On the 5th instant, I received information that the Colonel was on his march with a regiment. That force I believed I could employ usefully, if it should arrive, and determined to accept it, but I shall be rather embarrassed by the force now arriving. To refuse to accept it, however, might produce difficulty with the volunteers, which would probably be injurious to the service in any future occasion, where such a force might be required. As it is near at hand, I believe the better course will be to accept it, and give it active employment at once. I shall, therefore, take it into service, and it will enable me to cover every foot of the country where an enemy could find refuge. The greatest difficulty will be to supply this force; but the Quartermaster's and Commissary's departments will only have to redouble their energies. * The day previous General Jesup wrote to the Secretary: * * Congress, I preceive, are alarmed at the expenses of the war; they have gotten the country into it, and they will find that they must make three or four such appropriations, at the least, before they get clear of it. They broke the Army down in 1821, and are responsible for all the Indian difficulties which have since taken place. Had they left it as it was in 1818, it would have been competent, with the two regiments of dragoons since added, for every purpose of defense, as well as for the suppression of every hostile movement on the part of the Indians. @ On the receipt of General Jesup's letter, the Secretary of War, on the 1st of December, replied: I received your letter of the 22d ultimo yesterday afternoon, and hasten to say that the great amount of force expected from Georgia was uncalled for, and can not be retained in the service. Such an additional number of mounted men will break down your army, destroy all the resources of the country, and consume the forage and provisions collected for the supply of the troops calculated for. The next day he continued: * * * Alarmed at the immense accumulation of volunteer mounted men in Florida, and seriously apprehensive that we might not have the means of maintaining them in the field, I wrote you a hurried letter yesterday directing the Georgia militia to be discharged. If, however, you find that you can better spare the Alabama or any other troops, you can select the best. I do not think your operations would be at all retarded, or your army less efficient by limiting the number of mounted men to 2,000, including the regular cavalry, or, if absolutely necessary for escorts, the number may be carried up to 2,000 mounted volunteers. * * * * I am not disposed, as you know, to jeopardize the success of the campaign by the exercise of an ill-judged economy, but the attention of the public has been called to the immense expenditures occasioned by this war, and they have become a matter of investigation by Congress, and we are called upon by our sense of duty and regard for the reputation of the service, to avoid the appearance of lavish or unnecessary expense.d * * The manner in which the volunteers have everywhere obeyed the call of their country, and by their eagerness to serve in this war, have led their officers to exceed the call made upon the States, is highly creditable to them, and is fully appreciated by this Department; and in declining their services at this moment, it is governed only by a sense of its paramount duty to the country. It has been represented that the volunteers on entering the service have had their horses appraised, some at the exorbitant price of $300; thus attempting to establish a claim for this unreasonable rate of compensation, for any loss they may hereafter sustain. It may be proper to inform all such persons that it is the determination of this Department, unless otherwise directed by the laws that may be passed for indemnity against such losses, not to allow more than $120 for any cavalry horse that may die in the service. As a private then received but $5 per month, it should be observed that the amount allowed by the Secretary, to volunteers for each horse dying in service, was equal to two years full pay of a regular soldier; the appraised value equaled his full pay for five years. a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 889. DETACHED SERVICE. All defects in the peace organization of 1821 were brought to light during the first year of the Florida war, but none more conspicuously than the evil of detached service. Much of this was due to the law and to the attempt to economize in the staff, at the expense of the line, by detailing officers from the latter, with no provision to replace them by supernumeraries. The evil was not confined to the commissioned officers, but embraced the enlisted men, who were detailed in large numbers on extra and daily duty in departments, which in other armies, have their special organizations. Its effect in reducing the Army to a mere skeleton, was fully set forth in the reports of military commanders. