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contemporary evidence that Charles Cotesworth Pinckney33 repelled as unjust to Adams a proposal from men in control of the situation that a compromise between the two parties be adopted on the same plan as that which had been acted upon in 1796, and that the vote of South Carolina be given eight for Pinckney and eight for Jefferson.
The Federalists of the state allowed the election to go largely by default. Ralph Izard and William Smith were no longer in the arena, Thomas and C. C. Pinckney refrained from any electioneering; and worst of all, Robert Goodloe Harper had notified his constituents in a letter of May 15 that he would not run for Congress again and would not return for further residence in South Carolina. The local Federalists were leaderless-a new thing in their experience—handicapped by the record of the Alien and Sedition Acts, and generally powerless. The result of the contest hinged upon the
. work of one man, Charles Pinckney, whose exertions in Jefferson's and Burr's behalf were as marked as the inertness of the Adams and Pinckney men.
Charles Pinckney wrote a full account of his labors in the emergency in letters to Jefferson, which have been published in this journal.34 The choice of electors was to be made, as usual in the state, by the legislature elected shortly before the presidential contest. Charleston sent in 1800, as usual, a majority of Federalists to the assembly (11 to 4), but the whole membership of the two houses on joint ballot promised to be very evenly divided. Charles Pinckney, instead of going to Washington for the opening of Congress, went to Columbia to manage the election of electors. By contesting the election of numerous members, and other jockeying, and by persuading such members as could be persuaded, he succeeded in swinging the majority. The assembly chose Republican electors by votes ranging from 82 to 87 as against 63 to 69 for the Federalist candidates. Pinckney then promptly wrote Jefferson requesting him not to “make any arrangements for this state" before consulting himself. The allusion was of course to the distribution of patronage.
Harper on the day after Jefferson's inauguration wrote as a farewell to his late constituents a eulogy of the constructive work performed by the Federalist party:35 It was a splendid appreciation and fit to serve, as it did, as an obituary address. The gentry were
36 This was reprinted together with the other pamphlets herein mentioned in a volume: Select Works of Robert Goodloe Harper, vol. I., all published (Baltimore, 1814).
of course shocked by the triumph of Jefferson, and could adjust themselves to it only by retirement in injured dignity to private life.36
The Jeffersonian régime soon upset the whole adjustment of parties and their constitutional maxims. To the Republicans of 1801 the historical Republican doctrines were little more interesting than the last year's almanacs. The Northern wing of the Federalist party soon borrowed the arguments of strict construction in order to oppose the Louisiana Purchase, the embargo and the War of 1812; but the Carolina Federalists saw no occasion to follow this example. They accordingly did little but maintain their party machinery, in more or less isolation from parties outside the state. At the beginning of 1803 the Charleston Courier was established as a Federalist organ, denouncing in its editorials the French doctrines of the rights of man, etc., and praising conservatism and stability in government.37 The editor soon began to complain of apathy in his party: “Sure some spell . . . hangs over the federalists. . . . If not for their own sakes, will they not for the salvation of their country rouse from the censurable sloth and fight the democrats ? ”38 The Federalists locally would not arouse, for they had no issue for which to fight. The Jeffersonians had adopted the Federalist policies, and the South Carolina Federalists were drawn more and more into harmony with them and out of sympathy with the filibustering New Englanders. The older generation continued to cling passively to the name of Federalist. The Charleston Courier toned down and ceased to be a party organ.
The sons of the gentry, William Lowndes, for example, drifted inevitably into the Republican party,39 which was now no longer Democratic in the old doctrinaire sense, but was the one party of action. As a sign of the times even among the older group, William Smith, having returned from Portugal, went over to the Republicans and in 1810 tried to secure a nomination to Congress.40 By force of the embargo and the British war, which they supported, the South Carolina Federalists gradually ceased to contend that they had a reason for separate existence, and they were gradually merged among the Republicans, who as a party accepted leaders largely from the gentry of the former Federalist families.
The Federalist party in the state was practically dead by 1812. The old Federalist policies, however, championed as they were by
the new generation of leaders in spite of their repudiation of the party name and alignment, continued to control the state until about 1827. But the times again were changing, and men's opinions with them. Calhoun, Cheves, Lowndes and VcDuffie had supported the national banks, Federal internal improvements and the protective tariff in the years of emergency at the close of the War of 1812, and had rejoiced in the opportunity of promoting the welfare of the manufacturing and wool-growing regions, so long as it did not obviously threaten injury to the people of their own state. But when the protected Northern and Western interests fattened and grew strong and used their strength to force through Congress bills for the further heightening of duties, and when it came to appear that the plantation states were entering a severe depression partly because of their previous generosity, the dominating sentiment among the people and the leaders in South Carolina reacted sharply against the so-called American system and against the constitutional theory which supported it. The Carolina statesmen, finding that the genie which they had loosed from his jar was threatening them and their people with oppression, resorted to the mystic (yet severely logical) formula of nullification in the hope of conjuring him back under control. Andrew Jackson's coercive proclamation, together with the Congressional force bills, established a decisive majority in the state in a position of resentment and reaction. The public appreciation of the impending crisis over negro slavery in the following period operated to make this attitude permanent. The Federalist policies were now not appreciably less dead in the state than was the old Federalist party organization.
