obtain repayment of a sum of 5201. paid by would then have to do would be to read out defendants out of his account on forged che- the amounts of forged cheques as if they apques. The defendants denied that the che-peared in the ledger, and as they appeared, ques were forged, and said that if they were of course, in the pass-book, they would be forged the plaintiff was guilty of negligence ticked off. The cheques, the subject of the which contributed to the loss, and was not action, numbered twenty-five, and were altherefore, entitled to recover. The case was most all paid over the counter, being drawn originally tried before Mr. Justice Day and a in favour of regular customers of his, and special jury on April 16 last, when the jury were uncrossed. found for the defendants. On application to a Divisional Court, consisting of Mr. Justice Denman, Mr. Justice Charles, and Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, a new trial was ordered, and this was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, composed of the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Lopes. The short facts of the case, as opened by counsel, were these: In 1887, the plaintiff, who banked, and still banks, with the defendants, had a confidential clerk named Noad, son of a clergyman. It was Noad's duty to put cheques before him to sign, with the accounts on which they were due. Having | examined the vouchers, he would sign the necessary cheques, which were to bearer, and were always crossed. The body of the cheque was filled up by Noad. Matters went on until August 14, 1888, when plaintiff had occasion to go to the bank himself. The cashier called his attention to the fact that his signatures varied a good deal, but as he had been using a box of sample pens he attributed the variation to that fact, and said so to the cashier. On returning to his office, however, he mentioned the incident to Noad, and told him to get him a box of his old pens. Next day Noad did not appear, and wrote saying he was.ill, and from that day to this he has never been seen. Inquiries were then made, and it was found that not only had over 5007. been obtained by Noad on forged cheques, but over 2001. from the cashbox. Cross-examined: His accounts had not been audited during the period over which the frauds extended, as his auditor was ill, and he waited for him to get well. He never compared his returned cheques either with the pass-book or the counterfoils in the cheque-book. He ticked off the entries in the pass-book as read out, as he supposed, by Noad from the ledger. With one exception-that of the last forged cheque-all the forged cheques were missing. Noad never had his authority to sign cheques. Noad could not have obtained his signature by fraud; the cheques must have been forged. Noad had left behind him memoranda relating to all the cheques, but no confession that he had forged them. Evidence not having been called for the defence, Mr. Bigham, Q.C., addressed the jury on behalf of plaintiff, and submitted that there could be no doubt that the cheques were forged, and forged by Noad. That being so, what had plaintiff done to disentitle him from recovering his money from the bank? Was there any duty cast upon him to conduct his affairs in an unusual manner to protect the bank? He had said that he never signed a cheque except when he had the account on which it was due before him. He had never given Noad signed cheques in blank, or given him any authority to sign for him. That being so, the case was an undefended one. Mr. Finlay, Q. C., on behalf of defendants, contended that Noad could not have obtained Mr. J. H. Chatterton, the plaintiff, gave cheques without discovery unless he obtained evidence as to the course of business in his them from the plaintiff, no doubt by fraud. office. He used to check the pass-book with Week after week the bank sent in its passthe ledger. Noad would read entries from the book and returned cheques, and no comledger, and he would tick the amounts off in plaint was made until after Noad had bolted. the pass-book. What Noad must have done If plaintiff had adopted the ordinary precauwas to get the forged cheques out of his pass-tion of comparing his old cheques with the book at the bank and destroy them. All he pass-book or the counterfoil cheque-book, the fraud must have been discovered on the very first cheque being brought to his notice. Because Noad was a rogue, it did not follow that he was necessarily a forger, and he submitted that he would shrink from the more serious crime when he could obtain the same results by fraudulently obtaining his master's signature, in which case the bank would not be liable. Even if the cheques were forged, could it be said that plaintiff by his conduct had not led the defendants to believe that he had examined his book and found his accounts correct? It might be said that no duty was cast on plaintiff to examine his pass-book, but if he did so and ticked off the entries, surely it was his fault if the bank were deceived. Mr. Justice Mathew, in summing up the case to the jury, described it as one of immense interest to all commercial men, dealing as it did with the relations existing between banks and their customers. What was the contract existing between a bank and its customers? To debit them only with such cheques as they drew. The meaning of that was that the bank took upon themselves the risk. It might be said that was hard on the banker, but he must be supposed to know his own business, and on that basis make his own bargain. The first question was, Were the cheques forged? But the bank had called no evidence to prove their genuineness. That Noad was a rogue and a forger no one could doubt, because it was common ground that the last cheque-the only one not destroyed-was a forgery. Was it, therefore, likely that that was his only effort in that branch of crime? It was said on defendants' behalf that Noad would shrink from forgery when he could obtain his master's signature by fraud, and then alter the figures. That, however, was