Statement of case.

now are, had the said railway and stations not been built," and yet he found that the fee of plaintiff's real estate is diminished in value by the maintenance and operation of the road by the sum of $8,000, and to this finding the defendants excepted. The General Term reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, as appears from the opinion there pronounced, without considering other alleged errors, on the ground that the findings of the court showed that the plaintiff's real estate was not damaged by the defendants, and that the trial judge erred as to the damages.

Esek Cowen, George P. Smith and Edward C. Perkins for appellant. The maintenance and operation of the elevated road in front of plaintiff's premises were not justified as to him by law, but constituted an unlawful interference with his right of property, and he was entitled to an injunction, whether he suffered pecuniary loss or not; and the appellate court, therefore, erred in absolutely reversing the judgment. (Story v. M. E. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Lahr v. M. E. R. Co., 104 id. 268; Drucker v. M. E. R. Co., 106 id. 158; Smith v. City of Rochester, 104 id. 674; Corning v. T. I. & N. Foundry, 40 id. 191; Webb v. P. M. Co., 3 Sumn. 189; W. & B. C. Co. v. Swindon, L. R. [9 Ch. App.] 451; Lyon v. McLaughlin, 32 Vt. 425; Ward v. Warren, 82 N. Y. 455; Nicholls v. Wentworth, 100 id. 455; Lund v. City of New Bedford, 121 Mass. 268, 288, 290; Plumleigh v. Dawson, 6 Ill. 544, 551, 552; Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253; Chapman v. Thames Co., 13 Conn. 269; Crooker v. Bragg, 10 Wend. 260, 266; Ware v. Allen, 140 Mass. 513; Lawson v. Menasha, 59 Wis. 393.) The opportunity offered to the defendants to avoid the injunction by payment of a certain sum, was a mere act of grace on the part of the court, of which defendants were not bound to avail themselves. An error in computing that sum, therefore, was no ground for appeal on their part. (Henderson v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. 423, 429, 430; 17 Hun, 344, 352; N.

Y. N. E. Bank v. M. R. R. Co., 21 J. & S. 511, 513; 108 N. Y. 660; Lawrence v. M. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. S. R. 39;

Statement of case.

Welsh v. R. R. Co., 8 N. Y. Supp. 492; Carter v. R. R. Co., 25 J. & S. 279, 281; Eno v. M. R. R. Co., 24 id. 313, 318; Smith v. Rathburn, 75 N. Y. 122, 126, 127; Carll v. Oakley, 97 N. Y. 633, 635; Genet v. Davenport, 59 N. Y. 648; Bartlett v. Stinton, L. R. [1 C. P.] 483, 484; Radway v. Graham, 4 Abb. 468; Murphy v. Spalding, 46 N. Y. 559.) There was no error, however, in the determination of the Special Term as to the amount to be paid, and defendants were not entitled to any deduction for benefits. (Roberts v. Comrs., etc., 24 Kan. 247; Armstrong v. City of St. Louis, 69 Mo. 309; Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152; Eagle v. Clearing, L. R. [2 C. P.] 638; Sanderson v. Pennsylvania, 102 Penn. St. 370; Marcy v. Fries, 18 Kan. 353; 1 Sedg. on Dam. 56; N. V. R. R. Co. v. McClure, 29 Ind. 536; Laws of 1850, chap. 140, § 16; Laws of 1885, chap. 606, § 21; S. A. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 333.) Evidence was properly received by the trial court, to show the difference in the value of the plaintiff's lots as they are, and their value as they would have been if the defendants' road had not been built, for the purpose of fixing the compensation to the plaintiff for the easements taken by the defendants. (Jay v. Hopkins, 5 Den. 84; Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183; Robertson v. Knapp, 35 id. 91; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 id. 36; Argotsinger v. Vines, 82 id. 308; R. & S. R. R. Co. v. Budlong, 6 How. Pr. 467; 10 id. 289; N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Harnett, 27 Hun, 151; In re N. & M. R. R. Co., 47 id. 489; People v. McCarthy, 102 N. Y. 639; Tallman v. M. E. R. Co., 121 id. 119.) The admission of evidence to show that this land was specially adapted to a valuable use, and that the railroad had destroyed such use, was proper. (Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Chicago & E. R R. 110 Ill. 414; C. R. Co. v. Moore, 124 id. 329; Galway v. M. E. R. Co., 13 N. Y. Supp. 47.) Even if the court had erred in the rulings as to the measure of compensation for the easements taken, the error would not be regarded, for the exclu sion of the evidence could not have altered the result. (MeGean Case, 117 N. Y. 223; Birch v. M. E. R. Co., 8 N. Y. Supp.

