"Ainsi, l'insolvabilité fait légalement pré

"Vainement donc, la fraude du débiteur serait-elle prouvée et acquise, l'acte à titre onéreux n'en serait pas moins maintenu si l'autre partie a été de bonne foi. Celle-ci est présumée jusqu'à preuve contraire, mais cette preuve peut être faite par témoins et par présomptions. Elle résulterait suffisamment de tout ce qui tendrait à établir que le tiers a connu la fraude de celui avec qui il a traité. Connaître une fraude et accepter une participation dans l'acte destiné à la consommer c'est en accepter la complicité. Ainsi, l'action révocatoire n'est recevable que par la double preuve de la qualité de créancier et de l'insolvabilité du débiteur. Elle n'est fondée que par celle de la fraude de celui-ci et des tiers qui ont traité avec lui. Cette dernière preuve n'est exigée que dans le cas d'un traité à titre onéreux. La libéralité cède à la seule mauvaise foi de son auteur.

"La preuve n'est même pas toujours nécessaire, car fidèle au système de se montrer d'autant plus sévère que la fraude est plus facile et plus probable, la loi en a présumé Fexistence dans divers cas.

"Ainsi la fraude est légalement présumée contre le débiteur lorsqu'il dispose de ses biens au détriment de ses créanciers, dans un moment où il a lui-même la conviction de

son insolvabilité.

"Toutefois cette présomption ne concerne que le débiteur. Celui qui a traité avec lui peut avoir ignoré l'état réel de ses affaires. N'ayant, d'ailleurs, aucun devoir à remplir envers les créanciers, la connaissance qu'il aurait eu qu'il en existait un ou plusieurs, ne ferait pas admettre sa complicité dans la fraude de celui avec qui il a traité.

"Mais si l'insolvabilité était notoire, si des actes significatifs, si des poursuites judiciaires l'avaient signalé, la fraude du tiers, quoique non présumée de droit, serait facilement admissible. Pour peu que cet indice fût accom

aux tiers qui ont traité avec lui, la connaissance de cette insolvabilité ne suffit pas pour les constituer en mauvaise foi. Mais elle crée une telle prévention que l'admission de cette mauvaise foi serait la conséquence de quelques circonstances suspectes venant l'étayer et l'aggraver.

"Les auteurs anciens ont beaucoup écrit sur la nature, la qualité, le nombre des présomptions qu'on devait exiger. Les plus judicieux arrivent cependant à cette conclusion, qu'en pareille circonstance, il ne saurait exister de règles certaines ou absolues. Que chaque espèce avait ses caractères particuliers, ses exigences spéciales, et qu'ainsi, telle ou telle présomption, jugées suffisantes dans un cas, pourraient ne pas le paraître dans un autre; que c'était donc à la conscience du juge à se prononcer selon les inspirations qu'elle puiserait dans un mûr examen de chaque cause. Ces principes sont encore aujourd'hui les seules vrais, les seuls admissibles.

"Mais, et sans empiéter sur les fonctions de la magistrature, on peut reconnaître qu'il est certains faits qui auront nécessairement une importante influence sur le sort du litige. Dans cette catégorie se placent l'aliénation de tous les biens, la qualité des parties, la rétention de la possession des choses prétendues aliénées, le mystère et la clandestinité de l'opération.

autrement sur ce que nous avons déjà dit, "Ce que nous devons ajouter, sans revenir c'est que la pertinence des présomptions est souverainement appréciée par le juge. Appelé à prononcer comme juré, le magistrat ne doit compter qu'à sa conscience de la conviction qu'il puise dans l'ensemble des faits et circonstances du procès.”

Plaintiffs' counsel at the argument frankly admitted that he had failed to establish the alleged notorious insolvency of Dufresne, so that no presumption against Gilmour exists from that source; but plaintiffs contend that they have disclosed such a combination of unfavorable acts and circumstances as lead inevitably to the conclusion that Gilmour must have known of the insolvency. Let us

examine these so-called suspicious facts in the order in which they are stated by Bédarride. Did Dufresne in effect, by the deed alienate all his property? We have already seen that Gilmour had at the time three hypothecs upon the immovables amounting to $5,743.25, and that on that day a fourth one was executed for $3,000 to cover advances theretofore made, and which are shown by the statement "A" produced by Gilmour, to have been for two cheques and five notes made by others and endorsed by Dufresne and presumably then due. Dufresne says that he does not remember the mortgage; that there was some talk of giving a mortgage at first. He says that the factory alone cost him $17,000. We have also seen that the sale of all the immovables produced only the sum of $3,534.33. As to the movables Dufresne says they were all included in the deed, (see his answers to interrogatories 12 and 21) but in answer to cross-interrogatory 7 his answer varies. Gilmour said there was besides what was sold him the household furniture, some lumber, and $4,500 of stock which Dufresne claimed to have in La Banque de St. Jean. As to the lumber I have not been able to find any trace of it. As to the bank stock, which Dufresne says he sold shortly after the sale to Gilmour, using the money to pay off his creditors, it turns out that some few months before Mr. Girard, of Marieville, had sold Dufresne some shares at the rate of $15 per share, and that about the 15th September, 1888, Girard bought the same shares back at the same price from Mrs. Chatèle (Dufresne's sister-in law), who was then the owner, and paid for them in her two notes of $1,500 which he held on account of the original sale. From the evidence I am unable to say whether on the 25th of August, 1888, Dufresne was the owner of this bank stock or not. Had Gilmour thought so and had he regarded it as of any value, it was his duty as one of the inspectors of the estate to have done something about it, and yet nothing appears to have been done. Gilmour does not claim the household furniture, but Dufresne does not except it as coming within the property sold to Gilmour by the deed. Looking at the deed itself its terms are very general, and

