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CHAPTER XXII.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, FROM ITS ARRIVAL AT HARRISON'S LANDING TO ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA.

Although constitutional Commander in Chief, the fruitless strategy in the valley campaign convinced the President, that neither he nor the Secretary of War, had any of the qualifications of a military commander. He saw, too, from the ease with which 16,000 men had neutralized 60,000, that the creation of the Mountain Department and of the Departments of the Rappahannock and the Shenandoah had worked to the advantage of the Confederates. To remedy this evil an order was issued on the 26th of June merging the troops of the three departments into the Army of Virginia, commanded by Major-General Pope.

To clearly understand the events which followed, let us now direct our attention to the influence exerted upon the conduct of military affairs by individuals in high station outside of the Cabinet. The power of Congress to raise and support armies unquestionably gave it the right to inquire how the military resources it had provided were being applied. This right it exercised on the 9th and 10th of December, 1861, by appointing a joint committee of three members of the Senate and four members of the House of Representatives "to inquire into the conduct of the present war." To accomplish this object the committee was given power "to send for persons and papers, and to sit during the recess of either House of Congress."a

Had the investigations been confined to transactions which had already occurred, no harm would have ensued beyond the injury done to discipline by encouraging officers to criticise their superiors with a view to securing promotion, or to the gratification of personal ill will. But a knowledge of past events by no means satisfied the committee. It pried into the present and sought to look into the future. With but little or no regard for secrecy, it did not hesitate to summon commanders of armies in the field, who were asked and encouraged to disclose the numbers of their troops and their plans of campaign.

July 8, 1862, scarcely a week after his assignment to the Army of Virginia, General Pope was called before the committee. From the

a The committee originally consisted of:

On the part of the Senate: Mr. B. F. Wade (chairman), Ohio; Mr. Z. Chandler, Michigan; Mr. Andrew Johnson, Tennessee.

On the part of the House: Mr. D. W. Gooch, Massachusetts; Mr. John Covode, Pennsylvania; Mr. G. W. Julian, Indiana; Mr. M. F. Odell, New York. (Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 66.)

Mr. Johnson, on being made military governor of Tennessee, was replaced by Jos. A. Wright, of Indiana. The place of the latter on retiring from the Senate was left

vacant.

following question it will be seen that he revealed the strength of his command:

Q. Will you state to the committee the amount of troops now under your command, and the objects you have in view to accomplish what is being done and about to be done with that force?-A. I have a movable force, aside from the few troops that are here around Washington and in the intrenchments, of about 43,000 men. That is exclusive, also, of a small force that is in the Kanawha Valley, too far from the seat of operations here to be of any use in the present service, a

In continuation of his answer he next laid before them his original plan of campaign:

This command, when concentrated, was designed by me-when I first came here and learned the condition of things, and before the late reverses before Richmondto have marched upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville, in Virginia, and the southern extremity of the Shenandoah Valley, and thence upon Richmond upon the western side; at the same time, in the course of that march, I intended to destroy the railroads from Charlottesville to Lynchburg and from Richmond to Lynchburg; then, having arrived in the vicinity of Richmond, I proposed to aid the forces there in every possible way in the reduction of that place. That is what I proposed in the beginning."

Being interrogated as to what was about to be done, he explained his plans as follows:

The reverses which have occurred within a few days there, and which have caused the retreat of our forces to a point from which they are not accessible from this direction, and which by interposing the whole body of the enemy between them and Washington may perhaps endanger the safety of the capital here, has made it necessary to make some other disposition of my forces. I am therefore now assembling them at points on the east side of the Blue Ridge, some 25 or 30 miles south of Front Royal, and immediately in front of the passes leading through the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley, occupying Culpeper Court House with cavalry, and a point 20 miles in front, in the direction of Richmond; so that, in case any of the enemy's troops succeed in penetrating into the valley of the Shenandoah, I occupy such a position that, by marching upon Gordonsville, I have a shorter distance to march than they will have in turning back, and shall be able to cut them off completely. At the same time I shall be in such a position that in case the enemy should advance in any considerable force toward Washington, I shall be able to concentrate all my forces for the defense of this place, which I propose to defend, not by standing on the defensive at all, or confronting the enemy and intrenching myself, but I propose to do it by laying off on his flanks and attacking him from the moment that he crosses the Rappahannock, day and night, until his forces are destroyed, or mine. I have no apprehension, with my troops stationed in that position, although I have but 43,000 men, that even 80,000 of the enemy would be able to get to Washington at all. b

The safety of the capital next engaged the attention of the committee.

