then utilize it for the purpose of washing and dressing. I think that that meant that they could not guarantee the plaintiff a room beyond the time that the people who had en'gaged it should arrive, but that till those people arrived he might have it. The subsequent facts seem to bear out that view. His luggage was taken up to the room, and he went down to breakfast, leaving his things there. No bill was made out for the use of the room. It is true that his name was not entered in the guest book of the hotel; but that was because it was not certain that he would sleep there. Although it may have escaped their memory during the day, the hotel servants must have known at the time the plaintiff went out in the morning that his luggage had not been brought down. Mr. Taylor argued, that at any rate, the plaintiff ceased to be a guest when he left the hotel in the morning. That to my mind is not a true proposition of law. I think that the relationship of host and guest continued until a reasonable time after a demand had been made for the room.

I think therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict; but I think that he is only entitled to recover to the extent of £30, for the reasons given by the master of the rolls.

FRY, L. J. On the questions that arise in this case as to the burden of proof, I agree with what has been said by the master of the rolls and Bowen, L. J.; but with regard to what is the true inference to be drawn from the facts, I differ from them, and agree with the learned judge who tried the case. Now it is quite clear that on arriving at the hotel, the plaintiff was told he could not have a bed room. He was told by the manageress that the hotel was full, but that there was one room vacant which was engaged by a lady and gentleman who were expected to arrive during the day, and that the plaintiff could then utilize it for the purpose of washing and dressing. The plaintiff might perhaps have insisted on engaging the room for the day, until the persons who had engaged it arrived. The usual thing is to engage a room for the night, and not for the day. However I say nothing as to what his rights

I would have been if he had insisted on his

right to engage the room for the day. But he did nothing of the kind. He was quite free to go to another hotel. He accepted the offer of a room to wash and dress in that was made by the manageress. He would require a portion of his luggage for the purpose of dressing; and as it was obviously convenient that it should be kept together, it was all taken to the room. He occupies the room for the purpose for which it was offered, and then comes down to the coffee room for breakfast. Having had his breakfast he pays for it then and there. That is not the ordinary course for a person staying in the hotel. He does not receive the ticket which, according to ordinary usage, he would have received if he had been staying at the hotel. After breakfast he goes away. What ought the plaintiff to have done before he left, even if he had engaged the room till the other guests arrived? Knowing that they might arrive before his return, he ought to have made some provision as to the disposal of his luggage. We all know that the people of the hotel do not interfere with a guest's luggage till they are told that it is ready. I think therefore that the true infer. ence from all the facts is, that the plaintiff occupied the room for the purpose of washing and dressing only. He could not, in my opinion, have been charged for anything more than that. It has been suggested that he was entitled to occupy the room till the arrival of the other guests. If he was entitled to make such an arrangement he did not do so. He did not even ask at what hour the other guests were expected to arrive. On these grounds, I think that the view taken by the learned judge below was correct. Appeal allowed.

ENGLISH CAUSES CÉLÈBRES.

SAURIN V. STAR.*

In this case the plaintiff, Miss Susanna Mary Saurin, sued the defendants, Mrs. Star, the Lady Superior, and Mrs. Kennedy, one of the members of a convent at Hull, for having conspired to procure her expulsion from said convent, for assault and false imprisonment, and for having libelled her to

Cf. 'The Annual Register for 1869, pp. 177-218.

her ordinary state, so that it made you uneasy?—Yes. Now you saw the statements of the other sisters and the lay sisters? Yes. Well, in one of them there is this passage: "I have noticed her manner very familiar with one of the priests; I saw her once on her knees beside him entreating him to go with her." Now what did you mean by sending that to the Bishop?-It turns entirely on the rules. Turns on the rules-what rules? The witness referred to a passage in the rules, which was read, as to a becoming gravity of demeanour. "Then all you meant by sending that statement was that she had not preserved in her deportment a gravity becoming a religious. That was all you meant?-Yes. Don't you think it would have been better to have said so?-It did not occur to me."'