Co. v. Jacobs,

Statement of case.

325; Rooswell v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., Id. 547; Werfelman v. M. R. Co., 11 id. 66; Kenkle v. M. R. Co., 62 Hun, 398.)

Henry A. Foster for appellant. The alleged special benefit to the plaintiff's land and building from the elevated railroad cannot be set off against the value of that part of the easements of light, air and access belonging to the plaintiff which defendants have taken. (N. Y. N. E. Bank v. M. E. R. Co., 21 J. & S. 512; 108 N. Y. 660; Laws of 1875, chap. 606, § 20; Laws of 1850, chap. 140, § 16; Laws of 1872, chap. 885, § 3; Code Civ. Pro. $ 3370, 3383; Laws of 1890, chap. 95; Story v. M. E. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 179; Lahr v. M. E. R. Co., 104 id. 269; 117 id. 448; S. A. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 id. 333; Rockhill v. Nelson, 24 Ind. 424; Ewing v. Ewing, Id. 470; Van Winkle v. Constantine, 10 N. Y. 422; McMahon v. City of Cincinnati, 5 Ind. 413; Newcastle v. Brambach, Id. 543; Evansville v. Fitzpatrick, 10 id. 120; W. W. R. R. Co. v. McClure, 29 id. 536; Frederick v. Shane, 32 Iowa, 254; Bland v. Hixenburgh, 39 id. 532; Britton v. D., M. O. & S. R. Co., 59 id. 540; A. R. R. Co. v. Burkett, 42 Ala. 84, 89, 90; Shipley v. R. R. Co., 34 Md. 336; Tremont v. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585; Wagner v. Gage County, 3 id. 237; Paducah v. Stovall, 12 Heisk. 1; Woodfolk v. N. R. R. Co., 2 Swan, 422; E. T. R. R. Co. v. Love, 3 Head, 64; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 508; M. R. R. Co. v. McDonald, 12 id. 54; Mitchell v. Thornton, 21 Gratt. 164; James River v. Turner, 9 Leigh, 313; R. R. Co. v. Tyree, 7 W. Va. 693; R. R. Co. v. Foreman, 24 id. 662; Robbins v. Harrison, 6 Wis. 636; Neilson v. City of Chicago, 58 id. 516; Washburn v. City of Milwaukee, 59 id. 364; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 228; Penrice v. Wallis, 37 id. 172; New Orleans v. Moye, 39 id. 374; Commissioners v. Harkleroads, 62 id. 807; Whitehead v. Arkansas, 28 Ark. 464.) As the plaintiff was entitled to an absolute injunction against the defendants, the provision that on the payment of the sum fixed as the value of the plaintiff's easements, the injunction should be avoided, was a

Statement of case.

grace or privilege to the defendants, and the defendants are not entitled to complain that the terms on which such a favor is given to them are higher than they think such terms should have been. (90 N. Y. 123, 179; 104 id. 269, 288; 123 id. 1; 34 N. Y. S. R. 876; 117 N. Y. 448; Smith v. City of Roch ester, 38 Hun, 612, 615; 104 N. Y. 674; Corning v. T. I. & N. Factory, 40 id. 191; Lund v. City of New Bedford, 121 Mass. 286; Plumleigh v. Dawson, 6 Ill. 544, 551, 552; Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253; Chapman v. T. M. Co., 13 Conn. 269; Crooker v. Bragg, 10 Wend. 260, 266; Wilts & B. C., etc., Co. v. Swindon, L. R. [9 Ch. App.] 457; 7 id. 697; Ware v. Allen, 140 Mass. 513; Webb v. P. M. Co., 3 Sumn. 189; Hammond v. Zehner, 21 N. Y. 118; Nicholls v. Wentworth, 100 id. 455; Eckerson v. Crippen, 110 id. 585; Barnes v. Seligman, 55 Hun, 339; Bruce v. Welsh, 52 id. 524; Henderson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. 423; N. Y. N. E. Bank v. M. E. R. Co., 108 id. 66; Smith v. Rathbun, 75 id. 122, 126, 127; Carll v. Oakley, 97 id. 633, 634; Genet v. Davenport, 59 id. 648; Bartlett v. Stinton, L. R. [1 C. P.] 483; Pearce v. Chaplin, L. R. [9 Q. B.] 802.)

