1. Under a liquidation agreement be-
tween a corporation and its credit-
ors, plaintiffs were appointed
trustees. In an action upon certain
promissory notes given for prop-
erty purchased by defendant of the
trustees after they had assumed
the trust, the answer alleged that
defendant, as creditor, was in-
duced to become a party to the
liquidation agreement by false
representations, and asked to have
the same set aside and canceled as
to him. Held, that a demurrer to
the answer was properly sustained;
that the proper parties were not
represented in the litigation to
entitle defendant to judgment
upon the issue sought to be made
by his answer; and that it set up
no defense, as fraud inducing the
execution of the contract was no
answer to defendant's obligation
to pay for property purchased of
the trustees. Otis v. Shants.

45

2. As said act is one by its title re-
lating "to the collection of taxes
on lands of non-residents," and as
in the purview of the tax laws, oc-
cupied lands are not lands of non-
residents (1 R. S. 389, § 3), where
lands of a non-resident are occu-
pied by a resident the act does not
apply thereto, and an assessment
thereof to the owner in the "non-
resident" part of the roll is illegal.

Id.

3. As to whether a statute making a
tax deed, after a certain designated
time, conclusive evidence of the
existence of every fact necessary
to create a good title under the
deed, would be a valid exercise of
legislative power, as against the
original owner who had always
been in possession and whose pos-
session remained undisturbed up
to the time of the bringing of an
action to obtain possession under
the tax deed, and where said owner
had in fact either paid his taxes
before sale or merely formal sale
was made which was void for
want of jurisdiction, quære.

Id.

4. In an action of trespass, the plain-
tiff claimed title under deeds from
the comptroller, executed on sales
for unpaid taxes. The lands were
assessed as non-resident lands; de-
fendants were permitted to give
evidence which tended to show
that at the time of assessment they
were occupied by a resident; also
that said taxes were paid to the
collector before he made his return
to the county treasurer These
questions were submitted to the
jury, who were charged that if the
lands were occupied when assessed,
the assessment was void, or if the
taxes had been paid before being
returned to the comptroller, all
procedings after payment were
void. Held, no error.
ld.

2. It is not necessary that a power of
attorney to confess judgment
should be acknowledged or at-
tested by a subscribing witness.
Id.

3. The filing in court of a power of
attorney authorizing the confes-
sion of judgment for a specific sum
gives the court jurisdiction over
the party executing it, and
authority to enter judgment for
the sum specified, without proof
of the nature, existence or amount
of the debt.
Id.

4. The provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure (1274) in relation to
judgments by confession, requir-
ing the defendant to state the
nature and circumstances of the
indebtedness and to verify the
same, has no relation to the juris-
diction of the court or the
authority of the clerk to enter
judgment; its only purpose is to
protect creditors from a judgment
fraudulently confessed by an in-
solvent debtor; and so, the omis-
sion of the verified statement does
not render the judgment void, but
only voidable at the instance of
certain creditors; it may not be
impeached by the defendant be-
cause of the omission.

Id.

5. The history of legislation in this
state, in relation to judgments by
confession given.
Id.

9. The manner of entry of such a
judgment is matter of form, to be
regulated by the laws of the state
where it was rendered.
Id.

66

10. In an action upon a judgment
by confession rendered by a court
of general jurisdiction of Pennsyl-
vania, it appeared that said judg-
ment was entered by the prothono-
tary, the clerk of the court, upon
an instrument known as a judg-
ment note," filed with the records
of the court which, after a promise
to pay a certain sum, authorized
"any attorney of any court of
record in Pennsylvania or else-
where, to confess judgment there-
for," and waived all stay of execu-
tion from and after the maturity of
the note. Both parties to the note
resided in Pennsylvania. It ap-
peared that such notes were
authorized by the laws of said
state and that a prothonotary, as
the clerk of the court, upon appli-
Ication of the owner of the note is
required to enter judgment
thereon against the person execut-
ing the same, without the agency
of any attorney, and it was found
that the judgment was duly ren-
dered according to the law of
Pennsylvania. Held, that the
judgment was valid and conclu-
sive against defendant here. Id.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

