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An agent of a foreign mercantile house who induced a merchant here to make a shipment of goods to his principals, to be sold on commission, and engaged that insurance should be effected either here or in Europe on the property shipped, WAS HELD not to bs personally liable for a breach of the agreement to insure; the action, if maintainable, lay only against the principals. Kirkpatrick v. Stainer,

CHANCELLOR.

244

25. Where the defendant before the expiration of the rule to plead in two suits brought against him, obtained an order to stay until a motion could be made to consolidate, and the motion was made and granted after the rules to plead had expired, and the 2. See the dissenting opinion of the plaintiff forthwith entered the defendant's default for not pleading, IT WAS HELD, that the default was regularly entered, and that the plaintiff was entitled to retain it, notwithstanding that on the same day, though after the entry of the default, the defendant served a demurrer; the court holding that the defendant should have pleaded before the motion was made for consolidation. Jenkins v. Bloodgood,

645

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3. Where an agent compromised a claim of his principal, by receiving from a debtor money and other means of realizing a debt, and executed a release, in his own name, it was held, that such release not purporting on its face to have been made by the principal, or to have been executed by him was not binding upon the principal as a release, and could not be set up by the debtor in bar of a recovery in an action brought for the recovery of the original debt. Evans v. Wells,

324

4. But it was further held, that it was competent to the debtor for the purpose of establishing an accord nnd satisfaction, to prove by parol a ratification by the principal of the acts of the agent by showing that with full knowledge of the facts he reaped the benefit of the compromise, by accepting in whole or in part, its fruits; and for that purpose to produce the release as evidence of the agreement, and show a compliance on his part with its requirements. id

5. The rule that a contract under seal entered into by an agent to be binding upon the principal, must on its face purport to have been made by

the principal, and to have been executed in his name, and not in the name of the agent, is applied in all its rigour where the validity of the instrument in question depends upon the annexation of a seal; but it seems, in reference to less formal writings, such as the evidence of ordinary commercial transactions, a more liberal interpretation prevails; in such cases in furtherance of the public policy of encouraging trade, if it can upon the whole instrument be collected that the true object and intent were to bind the principal and not merely the agent, courts of justice will adopt that construction of it, however informally it may be expressed,* id

*Propositions advanced by the CHANCELLOR in the opinion delivered by him; All the partners of a firm are bound by a note made by one of them in the name of the firm, although it was made for a special purpose, and fraudulently put into circulation; or, although the maker of the note had lent the credit of the firm without the knowledge and consent of his copartners, where the note before maturity comes into the hands of the holder for a valuable consideration, in the ordinary course of business, and there is nothing in the na

the name of the principal, and purports upon its face to be his deed, and not the deed of the attorney or agent for the principal, merely, it is not necessary that a particular form of words should be used in the execution thereof.

The CHANCELLOR also suggests a doubt whether the deed from Hill to Mather, as set forth in the statement of the case, being a deed in trust to sell or mortgage lands for the payment of debts, is not void as made upon trusts unauthorized by the revised statutes, Senator VERPLANCK, upon this point expresses the opinion that the deed is valid, either for passing the estate, or as a power in trust.

6. A principal is bound by the act of his agent in disposing of his property where the latter is furnished with the external indicia of right to dispose of it, notwithstanding that he may have deviated from the secret instructions of his principal. Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 348

REDEMPTION OF LANDS.

ture of the transaction to apprize him See EXECUTION, 1, 2. LANDLORD AND that it was not given for a copartnership debt.

It is competent to one of several partners by an instrument under seal, to authorize a third person to discharge a debt due to the firm.

Where it is not necessary to give validity to a contract executed by an agent that it should be in writing, the constituent is bound by an agreement of his agent, which is in fact made for his benefit, although he is not named; and even where it is necessary that the contract should be in writing to give it validity, the constituent is bound by it if it appear in any part of the instrument that it was intended to be executed by his agent for him in the character of agent merely. But where it is necessary that the instrument to be executed by an attorney. under a power, should operate as the deed of the constit. uent under seal, to convey an estate.or interest, or to release a right, without a full compensation received or secured to be paid, it must not only appear to have been executed by the agent for the principal, but it must be executed in his name, so as to make it his deed; though if the deed be actually made in 2.

TENANT, 1.

REFERENCE.

See EXECUTORS, 5. PRACTICE, 19.

REGISTRY OF DEEDS.
See DEED, 6.

RELEASE.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2, 5.
TRUSTS, 4, 5.

REPLEVIN.