John F. Dillon, Julien T. Davies and Samuel Blythe Rogers for respondents. The reversal at General Term was properly directed, because of the finding of the trial court that these premises are worth more than they would have been had the railway and stations not been built. (Bonnell v. Griswold, 89 N. Y. 122; Schwinger v. Raymond, 83 id. 192; Conselyea v. Blanchard, 103 id. 222, 231; Redfield v. Redfield, 110 id. 671; Genet v. D. & II. C. Co., 122 id. 505; Hart v. MacLaury, 121 id. 636; Elmhirst v. Spencer, 2 M. & G. 45, 50; Kensit v. G. E. R. Co., L. R. [23 Ch. Div.] 566, 573; Jeffers v. Jeffers, 107 N. Y. 653; Morgan v. City of Binghamton, 102 id. 500; T., etc., R. Co. v. II. T., etc., R. Co., 86 id. 106, 123, 126; People v. M. T. Co., 31 Hun, 596; Drake v. II. R. R. Co., 7 Barb. 508; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Living ston v. Livingston, 6 id. 497; Newman v. M. E. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 618; Laws of 1882, chap. 410, § 970; Laws of 1854,

Statement of case.

chap. 384, §§ 3, 6–9; Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296 ; Rexford v. Knight, 15 Barb. 627; Newby v. P. Co., 25 Mo. 258; Helck v. Reinheimer, 105 N. Y. 470; J. R. Co. v. Turner, 9 Leigh. 313; Betts v. City of Williamsburgh, 15 Barb. 256; C. & P. R. Co. v. Francis, 70 Ill. 238; Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30; Lewis on Em. Domain, § 470; 1 Redf. on Railways [6th ed.], 272; In re B. E. R. Co., 55 Hun, 165; Henderson v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. 423; In re W. S. R. R. Co., 29 Hun, 609; T. & B. R. R. Co. v. Lee, 13 Barb. 169; U., etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 56 id. 456; B. R. R. Co. v. Barnard, 9 Hun, 104, 105, 106; In re N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Judge, 15 id. 63; In re N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Arnot, 27 id. 151, 155; In re N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Miller, 49 id. 542; Dupins v. C. & V. W. R. Co., 115 Ill. 97; Frederick v. Shane, 32 Ia. 254; II. & N. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. 173; Whitman v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 7 Allen, 313; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 508.) The reversal at General Term was properly directed because of the express refusal of the trial judge to take into consideration any special or peculiar benefits. (Cross v. Plymouth, 125 Mass. 557; Hilbourne v. Suffolk, 120 id. 393; Donovan v. Springfield, 125 id. 373; Drucker v. M. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 157; McGean v. M. R. Co., 117 id. 219; Avery v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 121 id. 31; P. & L. E. R. Co. v. Robinson, 95 Penn. St. 426; Hayes V. O., etc., R. Co., 54 Ill. 373, 375; Nicholson v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 22 Conn. 74, 79; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568, 578; Payne v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Trinity College v. City of Hartford, 32 Conn. 452; Van Slyke v. Iyatt, 46 N. Y. 259; Leffler v. Field, 33 How. Pr. 385.) The reversal in this case was properly directed, for the error of the trial judge in admitting the opinions of witnesses, as to what this property would be worth if the railway were not there. (McGean v. M. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 219; Avery v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 121 id. 31; Starbird v. Barrows, 43 id. 200; Coleman v. People, 58 id. 555; People v. Fernandez, 35 id. 59; Foote v. Beecher, 78 id. 155, 157; Williams v. Fitch, 18 id. 546; Carroll v. Diemel, 95 id. 252, 256; IolSICKELS-VOL. LXXXIII. 64