207 to the other scales, which were only a hundred yards away. He says that nothing was said by him about weighing on the other scales, because he preferred to have the cattle weighed in St. Joseph. Dickinson still insisted that he would not weigh and deliver the cattle at St. Joseph, and that if Wood refused to accept them by the Robinson weights, he would drive them back home. After this controversy, and after learning of the condition of the Robinson scales, Wood consented to settle and did settle with Dickinson in accordance with the Robinson weights. Together they figured up the amount due by these weights, and Wood paid part of the same in cash, and executed the note in question for the balance. He need not have taken the cattle as they were weighed to him. Under his contract he was entitled to their delivery measured by the correct and standard weight. Instead, however, of insisting upon this right, he elected to end the controversy, and to take the cattle weighed upon Afterscales which he had discovered and asserted were untrue. wards he claimed a credit on the note for the difference as shown by the St. Joseph weights. But at the time the note was given, nothing was said about reweighing the cattle at St. Joseph, nor that there should be any other or future adjustment between them concerning the weighing of the cattle. Indeed, Wood, in his testimony, states that "when the note was drawn up nothing was said about correcting the note according to St. Joseph weights. He drew up the note, and I suppose he would not have accepted the note with any promise for correction to be made according to St. Joseph weights." On the testimony, then, it cannot be doubted that Wood consented and agreed to abide by the weights taken at Robinson, and that this consent was given by him with actual knowledge of the infirmity of the scales upon which the cattle were weighed. An examination of the testimony makes it equally clear that in this agreement he was not deceived or misled to any extent by Dickinson. There being no fraud, the agreement must be held to be binding, and to have operated, as the court below ruled, as a waiver of any question growing out of the weighing of the cattle. It is next urged by the plaintiffs in error that, by the testimony, it is shown there had been a full accord and satisfaction of the promissory note, and therefore the verdict should have been in their favor. There was credited upon the note a payment of $804.15, which was the amount due according to the St. Joseph weights. It seems that after Wood had returned from St. Joseph, where he had shipped and weighed the cattle, he informed Dickinson of the difference in the weights, and also told him that he would not pay the face of the note, but only the amount determined to be due by the weighing at St. Joseph. It is here claimed by the plaintiffs in error on the testimony that Wood proposed to pay and did pay the sum of $804.15, and that If Dickinson agreed to accept that sum as full payment of the note. such was the fact it would be a full accord and satisfaction of the promissory note as between the parties to the transaction, and no recovery could be had of the balance apparently due thereon. But Dickinson denies that he agreed to accept the $804.15 as a full payment of the note. Thus there was a question raised for the determination of the jury, and their finding, as has been seen, was in favor of the defendant in error. Reading the testimony as it appears in the record, it seems to us to preponderate in favor of the claim made by the plaintiffs in error. But there was some legal testimony which tended to support the theory of the other side, and under the well-established rule "that, where there is clear, positive, and direct testimony to sustain every essential fact, this court will not set aside a verdict of a jury sustained by the district court because of a seeming preponderance of testimony against it." Ladd v. Brewer, 17 Kan. 204. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. (All the justices concurring.) (34 Kan. 237) STATE V. SCHOOL-DISTRICT No. 3, CHAUTAUQua Co. Filed October 9, 1885. 1. TRIAL-OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE BECAUSE PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION. Where an objection is made to the introduction of evidence upon the ground that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the allegations of the petition should be construed liberally for the purpose of sustaining the petition. 2. PETITION WITH EXHIBIT ATTACHED. Where an instrument in writing for the payment of money is sued on, and a copy of such instrument is attached to the petition and made a part thereof, such copy should be considered as a part of the petition when construing the allegations thereof. 3. STATE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. A statute of limitations will not run against the state or the sovereign authority, unless the statute itself expressly so provides, or unless the implications of the statute to that effect are so strong as to be utterly unavoidable; and even where the state holds the claim or debt sued on as the assignee or transferee of some individual person, still such statute of limitations will not run against the state where such statute had not commenced to run before the state obtained the claim or debt. 4. SCHOOL-DISTRICT BONDS-RECITALS. Where school-district bonds are issued under an act which provides that the bonds shall specify on their face for what purpose they are issued, but the bonds do not in express terms do so, but specify that they are issued in pursuance of the said act, and under such act bonds can be issued only for one purpose, held, that the bonds, in effect, specify for what purpose they were issued, and are therefore not void for the want of such specification. 