ferred by the act of July 6, 1812, and was again repeated during the Mexican war. These instances, to which others might be added, establish the fact that the practice of Congress has not conformed to the views of the committee. Nevertheless, as its rights are still questioned, wisdom suggests they be definitely settled before the enemies of the country again surround the National capital.

If, under the same power, Congress has not the right to raise an army of volunteers, independent of the States, then for the future, volunteers only can be employed "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." If, under the power to "raise and support armies," Congress cannot officer an army of volunteers, then its action in authorizing the President to commission the general and staff officers of volunteers, and also to appoint officers in regiments belonging to States whose governors were disloyal, was also unconstitutional."

TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1861.

The mistaken economy which in time of peace discourages preparations for war became apparent before the close of the year 1861.

With no military operations encouraging the hope of a speedy suppression of the rebellion, statistics show that the total number of men obtained in 1861 was:

Under call of April 15, for 75,000 militia..

Under call of May 3, and the laws of July 22 and 25, regulars, volunteers, and seamen....

Total...

93, 326

714, 231

b807, 557

Of the whole number of men obtained under these calls there were in the field on the 1st of January, 1862:

Regulars....

Volunteers

Aggregate ....

22, 425 553, 492

€ 575, 917

If to this number be added the 93,326 militia, the total number of troops under pay at different times during the year 1861 amounts to 668,545.a

a This question should not be dismissed without further reflection, for on its solution may yet depend the fate of the Union. It has already been stated that for want of a compulsory system of recruitment, the number of men who served in the Regular Army dwindled to but one-third of 1 per cent of the total number of troops who were

called to the national defense of the nation.

To say that in bringing about this result the intelligent men composing Congress were actuated by a morbid fear of standing armies, would be a judgment no less ridiculous than insulting.

The cause of their action lies deeper. It now turns out that they did not fully comprehend the theory of our Government; they did not realize that adherence to principles sanctioned by the Articles of Confederation, but rejected by the Fathers, amounted to heresy under the Constitution.

They did not, nor did their successors during the war, rise to a full conception of its powers to "raise and support armies," but, suffering themselves to be entangled or restrained by views wholly false or fallacious, they adopted a middle or volunteer system, which from the first proved a bloody and disastrous compromise between so-called "State sovereignty" on the one hand and national unity on the other. Report of Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 1, p. 160.

c Report of Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 1, p. 102.

At this time the two laws of July 22 and 25 were still construed as sanctioning but 500,000 men. See report of Provost-Marshal-General, vol. 1, p. 160.

The troops obtained under the foregoing calls were organized as follows:

Exclusive of the militia, the infantry of the Army of 1861 exceeded by 93 battalions the infantry of the field army of Germany on a war footing, while the total force, regulars, volunteers, and militia, exceeded the total field army of Germany by 119,963 men. But, unlike the army of Germany, there were no reserves, depot, or garrison troops to supply the casualties of battle or repair the ravages of disease.

The consequences of these defects of military legislation did not become apparent till the year 1862.

EXPENDITURES FOR THE YEAR 1861.

The expenditure for the War Department for the fiscal year 1860–61, was $22,981,150.44, showing a decrease as compared with the years 1858 and 1859.a

The expenditures for the next year, 1862, show the cost of maintaining a vast army in a state of preparation for a period of nearly eight months.

The appropriations for the Regular Army for the year were so meagre that on February 25, 1862, additional appropriations for our military forces were made aggregating $208,392,488.77.

As a commentary on our economy in peace these appropriations under the principal headings were as follows:

Pay of two and three years' volunteers.
Subsistence for the same..

Transportation of Army and its supplies

Clothing and camp equipage.

Regular supplies and Quartermaster's Department .

Ordnance and ordnance stores.....

Purchase of arms and ordnance stores..
Medical and Hospital Department...

Reimbursement of States for expenses incurred on account of volun-
teers

$50, 000, 000. 00 26,668, 902. 00 14, 881, 000. 00 12, 173, 546.77 76,500,000.00 1,924,000. 00 7,500.00 1, 000, 000. 00

15, 000, 000. 00

This appropriation was supplemented by another on the 14th of May, 1862, for additional pay to volunteers amounting to $30,000,000. These were not the only appropriations on account of the War Department during the year 1862, the total expenditures of which aggregated $389,173,562.29.a

"The expenditures for the fiscal year 1857-58, amounted to $25,485,383.60, and for the fiscal year 1858-59, $23,243,822.38.

As our inability to promptly subdue the Rebellion was due to faults in our military system, to the above should be added the increased expenditure of the Navy in 1862, which amounted to $30,253,197.75, making a total war expenditure of $419,426,760.04.a

Such a sum mostly expended before our armies were in condition to strike effective blows foreshadowed a national debt from which a century of taxation will scarcely relieve us.

a Report of Secretary of the Treasury, 1877, p. 14.

CHAPTER XIX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

The military operations of the year, both in the East and the West, may be divided into three distinct periods. In the first our armies took the offensive, in the second the defensive, and in the third they again resumed the offensive.