1. Where a writ of replevin is sued out, and the whole of the property claimed be not found so that deliverance may be made, the plaintiff is not bound to accept part, but may cause the defendants to be arrested. Snow v. Roy, 602

If the plaintiff accept part, he may

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3. Where a year elapsed after the return of the first writ, by virtue of which deliverance was made of three fourths of the property claimed, and no further proceedings were had on the part of the plaintiff other than the mere suing out of alias and pluries writs, on which nothing was done, IT WAS HELD, that party persons standing in the relation of assignees to the defendants, might rule the plaintiff to declare and proceed to judgment of non-pros, although special bail had not been filed.

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1. Where, under a contract for the sale of chattels, a delivery of a portion of the property sold was made to the purchaser, under an agreement that a note should be given for the whole quantity upon the delivery of the residue at a future day, the delivery of the first parcel was HELD to be conditional, and that on the delivery of the residue and the refusal of the purchaser to give the note and to deliver up the first parcel on demand, an action of replerin for the wrongful detention might be sustained. Russell v. Minor,

659

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I. The privilege of counsel in advocating the rights of his client, and of the party himself where he manages his own cause, in judicial proceeding, is as broad as that of a member of a legislative body; however false and malicious may be a charge made by the counsel or the party upon such an occasion, affecting the reputation of another, an action of slander will not lie, provided that what is said be pertinent to the question under discussion; the remedy is by action on the case. Hastings v. Lusk, 410

2. Where, however, a verdict is rendered for the plaintiff in an action of slander, the judgment will not be arrested if the pertinency of the words and the time of the utterance are put in issue and found against the defendant, although from the declaration it appears that the words were spoken in the course of a judicial inquiry. id

T

TROVER.

2. Whether the right of property in the 1. An auctioneer who sells stolen goods

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or mortgage the same and apply the
proceeds to the payment of debts, is
a valid instrument under the statute
of uses and trusts as to the trust to
sell, notwithstanding that the trust
to mortgage, being for the benefit of
creditors at large, is void. The rule
ut res magis valeat quam pereat gov.
erns in such a case, and applies as
well where what is void is declared
so by statute, as when it is so at
common law, unless the prohibitory
enactment declares that the deed by
which the thing be done shall be void.
Darling v. Rogers,
483

It seems that had the trust to mort-
gage been created for the purpose of
raising funds to pay charges upon
the land, such as judgments and mort-
gages, it would have been held valid.

id

3. Where an estate was granted during
the joint lives of a husband and wife,
with power to the wife of appoint-
ing the fee either by deed or will;
and if she died before her husband,
without executing the power, the
estate to go to her issue; and in de-
fault of issue, to her right heirs-she
taking the absolute fee if she surviv-
ed her husband: IT WAS HELD, that
the wife had a general and beneficial
power, within the provisions of the
statute, of appointing the fee; that a
master's sale under a decree in a par-
tition suit would not destroy the con-
tingent interest of her children, and
that the only mode of conveying the
estate freed from the interests of the
children was by deed duly acknowl-
edged, or by last will and testament.
Jackson v. Edwards,
498

*The law is different here from what
it is in England, in respect to the right
of the owner to pursue or to recover the
value of stolen property which has been 2.
sold by the thief. In England, the own-
er cannot bring his action against the
thief or a purchaser from him, until af
ter conviction for the larceny, because
by the common law, the private injury
is merged in the public wrong. Nor
will an action lie there against a bona
fide purchaser in market overt, if he has
parted with the property previous to the
conviction. Neither of these rules pre-
vail here. The doctrine that the private
injury is merged in the public wrong,
is abolished by statute, and the English
law of market overt has not been adopt-
ed here. Consequently the owner of
goods feloniously taken, may here bring
his action to recover the property or its
value, without showing a conviction of
the thief, and notwithstanding that the
purchaser has parted with the property
previous to the conviction. The reason
why the owner cannot maintain an ac-
tion in England where the purchaser
in market overt has parted with the
pro-
perty previous to the conviction of the
felon is, that by the purchase in mar-
ket overt the owner's right of property
is gone, until the conviction of the thief.
If, therefore, previous to such convic-
tion, the purchaser part with the pro-
perty, the owner in an action of trover
cannot prove that the stolen goods were
his property, and that while they were
so, they came to the defendant's pos.
session, who converted them to bis use,
for until the conviction, the owner has
no property in the goods. Thus it will
be perceived that this doctrine rests up-
on the law of markets overt, and as
that does not prevail here, the law with
us depends upon different principles.

TRUSTS.

1. An assignment of real estate for the
benefit of creditors, upon trust to sell

4. The release of lands by one of two
trustees, from the operation of a
mortgage, is not in itself sufficient to
discharge the lands; to render it a-
vailable, it must be executed by both
trustees. Van Rensselaer v. Akin,

5.

549

If however, such release be treated
as a valid instrument by an assignee
of the trustees, all persons deriving
title from such assignee are estopped
from questioning its validity.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 5.

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