there being no remedy by a suit against the state, the contract is substantially without sanction, except that which arises out of the honour and good faith of the state itself, and these are not subject to coercion. Although the state may, at the inception of the contract, have consented as one of its conditions to subject itself to suit, it may subsequently withdraw that consent and resume its original immunity, without any violation of the obligation of its contract in the constitutional sense."9 Yet, as was pointed out by Bradley, J., in Hans v. Louisiana,10 "where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or contract made by a state, they cannot wantonly be invaded. Whilst the state cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or V rights acquired under its contracts may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment." The force and effect of the prohibition as construed by the 76. The force and effect of the prohibition, as construed by the court, is, that a state may not, by any law or by any act to which the state, by its enforcement thereof, gives the force of a law, deprive a party of the legal right of enforcing, or obtaining compensation for the breach of, an express contract, executed or executory, between individuals, or between a state and individuals, but a state may regulate or limit the remedies of the contracting parties, provided that it leaves in force a substantial part of the legal remedies which subsisted at the time of the making of the contract. 'Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527; R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337. 1o 134 U. S. 1. See also McGahey v. Virginia, 135 id. 662. CHAPTER VI. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER. 77. The constitutional provisions. 78. The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws. 79. Ex post facto laws defined. 80. Illustrations of ex post facto laws. 81. Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto. 82. Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. The constitutional provisions. 77. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law." Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, restricting the powers of Congress, declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws. 78. Ex post facto laws relate to criminal, and not to civil, procedure.1 They are necessarily retrospective, but all retrospective laws are not ex post facto.2 State laws which operate retrospectively, or which divest antecedently vested rights of property, are not prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, if they are not ex post facto laws, and if they do not impair the obligation of contracts. A state legislature, unless restrained by the 'Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156. 2 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. * Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 138; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; B. & S. R. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469; League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156. 6 7 5 constitution of the state, may, therefore, enact statutes setting aside a decree of a court of probate, refusing to allow probate of a will, and granting a rehearing by the court of probate with liberty of appeal therefrom, after the time limited by existing laws for an appeal has passed; declaring that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between parties as to whom the courts of the state have decided that that relation does not exist; curing defective acknowledgments of deeds by femes covert; construing by a declaratory statute, after the death of a decedent, existing tax laws so as to subject to a collateral inheritance tax the distributive shares of nonresident distributees; directing a county court to set aside an inquisition condemning certain land for the use of a railway and to order a new inquisition; directing the imposition of a tax according to an assessment theretofore made; authorizing the sale of lands on which the state has a lien for debts due to it; 10 and establishing new remedies for the collection of taxes already delinquent.11 Upon the same principle, Congress having passed an act for the admission of a territory as a state, and having in that act omitted to provide for the disposal of causes pending in the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal from the territorial courts, may by a subsequent act properly make provision for such causes, for such legislation is remedial; 12 and it may provide for a review of the actions of a commission created by it, by a transfer 9 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380. "Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88. 8 Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456. B. & S. R. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172. 10 Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469. "League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156. "Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160. 8 of its proceedings and decisions to judicial tribunals for examination and determination de novo.13 So also Congress may by statute impose a tax retrospectively.14 Ex post facto laws defined. 17 79. In Fletcher v. Peck,15 Marshall, C. J., defines an ex post facto law to be one "which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed." In Cummings v. Missouri,16 Field, J., defines an ex post facto law, as "one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was required." In Calder v. Bull, Chase, J., classified ex post facto laws as follows:-"first, those that make an action, done before the passing of a law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punish such action; second, those that aggravate a crime, or make it greater than it was when committed; third, those that change the punishment and inflict greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; and, fourth, those that alter the legal rules of evidence and receive less or different testimony to convict the offender than that required at the time of the commission of the offense." That classification has been repeatedly quoted with approval.18 18 Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 id. 377; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 id. 565; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 id. 589. Illustrations of ex post facto laws. 80. Laws have been held to be ex post facto, which, after the commission of an act, alter the situation of the accused to his disadvantage, as, for instance, by providing that the plea of autrefois convict should not at a second trial be a defense in the case of a prisoner convicted of murder in the second degree under an indictment charging murder in the first degree, the law having been at the time of the commission of the crime that such a plea was a defense; 19 or by requiring a clergyman,20 or a lawyer,21 as a condition precedent to the practice of his profession, to take an oath that he has not done an act, for the doing of which, when done, deprivation of office was not a legal penalty; or by requiring one who applies to a court to open a judgment rendered against him in absentia, to take oath, as a condition precedent to his obtaining the desired relief, that he has not done an act for the doing of which the deprivation of the right to sue in courts of justice was not by law antecedently imposed as a penalty; 22 or by adding to the death penalty for murders already committed, the withholding from the convict of all knowledge as to the date of his execution and the keeping of him in solitary confinement until that time; 23 or by reducing from twelve to eight the number of jurors necessary for the trial of felonies committed before the enactment of the law.24 In the case last cited it was pointed out that while, as a general rule, the accused has no vested rights in particular modes of procedure, yet he cannot be deprived of any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption 19 20 Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. "Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. U. S. 189. 22 Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234. 23 Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160. 24 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343. But see Hawker v. New York, 170 |