may discriminate in favour of its own corporations and against foreign corporations; 71 it may tax foreign corporations; 72 it may arbitrarily refuse to foreign corporations permission to do business within its territory, or it may give its consent on any conditions which "are not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States, nor inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each state from encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defense;"73 it may impose on a foreign corporation a condition that service of process on the resident agent representative of the corporation on reasonable notice shall be considered a service upon the corporation," and it may prohibit the transaction of the business of insurance within its bounds by a foreign corporation, or it may impose in its discretion conditions on the performance of such business, for contracts of insurance being covenants for indemnity and not articles of commerce, the negotiation and issue of policies of insurance are not transactions of foreign or interstate commerce.75 But a state cannot, by any alteration of the conditions imposed upon foreign corporations doing business within the state, impair the obligation of contracts lawfully made.76 So also "Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 id. 410. 72 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 id. 410; L. I. Co. v. Massachusetts, ibid. 566; H. S. M. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305. See also Kidd v. Alabama, 188 id. 730. 73 L. I. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 407; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 356; H. S. M. Co. v. New York, 143 id. 305; Ashley v. Ryan, 153 id. 436; Hooper v. California, 155 id. 648; New York v. Roberts, 171 id. 658; Bedford v. E. B. & L. Assn., 181 id. 227. "L. I. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 356. 75 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 id. 410; L. I. Co. v. Massachusetts, ibid. 566; P. F. Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110; Hooper v. California, 155 id. 648; N. Y. L. I. Co. v. Cravens, 178 id. 389. 76 Bedford v. E. B. & L. Assn., 181 U. S. 227; cf. D. G. Co. v. U. S. G. Co., 187 id. 611. a state cannot rightfully impose as a condition the nonexercise by a corporation of its right of removing to the courts of the United States actions brought against it in the courts of the state." If, however, a state prohibit a foreign corporation from doing business within its bounds because the corporation will not forego the exercise of its right of removal of actions, the corporation cannot be protected by an injunction issued by the courts of the United States; 78 but a state statute, requiring foreign corporations as a condition of doing business in a state to stipulate that they will not remove into the courts of the United States causes which under the laws of the United States they would be entitled to remove, is void; 79 and a servant of the corporation 80 cannot be convicted for doing business for a corporation which had not complied with the statute.81 A substantial compliance by a foreign corporation with the condition on which it is permitted to do business within the bounds of another sovereignty is sufficient; thus, the law of Colorado requiring the filing of a certificate "designating the principal place where the business of such corporation shall be carried on in this state, and an authorized agent or agents, residing at its principal place of business, upon whom process may be served," is sufficiently complied with by a certificate naming the town in which the business is to be carried on and stating "that the general manager of said corporation residing at the said principal place of business, is the agent upon whom process may be served," but not giving the name of the general manager.82 A foreign corporation does not, by making a single contract for the sale of "H. I. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; S. P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202. 78 'Doyle v. C. I. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Cable v. U. S. L. I. Co., 191 id. 288. "Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186. 50 In this case an engine driver of a foreign railway corporation. 81 Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186. 82 Goodwin v. C. M. I. Co., 110 U. S. 1. machinery, come within the provisions of a statute forbidding foreign corporations to "do any business" within the state,83 but it does come within a similar statute when it loans money upon a note and mortgage solicited by its agent and executed within the state, although the instruments especially stipulate that they are made with reference to and under the laws of the home state of the corporation.84 Moreover, a foreign insurance company does not cease to do business within the state by withdrawing its agent and refusing new risks if its old policies continue in force and premiums are paid thereon by the policy-holders.8 85 Every one who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to the laws of the foreign government which chartered the corporation, so far as those laws affect the powers and obligations of the corporation or the validity, enforcement, or discharge of its contracts; thus, for instance, a holder in the United States of bonds, issued by a railway corporation of Canada, but negotiated, and stipulated to be paid, in the United States, is bound by the terms of a statutory scheme of arrangement enacted by the Parliament of Canada subsequently to the issue and sale of the bonds.86 On the same principle, a holder in Louisiana of a policy of life insurance issued in that state by a Missouri corporation is chargeable with notice of the insurance laws of Missouri substituting the insurance commissioner of that state as the representative of insolvent insurance companies.87 83 C. M. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727. But see also Fritts v. Palmer, 132 id. 282; F. & M. C. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 id. 98; C. N. B. & L. Assn. v. Denson, 189 id. 408. 84 4 C. N. B. & L. Assn. v. Denson, 189 U. S. 408. 85 C. M. L. I. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602. SC. S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527. 87 Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222. See also Pinney v. Nelson, 183 id. 144. The I Amendment. 128. The I Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." The clause as to religion cannot "be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society;" 88 nor does the clause prevent Congress from declaring the marriage, in a territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, of any person having a husband or wife living and undivorced, etc., to be bigamy; nor can one convicted of bigamy successfully defend upon his allegation that he religiously believed in plural marriages; 89 nor does this clause prohibit a contract of the commissioners of the District of Columbia with an incorporated charitable association for the application of the moneys of the United States in the construction of hospital buildings in which paupers are to be housed and to be cared for by devotees of the Roman Catholic faith; nor does the clause as to the freedom of speech and of the press prohibit congressional legislation forbidding the transportation of lottery tickets and advertisements by the mails; 91 nor does the Amendment forbid congressional prohibition of the immigration of anarchists.92 99 id. 1. Per Field, J., Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342. 90 Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145. See also Mormon Church v. U. S., 136 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291. "1 In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110. As to the right of assembly and of petition, see U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552. 92 U. S. v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292. The XIII Amendment. 94 129. The XIII Amendment declares that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction," and that "Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation." This provision does not validate an act of Congress which declares it to be a crime to conspire to deprive others of the equal protection of the laws.93 Nor does the XIII Amendment prohibit the creation of monopolies by a state, such as the exclusive right of providing a place for the slaughtering of cattle. Nor does it prohibit state legislation requiring railway companies to furnish separate accommodations for white and coloured passengers.95 Nor does it prohibit congressional legislation providing for the punishment of sailors who desert a ship after having contracted to serve upon it.96 Nor does it invalidate a promissory note made before the adoption of the Amendment, the consideration for which note was the price of a slave, slavery having been lawful by the lex loci contractus at the time the note was given, and this rule holds even where the vendor made an express warranty, warranting the chattel to be a slave for life and the warrantor's title to him to be clear and perfect.98 And, on the same principle, the estate of a former slave-owner may recover from one who used those slaves upon his own plantation a fair rental for their use, estimated to the time when they became free."9 93 * U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. "Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275. 97 White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Boyce v. Tabb, 18 id. 546. 95 Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654. |