Q. What will be the number of troops left in the entrenchments about Washington?-A. In numbers they will be about 12,000; in condition they are very poor, indeed. They consist of new regiments, perfectly raw, and broken fragments of old regiments sent here to recruit. The force is not an effective one by any means.

Q. So that the defense of the capital will depend upon your army?-A. Largely upon operations in the valley. But I tell you that unless the enemy have force enough in Richmond to be able to detach at least 100,000 men, I do not anticipate any danger to this city. If they were to send so large a force as that against it, it would be very troublesome.

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Q. Is it your design to act upon the defensive alone?-A. Not at all.

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Q. So that you mean to attack?-A. I mean to attack them at all times that I can get the opportunity. If I was to confront them with the force that I have, and go to building intrenchments, etc., they could flank me on either side and force me back without my being able to offer any resistance of any consequence.

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a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 276. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, pp. 276, 277.

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But if they should come this way with a very large force, it seems to me that the only sort of defense of Washington at all I can afford, with the force I have, is to lie off upon the flanks of their army and attack them day and night at unexpected times and places so as to prevent them from advancing. It will be hard work, but I do not see anything else so likely to prevail against them.

Q. Would you not in all these movements feel embarrassed with the knowledge that while you are moving forward on the enemy you are looked upon as the protector of the capital here?-A. No, sir; for I am fully convinced that I would be doing the best I know to effect that object. It is not necessary, in my opinion, in order to protect the capital, that I should interpose myself between the enemy and the place itself, in fact it would be the very worst policy to do so now; for wherever I could put myself, they could place themselves between me and the capital by attacking my flanks. By laying off on their flanks, if they should have only 40,000 or 50,000 men, I could whip them. If they should have 70,000 or 80,000 men I would attack their flanks and force them, in order to get rid of nie, to follow me out into the mountains, which would be what you want, I should suppose. They could not march on Washington with me lying with such a force as that on their flanks. a

The knowledge of the plans of the new commander thus acquired, together with his views as to the future movements of the Army of the Potomac, yet to be related, produced a pressure which, as in the case of Blenker's division, the President could not be expected to resist.

The members of the committee, all of them influential Senators or Representatives, were aware that for three months there had been no military head at the capital. They knew, too, that by turns the President and the Secretary of War had directed the movements of our armies. As the special representatives of Congress, which in its time represented the people, they felt that they had a right to mingle in the military as well as civil councils of the nation.

The cause of the Rebellion, as alleged by the Confederates, was the accession to power of the great party which owed its success to its love of freedom and hatred of slavery. How far a want of sympathy with the new leaders of the Government influenced the removal of General McClellan as General in Chief it is impossible to tell, but it is certain that about this time he made the estrangement between himself and the Administration complete. Forgetting that as an army commander his sole duty was to deal with the armed enemies of the country, he sought to influence the political results of the war. In time of civil war it should be a maxim, inflexibly adhered to, that no general should remain in command of an army who can not heartily support the civil policy of his government.

July 7, he wrote to the President:

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I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before Your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble. * This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. * It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfer›

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Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, pp. 277, 278,

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with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service, claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies, a

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It would not have been surprising had the expression of views so antagonistic to the civil policy of the Administration determined his removal from command, but to accomplish this openly was impossible. He had extricated his army from a position which in the calculation of the Confederates doomed it to destruction. He was, moreover, one of a vast number of citizens who still sought to save the Union without the abolition of slavery, and who naturally approved and applauded him for his conservatism. To have relieved him under such circumstances would have been a shock to the country. There was but one way to get rid of him, and that was to disintegrate his army.