a matter for them to consider. The second question was, Had the bank been misled by plaintiff's conduct, and had plaintiff by his conduct disentitled himself to recover from the bank? If the bank had proved that they were misled -and they had not done so-could it be said that plaintiff had done anything wrong because he conducted his business in his own way? People in business were not always guarding against fraud, but against mistakes. Supposing plaintiff had told Noad to examine his pass-book and compare the returned cheques with it and with the counterfoils, would the bank have any right to complain? And yet in that case the frauds would not have been discovered any sooner in the ordinary course of events. His lordship then proceeded to review the evidence carefully, and left the following questions to the jury: (1) Were the cheques forged? (2) If so, did the plaintiff so act as to lead the bank to believe they might honour the cheques now admitted to be forgeries, and did the bank do so because of his acts? (3) What were the plaintiff's acts which misled the bank? The jury found for the plaintiff for the amount claimed-520l. 58. 7d.-Judgment accordingly. EMBRACERY. On January 17, before the recorder, James Baker surrendered and was indicted for unlawfully and knowingly attempting and endeavouring to corrupt a jury sworn to give a true verdict according to the evidence in the issue joined between the Queen and Bernard Boaler, upon an indictment against him for having published a defamatory libel concerning the directors of the Briton Medical and General Life Association (Limited), and to incline the jury to be more favourable to the side of the said Bernard Boaler by persuasion, entreaties, entertainments, and other unlawful means, and so committing acts of embracery. Mr. Besley moved the Court to quash the indictment, and said that no search had been able to find any conviction for embracery. With regard to embracery, they had to go back to the time of Edward III. The learned counsel went on to quote 'Russell on Crimes,' and the Report of the Royal Commission in 1879 on the criminal law. He submitted that there must be an attempt to influence an individual, and not a body like a jury. The jurors supposed to have been embraced were not named in the indictment. The indictment simply referred to a jury,' and did not mention names. The corrupt means were not set out. Mr Wightman Wood followed on the same side: 'Corrupting a jury,' he pointed out, was a conventional expression, and was inaccurate when mentioned in an indictment. What ought to be alleged was that certain jurors mentioned by name were corrupted. The learned counsel quoted 'Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law,' p. 77, and said that the word 'jury' was not used, but only 'a juryman.' The offence of embracery was the embracing of a juror. He therefore submitted that the indictment which alleged an attempt to influence a jury instead of an attempt to influence certain jurors, and mentioning their names, was bad. He argued also that the nature of the persuasion and entertainment ought to be set out, and that the words 'other unlawful means' were far too vague for an indictment. He therefore submitted that the indictment ought to be quashed as the names of the jurymen were not mentioned in it, and the means of corruption were not stated sufficiently, and the words 'other unlawful means' were too vague. Mr. Fulton argued that the offence was sufficiently stated. The charge was unlawfully attempting to influence a jury. There was no precedent on which the indictment could be drawn. The recorder said that this was an indictment at common law, and there did not appear to be any precedent for the indictment. What they found was that where the offence was alluded to in the Act 32 Hen. VIII, in 'Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law' and in the Report of the Royal Commission, and also in the draft bill drawn in conformity with the recommendations of that report, the language had been singularly uniform, and in every case the allusion had been not to a body as a jury, but always referred definitely to individuals. In his opinion the indictment was bad, and must be quashed.-The indictment was accordingly quashed, and the defendant was discharged. - Law Journal (London). INSOLVENT NOTICES, ETC. Quebec Official Gazette, March 7. Judicial Adandonments. Henri Blanchette, trader, parish of St. Valerien de Milton, Feb. 27. Dominateur Collins, scale manufacturer, Montreal, Feb 26. Alphonse Langevin Lacroix, trader, Montebello, March 4. Raoul Lavoie, hardware merchant, Quebec, March 4. Thomas Malhiot, trader, Gentilly, March 5. Curators Appointed. Re Briggs & Jackson, Stanbridge East.-M. Boyce, N.P., Bedford, curator, Feb. 28. Re John Delisle.-C. Desmarteau, Montreal, curator, March 4. Re Odilon Desrosiers et al.-L. A. Saucier, Louiseville, curator, Feb. 28. Re P. Gallery, Montreal.-A. W. Stevenson, Montreal, curator, March 2. Re J. B. O. Langlois, St. John's.-J. M. Marcotte, Montreal, curator, March 3. Re A. Lanthier, Waterloo.-W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator, Feb. 28. Re Damase Larche, shoemaker, Athelstan.-James Cameron, curator, Feb. 17. Montreal, joint curator, Feb. 27. Re F. X. Mantha.-Bilodeau & Renaud, Montreal, joint curator, March 2. Re T. Slayton & Co., Montreal.-W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator, Jan. 10. Re R. Tyler, Sons & Co., Montreal.-W. A. Caldwell, Montreal, curator, Feb. 27. Re Adam Watters.-H. A. Bedard, Quebec, curator, March 4. Dividends. turn ?" Beach, then a resident of this city, was engaged in the A GREAT LAWYER WHO COULD NOT WRITE.