which is exempt from such regulation claim exemption as to property which it acquires from a company which was not exempt.75

Exemption from the operation of the police power.

73. There is no implied contract in a charter that the state will exempt the corporate franchises and property from the operation of such legislation as the state may deem necessary to secure the welfare of its citizens.76 The granting, therefore, of a charter to an insurance company does not invalidate a subsequent statute which requires that company to make a full return showing its business condition to the proper officers of the state." Nor can a state surrender by implication the right to regulate by subsequent legislation the location of railway stations and the stoppage of trains at those stations; 78 nor to require by such legislation the fencing of all tracks used by railway companies within the state.79 Nor can a state by implication exempt a railway company from liability in

75 P. G. & C. Co. v. Chicago, 194 U. S. 1.

76

TMa C., B. & Q. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. C. & N. W. Ry., ibid. 164; W. & St. P. R. v. Blake, ibid. 180; Boyd v. Alabama, ibid. 645; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 id. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, ibid. 659; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. 526; Stone v. F. L. & T. Co., 116 id. 307; G. R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 id. 174; P. R. v. Miller, 132 id. 75; C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 418; W. & B. Bridge Co. v. W. Bridge Co., 138 id. 287; New York v. Squire, 145 id. 175; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 id. 364; E. I. Co. v. Ohio, 153 id. 446; N. & W. R. v. Pendleton, 156 id. 667; Pearsall v. G. N. Ry., 161 id. 646; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, ibid. 677; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 id. 1; C., B. &. Q. R. v. Chicago, 166 id. 226; L. I. W. Co. v. Brooklyn, ibid. 685; W. R. v. Defiance, 167 id. 88; C., B. & Q. R. v. Nebraska, 170 id. 57; A. Ry. v. New York, 176 id. 335; F. W. Co. v. Freeport, 180 id. 587; K. I. Co. v. Harbison, 183 id. 13; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, ibid. 503; Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & I. Co., 192 id. 201; cf. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 id. 628; C. M. L. I. Co. v. Spratley, 172 id. 602.

damages for fires caused by its locomotives,80 or for injury to property in the construction of its road.81 On the same principle, the grant of a franchise to a railway does not preclude a municipality from making reasonable regulations as to the use of its streets.82 A state which, by charter, has authorized a railroad to consolidate with other roads, may forbid its future consolidation with competing roads.83 A state may place reasonable limitations upon the rates of fare and freight charged by its railways.84 It may, in the case of a railway whose charter authorizes the company from time to time to fix, regulate and receive tolls and charges, vest in a commission by a subsequent statute the power of fixing those rates.85 It may by statute regulate the rates of a water corporation whose charter vested the power of fixing the rates in a board of commissioners, some of whom were appointed by the company.86 And it has been said that where a water company was organized under a statute which provided that the commissioners should not reduce the rates below a given point, the state may by subsequent statute authorize the commissioners to reduce the rates below that

St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1.

81 P. R. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75.

Baltimore v. B. T. Co., 166 U. S. 673; W. R. v. Defiance, 167 id. 88. See also C., B. & Q. R. v. Nebraska, 170 id. 57; L. G. L. Co. v. Murphy, ibid. 78.

Pearsall v. G. N. Ry., 161 U. S. 646.

"C., B. & Q. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. 526; G. R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 id. 174; M. E. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 467; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503. In Reagan v. F. L. & T. Co., 154 id. 362, 393, after admitting that a state has the general power to regulate rates, the court suggested, but did not decide, that there might be an implied grant to the railway of the right to reasonable tolls. 85 Stone v. F. L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307; Stone v. I. C. R., ibid. 347; C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 418. See also Owensboro v. O. W. Co., 191 id. 358.

