Put as briefly as possible, these are the measures advocated by India's progressive leaders, and a study of the subject on the spot forces upon one the conviction that it was rather as a reply to that advocacy than for administrative convenience that the partition of Bengal was devised. That belief is strengthened by the hurried fashion in which a measure of such importance was executed: a measure which, as Mr. Brodrick pointed out in a despatch to the Viceroy, four months before it became law, "had not yet, in its complete form, been laid before the public for criticism"; which was never discussed in its ultimate shape by the House of Commons; which was passed by legislative enactment at Simla, contrary to Government practice of dealing with contentious matter only at Calcutta, and at a sitting of the Council at which not a single Indian member was present. One cannot but feel that, however pressing was the administrative necessity, some more potent reason is required to explain such precipitude, and that the Government did not so much desire, in its own words, "to encourage the growth of centres of independent opinion, local aspirations, local ideals, and to preserve the growing intelligence and enterprise of Bengal from being cramped and stunted," as to strike a blow at an intelligence and enterprise which had taken a form of which it did not approve; and that, in expressing its

view that it "cannot be for the lasting good of any country or any people that public opinion, or what passes for it, should be manufactured by a comparatively small number of people at a single centre, and should be disseminated thence for universal adoption," the Government of India confessed the cause of its hurry and the real reason of its anxiety for the partition of Bengal.

The mere administrative problem might have been solved, as, indeed, it was proposed to solve it, by placing the Bengali-speaking nation, to which Behar might or might not have been added, under a Governor and Council, and by adding Chota Nagpur and Orissa to the Central Provinces, under a Lieutenant-Governor. By this means there would have been no dispersion of offices, no irritation of public feeling; and all the administrative advantages of the partition would have been obtained. Nor is the division of opinion on the partition represented by a racial line. There are British merchants, shipping firms, and millowners in Calcutta, there are even teaplanters in Assam, who do not expect from it the benefits foretold.

Any decrease in the trade of Calcutta will increase disproportionately the expenses of the port, and Calcutta, with eighty miles of dangerous and difficult river between it and the sea, will be extremely sensitive to competition from a port with superior attractions for shipping. Also

the development of the southern part of the new province is not likely to assist the solution of the labour question in Assam.

There was thus sufficient uncertainty as to the benefits to be derived from the partition to make questionable its expediency in the face of such deep-seated opposition, and one can imagine no measure affecting the welfare of so many millions consummated with less attempt to conciliate the sentiment of those whom it most concerned. Lord Curzon placed himself towards the close of his Governor-Generalship more and more in opposition to the intellectual part of India. Had he adopted more conciliatory methods he might have kept in touch with the popular leaders, and so have avoided that misconception of the depth and tenacity of the sentiment with which he had to do. He urged haste to avoid agitation, trusting to that Eastern respect for an order which is part of its fatalistic acceptance of things as they are. But the East with which he dealt has been growing out of its fatalism: growing, thanks to its British training, into a belief in open dealing and fair play, and no small part of the bitterness in its resentment arose from finding itself or thinking itself unjustly treated by a Power from which it had learnt its appreciation and to which it looked for an example of unswerving honour.

How much further the agitation will be carried

to say.

in default of concessions it is not easy With all the facts before him it is unlikely that Mr. Morley will be able to avoid those doubts which plainly Mr. Brodrick entertained as to the wisdom of the partition, or altogether to withhold his sympathies from those it has injured most. If any reparation be possible, he is not the man to be deterred by its difficulties; if not, it will only remain for the Bengali-speaking people to face their losses courageously since in the long period of readjustment they must lose considerably--and attempt to wrest from adversity an advantage which, with the widened scope of their activities, it is by no means unlikely they may be able to secure.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE NEW ARMY

THE immediate future of the Army may be considered the question of supreme importance to India to-day. It would deserve precedence if only because the black British ignorance of Indian affairs reaches a culminating density in military matters, and that, whereas India must be left in certain other important directions to work out her own salvation, the question whether she shall be given adequate protection will depend entirely on the conception or misconception of her protectors which may obtain at home. Now in all the obscuring disparagement of our military system the competence of our Indian Army has never been called in question. It has been assumed as a model of efficiency and organisation.

A study of the Army on the spot tends, however, considerably to modify that assumption. It has, indeed, hitherto done all that was demanded of it, and frequently done it well. But the demands have been small in comparison with its capacity, and yet meeting them has frequently put a considerable strain on its resources.