second prosecution. The maxim that no one shall be twice vexed for the same cause of action will always prevent any plaintiff from suing twice for the same damages. If they can be recovered in this action under the pleadings, a recovery in this will necessarily be a bar to any future action."

There are many other cases which are in line with those from which we have quoted. We have examined them with care, and find that they clearly and by unimpeachable reasoning sustain the contention of respondent that under our system it is permissible to plead seduction in aggravation of damages in an action for the violation of a marriage contract. We will not take the time to present excerpts from all those decisions, for we think it sufficient to say, finally, that from our investigations of the questions discussed we feel persuaded of the soundness of the rule contended for by respondent, and are further convinced that a recovery in an action for breach of promise where seduction is alleged in en. hancement of damages would, if pleaded, be a bar to an ac. tion for seduction founded upon the same facts set up in the former suit.

It is urged that the damages awarded to the plaintiff are excessive, and that for this reason the verdict should be set aside. The rule in this state is so well settled by judicial decision that it has become elementary, that the appellate courts will “not interfere in such cases unless the amount awarded is so grossly excessive as to shock the moral sense and raise a reasonable presumption that the jury” in the rendition of its verdict was actuated and influenced by passion or prejudice. (Marshall v. Taylor, 98 Cal. 55-63, [35 Am. St. Rep. 144, 32 Pac. 867); Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 386; Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59, [28 Pac. 845]; Wheaton v. North Beach & Mission R. R. Co., 36 Cal. 590; Howland v. Oakland C. St. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 513, [42 Pac. 983]; Aldrich v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 513.)

In Lee v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 101 Cal. 118, (35 Pac 572), it is said: "While the verdict in these cases, as in all others, is subject to review by the court, it will not be disturbed merely upon the ground that the damages are excessive, nor because the opinion of the court differs from that of the jury, but only where it appears that the excess has been given under the influence of passion or prejudice."

But in the case at bar it is argued that because the principal testimony in the cause on behalf of plaintiff was that given by plaintiff herself and that the same was “squarely contradicted” by that of the defendant, and because, further, the defendant's physician gave testimony tending to show impotency in the defendant and his consequent incapacity to perform the act of sexual intercourse, it is the duty of this court to set aside the verdict. This we cannot do. There is no rule more firmly settled or better understood than the one which removes from within the practice of appellate courts the duty of weighing the testimony or of settling and reconciling discrepancies in the testimony. This duty, under our system, is, happily, committed to the jury who see and hear the witnesses, and who, having thus heard the evidence, must weigh it by the light of all the tests afforded by legal rules, and finally determine the truth concerning the questions in dispute. And when they have thus reached a conclusion in cases upon evidence in which there appears a substantial conflict, their findings are conclusive upon us, and cannot be disturbed. But do the facts disclosed by the evidence justify the contention of counsel that the verdict is excessive? The rule that the pecuniary condition of the defendant may be considered in determining this question is conceded. According to his own testimony, the defendant owned, at the time he is alleged to have agreed to marry plaintiff, money and real property of the aggregate value of $14,009.83. To this amount, it is contended by plaintiff, should be added the sum of $2,500 which defendant claimed to have paid to his nephew. This would bring the extent of his wealth, meas. ured in money, up to a total of $16,509.83. It is insisted that the amount of the verdict, when compared to the total value of defendant's possessions, is so excessive as to warrant us in declaring or indulging the presumption that it was brought about by passion or prejudice. We think that, under all the circumstances of the case, as found by the jury, the verdict is not excessive in any view of the case, even if the item of $2,500 mentioned is not to be computed in estimating the value of his estate. The injury inflicted upon the plaintiff by the conduct of the defendant is irreparable. The acts superinducing that injury were incomparably reprehensible. We must believe the facts as the jury found them, and, so believing, we do not hesitate to say that there is even no act denounced as criminal of which the meanest of the human family is capable so diabolical and dastardly as the impulse which prompts any man, old or young, in the full possession of his intellectual faculties, to wantonly and ruthlessly rob, by means as false as they were ignominious, a young and inexperienced maiden, without the protecting care and cautious solicitude of a father, and, still worse, the daughter of a lifelong friend, between whom and his family the most cordial and intimate social relations had existed, of the richest and most cherished of the traits which go to form human character. Mercilessly thrown out into the world, so to speak, rejected by the man who deliberately and by false pretenses betrayed her, and, thus dismantled of the priceless armor of virtue and honor, and exposed to the scorn and contumely of her friends and acquaintances, and, it may even be added, to relent. less humanity, in general, is it possible that money damages can repair, in any degree, so grievous an injury! We think the verdict is not excessive. The defendant, advanced in years and to a point in life where the probability of his living much longer does not exist, with no one dependent upon him for sustenance and support, is still left with a competence upon which he can subsist by the practice of ordinary habits of frugality. If, under these circumstances. he cannot do this, then, in the absence of other features of the record than those urged justifying us in declaring the verdict to be excessive, we must leave him to reap the fruits of his own folly and perfidy.