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Pierce, First Artillery, in a report dated Fort Heileman, September 13, 1836, stated: I can not permit the express to depart, without stating to you the miserably deplorable situation of the regular troops in the Territory, as regards their efficient action in the field. There are here 11 companies of artillery; the whole presents a fighting force of 110 men; and while we are entitled to 55 officers, we have here only 6 for company duty.a The colonel of the same regiment, February 2, reported: There are only 7 company officers present for duty with the 9 companies (of the regiment), and not one of the officers attached to Companies C, D, and I are present with any of those companies." * * * While such was the state of the battalions in active service in Florida, the condition of those ordered to the Creek country was but little better. In the month of June, 1836, with 16 companies there were present 27 officers. Included in this number were 5 captains detached from their companies, either as battalion commanders, inspectors, or performing other duties as field officers. The condition of the troops in Florida in 1836 was more specifically stated in the report of the Adjutant-General dated February 27, 1837, pursuant to a resolution of the House of Representatives on the 13th of the same month. In June, while the officers present numbered but 33, the absentees, deducting a few vacancies, numbered 81. Of the detached officers "the greater number were absent on ord nance, engineer, and topographical duty, Indian service, etc." March 2, 1837, the Adjutant-General submitted a supplemental a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 110. 44461°-12-12 report showing the number of officers, during the year 1836, who were employed in any service which separated them from their respective regiments or corps. From this report it appears that the number of officers detailed from the line were as follows: The depletion will perhaps be better understood, by giving the complement of officers in each artillery regiment and then the absentees. This table does not include officers of artillery detailed as aid-decamp on recruiting service, or in the Quartermaster or Commissary Departments: The officers of the Third Artillery were detached as follows: The number of companies of dragoons, artillery, and infantry in the Army at the period of this report was 126, their complement of company officers was 456; the number left for duty after deducting 181 on detached service (2 officers on detached service were field officers) was 275, or less than 2 per company. From the number 275, there were still to be deducted regimental and post adjutants, post quartermasters, the absent with leave, sick, and many other officers, the companies on the average being left with less than one-half of the complement required for field service. The number actually detailed on detached service amounted to 37 per cent of the total number of officers 491, belonging to the line of the Army. INCREASE OF THE ARMY. In the annual reports made in December, 1837, the chiefs of staff departments, almost without exception, urged an increase of their departments, their main argument being the acknowledged evil of detached service. The General in Chief in his report indorsed their views, and renewed his recommendation of the year before, as to an increase of the line, stating that The disasters and consequences of an Indian war are too well known to be here dwelt on. Disturbances continually occur which produce alarm and agitate the country, and sometimes lead to open hostilities. On such occasions, for the want of sufficient numbers of regular troops on the frontier, the distant posts are obliged to be evacuated to furnish means of defense, and a militia force called out, and heavy expenditures by the loss of property near the scenes of those troubles are the consequence. * * * An augmentation of the Army, therefore, to a reasonable extent, is called for by a policy of humanity and economy. * I would, therefore, respectfully submit to your consideration the propriety of augmenting the numerical force of the Army, so as to furnish an effective rank and file of 15,000 men. * * It is recommended, in order to render the Army efficient and capable of performing the duties required, that every company of artillery and infantry be augmented to 80 men, with authority to increase to 100 should circumstances render it proper, so that there may always be in each regiment, for duty with arms, a respectable force.a The plan suggested by the General in Chief was to increase the infantry regiments from 7 to 12, to add 1 company to each of the 4 regiments of artillery, to increase the enlisted strength of each company in all arms to 80 men, with discretionary authority vested in the President, to increase the companies of artillery and infantry to 100. This recommendation would have given the Army 2 regiments of dragoons, 4 regiments of artillery, and 12 of infantry of 10 companies each, with an aggregate force of 15,132. The report of the Secretary of War entered into the cost of the war and explained that— Another cause of unusual expense is to be found in the character of the troops employed. At first they were drafted men or volunteers engaged for so short a period of service, as to render their employment not only expensive but inefficient, and when they were engaged for a longer time, the inexperience of their staff officers occasioned great and unnecessary expenditures, while the description of force, chiefly mounted men, augmented very much the cost of the campaign. The remuneration this irregular cavalry received from Government, merely for the use of their horses, amounted in six months to a sum nearly if not quite equal to their real value. The Government has had besides, to pay a large amount for