5. SAME-ACTION ON BONDS-PETITION-DEFENSE. Where a petition in an action against a school-district upon its bonds alleges that the school-district made and issued the bonds; that it made and issued them by its proper officers for value received: and copies of the bonds are given and made a part of the petition; which show that the bonds were issued in pursuance of an act of the legislature authorizing such bonds, and the bonds. appear to be valid upon their face: held, that the petition states a cause of action against the school-district, and that, if anything was done or omitted that would render the bonds invalid, it devolves upon the defendant to set the same up in its answer as a defense. 6. SAME-CONSIDERATION. . And, further, held, that it is not necessary in such a case for the plaintiff to state in his petition the amount of the consideration for which the bonds were issued, or the prices fixed by the qualified electors of the district for the sale of the bonds. Error from Chautauqua county. This was an action brought by the state of Kansas against schooldistrict No. 3, Chautauqua county, Kansas, to recover on 7 schooldistrict bonds and 35 accompanying coupons. The petition contained a separate count and a separate statement of a cause of action upon each of the 7 bonds and on each of the 35 coupons. The statement of the cause of action upon the first bond reads as follows: "That on the first day of January, 1873, at Peru, in the county of Howard and state of Kansas, school-district No. 135, county of Howard, state of Kansas, the same being then a school-district duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Kansas, and acting as such, and by U. J. O. Greytrax, director, Albert Kees, clerk, and J. M. Brown, treasurer of said district, the same having been duly elected, appointed, qualified, and acting as such of ficers, made and issued its certain bond, dated on said day at said place, whereby, for value received, it promised, on the first day of June, A. D. 1875, to pay to A. B. Close, or bearer, two hundred dollars, at the banking-house of W. N. Coler & Co., in the city of New York, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, payable annually on the first day of June of each year, according to divers coupons thereto attached, which bond, in order to distinguish it from others of like character, was marked No. one.' A copy of said bond is hereto attached and made part hereof. That on the sixteenth day of January, 1873, said bond was duly registered in the office of the county clerk of said Howard county, Kansas. "And said plaintiff further says that, in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of Kansas entitled 'An act to divide the county of Howard, and to erect the territory thereof into the counties of Chautauqua and Elk, to provide for the due organization of said counties, the filling of vacancies in offices, for the proper division of the property and indebtedness of Howard county, and in regard to the taxes and records thereof,' approved March 3, 1875, the territory embraced in school-district No. 135, of Howard county, Kansas, became, and still is, a part of Chautauqua county, Kansas. Thereupon, said Chautauqua county being organized in pursuance of the act of the legislature aforesaid, the county superintendent of said Chautauqua county proceeded to and did change the name of said school-district No. 135, Howard county, to said defendant, school-district No. 3, Chautauqua county, state of Kansas; that said school-district No. 3, of Chautauqua county, lies wholly within the boundaries of the former school-district No. 135, of Howard county, Kansas, and includes within its borders all the inhabitants of school-district No. 135, Howard county, and is the same corporate entity as school-district No 135, Howard county, Kansas. And plaintiff further says that school-district No. 135, Howard county, Kansas, is wholly merged in and become a part of said school-district No. 3, of Chautauqua county, state of Kansas, which has succeeded to and become possessed of all the property, rights, and privileges formerly enjoyed by said school-district No. 135, Howard county; that, before said bond by its terms became due and payable, the said bond came to and for value became the property of this plaintiff, the same having been sold and delivered for a valuable consideration to the commissioners of the permanent school fund of the state of Kansas for this plainv.8P,no.3-14 tiff, who therefore became, and ever since has been, and still is, the true and lawful owner and holder thereof; that when said bond by its terms became due and payable the same was duly presented at the place of payment therein mentioned and payment demanded, but refused because said defendant had not, nor had said school-district No. 135, Howard county, nor did either of said districts, ever have funds at said place; that the said plaintiff has often applied to said defendant to pay the said bond, but it has refused to do so, notwithstanding it is justly indebted thereon to the plaintiff in the full sum of two hundred dollars, which it claims, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum from the first day of June, A. D. 1875." The statement of the cause of action upon each of the other bonds is precisely the same as the statement of the cause of action upon the first bond, except that such statements show that the bonds were numbered consecutively from one to seven, and became due in successive years from June 1, 1875, to June 1, 1881. The statement of the cause. of action upon each of the coupons is precisely the same as the statement of the cause of action upon the bonds, except that clauses with reference to the coupons are added. A copy of each of the bonds and of each of the coupons is attached to the petition and made a part thereof, and a part of the statement of the cause of action to which it properly belongs. The first bond reads as follows: No. 1. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF KANSAS. $200 District School Bond of School-district No. 135, Howard County: Know all men by these presents, that school-district No. 135, county of Howard, state of Kansas, is indebted unto A. B. Close, or bearer, in the sum of two hundred dollars, lawful money of the United States, to be paid on the first day of June, A. D. 1875, at the banking-house of W. N. Coler & Co., in the city of New York, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, payable annually on the first day of June of each year, on presentation of the annexed coupons, as the same becomes due. This bond is issued in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of Kansas, entitled "An act to enable school-districts in the state of Kansas to issue bonds," approved February 26, 1866, and acts amendatory and supplemental thereto. In testimony whereof, this bond has been issued, signed by the director, countersigned by the clerk, and registered by the treasurer of said district. Dated at Peru, County of Howard, State of Kansas, this first day of January, 1873. J. O. GREYTRAX, Director Countersigned: ALBERT KEES, Clerk. Indorsed: No. 1. $200. State of Kansas. Registered school bond of schooldistrict No. 135, Howard county. Ten per cent. interest, payable annually on the first day of June, at the banking-house of W. N. Coler & Co., New York. Matures June 1, 1875. Each of the other bonds is the same as this, except as to number and date of maturity. The first coupon attached to the first bond reads as follows: School-district No. 135, county of Howard, Kansas, will pay to bearer on the first day of June, 1874, twenty-eight and 33-100 dollars, at the bankinghouse of W. N. Coler & Co., in the city of New York, being one year's interest on bond numbered one. J. O. GREYTRAX, Treas. ALBERT KEES, Clerk. Each of the other coupons is the same as this, except as to number and date of maturity. The defendant answered to the plaintiff's petition, setting up five separate defenses, and the plaintiff replied to this answer by filing a general denial. Upon the issues made up by these pleadings the action came on for trial before the court without a jury, and the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, put a witness on the stand, and asked him a question; whereupon the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence under the petition, upon the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, and the court sustained the defendant's objection, and dismissed the plaintiff's action; to all of which the plaintiff duly excepted, and now brings the case to this court for review. W. A. Johnston, for the State. C. J. Peckham and M. B. Light, for defendant in error. VALENTINE, J. The only ruling of the court below complained of in this case is the sustaining of an objection made by the defendant to the introduction of any evidence under the plaintiff's petition, upon the ground that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, and the dismissal of the plaintiff's action upon the same ground. Preliminarily, we would say that such an objection is not favored by courts, and that where the sufficiency of the petition is raised for the first time, and only by such an objection, the courts will construe the allegations of the petition very liberally for the purpose of sustaining the petition, if it can reasonably be sustained. Barkley v. State, 15 Kan. 99, 107; Mitchell v. Milhoan, 11 Kan. 617, 625, 626, and cases there cited. Also, in this case, besides the direct allegations contained in the body of the petition, copies of the bonds and coupons sued on were attached to and made a part of the petition; and therefore, in construing the allegations of the petition, the contents of the bonds and coupons, as contained in such copies, must also be considered as a part of the petition. Budd v. Kramer, 14 Kan. 101, 102, et seq. See, also, Reed v. Arnold, 10 Kan. 103; Campbell v. Blanke, 13 Kan. 62; Andrews v. Alcorn, 13 Kan. 351. Besides, section 123 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that "in an action, counter-claim, or set-off, founded upon an account, promissory note, bill of exchange, or other instrument, for the unconditional payment of money only, it shall be sufficient for a party to give a copy of the account or instrument, with all credits and the indorsements thereon, and to state that there is due to him on such account or instrument from the adverse party a specified sum, which he claims, with interest." The first objection made by the defendant to the plaintiff's petition is that a portion of the 42 causes of action set forth therein is barred by the five-years statute of limitations contained in the first subdivision of section 18 of the Civil Code. But this objection can certainly avail nothing; for if any one of the several causes of action |