L'LRICH B. PHILLIPS.
ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE ANNEXATION OF
All histories treating of the Pacific Coast devote much attention to the question of English interests in, or designs on, California during the period from 1838 to 1846. In any brief treatment of this subject, only the more important points can be considered, and this article is therefore confined to the larger aspects of the case customarily stated by historians. When the various suspicions directed against Great Britain are summarized, they are found to deal with three points: first, a mooted transfer of California to the English bondholders of the Mexican debt, with the ultimate object of making California a colony of Great Britain; second, a project for the immediate and direct transfer of California to England by sale or gift from Vexico; and third, specific instructions to British admirals upon the Pacific Coast looking toward the accomplishment of these designs. Up to within a very recent time, it has been possible to do no more than to present negative evidence against an assertion of such designs or plans. Now, however, by the recent opening to research of the Records of the British Foreign Office to 1850, it is possible to determine whether or not English foreign secretaries knew or cared anything about California. It is the purpose therefore of this article to state the results of an examination made into the documents preserved in the Record Office in London with special reference to the question of British designs upon California,for it is certain that if any definite plans ever existed upon the part of the English government, or were even favorably received by English ministers, they would find some place in British contemporary correspondence.
1 The substance of this paper was presented before the meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, at Berkeley, California, November 21, 1908.
The Records thus examined covered the period from 1838 to 1846 inclusive, and were found in the series of despatches to and from the diplomatic agents, both ministers and consuls, in America, Mexico, and after 1841, in Texas. In addition, search was made in the Admiralty Records for the same period, although these are by no means complete, owing to the destruction by an official at the Admiralty Office of the greater portion of the despatches of the Admiralty of this period-a destruction covering not merely the Admiralty Letters to and from the Pacific Coast, but Admiralty Letters from stations all over the world. It was, however, possible, in the lack of the letters themselves, to use for these years the “ Digest and Précis” of Admiralty Correspondence, which gives in condensed form the substance of each letter sent out or received.
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Setting aside, then, all the various rumors prevalent at the time, and confining attention to the evidence secured from the Record Office, it appears that the very first interest in California, manifested by British agents, arose as a result of the arrest of English and American citizens in Monterey, in April, 1840, for an alleged conspiracy intended to overthrow the authority of Governor Alvarado. These foreigners, some two score in number, were transported to Tepic, under the charge of Josef Castro, and there claimed the protection of Barron, the British vice-consul. In his report to Pakenham, at Mexico, upon the incident, Barron, while taking the necessary steps to secure indemnity for the “injustice” done to British subjects, was nevertheless primarily concerned that no British ship of war was at hand to be despatched to Monterey. He was in fact compelled to appeal to the commander of the United States corvette, San Luis, and to entrust to him the investigation of the causes of the trouble in California. In the subsequent correspondence on the adjustment of the difficulty, much praise is given the American commander for his prompt and generous services, but the necessity for such aid irritated both Barron and Pakenham, and both men urged an increase of naval strength in the Pacific.5
In the beginning, then, Pakenham was interested solely in the question of British naval prestige, and there is no evidence that he had any real knowledge of the situation in California. Soon after this, however, he received several communications from Barron, stating the great value of Upper California, and at about the same time, he had a long conversation with one Forbes, who had been a resident of Monterey. Also, Pakenham learned of the journey through California of a Frenchman, Duplot du Morfras, and apparently became somewhat suspicious of French designs upon the Pacific Coast. The result was that on August 30, 1841, he addressed a despatch to Palmerston, advocating a plan which should ultimately secure California to Great Britain. He wrote:
It is much to be regretted that advantage should not be taken of the arrangement some time since concluded by the Mexican Government with their creditors in Europe, to establish an English population in the magnificent Territory of l'pper California. He then stated the terms of an agreement concluded in 1837 between the Mexican government and the British bondholders of the
*F. O., Mexico, 136, Barron to Pakenham, May 12, 1840. * Ibid., 137, no. 78, Pakenham to Palmerston, August 22, 1840. * Ibid., 136, no. 65, Pakenham to Palmerston, July 5, 1840. * Ibid., 145, no. 43, Pakenham to Palmerston, June 10, 1841. ' Ibid., 146, no. 91, Pakenham to Palmerston.