horses that perished for want of forage, which the state of the country rendered it impracticable to transport in sufficient quantities, for the supply of so large a body of cavalry. The irregular force thus employed in Florida during the campaign of 1836 amounted to about 10,000 men, one-half of which were cavalry, at an expense greatly exceeding that of regular troops, and by no means so efficient as one-half the number of that description of force. Notwithstanding the experience gained during the last two campaigns, showed the great cost of employing volunteers, the Department had no alternative but to engage them again, which the patriotic offers of the citizens from every part of the country enabled it to do. b The events of this war and the heavy expenses attending it, have shown the propriety and even necessity of increasing and organizing the staff and of augmenting the Army of the United States. * * * I would recommend the addition of three regiments of infantry and one company to each regiment of artillery, and that the companies, both of artillery and infantry, should be increased to 64, rank and file, with authority vested in the President to augment their number, not to exceed 100 men, whenever the exigencies of the country a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 589. may require it. This would secure all the advantages of the present peace establishment and enable the Executive on any "sudden emergency to place the Army on a respectable footing of defense." a Like the General in Chief, he recommended a permanent increase of the staff corps, arguing that: As the Army is now constituted, officers are drawn off for staff duties, to the great injury of the service of the line, and these duties are by no means so well performed as they would be by officers properly instructed and entirely devoted to them. The present organization does not give to regiments or companies any supernumerary officers. There are no more officers than the performance of the various duties of their military command actually requires, and to reduce the number must weaken the Army, render it irregular and inefficient in its operations, and greatly impair its discipline. In concluding his arguments in favor of the increase of the rank and file and staff of the Army, Mr. Poinsett thought it necessary, like Washington, to advert to the jealousy of a standing army: When in 1821 the Army was reduced to 6,127 men, the extent of our frontier did not exceed 6,373 miles. * * * Since that period its extent has been increased by the acquisition of Florida, and other causes, to 8,500 miles; most of our principal harbors and bays have been fortified by extensive works, and the Indians concentrated upon the western line so as to present a front of not less than 45,000 warriors. The protection due by the Government, to the inhabitants of this extensive and exposed portion of our country, would require a much larger force than is here proposed, if their safety were made to depend entirely upon the Regular Army; and I would respectfully recommend the construction of a chain of permanent fortresses along that line, and a competent organization of the frontier States, as important and necessary auxiliaries for this purpose. If any danger is to be apprehended from an army of 15,000 men, scattered along a frontier of more than 8,000 miles and commanded by officers educated to reverence the laws and cherish the freedom of their country, it is effectually to be guarded against by a proper organization of the militia. Their aggregate force now is little short of a million and a half of men, and whatever may be their efficiency against a foreign enemy, they may always be relied upon when the liberties of the country are assailed. c Had Mr. Poinsett remembered the ineffectual efforts of Congress on the 21st of June, 1783, to disperse the handful of armed recruits who surrounded it and demanded a redress of grievances, he probably would not have expressed the opinion, that in any emergency, an undisciplined militia would be found more reliable for the defense of our liberties, than disciplined troops. When this mutiny occurred, Congress requested the executive council of Pennsylvania, then sitting under the same roof, to call out the militia. The president of the council at once expressed his doubts as to the propriety of such a course. In the evening, therefore, Congress again met and resolved: That the executive council should be informed that, in their opinion, effectual measures ought to be immediately taken for suppressing the mutiny and supporting the public authority; that a committee should confer with the Executive, and, in case no satisfactory grounds should appear of adequate and prompt exertions for those purposes, the President should, with the advice of the committee, be authorized to summon the members to meet at Trenton or Princeton, in New Jersey; that an express be sent to General Washington for a detachment of regular troops. The conference with the Executive produced nothing but doubts concerning the disposition of the militia to act, unless some actual outrages were offered to persons or property. They even doubted whether a repetition of the insult to Congress would be a sufficient provocation. Neither the exhortations of the friends of President a American State Papers, vol. 7, pp. 572, 573. c American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 574. |