Sir Alexander Cockburn summed up the case to the jury with his accustomed power. His charge contains only one passage of distinctly legal interest-that in which he dealt with the constitution of the convent and the authority that the Lady Superior was entitled to exercise. There are three vows entered into, but we have only to deal with two of them-poverty and obedience. What ' is the meaning of the vow of poverty? It is the renunciation of all rights of property, of all capacity for acquiring any, so that any which is acquired is for the benefit of the community, and to be administered at the will of the Superior, so that what is done in the honest exercise of that authority cannot be complained of. It is important, again, to observe the scope of that authority. The vow is that of obedience to this unlimited extent, that the voice of the Superior is as the voice of God. A form more emphatic could not be used, nor to my mind one more shocking, though by that, as I have already said, we must not allow ourselves to be influenced. But we have to consider the extent to which this authority can be considered as legitimately going, and whatever is intended under it a sister has sworn on all occasions to submit to. I take it to be clear that it must be reasonably exercised, and must be restrained within reasonable limits. There must be nothing contrary to the laws of God or man; and, further, what is meant

by obedience is obedience to the rules or customs, whether written or traditional, established or exercised in the community. For instance, suppose it had occurred to the Superior that the discipline of flagellation would be salutary for the soul of (Miss Saurin), and the sister protested against it as contrary to the rules and customs, and it was forcibly inflicted upon her, I do not doubt that an action would be maintainable for it. . . . . So here, if the Superior has committed an assault, I should hold it not within the scope of her authority. But as to other matters within the scope of her authority there would be no legal cause of complaint, unless you thought that they were vexatiously committed.' This charge, and indeed the trial as a whole, will be found to form a fitting prelude to the study of the class of cases of which Allcard v. Skinner is the latest, and not the least interesting, example.-Law Journal (London).

GENERAL NOTES.

CROSSES IN CHURCHYARDS.-A certain vicar died and was buried, his friends desired to place a cross over his grave, but the new vicar demurred, considering a cross in the churchyard would promote idolatry. The parishioners thereupon took the case before the Consistory

Court at Wells, and the Chancellor declared that there was not the slightest ground for apprehending any offence being caused to the conscience of any reasonableor educated man. It was pointed out that Englishmen do not worship crosses wherever they see them, and that They are not confined to one particular creed or sect crosses in churchyards and cemeteries are quite legal. either, as Nonconformists, as well as other religious persuasions, erect them over the graves of relatives. The symbol of the cross has of recent years, if one may say so reverently, become so popular, that when the practice of cremation increases it will, doubtless, be the custom to surmount or paint on the urn the cross, and there would be no idolatry in doing so.-Law Journal.

JACKDAW LAW.-A paragraph has been running the round of the dailies under the above title. A lady had lost a jackdaw, and, seeking to recover it from a man who said he had bought it, she now desired the assistance of a bench of magistrates. It was pointed out to her that a jackdaw is an English wild bird, and if it flies out of the possession of the person who has been keeping it, and is caught by someone else, the person so catching it cannot be charged with unlawful detention, suggested to the applicant that she could proceed in for there is no criminal act by such retention. It was

the County Court as regards the bird.-Ib.

The Legal News.

Vol. XIV. SEPTEMBER 19, 1891. No. 38.

COUR SUPERIEURE.

JOLIETTE, 10 juin 1891.

Coram DE LORIMIER, J.

"Cousidérant que telle décision unarime des membres du dit Conseil est suffisante et légale ;

"Considérant qu'aux termes des articles 839, 840, 841 et 842 des Statuts Refondus de Québec, les certificats pour licences d'auberges doivent être sauf pour Montréal et Québec-confirmés par une décision du conseil de la municipalité dans les limites de laquelle la maison est située, et que, sauf

DE ST. FELIX.

Elzéar Geoffroy, hôtellier, de St. Félix de Valois, présenta le 4 mars 1891, au conseil de la corporation intimée, un certificat de licence et en demanda la confirmation. Le Conseil, sans spécifier aucune raison particulière, refusa à l'unanimité de confirmer le certificat. Le requérant fit alors une requête à la Cour Supérieure demandant l'émanation d'un bref de mandamus, alléguant qu'il avait rempli toutes les conditions de la loi, et que le Conseil n'avait aucune raison valable pour refuser de confirmer son certificat; qu'en conséquence il avait droit à un mandamus ordonnant au dit Conseil de confirmer le certificat par lui obtenu des électeurs municipaux pour l'octroi d'une licence d'auberge.

La Corporation intimée s'opposa à cette demande, prétendant qu'elle avait une entière discrétion et que dans ce cas il n'y avait pas lieu à l'émanation d'un mandamus.

La Cour maintint les prétentions de l'intimée et renvoya la requête par le jugement

suivant.

