tenant to pay rent, if before the beginning of the term the premises are destroyed. And in case of a partial destruction of a building, if the insurance company takes possession to restore the premises, the tenant is not liable for rent, while the insurance company occupies the building for that purpose.

Where a lease provides for a forfeiture for nonpayment of rent when due, a tender or readiness to pay on the premises at any time before sunset on the day stipulated will be sufficient. If a different place

for payment is designated in the lease, the payment or tender must be made there.

§ 122. Duration of tenancy.-In ascertaining the time of the beginning and ending of a term where the words "month" and "year" occur in leases the Gregorian calendar is used, by which the beginning of the year is January 1. Prior to the year 1752 the Julian calendar, fixing the beginning of the year on the 25th of March, was used. When the word year occurs in a statute or contract it is to be understood as meaning the whole twelve months according to the calendar, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. The period of time is always to be settled according to the intention of the parties. At common law a month meant a lunar month, but now it is held to mean a calendar month, both in England and the United States. A natural day is full twenty-four hours, and in legal contemplation the legal day is without fractions, but if two acts are performed on the same day and it is important which was first in time, evidence will be heard to fix the exact hour and minute. This becomes important in disputes as to the priority of liens, deeds, time of re

cording and the like. In computing time from the day of the date, or from a certain act or event, the day of the date or act is to be excluded, unless it is clear that the parties to the instrument had a different intent. A week means a full week of seven days, and if by statute or rule of court a notice is to be published for a certain number of weeks, the publication is not completed until the number of weeks has fully expired from the date of the first publication. Thus, if the publication is to be once in each week for six successive weeks, and the first publication is on Tuesday, the publication is not completed without including Monday of the seventh week, which is the forty-second day, and whatever was to be done dependent on such publication could not be done earlier than Tuesday of that week. When the day for the performance of an act or the payment of money falls on a legal holiday, the next business day following is the one on which performance or payment is to be made; except, however, that where days of grace are allowed, and the last day of grace falls on a legal holiday, the next preceding business day is the day for payment. The computation of time and the meaning to be given to terms such as "month," "year," etc., are often the subject of statutory regulation, and where there is a conflict, statute law supersedes and displaces the common law.

§ 123. Distress.-Distress was a right which the landlord had at common law to seize and hold the tenant's personal property to enforce the payment of rent. It became unpopular in the United States, has been abolished in some of them by statute, and has been superseded by the ordinary remedies

for the recovery of money due. Some states give the landlord a first lien upon all crops for the security of his rent.

§ 124. Apportionment of rent.-During the existence of the tenancy the landlord or reversioner may sell part of the leased premises. In such cases the rent is apportioned and paid to the new owners in proportion to the value of the land.

§ 125. Estates at will.-An estate at will was formerly when a tenant occupied at the mere pleasure of him who had the next estate. The landlord could terminate it any moment without notice. This harsh rule was modified at first, so that an estate at will was equally at the will of both parties, and later it became settled that unless there was an express agreement to hold at will, such tenancies should be construed as estates from year to year. These changes have virtually abolished the old tenancy at will, and now such estates are determinable by notices to quit, and the form and length of time for giving notice is regulated by statute. Tenants holding such estates are entitled to emblements, owing to the uncertainty of their tenure.

§ 126. Estates at sufferance.-An estate at sufferance is where one who comes lawfully into possession of land holds over after his interest is determined. And while he is not liable strictly for rent as such, he is liable for such sum as may be reasonable in an action for use and occupation. In some states, a penalty in addition to this is awarded against one who unlawfully deprives the owner of the use of his land.

§ 127. Base fee.-A base or qualified estate in

fee is an interest which may continue forever, but may be determined without the aid of a conveyance by some act or event circumscribing its duration. A limitation to a man and his heirs, so long as he shall have heirs of his body, or so long as St. Paul's church shall stand, are examples of this sort of an estate. The owner of such an estate has all the rights of an owner of a fee-simple, until his estate is determined. Such estates are called base because their duration depends upon the occurrence of collateral circumstances which qualify and debase the purity

of the fee.

$128. Conditional fee.-A conditional fee is one which restrains the fee to some particular heirs exclusive of others, as to the heirs of a man's body, or to the heirs male of his body. At common law this was construed to be a fee-simple on condition the grantee had the heirs prescribed. If he died without such heirs the estate reverted to the grantor. If he had such heirs the fee became absolute in him, and he could sell his estate and bar his own issue and prevent a reverter. This right of the grantee was cut off by the statute of Edward I, which prohibited a sale by the grantee, to the detriment of his issue and the grantee's reversioner.

§ 129. Estates tail.-This statute converted what before had been a fee-simple estate into an estate in fee tail. This restraint upon the power of alienation fettered inheritances and created perpetuities, which were condemned by Bacon and Coke and other writers. The landed aristocracy opposed all attempts to facilitate sales of land, but the growing spirit of commerce and industry, foiled by the legislature, found

expression in a species of judicial legislation, by which the fiction of a common recovery was allowed to cut off the entail. Common recoveries were fictitious suits, in the nature of pious frauds, allowed by the courts, the object of which was to get rid of the mischievous consequences of the statute of Edward I. If the tenant wished to have his estate tail converted into an absolute fee, he procured himself to be sued by a fictitious person, who claimed that the tenant had no right to the land. The parties to the suit, as the made-up record would show, then compromised the case and a judgment was entered, the result of which was that what was formerly a fee tail estate was converted into an absolute fee with all its incidents. To such awkward shifts, such subtle refinements, says Blackstone, were our ancestors obliged to have recourse in order to get the better of that stubborn statute of Edward I. The design for which these contrivances were set on foot was certainly laudable, the unriveting the fetters of estates tail, which were attended with a legion of mischiefs to the commonwealth, but while we applaud the end we can not admire the means.

§ 130. Estates in fee tail with all their inconveniences existed in this country before the Revolution. They have now become obsolete from disuse or have been abolished or modified by the legislatures of the different states. The general tendency of judicial decision as well as legislation in this country has been in the direction of removing all limitations. upon the power of sale of real estate, and preventing perpetuities.