« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
SECTION 21. FALSE IMPRISONMENT. The second great class of trespasses against the person consists of cases of false imprisonment. 87
False imprisonment is any unlawful detention of any person.
In an action for damages for false imprisonment the motives of the defendant are not material, except in mitigation of damages. In McConnell vs. Kennedy 88 the court said : "In such an action it does not seem to us that the motive with which the prosecution is instituted constitutes any element of the cause of action. If a prosecution is commenced against a party and he is arrested without lawful authority, the person who procures such arrest, no matter how pure or laudable may have been the motives of the prosecutor in instituting the prosecution, may be liable to an action for false imprisonment, because he caused a citizen to be
sailed because of the unlawfulness of the first assault, and the assailant because of the excess of the force used by the other in defending against the original assault." Street's Foundation of Legal Liability, Vol. I, p. 7. Dole vs. Erskine, 35 N. H., 503; Gratton Vs. Glidden, 84 Me., 589; Slone
vs. Slone, 2 Met. (Ky.), 339. 87 "Forcefully to deprive a man of
the freedom to go whithersoever he may is clearly a trespass. False imprisonment was indeed one of the first trespasses recognized by the Common law (Bracton's Note Book II, p. 314 (1229), pl. 465). A laying of violent hands upon the person and an actual forceful deprivation of liberty is the element undoubtedly, at the root of liability in this wrong: In other words, the typical original imprisonment involved a battery. But the wrong was not destined to be restricted
to such narrow bounds, Just as the assault represents an extension of the conception of harm involved in the battery in one direction, so the wrong of imprisonment represents the extension of that conception in another direction. Accordingly, it has been settled that actual physical constraint or physical contact is not necessary to make an imprisonment. Coercion of any kind, as where the person yields without resistance to superior force or to authority, is enough. But some form of coercion is essential. One who is prevailed upon by false representations to go and remain at a particular place is not imprisoned, unless, perchance, force or intimidation be used to prevent departure." Street's Foundation of Legal Liability, Vol. I,
29$. Car., 180.
restrained of his liberty without lawful process, and his motive has nothing to do with the case, except, perhaps, as an element to be considered in measuring the damages.” That the arrest was made by mistake is not a defense to an action for false imprisonment. The provocation given to the defendant is also no defense.” SECTION 22. FALSE IMPRISONMENT, COMPARED WITH
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. The actions of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution have often been confused together," but
Sugg vs. Pool, 2 Stew. & P., 196;
Landrum vs. Wells, 7 Tex.
Civ. App., 625.
where it was held that a letter
the provocation of such letter.
of this confusion are culled in
Another instance of con-
rules of law applicable to actions of this character are very simple and familiar. There must be want of probable cause, and malice, but if the former is established the latter may be inferred therefrom.” Thus it appears that either the action was not false imprisonment, but more in the nature of an action for damages for malicious prosecution, or the court misstates the rules of law applicable thereto. In fact, it further appears that the arrest of the plaintiff was under legal process, valid and regular, and the point upon which the case was turned was whether or
not there probable cause for the prosecution, the conclusion being that under the circumstances it was a question of fact for the jury.
And also in the case of Brown vs. Chadsey, 39 Barb. (N. Y.), 262, the court said with reference to an action for false imprisonment; "Malice in the defendant will be inferred, so far at least as to sustain the action."
Likewise in another case the action, though stated in the opinion of the court to be one for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, seems to have been regarded only in its latter aspect and a verdict was directed for the defendent, al
the two actions nevertheless present striking differences. These differences are shown by the following decisions: In the case of Hobbs vs. Ray92 it was said with reference to the distinction between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution: “These actions are quite distinct from each other. An action of trespass and false imprisonment lies for an arrest or some other similar act for an arrest or some other similar act of the defendant, which, as is said, 'upon the stating of it is manifestly illegal;' while malicious prosecution, on the contrary, lies for a prosecution which upon the stating of it is manifestly legal.” In the case of McConnel vs. Kennedy " in distinguishing between an action for false imprisonment and one for malicious prosecution, the court said: “It is quite true that one arrested and restrained of his liberty even under lawful process, may have a cause of action if it is alleged and shown that the prosecution was malicious and was without probable cause and has terminated; but that is a different cause of action and depends upon different allegations and proofs, and the action for malicious prosecution must not be confounded with an action for false imprisonment."
