case, however, Gray, J., discussed at length the meaning of the term "citizen" as used at common law and suggested that after the adoption of the Constitution all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States. An even broader definition of the term was established by Section 1 of the XIV Amendment, which declares that" all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." From and after the adoption of that Amendment, therefore, the birth within the United States of any person, whether white or coloured, who is subject to its jurisdiction, or the naturalization of any alien, makes the person so born, or naturalized, a citizen of the United States; and that right of citizenship is entitled to protection under such laws as Congress may enact in execution of the powers conferred by the XIV and XV Amendments. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." It is, therefore, beyond the power of any state to prescribe the conditions of naturalization, or to admit to citizenship any alien other than those whom the acts of Congress permit to be naturalized; nevertheless aliens may be naturalized by proceedings in courts of the states in conformity with the acts of Congress.5

'U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649.

3

The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 73; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 548; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 id. 649, cf. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 id. 94. Congress may, by statute or treaty, provide for the collective naturalization of the citizens of a territory upon its admission to statehood: Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135; Contzen v. U. S., 179 id. 191.

Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 269; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405. Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. 294.

Citizenship of a state.

120. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the court determined that a free negro could not be a citizen of a state, but, in his dissenting judgment, Curtis, J., showed that it was an historical fact, that in five of the thirteen original states negroes were not only recognized as citizens, but also admitted to the exercise of the right of suffrage, and that many acts of Congress had, by necessary implication, recognized negroes as citizens; and the weight of authority supports the position, that each state could, so far as the Constitution of the United States does not restrain it, determine the status, and consequently the citizenship, of the persons domiciled within its territory. By the terms

of the XIV Amendment, "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." Therefore birth, or naturalization, in the United States, followed by residence within the territory of any state, makes the person so born or naturalized, and so residing, a citizen of that state.

The right of suffrage.

121. All citizens are not necessarily entitled to the exercise of the right of suffrage, for the term "citizen," in the constitutional sense of the term, means one who owes the duty of allegiance and is entitled to the correlative right of protection, and it, therefore, includes persons who, by reason of sex, or age, may not be qualified to vote. The right of suffrage is a subject of state regulation, and not a privilege, or immunity, of citizenship protected by the Constitution of the United States, except in so far

19 How. 393.

'Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 93; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 id. 449; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 id. 539.

Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621.

11

as the XIV Amendment protects it. The Constitution provides, in Section 2 of Article I, that, at congressional elections, "the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” ' A state may, without contravening any constitutional provision, deny the suffrage to women,10 but by force of the XV Amendment a state may not, in its limitations on the exercise of the right of suffrage, discriminate against citizens of the United States on account of their "race, colour, or previous condition of servitude." A state, therefore, cannot limit the right of suffrage to the white race. Nevertheless, the power of Congress to legislate for the protection of the rights conferred by that Amendment being limited by the terms of the Amendment, Congress cannot by statute provide for the punishment of state election officers for wrongfully refusing to receive the vote of a qualified voter at an election, when that refusal is not based upon a discrimination against the voter on account of his race, colour, or previous condition of servitude; 12 nor can Congress by a general statute provide for the punishment of individuals who bribe persons to whom the right of suffrage is guaranteed by that Amendment; 13 nor can a conviction in a court of the United States be sustained under an indictment which charges the defendant in general terms with an intent to hinder and prevent citizens of the United States, of African descent, therein named, in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection, granted and secured to them

9 Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58. See also Mason v. Missouri, ibid. 328; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 id. 487.

10 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.

11 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 665. See Giles v. Harris, 189 id. 475; Giles v. Teasley, 193 id. 146.

12 U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.

13 James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127.

as citizens of the United States and of a state, without specifying any particular right, the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended to hinder or prevent.1a

As the right of a citizen of a state to vote for representatives in Congress is derived not only from the constitution and laws of his state, but also from the Constitution and laws of the United States, it follows that a citizen, otherwise qualified under the constitution and laws of his state, may maintain an action at law in the circuit court of the United States to recover from officers of the state damages for their wrongful refusal of his vote at a congressional election.14a But where the constitution of a state defines the qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage, and imposes the conditions of registry as a voter, one to whom registry is refused cannot, upon an allegation that the state's system of registration is void because it violates the XV Amendment, maintain a suit in equity in the circuit court of the United States to compel the state officers to register him as a voter under that system which he alleges to be void, for a decree in his favour would accomplish no practical result; 14b and when that citizen has brought an action at law in a court of the state to recover from state officers damages for their alleged wrongful refusal to register him as a voter, and when he has petitioned a court of the state for a mandamus to compel the state officers to register him as a voter, and the state court of last resort has entered judgment against him on the grounds that if the provisions of the state constitution are repugnant to the XV Amendment they are void and registrars appointed thereunder had no power to act, they could not be liable to him in

14 U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542.

14

14

a Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 id. 487.

"b Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475; Harlan, Brewer, and Brown, JJ., dissented.

damages for their refusal to register him, and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to register him; and the Supreme Court of the United States cannot reverse the judgment of the state court upon writ of error, for the state court has denied relief to the plaintiff in error for reasons independent of the federal right upon which he claimed.14c

The right of serving on juries.

122. The right of serving as a juror being incident to citizenship, a state cannot so regulate the selection of jurors in its courts as to prevent citizens of African descent from serving as jurors.1

15

Congressional regulation of federal elections.

123. Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution declares that, "the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.' Under this clause of the Constitution, Congress without question provided for the election of its members by separate districts, composed of contiguous territory, and required the election in every district throughout the United States to be held on the Tuesday after the first Monday of November in every second year. In other respects, however, the exercise of power by Congress on this subject has been contested in the courts. In the several cases it has been held, that Congress, having a supervisory control over the election of its members, and

15 XV Amendment; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Virginia v. Rives, ibid. 313; Ex parte Virginia, ibid. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 id. 370; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 id. 565; Carter v. Texas, 177 id. 442; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 id. 226.