8 S. V. W. W. v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347; cf. F. W. Co. v. Freeport, 180 id. 587.

or

point.87 Indeed, while a state may, by an express agreement,88 bind itself not to regulate the rates charged by a quasi-public corporation, such as a water-supply street railway 90 company, a state cannot, even by an express contract, bargain away its right to enact such legislation as may be necessary to secure the safety or to protect the health or the morals of its citizens. It may amend statutes which regulate the construction of railroads within its limits.91 It may forbid the continued prosecution of their respective trades by corporations chartered by it for the purpose of rendering dead animals into fertilizers,92 or manufacturing and selling liquors," or selling lottery tickets and drawing lotteries.94 And, upon this principle, it has also been held that a state may, in derogation of a previous grant of the exclusive privilege of slaughtering cattle, authorize others to conduct the same business.95

Contracts as to matters of public concern.

74. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Marshall, C. J., conceded that "the framers of the Constitution did

87 Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 201. In this case, however, the state constitution had reserved to the legislature the power to amend or repeal the law in question.

ss Even an express grant of exemption from regulation does not by implication extend to a purchaser from the grantee: Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 id. 649; N. & W. R. v. Pendleton, ibid. 667; C. & L. T. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 id. 578; G. R. & I. Ry. v. Osborn, 193 id. 17; and see P. G. & C. Co. v. Chicago, 194 id. 1.

89 Los Angeles v. L. A. W. Co., 177 U. S. 558; cf. K. W. Co. v. Knoxville, 189 id. 434.

20 Detroit v. D. C. S. Ry., 184 U. S. 368; Cleveland v. C. C. Ry., 194 id. 517; Cleveland v. C. E. Ry., ibid. 538; cf. F. W. Co. v. Freeport, 180 id. 587; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503, 518.

Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25.

"Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 id. 488. Butchers' Union v. C. C. Co., 111 U. S. 746.

64 Wheat. 629.

98

not intend to restrain a state from the regulation of its civil institutions adopted for internal government.” On this principle, there can be no implied contract on the part of a state that it will not amend its constitution, in so far as that constitution deals with the administration of the public concerns of the state.97 Nor can a state legislature bind subsequent legislatures as to the exercise of the powers of sovereignty over the political subdivisions of the state, and over its municipal corporations with regard to subject-matters of public and not of private interest, as, for instance, the location of a county seat," or the boundaries of its municipalities, or the sale of property held by a municipality for public purposes, such as water works,100 or the appropriation under state authority of municipal obligations by their holders as a set-off against municipal claims against those holders; nor does the appointment by the state of a public officer for a fixed term for a stipulated compensation constitute a contract between the state and the appointee whose obligation is impaired by either the reduction of his compensation or his removal from office,2 but after the duties have been performed by the appointee of a municipal corpora tion during the term of his office there is a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent statute abolishing the power of taxation for the payment of his compensation. Of course, in the case of an officer appointed under a statute which in terms defines the tenure of the office to

1

"Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282.

"Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548.

"U. S. v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284.

100 New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600.

1

Amy v. Shelby County, 114 U. S. 387.

* Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; cf. Crenshaw v. U. S., 134 U. S.

be according to law, a subsequent statute removing him is not an impairment of the contract.*

The withdrawal by a state of its consent to be sued.

7

75. The state's consent to be sued being voluntary and of grace, that consent does not constitute a contract whose obligation can be impaired by a subsequent repeal of the statute permitting such suit, especially where the statute authorizing the suit has provided no means for the enforcement of any judgment that may be rendered against the state. Under such circumstances the state may, by subsequent legislation, withdraw its consent to be sued." In this connection, that which was forcibly said by Mathews, J., in the judgment of the court in the case of In re Ayers, may well be borne in mind. The learned judge said: "It cannot be doubted that the XI Amendment to the Constitution operates to create an important distinction between contracts of a state with individuals and contracts between individual parties. In the case of contracts between individuals, the remedies for their enforcement or breach, in existence at the time they were entered into, are a part of the agreement itself, and constitute a substantial part of its obligation. That obligation. . . cannot be impaired by any subsequent legislation.

Thus, not only the covenants and conditions of the contract are preserved, but also the substance of the original remedies for its enforcement. It is different with contracts between individuals and a state. In respect to these, by virtue of the XI Amendment to the Constitution,

Head v. University, 19 Wall. 526.

Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527; Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, ibid. 530.

R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337; R. Co. v. Alabama, ibid. 832; Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 id. 240.

7123 U. S. 504.

Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203.