"Ayant entendu la requête du dit Elzéar Geoffroy, demandant l'émanation d'un bref de mandamus aux fins d'enjoindre à la Corporation intimée de lui accorder, par l'entremise de son conseil municipal, la confirmation du certificat par lui demandé pour tenir une auberge ou maison d'entretien public en la paroisse de St. Félix de Valois, entendu la dite intimée par son procureur, examiné les pièces produites et délibéré :

"Considérant que le conseil de l'intimée a, dans sa séance du 4 mars dernier, pris en considération la demande du requérant, et a décidé à l'unanimité de refuser la confirmation de ce certificat;

des conseils municipaux ;

"Considérant que si les conseils locaux pouvaient être contraints par voie de mandamus à accorder tels certificats, contrairement à leur décision unanime, ce serait enlever à ces conseils leur pouvoir discrétionnaire pour en investir les juges de la Cour Supérieure, ce qui est évidemment contraire aux intentions de la loi actuelle sur la matière ;

"En conséquence, la dite requête est déclarée mal fondée et renvoyée avec dépens, distraits, etc."

G. A. Champagne, avocat de l'intimée. (J. J. B.)

SUPERIOR COURT-MONTREAL.* Partition-Art. 689, C. C.-Reasons of utility justifying delay-Postponement till majority of testator's youngest grandchild-After born grandchildren included.

Held:-1. That Art. 689,C.C.,which provides that a partition may be deferred during a limited time, if there be any reason of utility which justifies the delay, expresses the law as it was before the Code.

2. That where a testator bequeathed his whole estate to trustees to pay an annuity to

his wife and the remainder of the revenues

to divide and pay to the whole of his children or their lawful issue per stirpes, and directed that the immovables in his estate should be divided at the majority of his youngest grandchild-there were sufficient "reasons of utility" justifying the delay, and the testator's directions would be respected by the Court. 3. That as the legacy was universal and * To appear in Montreal Law Reports, 7 S.C.

per stirpes grandchildren born after the testator's death were clearly included in the terms of the bequest, and an action for partition brought when all the grandchildren born in the testator's lifetime were of age, but before the majority of some of the after-born grandchildren, was premature. Muir v. Muir, Taschereau, J., April 24, 1891.

and inspected-are not latent defects against which the seller is obliged by law to warrant the buyer.

C. P.

Held-That an articulation of facts which does not set up specific facts in the interrogatories, does not comply with the requirements of Art. 208, C. C. P., and will be rejected from the record. Williams v. Labine, Würtele, J., May 8, 1891.

Disabilities of Corporations-Acquiring immovable property-Art. 366, C. C.-City of Montreal-Expropriation.

Held-On demurrer, that a municipal corporation has a right to expropriate, or acquire by voluntary sale, such real estate only as may be required for the municipal administration, or as it may have been authorized to acquire and hold for specific purposes. A corporation cannot, without special authorization, expropriate or acquire real estate for the purpose of erecting a building thereon to be let as shops and dwellings.

2. In the absence of express authorization to the corporation, the expropriated owner of real estate taken for a public purpose, has the right, when the property is not used for such purpose, to have it restored to him, and when part only has been used for the public purpose, to have the unused portion restored to him.

3. Where the buyer pretended that the sale was made with warranty, and the agent of the seller immediately wrote that before the sale he had read his principal's letter to the buyer, stating that there would be no warranty, this fact, in the absence of any immediate and positive denial by the buyer, furnishes a strong presumption of the truth of the agent's statement. Vipond et al. v. Findlay et al., Tait, J., May 29, 1891.

Canal d'égout-Garantie-Responsabilité. En 1887 et 1888, la ville de la Côte St. Louis, municipalité limitrophe de la cité de Montréal, a construit divers canaux d'égout pour l'égoutement des rues et de plusieurs cours d'eau, lesquels canaux elle a illégalement, et sans la permission de la cité de Montréal, reliés au canal d'égout de la rue St.-Denis en la cité de Montréal. Cette connection s'était faite à la connaissance des officiers, mais sans la permission du conseil de la corporation de Montréal.

Dans l'hiver et le prin

temps de 1890, l'égout de la rue St-Denis ne pouvant suffire à l'écoulement des eaux de la Côte St-Louis, la maison du demandeur fut inondée par le refoulement des eaux dans le canal d'égout. De là, action en responsabilité par le demandeur contre la cité de Montréal qui, à son tour, appela en garantie la ville de la Côte St-Louis.

Sale of goods-Latent defect-Art. 1523, C. C.— Reasonable delay for complaint as to quality -Evidence.

Held-1. That sourness and unsoundness in salted salmon-defects which were discoverable by smell when the goods were opened

rue St-Denis, est responsable vis-à-vis du demandeur des dommages que ce dernier a éprouvés par suite du refoulement des eaux de l'égout de la rue St-Denis.

| 20. Que la ville de la Côte St-Louis, ayant fait la dite connection illégalement et sans la permission de la cité de Montréal, et dirigé toutes ces eaux dans le seul égout de la rue