would seem fairly to convey the impression that it was intended at the time of its execution to include the furniture. Gilmour says the furniture was worth $2,000, but Douglass, the bailiff who sold it, and who had been in the house several times while occupied by Dufresne, puts the value of the whole furniture at from $300 to $400. The portion seized, which must have included the greater part of the whole lot, sold for $227.85. The sale if not intended to be of the whole of Dufresne's available property was really and practically such, for there was nothing but the shadow left. Bédarride (Vol. 4, No. 1447), thus characterizes such a sale: "Cette circonstance avait pris, dans le Digeste, le caractère d'une présomption légale, à tel point qu'elle dispensait de rechercher quelle avait été l'intention du débiteur; comment, en effet interpréter autrement une pareil conduite? Qu'un homme puisse, par convenance, par calcul et quelquefois même par besoin se défaire de quelques-uns de ses immeubles, on le comprend. Mais aliéner tout ce qu'on possède, pour se trouver ensuite en présence d'une masse de créanciers non payés, c'est évidemment n'avoir agi que pour se soustraire à des exécutions en dénaturant et en la faisant disparaitre."

The next question is the qualities of the parties. There is no family relationship between Dufresne and Gilmour, but the same inference which exists between relatives may be deducible from the business relations of others. Was Gilmour in a position to know the financial condition of Dufresne? He says himself that he had been doing business with Dufresne for several years, and his statement showing a total indebtedness of over $38,000 is pretty convincing evidence of the extent of that business. He says he knew that Dufresne had other creditors, but that he did not suppose they were so for large amounts. Dufresne says Gilmour did not know that he was insolvent, as he was not in fact; that Gilmour had no reason to think him insolvent; and that he had always represented himself to Gilmour as solvent. It may be that both Gilmour and Dufresne did not fully realize the extent of the latter's embarrassment; but there are some things which could not have escaped the business

The Legal News.

Vol. XIV. MARCH 7, 1891.

A very interesting question came before the English Queen's Bench Division, Nov. 3, 1890, in Stanley v. Powell (1 Q. B. Div. 86). The defendant, who was one of a shooting party, fired at a pheasant. One of the shot accidentally glanced from the bough of an oak, and injured the sight of the plaintiff, who was employed at the time in carrying cartridges for the party. The jury found that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant, and the question was whether an action lay in the absence of negligence. The Court reviewed the authorities from the time of Henry VII, and came to the conclusion that if the case was regarded as an action on the case for an injury by negligence, the plaintiff had failed to establish that which was the very gist of such an action. Regarded as an action for trespass the verdict of the jury was equally fatal. The action was therefore dismissed.

The folly of testators in neglecting to visit their lawyers before making their wills is illustrated by the case of the Rev. John Hymer, of Brandsburton. This gentleman bad a fortune of about a million dollars with which he was desirous of founding a grammar school at Hull. To avoid paying a lawyer's fee he drew the will himself, but it was so worded that it was void under the Statute of Mortinain. An intestacy resulted, and Robert Hymer, to whom the will bequeathed merely an annuity of $300, became the possessor of the estate. The heir who profited so largely by his kinsman's aversion to lawyers, has contributed a quarter of the estate to the original object.

A Bill before the Imperial Parliament pro poses a radical innovation in qualification for office. Section 3 reads as follows:-"No person shall be disqualified from being elected or appointed to or from filling or holding any office or position merely by reason that such person is a woman, or being a woman is un

COURT OF REVIEW.

MONTREAL, Feb. 24, 1891. Coram JOHNSON, Ch. J., JETTÉ, MATHIEU, JJ. CHARLAND V. MALLETTE.

Precedence of hearing-Court of Review. HELD:-That cases in the Superior Court, instituted under the Act relating to summary causes, when taken to Review are not entitled to precedence of hearing before that Court.* The action was on a promissory note, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant inscribed.

JOHNSON, Ch. J. :—

A motion was made yesterday by Mr. Bonin to put the case of Charland v. Mallette upon what is known as the privileged list, i. e. to give it precedence over the cases on the ordinary roll. That motion was useless, because the case was already on the preliminary list of cases which we have been accustomed to call before the others. At the same time it was stated by Mr. Archambault, adversely to Mr. Bonin's pretensions, that the case had no right to be there. As nothing appears to have been ever distinctly settled upon this subject, I will take leave now to give my opinion upon it.

In the first place I have never been able to understand how there came to be any confusion between questions of procedure and questions of precedence, which are obviously very different things. The law has authorized summary procedure for a long time past in certain cases, as, for example, cases between lessors and lessees; but so far from giving those cases a precedent right of being heard before those of other of Her Majesty's subjects, the law has done something very different; it has given them a court and a procedure of their own. The same thing has been done in a numerous class of cases by

See also McIntyre v. Armstrong, M. L. R., 4 S. C. 251.