In the same letter General McClellan turned from the political to the military policy of the Government, of which he wrote:

The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a Commander in Chief of the Army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. b

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The President by this time had become weary of his responsibility as a military commander. In every new emergency he had been compelled to go to the War Department to consult the Secretary and his military council. Had he searched the annals of the war of 1812 he could not have failed to note that history was repeating itself and that all the orders issued to our armies, with or without his approval, were really nothing but the orders of the Secretary of War.

The difficulties of Mr. Lincoln's position were not diminished when he consulted the generals in the field. On the 8th of July, at a council of war during his visit to the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, General McClellan and some of his corps commanders, estimating the Confederate strength at 200,000, urged that the Army be reenforced by 20,000 or 30,000 men, and that operations against Richmond be resumed. Others who concurred in the above estimate, thought that the necessary reenforcements should number 100,000.

Unable to reconcile the differences of opinion or to determine what to do, the President is alleged to have said to Mr. Sumner:

My mind became perfectly perplexed, and I determined right then and there to appoint a Commander in Chief who should be responsible for our military operations,

a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, pp. 595-596, Supplement.
Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, p. 596, Supplement.

and I determined further that General Halleck should be the man. I accordingly, as soon as I arrived in Washington, telegraphed to him to come here and assume the responsibilities of that office."

It is true that he was designated "General in Chief," but if this title be intended to mean a military officer who exercises, under the orders of the President, exclusive command of the line and staff of the Army, save the staff officers detailed to assist the Secretary of War in his duties, then it must be admitted that General Halleck was never General in Chief. It has already been shown that the position of the Secretary of War, which was not fully established prior to the controversy between General Scott and Secretary Davis, rests upon an official construction of the decision of the Supreme Court, and more especially on the Attorney-General's opinion that "the order of the Secretary of War is the order of the President." This opinion could not but be congenial to the chiefs of bureaus and their subordinates.

In every conflict they saw that as the powers of the General in Chief were reduced their offices were magnified and their exemption from military control was increased. Finally, when the Executive order of March 13 left the Secretary of War untrammeled by a General in Chief, they found themselves exalted to the responsible posts of military counselors, with a voice in determining every important movement of our armies.

General Halleck had been brought up to recognize the complete sway of the Secretary of War. It was therefore but natural, when placed in command of our armies, that he should have acknowledged the system which practically united all powers in the hands of a civil officer whose department had been created by Congress for the sole purpose of organizing and supplying our troops.

The effort to serve two masters could not fail in the end to prove fatal to the new General in Chief. He had accepted a position with no defined powers, with the additional disadvantage that for every military mistake the people could now hold him responsible. In vindication of his official action while General in Chief he wrote, in February, 1864, to General Sherman as follows:

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The great difficulty in the office of General in Chief is that it is not understood by the country. The responsibility and odium thrown upon it do not belong to it. I am simply a military adviser of the Secretary of War and the President, and must obey and carry out what they decide upon, whether I concur in their decisions or not. * * It is my duty to strengthen the hands of the President as Commander in Chief, not to weaken them by factious opposition. I have, therefore, cordially cooperated with him in any plan decided upon, although I have never hesitated to differ in opinion. I must leave it to history to vindicate or condemn my own opinions or plans. They will be found at some future time on record.

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General Halleck, as will be observed, did not define his duty in case the President differed in opinion from the Secretary of War, but the omission is unimportant. When he reached Washington in July, 1862, he found the military forces in Virginia divided into two armies. He did not seek nor was it necessary for him to trace the responsibility for this division to any particular source. As a writer on strategy he knew that as a fundamental principle the two armies should be united. There were two ways of doing this with perfect safety, either of which, however, unless he chose to take the field in person, involved the sacrifice of a military commander.

a Mahan's Critical History of the Late American War, p. 145.

Fry on "The command of the Army," The Field Glass, May, 1879, p. 88.

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