-Mr. trial of an important cause at our court-house, and was keeping his own minutes of the evidence, as it was before the court had a stenographer, and having occasion to step out a moment, turned to Frank J. Parmenter, who was sitting near, and said: "Frank, will you be so kind as to keep minutes for me till I reyoung lawyer, "if I am not required to read your Certainly, Mr. Beach," replied the obliging own!" In the course of ten minutes Mr. Beach returned, when his big chair was restored to him, and he glanced eagerly at his minutes to see what had occur single note had been made, but instead, at the close red during his brief absence. To his horror, not a of his own unreadable minutes, he saw the following: EPITAPH ON HON. WILLIAM A. BEACH. Here lies the great lawyer struck down in his might, Who talked like an angel, but never could write. Beach, who had no idea of wit or humor, never indulged it himself, or tolerated it in others, was heard muttering to himself; The d-d rascal!"" the dd rascal!" The joke was soon known to the whole bar, and at last Beach enjoyed it as much as any. We ought, perhaps, to add that the parties were always good friends and so remained till the death of Mr. Beach broke the relation.-Troy Times. COSSETTE V. DUN et al. Appeal-Jurisdiction-Amount in controversy— Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, sec. 29-Mercantile agency-Responsibility for communicating to a subscriber an incorrect report concerning the standing of a person in business—Damages-Discretion of Judge in the Court of first instance. J. B. B. MORIN, Appellant, & THE QUEEN, Quebec.] Held, per Taschereau, Gwynne and Patterson, JJ., (affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, P.Q.,) that the question was founded on a question of law arising on the trial which could have been reserved under sec. 259 of ch. 174, R. S. C., and as the judge at the trial had not reserved or refused to reserve the question, the writ of error should be quashed. Sec. 266, ch. 174, R.S.C. Per Ritchie, C. J., and Strong, Fournier and Patterson, JJ., that the Crown could not without showing cause for challenge direct a juror to stand aside a second time. Sec. 164, ch. 174, R.S.C. Per Taschereau, J., that the learned judge at the trial was justified in ruling according to Morin v. Lacombe, 13 L. C. J. 259, and the jurisprudence of the Province of Quebec. Per Gwynne, J. That all the prisoner could complain of was a mere irregularity in procedure which could not constitute a mis-trial. Per Ritchie, C. J., and Strong and Fournier, JJ. That as the question arose before the trial commenced it could not have been re The plaintiff in an action for $10,000, for damages, obtained a judgment of $2,000. The defendant appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench where the judgment was reduced to $500 (M. L. R., 5 Q. B. 42.) plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court and the defendant filed a cross appeal. The Held, that the case was appealable to the Supreme Court, the matter in controversy being the judgment of the Superior Court for $2,000, which the plaintiff seeks to have restored. (Taschereau and Patterson, JJ., dissenting.) Held also, per Ritchie, C. J., and Fournier and Gwynne, JJ. 1st. That persons carrying the damages caused to a person in business on a mercantile agency are responsible for by an incorrect report concerning his standing, though the report be only communicated to a subscriber to the agency on his application for information. 2nd. Reversing the judgment of the Court below, that the amount of damages awarded by the judge in his discretion in the court of first instance, there being no error or partiality shown, should not have been interfered with by the court of appeal. Levi v. Reed, 6 Can. S. C. R. 482, and Gingras v. Desilets,Cassels, Digest 117, followed. Appeal allowed with costs. THE ROYAL INSTITUTION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT Appeal-Order for a new trial—When not ap- B. 273.) Where the father of a minor who was not her tutor, invested monies belonging to her in shares of a joint stock company “in Where a new trial has been ordered upon trust" and afterwards sold them to a person the ground that the answer given by the jury who had full knowledge of the trust, but to one of the questions is insufficient to enpaid full value, a tutor subsequently appoint-able the Court to dispose of the interests of ed has the right to recover the value of such shares, from the purchaser. Such shares became subject to the provisions of Arts. 297, 298, and 299, C. C., and could not be validly transferred without complying with the requirements of said articles. Taschereau, J., dissenting. Sweeney v. Bank of Montreal (12 App. Cas. 617) followed. Appeal allowed with costs. Maclennan for appellant. Quebec.] LANGEVIN V. THE SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF A judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side) reversed an interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court which had maintained the petitioner's demurrer to a certain portion of the respondant's pleas in proceedings for and upon a writ of mandamus. Held, that interlocutory judgments upon proceedings for or upon a writ of mandamus or habeas corpus are not appealable to the Supreme Court under sec. 24 (g) of the Supreme & Exchequer Courts Act. The words "the judgment" mean "the final judgment in the case." Strong and Patterson,JJ., dissenting. Appeal quashed with costs. Lacoste, Q.C., for appellants. Cornellier, Q.C., & Geoffrion, Q.C., for respondents. the parties on the findings of the jury as a Trenholme, Q.C., for appellants. Quebec.] MOLSON V. BARNARD. Appeal-Judgment ordering a petition to quash seizure before judgment to be dealt with at the same time as the merits of the main action not final—not appealable. A judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side), reversing a judgment of the Superior Court quashing on petition a seizure before judgment, and ordering that the hearing of the petition contesting the seizure should be proceeded with in the Superior Court, at the same time as the hearing of the main action, is not a final judgment appealable to the Supreme Court. Strong, J., dissenting. Appeal quashed with costs. Quebec.] THE ACCIDENT INSURANCE Co. v. MCLACHLAN. Bench suo motu-not final judgment—not Act. In an action tried by a judge and jury, the |