A judgment by confession entered
in another state upon a promissory

4. In an action upon a promissory
note dated at Washington, D. C.,
made payable at a bank in the state
of New York, which bore interest
at a rate legal in the place of its
date, but illegal in this state, it
appeared that the note was given
to take up another note dated at
Washington and payable there,
which bore the same rate of inter-
est and was similarly indorsed.
The arrangement for renewal was
made in Washington where the
note in suit was drawn; it was
handed to the maker to execute;
he took it to his home in New York
where he signed it and the defend-
ant N. indorsed it. The note was
then mailed to plaintiff at Wash-
ington. The indorser set up usury
as a defense. Held, untenable; that
as the contract of the parties, evi-
denced by the note, was made in,
it was governed by the laws of the
District of Columbia; that the
aflixing of their signatures by the
maker and indorser were simply
details in the performance and
execution of the contract which
was consummated when the note
was received by plaintiff; that the
naming of a New York bank as
the place of payment did not char-
acterize it as a New York contract;
and that while the engagement of
the indorser was, in a sense, inde-
pendent of that of the maker, this
did not affect the local character
of the contract. Staples v. Nott.

403

2.

CONSIDERATION.

It seems that a consideration is

not an essential to an executed
contract. P. R. R. Co. v. Forrest.

83

An agreement to rescind a previ-
ous contract containing mutual
stipulations imports that, until re-
scinded, it was recognized as sub-
sisting and binding by both parties,
and the mutual releases form a
sufficient valid consideration for
the new agreement.
ld.

*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. While under the provision of the
Constitution (art. 3, § 16, Const.),
declaring that "no private or local
bill * * shall embrace more
than one subject, and that shall be
expressed in its title," every pro-
vision of such a bill must be ger-
mane to and fairly connected with
and tending to promote the subject
expressed in the title; when the
subject is sufficiently expressed all
matters fairly and reasonably con-
nected with it, and all measures
which will or may facilitate its ac-
complishment, may properly be
incorporated in the act. Van Brunt
v. Town of Flatbush.

50

2. The subject expressed in the title
of the act entitled, An act in re-
lation to local improvements in the
town of Flatbush and the acquisi-
tion of the rights of a plank-road
company in said town" (Chap.
161, Laws of 1889), properly em-
braces the building and improve-
ment of highways and the con-
struction of sewers, and the act is
not made repugnant to said con-
stitutional provision because it
contains a provision authorizing
the construction of a trunk sewer
through the adjoining town of
Flatlands, a necessary part of the
sewage system provided for in the

act.

Id.

3. Owners of lots abutting on a city
street, the fee of which is in the
municipality for street uses, al-
though they have no title to the
soil, are entitled to the benefit of
the street in front of their prem-
ises for access and other purposes.
and cannot be deprived thereof

N. Y., L. & W. R. Co.

157

5. As against abutting owners, hav-
ing no title to the bed of a city
street, it is competent for the leg-
islature to authorize the construc-
tion of a horse or steam surface
railroad therein, without making
compensation to them for conse-
quential damages, arising from a
reasonable use of the street for
purposes of such a railroad, not
exclusive in its nature, and when
the road is substantially on the
same grade as the street itself and
passage across and through the
same is left free and unobstructed
for the public use.

Id.

stroy or nullify a party's muni-
ments of title is as effective in
depriving him of his property as
one which bestows it directly upon
another.
Id.

12. After judgment has been ren-
dered in an action, the fruits
thereof are rights of property, and
are beyond the reach of legislative
power to affect.
Id,

or

13. The provision of the Code of
Civil Procedure (§ 1440) relating
to the title to real property sold on
execution, as amended in 1881
(Chap. 681, Laws of 1881), which
provides that if the title of the
sheriff's " grantee or his assignees
is adjudged for any reason
cause whatever to be null and void
in any action for that purpose
brought by the judgment debtor
or his assignees, such judgment
shall have no force or effect unless
within twenty days after the
entry" or in case of pending ap
peal, within twenty days after final
judgment "the plaintiff shall pay
to such grantee or his assignees
the
money

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

paid on the sale, with interest from
the time of the sale,
including the costs and expenses
of defendant in defending the ac-
tion,
and in the event
of the plaintiff's failure to pay
such purchase-money and expenses
within the time aforesaid, said title
shall be valid in said grantee," is
unconstitutional and void; it vio-
lates the constitutional prohibition
against depriving the owner of his
property without due process of
law, and it assumes to nullify a
89