though from the facts stated it would seem that an action for false imprisonment might have been sustained. Casdro vs. De Riarte, 16 Fed., 93,
Again in the case of Warren vs. Dennett, 17 Misc. Rep., N.Y. (City Ct.), 86, the court, in distinguishing between actions for false imprisonment and those for malicious prosecution, said: “In the one for false imprisonment the plaintiff must show that the defendant had him imprisoned or deprived of his liberty, and that the mode or process was unlawful, i. e., without due
process of law. He must
sonment, but must be proven." a 18 R. I., 84, 28 29 S. Car., 180.
In the case of Herzog vs. Grahamo the court said with reference to false imprisonment and malicious prosecution: "The distinction is that false imprisonment is some interference with the personal liberty of the plaintiff which is absolutely unlawful and without authority. Malicious prosecution is in procuring the arrest and prosecution under lawful process on the forms of law, but from malicious motives and without probable cause." A clear and concise statement of the distinction under discussion is to be found in the case of Colter vs. Lamb 95 wherein it was observed that if the imprisonment is under legal process, but the action has been commenced and carried on maliciously and without probable cause, it is malicious prosecution. If it has been extrajudicial, without legal process,
it is false imprisonment. SECTION 23. ELEMENTS OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
The two constituent elements of false imprisonment are: (1) the detention or restraint; and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention or restraint. 88
SECTION 24. THE DETENTION OR RESTRAINT.
The confinement need not be in a jail; be in a private house, or even outdoors, if the party is deprived of freedom of movement. Where a person who had been fined for a violation of a municipal ordinance was wrongfully compelled to pay the fine by manual labor on the streets, it was held that there could be a recovery for false imprisonment. To constitute false imprisonment, however, the person must be completely deprived of freedom of movement; a 9 Lea. (Tenn), 152.
of Warner vs. Riddiford, 40. B. M. as 35 Ind., 285, Am. Rep., 735.
S., 180. Roy Rich vs. McIrney, 103 Ala., 345; 08 Floyd vs. State, 12 Ark., 43, 54 tate vs. Lunsford, 81 N. Car.,
Am. Dec., 250. 528; Amer. & Eng. Ency. of » Torbett vs. Lynch, 67 Ind., 474. Law, Vol. XII, p. 733.
07 it may
merely preventing him from going in one direction will not furnish a basis for this action.100
The imprisonmnet may be accomplished either by force or by threats. 101 In case of apprehension by threats, the fear of apprehension which the threats occasion may be either of injury to the person, property, or reputation.102 The threats may be either express verbal threats or may simply consist of acts or gestures.103 The threats must, however, be of such a character as to raise a reasonable apprehension of injury.104
SECTION 25. THE UNLAWFULNESS OF THE DETENTION.
The unlawfulness of the detention may arise either from the fact that it was without process, or under color of illegal process. 106
An arrest without a warrant is always illegal unless made by an officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed and that the party arrested is the guilty party."
108 An unlawful imprisonment may also arise from an arrest on a defective warrant, or the arrest of a privileged person,
100 Bird vs. Jones, 72 B., 742. In
this case, the defendant, an officer was
stationed at particular point to prevent persons from passing in a certain direction, prevented the plaintiff from passing that way, but left another way open to him, of which, however, he did not wish to avail himself, and therefore stood there for sometime. Held that there was no
104 Greathouse vs. Summerfield, 25
I., App. 296. 105 "It makes no difference whether
the restraint of the person is caused without process under color of process wholly illegal *** * it is a trespass against the person, for which the plaintiff is entitled to compensation in damages upon the necessary proof of the facts."
(U. S., 578); Greathouse Vs.
Ahern vs. Collins, 39 Mo., 150. 109 Brockway, vs. Crawford, 3 Jones
L. (48 N. Car.), 433; Firestone vs. Rice, 7 Mich., 377, 15 Am.
St. Rep., 266. 107 Wood vs. 'Kinsman, 5 Vt., 589;
Smith vs. Jones, 76 Me., 138, 49 Am. Rep., 589.