notwithstanding the protection afforded by the V Amendment.80 There is a continuous carriage of goods within the meaning of the act when goods shipped under a through bill of lading from a point in one state to a point in another state are received in transit and carried exclusively within a state by a carrier under a pro rata division of the rate, and such intrastate carrier thereby subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the commission so far as regards such transportation.81 The pro rata share of a through rate may, without unlawful discrimination or undue preference, be less than a local rate.82 Party rate tickets, sold at reduced prices for parties of ten or more in number, do not constitute undue, or unreasonable, preferences in favour of the purchasers thereof, nor unjust, or unreasonable, discriminations as against purchasers of single tickets.83 In the absence of a general regulation that free cartage from a railway station to the premises of a consignee shall be regarded as a part of a terminal service, railway transportation must be held to end at the railway station, and the furnishing of free cartage to consignees in one town, but not in another town, does not constitute unjust local discrimination; 84 but a rebate allowed to a consignee to compensate for the cost of cartage from the railway station to his premises, when a similar rebate is not allowed to another consignee in the same locality, is an unjust personal discrimination.85 That an unlawful discriminating rate was allowed, or a rebate paid, in violation of the act, does not prevent liability on the part of the carrier for the freight received and covered by insurance

8 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591; Shiras, Gray, and White, JJ., dissented.

81 C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 184.

82 Parsons v. C. & N. W. Ry., 167 U. S. 447.

83 I. C. C. v. B. & O. R., 145 U. S. 263.

84 I. C. C. v. D., G. H. & M. Ry., 167 U. S. 633.

88

in the custody of the carrier's agents.86 The act does not in terms authorize competing carriers to enter into contracts to maintain even reasonable rates.87 The right of recovery given by the statute for an excess of payment over a rate charged to another shipper under similar conditions is in the nature of a penalty, and the plaintiff must produce full proof thereof, and must show a pecuniary injury to himself resulting from such discrimination.8 Substantial similarity, or dissimilarity, of circumstances and conditions is a question of fact, to be proved by evidence and finding of the commission thereon is only prima facie, and is subject to review by the court. 89 Reduced through rates from a port of entry to a point within the country on goods from abroad, which, except for such reduced rate, would not have come through that port of entry, do not constitute an unjust discrimination as against traffic originating at that port of entry.90 The commission may administratively determine the circumstances and conditions affecting competitive rates, considering to that end the legitimate interests of the carrier as well as of the shippers, and the legitimate interests of the locality to which the goods are to be carried as well as of the locality from which the goods are shipped.91 A substantial competition, that is a competition producing a substantial and real effect upon traffic and rate making, is one of the circumstances constituting substantial dissimilarity under the long and short haul clause in sections 3 and 4 of the act,92 and which may justify a carrier in

"M. C. P. & S. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 151 U. S. 368.

87 U. S. v. T. M. F. A., 166 U. S. 290.

Parsons v. C. & N. W. Ry., 167 U. S. 447.

"I. C. C. v. A. M. Ry., 168 U. S. 144.

92

I. C. C. v. A. M. Ry., 168 U. S. 144; L. & N. R. v. Behlmer, 175 id.

charging a greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul.

It was held, before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, that a state could require under a penalty all railroads to fix and post their rates of fare and freight and not to charge in excess therefor,93 but it was held also that a state could not by a police regulation enforce, with respect to interstate transportation, a prohibition of a charge of the same, or a greater, toll for a shorter than for a longer distance in the same direction,94 and, after the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, it was held that such a regulation was a fortiori beyond the power of the state,95 for Congress having enacted its long and short haul clause, it was, of course, not lawful for a state to legislate on the same subject. When a company owned by a railway corporation buys coal at the mines under an arrangement alleged to secure preferential rates for the vendors, the Interstate Commerce Commission may, in a proper proceeding in the circuit court, compel the testimony of witnesses and the production of contracts.96

The cases in the Supreme Court and the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission show that the act of 1887 has invited much costly and fruitless litigation. Nevertheless, the legislation is of value in that it has strengthened the hands of those broad-minded railway managers who believe that the interests of their share

648; E. T., V. & G. Ry. v. I. C. C., 181 id. 1; I. C. C. v. L. & N. R., 190 id. 273.

R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560.

“W., S. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Waite, C. J., and Bradley and Gray, JJ., dissented.

"L. & N. R. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27; Gray and Brewer, JJ., dissented; G., C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98.

"I. C. C. v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25.

holders are best served by fair dealing with customers and with competitors.

The Anti-trust law.

53. The so-called "trusts" are combinations of corporations and properties made, in some cases, by the merger and consolidation of existing associations, and, in other cases, by the organization of corporations to acquire and hold the properties to be consolidated, or the controlling interest in the shares of the corporations to be combined.

The "trusts" are a necessary result of the growth of the country, and of the development of isolated and sparsely settled states into a nation whose territory is covered by a network of railways, whose trade is that of an empire and not that of a village, and whose markets have ceased to be local and have become world-wide. "Trusts" are formed to obtain capital by the sale of bonds and shares, to save the waste of competition, to secure in production, transportation, and distribution the maximum of efficiency at the minimum of cost, to expand trade by reducing the price to the consumer, and by economical operation to increase the net profit to the producer and the carrier.

It is not surprising that the capitalization of our railways, the number of our industrial organizations, and the magnitude of their operations should arouse the public interest, and should cause on the part of unintelligent people more or less fear as to possible consequences. Every great industrial development has excited such fears. The steam engine, the railways, and all forms of labour-saving appliances, from the spinning jenny to the type-setting machine, have seemed, in their turn, to threaten large additions to the ranks of the unemployed, and heavy losses to different classes of people; and yet in each case the result has been the opening of new avenues to employ

ment, and a substantial advance in civilization. So today, no one who is accurately informed as to present industrial conditions can doubt that, because of American financial skill in securing combination of resources and concert of action, and because of increased railway efficiency, the products of industry have been brought to a higher standard than ever before, the labour which produces them is better paid, the market is wider and is better supplied, and the consumer buys upon relatively more favourable terms.

In any legislative regulation of corporations, great or small, by the United States, there are only four classes of people to be considered. There are, first, the investors in the bonds and shares issued by the corporations, that is, those who desire to become partners therein, and to participate in their profits, and who, therefore, in so far as they may properly be regarded as beneficiaries of legislation, can only be aided by the requirement of publicity, that is, by compelling the corporation, under proper penalties, to furnish such information as to its capital, earnings, and disbursements as will enable intending purchasers and owners to determine whether its financial condition be such as to render the purchase or holding of its securities a prudent investment. But the federal law can have nothing to do with the organization of corporations for purposes not directly connected with the exercise by the United States of some power of government, nor can the United States constitutionally regulate the issue, sale, or transfer of the bonds or shares of such corporations, or protect investments therein. There are, secondly, the business rivals or competitors of the trading "trusts.' On their behalf complaint is made that those "trusts," in order to destroy competition, discriminate in their prices. But competition is industrial warfare. You cannot have