of the Constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him.25 So also, Congress cannot provide, by statute, that an act, which is not an offense against the law at the time of its doing, may become such by a subsequent independent act with which it has no necessary connection; as, for instance, that subsequent bankruptcy, either voluntary or involuntary, shall render criminal and punishable by imprisonment the obtaining of goods with intent to defraud at any time within three months before the commission of the act of bankruptcy.26 Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto. 81. On the other hand, a law changing the venue in a criminal case, though passed subsequently to the commission of the offense, is not ex post facto; 27 nor is a law open to that objection, which, though passed after the commission of an offense, requires that the persons selected for jury service shall possess good intelligence, sound judgment and fair character,28 or which enlarges the class of persons who may be competent to testify as witnesses at the trial, as, for instance, by repealing a statutory prohibition of the admission of the testimony of convicted felons, 29 or which provides that "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the 25 P. 352. 20 U. S. v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670. 27 Gut v. The State, 9 Wall. 35; Cook v. U. S., 138 U. S. 157. 29 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565. 20 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574. 31 writing in dispute," 30 or which allows to the prosecution an appeal from the superior to the supreme court of the state, or which lessens the number of judges in the appellate court,32 or which limits the number of spectators at executions for murder; 33 nor is a law ex post facto which denies the exercise of the right of franchise to bigamists, or polygamists, for "the disfranchisement operates upon the existing state and condition of the person, and not upon a past offense;" 34 nor is a law unconstitutional which prohibits the continuance of the practice of medicine by those who do not register themselves in accordance with its provisions,35 or which excludes from the practice of medicine those who have been convicted of felonies prior to its enactment; 36 nor can constitutional objection be raised to a law which provides that whoever has been twice convicted of crime shall, upon conviction of a felony committed after the passage of the act, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and be punished by imprisonment for twenty-five years.37 While a law which endeavors to reach acts already committed and which provides a like punishment for the same act in the future is void in so far as it is retrospective, it is, however, valid as to offenses which are committed after its passage.38 Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. 82. A bill of attainder is defined by Field, J., in Cummings v. Missouri, as "a legislative act which inflicts "Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380. 32 Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377. 35 Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189. 37 McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311. punishment without a judicial trial," and he adds, "If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties." It has been held that a state constitution requiring clergymen, as a condition precedent to the exercise of their profession, to take oath that they had not committed certain designated acts, some of which were at the time offenses subject to legal penalties, and others of which were innocent acts,40 and that a state statute requiring one who applied to a court to open a judgment rendered against him in absentia, to take oath that he had not committed certain designated public offenses,11 and that an act of Congress requiring a lawyer, as a condition precedent to the exercise of his profession, to take an oath that he had not voluntarily borne arms against the United States, etc., 42 constituted in each case a bill of pains and penalties and was, therefore, subject to the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, inasmuch as, by legislative action, and without judicial investigation, the statute imposed a punishment for an act done before the enactment of the statute, the oath being offered to the party incriminated as a means of compelling an admission of guilt. "Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. CHAPTER VII. THE PROHIBITION OF STATE BILLS OF CREDIT. 83. Bills of credit defined. 84. What are, and what are not, bills of credit. Bills of credit defined. 83. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall . . . emit bills of credit." Bills of credit within the meaning of this constitutional provision are promissory notes issued by a state government on its credit "intended to circulate throughout the community for its ordinary purposes as money," and redeemable on demand, or at a day certain in the future.1 What are, and what are not, bills of credit. 84. A state, therefore, may not issue interest-bearing certificates in denominations "not exceeding $10, nor less than 50 cents' receivable by the state in payment of taxes, and of debts due to the state, and payable to officers of the state in discharge of salaries and fees of office, and redeemable by the state under an arrangement that there shall be withdrawn "annually from circulation one-tenth part of the certificates."2 Nevertheless, a state may incorporate a bank, of which that state shall be the sole shareholder, and it may authorize that bank to issue notes as circulation, without contravening the constitutional prohibition, the distinction being that such notes are issued, not on the credit of the state, but on the credit of 1 'Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 411; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 id. 40; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 id. 257. 2 Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 id. 40. 190 PROHIBITION OF STATE BILLS OF CREDIT. Coupons of state the capital and assets of the bank. bonds, though negotiable and receivable for taxes due to the state, and warrants drawn in payment of appropriations made by the legislature, payable upon presentation if there be funds in the treasury, and issued to individuals in payment of debts due to them, cannot properly be called bills of credit, for they are not intended to circulate as money. 'Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Darrington v. The Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12. Virginia Coupons Case, 114 U. S. 269, 284. 'H. & T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 89. |