The rule that appellate courts will not disturb the verdict where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence renders it unnecessary for us to take up a detailed discussion of the testimony in this case; yet there can be no impropriety in saying that the record shows much more evidence than merely the testimony of the plaintiff and the “flat contradiction” (as it is put by appellant) of the same by the defendant, as is contended. Indeed, there are many circumstances testified to by the mother and sister of the plaintiff which tend strongly to corroborate the story of the plaintiff. The cross-examination of the defendant revealed weaknesses in his statement, and it may be added that if we felt called upon to search for reasons why the jury discredited the testimony of defendant, we need go no farther than that portion of his testimony in which he declared that he had sold a piece of his realty for $2,500 and had paid the money to his nephew to liquidate, as he termed it, “a debt of honor." He said that this relative had told him in the lifetime of his wife that the latter had borrowed from him certain sums of money, the exact amount of which he never apprised defendant of. He said that he had never mentioned the matter to his wife, and, when pressed for an answer as to how much the “debt of honor" amounted to, he replied that he did not know how much it was, whether it was ten dollars or a thousand dollars—but that all that he did know about it was what his nephew had told him. So improbable a story, coming from a man whose intelligence is not impeached, could not be believed even by the most credulous.

Certain rulings of the court are complained of. The mother of plaintiff was asked on her direct examination, “What is your daughter doing?”—referring to the time just previous to and about the date of the trial. She replied, “She is wet nursing." This question was objected to. The plaintiff had previously been asked a similar question and returned a similar reply. If there was error in overruling the objection (and we do not decide that there was), the reply of the witness was harmless. The plaintiff was asked, "State, Miss Lanigan, the names of any of your relatives, if there be any, who knew of the birth of this child.” Objection to this question was overruled and she replied: “My mother and sister. I haven't seen any of my other relations. I don't know whether they know it or not.” In Reed v. Clark, 47 Cal. 198, evidence was introduced that the plaintiff, within a few days after the proposal of marriage by defendant and acceptance by her, had announced the fact of the engagement to a number of ladies with whom she was intimate and whom she invited to attend the wedding. The evidence was objected to but allowed. The supreme court, in approving the ruling of the lower court, said: “It cannot be doubted that knowledge of the fact of a marriage engagement by the intimate friends and relatives of a party to the contract, with whom she has frequent and familiar intercourse, would increase in a considerable degree the annoyance and mental suffering occasioned by a sudden discontinuance of the relationship.” The fact was offered as an element to be considered in the estimation of damages, and the evidence limited to that point by the trial court. To the same purport is the ruling in Liebrandt v. Sorg, 133 Cal. 572, (65 Pac. 1098). We can see no distinction in prin

] ciple in the rulings in those cases and the one now under consideration in the case at bar. If, as we have held, seduction may be proved in aggravation of damages, when pleaded, what reason can be suggested why the knowledge of the fact of the birth of the child, claimed to have been the result of the seduction alleged, by other people, offered as an element in the assessment of damages, would not be relevant, niaterial and competent testimony? We know of no reason. The answer of the witness could not, however, in any view, have done the defendant injury, as the mother and sister of plaintiff had previously testified, without objection, that they knew of the fact of the birth of the child, and the answer of the witness only involved a fact of which the jury had already been made cognizant.

Before the trial, the deposition of the defendant was taken at the office of the attorneys for the respondent. The deposition was transcribed, but was not read to the witness and corrected and subscribed by him, required as a prerequisite to its use as a deposition by section 2032 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the trial, on cross-examination, the defendant was asked as to the color of his hair when he was a young man. In reply he stated that its color then was dark. The purpose of the question was evidently to establish a resemblance between defendant and the child born to plaintiff and which was in court during the trial. Counsel, upon the answer thus given by defendant, then asked him if he did not testify when giving his deposition that his hair, when he was a young man, was of auburn color. The question was read from the deposition, time, place and persons present being given; but there was no objection to the form of the question or upon any other ground, except that the purported deposition was not one in fact or in law, because it had not been read to the defendant and an opportunity given him to correct it if he so desired, and that he had not subscribed his name thereto. The objection was without merit and the court's ruling thereon eminently proper. "A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this can be done the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of times, places, and