The XIV Amendment.

130. The XIV Amendment declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The purposes of the Amendment are to define citizenship of the United States and of the states, to confer citizenship upon negroes, to secure against hostile legislation of the states those privileges and immunities which are common to citizens of the United States,100 and to protect all natural persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to difference of race, colour, nationality, or citizenship.1 The Amendment does not confer upon women the right of suffrage,2 nor the right to practice law. The provision that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" protects, it seems, only those rights which are secured against state encroachment by other clauses of the Constitution: it does not extend to state legislation those restrictions which the first eight Amendments impose upon congressional action.* Within the meaning of the Constitution, due process of law is secured when the laws operate on all alike and no one is subjected to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. The provision does not control

100 The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. See also Sec. 119, supra.

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1 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.

Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130.

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581. See also Sec. 125, supra.

mere forms of procedure, while, on the other hand, the bare observance of legal forms is insufficient when the proceedings are manifestly fraudulent. The prohibition of state legislation which denies to any person the equal protection of the laws, prevents the enactment of laws which discriminate unjustly against any citizen, although special legislation, as such, is not prohibited." And while corporations are persons within the meaning of the Amendment, yet foreign corporations are not entitled to such equal protection of the laws as to have the right to do business within a state without being hampered by such discriminating conditions as the state may choose to impose.8

The equal protection of the laws.

131. The provision of the XIV Amendment that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" requires that equal security be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights. The officers of a municipality may not, in the administration of an ordinance regulating the carrying on of a lawful business within the corporate limits, make arbitrary and unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race, between persons otherwise similarly placed.9 A state may not, to the prejudice of a coloured man who is put upon his trial for an offense against its laws, refuse to other coloured men the privilege of serving upon the jury, nor compel such prisoner to submit to a trial by a jury from which citizens of African descent are by reason of their

Sec. 117, supra.

Sec. 131, infra.

Sec. 127, supra.

Sec. 127, supra.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

race excluded; 10 but a prisoner cannot insist upon having a jury composed, either in part or in whole, of his own race, for all that he can rightfully demand is a jury from which men of his race are not excluded because of their colour.11 A state may not require railroad companies to transport passengers or freight at unreasonably low rates, for in so far as such corporations are denied the right, while others are permitted, to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, those corporations are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.12 So also a statute is unconstitutional which provides, as a penalty upon railroad companies for failure to pay certain debts, that parties successfully suing the companies to recover such debts shall be entitled to attorney's fees, but which gives to the companies no like or corresponding benefit.13 So also a statute is unconstitutional which, although general in its terms, is designed to limit the charges of a single stockyards company and which does not limit the charges which may be made by similar companies doing like business.14 And a statute is unconstitutional which prohibits the recovery of the price of articles sold by a trust or combination formed in restraint of trade, but which does not apply to agricultural products or live stock

10 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 id. 110; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 id. 565; Carter v. Texas, 177 id. 442; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 id. 226. See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 id. 339; Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 id. 426.

"Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 id. 110; In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 id. 291, 297; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 id. 565. See also Williams v. Mississippi, 170 id. 213; Tarrance v. Florida, 188 id. 519.

12 C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Reagan v. F. L. & T. Co., 154 id. 362; Smyth v. Ames, 169 id. 466; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 id. 684; cf. L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503; M. & St. L. R. v. Minnesota, 186 id. 257.

13 G., C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150. See, however, A., T. & S. F. R. v. Matthews, 174 id. 96; and also F. M. L. Assn. v. Mettler, 185 id. 308; I. L. I. Co. v. Lewis, 187 id. 335; F. & M. I. Co. v. Dobney, 189 id. 301.

in the hands of the producer or raiser.15 A corporation is a person within the meaning of the Amendment.16

But a law is presumptively constitutional whenever it operates alike on all persons and property similarly situated, and while a state may not make a classification of the objects of legislation an excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression or spoliation of a particular class, yet special legislation, as such, is not prohibited by the Amendment.17 A state may grant a monopoly of the slaughtering of cattle.18 It may require that prior to the admission to its territory of a corporation of another state,

15 Connolly v. U. S. P. Co., 184 U. S. 540.

16 Santa Clara County v. S. P. R., 118 U. S. 394; P. M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 id. 181; G., C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 id. 150; Smyth v. Ames, 169 id. 466; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 id. 684; M. P. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 id. 205; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Herrick, ibid. 210; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 id. 26; C., C. & A. R. v. Gibbes, 142 id. 386; C. & L. T. Co. v. Sandford, 164 id. 578.

17 Class legislation, discriminating against some and favouring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the Amendment:" Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 32. Arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. . . . It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the XIV Amendment, and that in all cases it must appear not only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selection:'' G., C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 159, 165. "The question in each case is whether the legislature has adopted the statute in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression or spoliation of a particular class:" Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 398. "Classification . is not invalid because not depending

...

on scientific or marked differences in things or persons in their relations. It suffices if it is practical, and is not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary: O. I. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 562. "The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality:" A., T. & S. F. R. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 106.

15 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

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such conditions as it may designate shall be observed; it may prohibit a white and a negro from living togther in adultery or fornication under more severe penalties than those to which the parties would be subjected were they of the same race and colour; 20 it may classify railroads for the purpose of regulating fares,21 and may establish reasonable rates of fare; 22 it may reasonably limit the rates of water supply companies; 23 it may fix the tolls which may be charged by turnpike companies,24 and the rates which may be charged by grain elevator companies,25 and in neither case is it necessary that the regulations so imposed be uniform throughout the state; it may make railroad corporations,26 or all corporations,27 liable for injuries to employees caused by the negligence of fellow-employees; it may prohibit the sale of oleomargarine within its limits; 28 it may prohibit the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine which contains colouring matter, although permitting the use of colouring matter in butter; 29 it may authorize municipalities to improve streets and to assess the owners of adjoining lots

"P. M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; H. S. M. Co. v. New York, 143 id. 305; New York v. Roberts, 171 id. 658.

20 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583.

"Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680.

22 St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649; Reagan v. F. L. & T. Co., 154 id. 362; Smyth v. Ames, 171 id. 361; M. & St. L. R. v. Minnesota, 186 id. 257. See also C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 id. 167; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503.

"Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 201. 24 C. & L. T. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578.

25 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, two justices dissenting; Budd v. NewYork, 143 id. 517, three justices dissenting; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 id. 391, four justices dissenting.

20

"M. P. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Herrick, ibid. 210. 27 Tullis v. L. E. & W. R., 175 U. S. 348.

28 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678. It may not, however, regulate commerce by prohibiting the sale, in original packages, of oleomargarine brought from other states: Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1. 2o C. C. D. Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238.

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