FIRST PERIOD.

In the East during the latter part of March, the Army of the Potomac, commanded by General McClellan, transferred its base from Washington to Fort Monroe; advanced up the peninsula on the 4th of April; engaged in the siege of Yorktown from April 5 to May 4; fought the battle of Williamsburg May 5, West Point May 7, Hanover Court House May 27, and Seven Pines or Fair Oaks May 31 and June 1.

The only other battle in the East was that of Winchester, fought by General Shields, on the 23d of March. In all these battles the Union troops were victorious. The general position of the enemy at the beginning of this period was with his right near Aquia Creek, blockading the Potomac; his center at Manassas, and his left in the Shenandoah Valley. He was also in possession of Norfolk, whence on the 8th of March the Confederate ironclad Merrimac proceeded to Hampton Roads and sank the sloop-of-war Cumberland and frigate Congress. The next day she resumed the attack, but, defeated by the Monitor, was compelled to return to Norfolk. The position of the enemy at the end of the period was with his main army around Richmond, his left under Stonewall Jackson, in the Shenandoah Valley, both forces being under the command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. The position of the Union troops at the close of the first period was as follows:

June 1, the Army of the Potomac, about 100,000, present for duty, on both banks of the Chickahominy, within 6 miles of Richmond; May 26, General McDowell, commanding Department of the Rappahannock, with 41,000 men at Fredericksburg, his advance but 15 miles from the right of the Army of the Potomac; May 24, General Banks, commanding Department of the Shenandoah, with 6,000 men at Strasburg; Major-General Fremont, commanding the Mountain Department, with 15,000 men at Franklin, W. Va., one brigade within 10 miles of Staunton; General Wool at Fort Monroe and Norfolk with 10,000. Besides troops in Virginia, General Burnside was in North Carolina with an expedition of 11,500 men; General Thomas W. Sherman, with another expedition fitted out in the previous November, was in South Carolina.

In Virginia our military forces, including those in the defenses of Washington, were under six independent commanders, whose movements could only be combined by the personal supervision and orders of the President. The lines of operations of the Army of the Potomac and of the troops in the Department of the Rappahannock converged upon Richmond. Those of the Mountain Department and the Department of the Shenandoah converged upon Staunton. Traversed by mountains and rivers, the front of operation of these six separate forces, extending from Norfolk up the Chickahominy to near Richmond, thence on to Fredericksburg, Washington, Strasburg, and Franklin, exceeded 250 miles.

Leaving our forces thus exposed to being attacked and beaten in detail, let us turn our attention to the West. At the beginning of the year Major-General Halleck was in command of the Department of the Missouri, the eastern limit of which was the Cumberland River. The part of Kentucky east of the Cumberland was occupied by the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Major-General Buell.

The enemy's front of operations or line of defense extended from Bowling Green on the right to Columbus on the left, a distance of 175 miles. His center was at Forts Henry and Donelson, the former on the Tennessee and the latter on the Cumberland River. The military operations of the year opened with the victory of Mill Spring, Ky., gained by General Thomas on the 19th of January. Under direction of General Halleck, General Grant moved from Cairo up the Tennessee River, and on the 6th of February, in cooperation with the Navy, captured Fort Henry. Crossing over the peninsula, he appeared on the 12th before Fort Donelson, and on the 16th received the surrender. The Union loss was 446 killed, 1,735 wounded, and 150 missing." The Confederate loss was 231 killed, 1,007 wounded,' and 13,829 prisoners, besides 65 guns and 17,600 small arms. The Confederate army at the beginning of the siege was estimated at 21,123 men, of whom 4,000 escaped; the Union troops began the investment with 15,000 men, but were reenforced before the surrender to 27,000.d

Never was the value of professional training more conspicuously illustrated than in the conception and execution of the Fort Donelson campaign. General Sherman, who was at St. Louis, Mo., during the winter of 1861-62, under the command of General Halleck, relates:

I remember one night sitting in his room on the second floor of the Planter's House with him and General Cullum, his chief of staff, talking of things generally, and the subject then was of the much talked of “advance" as soon as the season would permit. Most people urged the movement down the Mississippi River; but Generals Polk and Pillow had a large rebel force, with heavy guns, in a very strong position, at Columbus, Kentucky, about 18 miles below Cairo. Commodore Foote had his gunboat fleet at Cairo, and Gen. U. S. Grant, who commanded the district, was collecting a large force at Paducah, Cairo, and Birds Point. General Halleck had a "map" on his table, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, "Where is the rebel line?" Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, Forts Donelson and Henry, and Columbus, Kentucky. "That is their line," said Halleck; "now, where is the proper place to break it?" And either Cullum or I said, "Naturally the center." Halleck drew a line perpendicularly to the other, near its middle, and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River, and he said, "That's

a Medical and Surgical History of the War the Rebellion, pt. 1, Chronological Summary of Engagements and Battles, p. lxi.

b Same.

c Rations were issued at Cairo to 14,623 prisoners.

d Badeau's Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 51.

892