelation has been communicated to them by virtue of which the laws of the country can be defied. And while it is a matter of but little moment to the country at large what the peculiar belief of Mr. Cannon may be, still it does become a matter of grave importance when he presents himself as the representative of a great crime, not only a moral crime but a legal crime, denounced as such by the civilized world, and so declared by the highest tribunals of justice in the land, and boldly demands that he shall be recognized as such, and we cannot comply with such demand without making that crime our own; but I am constrained to deny Mr. Cannon a seat as a Delegate for the further reason that he has failed to make a contest for it.

True it is that on the 20th day of January, 1881, he served a notice of contest on Mr. Campbell in due form, and it is also true that Mr. Campbell, on the 26th day of February, 1881, filed his answer to that notice, putting in issue every material allegation set forth in the notice of contest, and especially the allegation that Mr. Cannon had received or was

elected by a majority of the votes legally cast at the election held on the 2d day of Noveinber, 1880, and also charging that Mr. Cannon was not at the time of the election a citizen of the United States, thus putting in issue every right upon which Mr. Cannon based his claim to a certificate of election and these being properly in issue, it becomes incumbent upon him to establish by proper and legal testing the truth of all his material allegations. I now ask, how did he do this? I answer, he did not do so. I further say that he never attempted to do so, and when I so declare I do not hedge such declaration with any mere technicality or subterfuge, to avoid meeting the very right of the contestant, but so maintain it upon the broadest principles of well-established rules of practice adopted and enforced by all the courts in the land. But I am answered by the majority that Mr. Cannon has produced as evidence a tabulated or what purports to be a tabulated statement of the votes cast at the election of November 2, 1880, by which it appears that Mr. Cannon had a large majority of all the votes cast, and that such statement is certified to by the secretary of the Territory under his seal of office, and therefore it must be received as evidence. It will be conceded, I think, by all that the committee can consider only legal evidence, such evidence as the laws of Congress prescribe, and that they cannot consider any other. The question is, is this such evidence as the committee can consider for any purpose whatever? I say it is not, and cannot be made so.

Section 108, Revised Statutes of the United States, 1873, provides "that the party desiring to take depositions under the provisions of this chapter shall give notice to the opposite party in writing of the time and place, when and where, the same will be taken, of the name of the officer before whom it will be taken, and the name of the witness to be examined, and such notice shall be personally served," &c. These are the plain, unequivocal requirements of the statute, and the wildest latitudinarian will not dare to say that these are merely directory and may be disregarded at the will and pleasure of a contestant or a committee. Each and all of these provisions are mandatory, and while we, as a committee, may have some discretion, some latitude, in the examination of facts, so that even-handed justice may be done, we have none in the matter of law; we are bound by that as we find it, and we have no right to go outside of its plain requirements, and when we do so we act in contravention of law, without authority, and our acts, unauthorized, must be null and void. When did Mr. Cannon give such notice? How and when did contestee have notice that such evidence would be taken or used for any purpose?

Every member of the committee knows that contestant does not even claim that he attempted to do so; but, on the contrary, it does clearly appear from the evidence that Mr. Cannon procured this statement without the knowledge of the contestee, and not for the purpose of being used as evidence before the committee, but only for the purpose of being used as evidence before the then Clerk of this House, so as to have his name entered upon the roll of Delegates. And, strange as it may strike every fair and candid mind, the Clerk assumed, in the absence of Congress, to perform its functions; and did, upon this evidence alone, and in the absence of the certificate required by law, judicially determine that Mr. Cannon was duly elected, and placed his name upon the rolls all this in open violation of law, and stands without a precedent. That evidence, then, had expended its force. It was not even among the papers referred by the House to the committee, and never found its way into the hands of the committee until the 6th day of February,

s;

1882, six weeks after the committee had been organized, when it again appeared as evidence on the part of the contestant, and when it had been suggested that no evidence had been taken and the contest was abandoned.

The contestee had a right to the notice required by law; he had a right to be present and cross examine the witness; he had a right to show that this statement was not the best evidence, and demand that investigation be made into the legality of every ballot cast, as well as the qualifications of each elector, and especially so when we find in evidence this strange law upon the statute books of Utah, then and now in force (act of February 12, 1870, section 43, chapter 2): "That every woman of the age of twenty-one years who has resided in the Territory six months next preceding any general election, born or naturalized in the United States, or who is a wife or daughter of a native-born or naturalized citizen of the United States, shall be entitled to vote at any election in this Territory."

The same law provides that all voters in the Territory shall be required to be registered prior to the election, and the registration list is in the hands of the election officers, and each voter has his or her name marked "voted" on such list; and that list is based on the affidavit of each voter, and shows both the qualification and the sex of the voter. This statement is not evidence of the legality of a single vote. It is not evidence of the qualification of any elector in the Territory, and these facts can only be ascertained by the examination of the register-lists, the ballots, and the electors. The contestee has been denied these rights, each and every one of them. He had a right to rest upon his statutory rights and make no move until he was notified that evidence would be taken. He held the certificate of election then; he holds it now. That certificate contains all the statute requires; it is under the hand of the only officer authorized to give it, and has attached thereto the broad seal of the Territory. It stands to-day uncontested; and no excused is given why it is uncontested; and the answer of contestee gives denial to all this, and declares that no statute, Federal or Territorial, required or authorized the governor of the Territory to open or inspect these returns as the whole or any part of the evidence on which he was required to determine the result of said election; and this state of the law has been judicially declared in the Territory; and while the committee may not be held to take notice of court decisions, they are bound to know the law as it exists, and to follow the interpretation given by the courts having proper jurisdiction of the subject-matter when attention is called to them.

I am brought to the conclusion that contestant, after he had commenced this contest, by the aid of a clerk, acting without law or authority, and in flagrant violation of both, got his name upon the rolls, considering himself safe, and had, as he supposed, placed the laboring oars in the hands of Campbell, and made him contestant, abandoned the contest, and never attempted to take a word of evidence to show him entitled to a seat, and stands in that attitude now, and ought to remain there. And it behooves us to scan carefully the allegation of Mr. Cannon that he received a majority of the legal votes cast, and more especially so when we are confronted with Territorial statute already quoted, by which the bold attempt is made to enlarge the naturalization laws and confer citizenship upon persons by other means and methods than those prescribed by Congress, whose province alone it is to make such laws; and such attempt is a most unwarranted assumption of power; and when men or women, by virtue of such a law, exercise the