Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

importance to the constitution, and the well-being of society, CHAP. XXVII. that the course of justice should be pure and unbiassed; and that suitors and others should be enabled to approach the throne of justice with confidence in its integrity and a full assurance of its absolute impartiality.

And therefore, all acts tending to intimidate or to unduly influence persons concerned in the administration of justice; and all writings, letters, or publications, which have for their object to pervert, or to obstruct, the ordinary course of justice, are contempts of court (s).

Judge, or

endeavouring

Nothing can be of greater necessity to the proper administra- Offering a tion of the law, than to keep the streams of justice clear and bribe to the pure, that parties may proceed with safety to themselves and otherwise their characters. "A greater offence than a person's attempt to obtain by private communication, without the knowledge of those to undue inwhom he is opposed, to influence, by private feelings, the conduct of any one invested with the duty of judicially disposing of matters pending in court, cannot well be stated" (t).

And where the Mayor of Yarmouth wrote a letter to Lord Hardwicke, C., mentioning that a bill in Chancery was threatened to be filed against him, and enclosing a bank-note for £20, of which he desired his lordship's acceptance; he was ordered to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of court; and afterwards, in consideration of his submission to the court, and asking pardon, and of his being at the time Mayor of Yarmouth; and on showing cause it appearing that the public business and affairs of the Corporation might suffer by his imprisonment, he was discharged upon payment of costs; and the bank-note was ordered to be applied to the relief of prisoners in the Fleet (u).

fluence.

Judicial

Every insult offered to a judge, in the exercise of the duties Threatening a of his office, is a contempt; but when the writing or publi- officer. cation proceeds further, and when, not by inference, but by plain and direct language a threat is used, the object of which is to induce a judicial officer to depart from the course of his judicial duty, and to adopt a course he would not otherwise pursue, it is a contempt of the very highest order (x).

Anyone who uses violent and abusive language to an officer Abusing or assaulting of the court in the execution of the duties of his office ;-as inferior Officers

(8) Vide Ex parte Jones, 13 Ves. 237. (t) Lechmere Charlton's case, 2 Myl. & Cr. 353, per Lord Cottenham, C.

(u) Martin's case, 2 Russ. & Myl.

674. See also Me Gill's case, 2 Fow.
Ex. Prac. 404.

(r) Lechmere Charlton's case, 2 Myl.
& Cr. 339, per Lord Cottenham, C.

of the Court.

CHAP. XXVII. when serving the process or orders of the court ;-or who uses scandalous or contemptuous words against the court, or the process thereof, is liable to be committed for contempt of court (y). So also, for assaulting the deputy messenger to the great seal, in the execution of the duties of his office (z). And obstructing a messenger or officer of the court in the execution of a warrant or order of the court, is a contempt (a). And so also, abusing, insulting, and challenging to fight, one of the jury for finding a prisoner guilty (V).

Abusing and

solicitor.

Abusing, accusing of perjury, and threatening a solicitor, threatening a within the precincts of the court, with reference to an order made by a judge at chambers in a judicial proceeding, is a gross contempt of court (c).

Attempts to intimidate parties to judicial proceedings.

Threatening a prosecutor.

Threat by plaintiff to defendant.

Threatening a petitioner in a

And where threats are used against parties to proceedings before the court, with the object of intimidating them in the conduct of their suit, such are contempts of court; whether they have the effect intended or not. The offence is complete the moment after the threat is used (d).

So, an attachment was granted against a defendant for threatening the life of the prosecutor, who had indicted another for perjury contained in an affidavit on which an information had been issued against him (e).

A threatening letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendant, pending the suit, with a view to intimidate him in the conduct of his defence, is a contempt, upon which to found an order for committal (f).

And so also, threatening a petitioner in a divorce suit, to Divorce Suit. publish concerning him, a statement of facts unless he withdraws his petition, is a contempt of court (g).

Threatening a

witness.

And where the respondent in a suit in the Divorce Court, some time before the hearing, threatened to prosecute a witness for perjury, with reference to certain evidence he had reason to suppose such witness would give in the suit; and had also

(y) Barker v. Shepherd, Toth. 167;
Rer v. Jones, 1 Str. 185; Williams v.
Johns, 2 Dick. 471; 1 Mer. 303, n. (d) ;
Price v. Hutchinson, L. R. 9 Eq. 534.

(-) Eliot v. Halmarack, 1 Mer. 302.
(a) Ex parte Titner, 1 Atk. 136; Ex
parte Dixon, 8 Ves. 104; Ex parte
Page, 1 Rose, B. C. 1.

(b) Reg. v. Martin, supra, p. 408.
(c) In re Johnson, 20 Q. B. D. 68;

57 L. J. 1; and supra, p. 391.

(d) Bromilow v. Phillips, 40 W. R. 220; and see Welby v. Still, 66 L. T. 523.

() Rex v. Carroll, 1 Wils. 75.

(f) Smith v. Lakeman, 26 L. J. Ch. 305; and see as to a threat by defendant to plaintiff, Kitcat v. Sharp, supra, p. 405,

(g) In re Mulock, 33 L. J. P. & M. 205; 3 S. & T. 599.

written abusive letters to her; such were held contempts of CHAP. XXVII. court (h).

with a Witness.

It is also a gross contempt, and interference with the fair Tampering trial of an action, to tamper with a witness by the offer of money to induce such witness to go out of the way to some place where she could not be found (i).

And for terrifying a witness who was about to be examined. on a commission, the offender was committed for contempt of court (k).

authorities.

It appears from these and various other authorities, that it Result of is immaterial what measures are adopted, if the object be to taint the source or to pervert the course of justice; and to obtain by corrupt or improper means, a result of legal proceedings different to that which would follow in the ordinary

course.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

AS TO THE PROCEDURE AGAINST OFFENDERS FOR

CONTEMPTS OF COURT.

The procedure against offenders for | Proceedings by attachment for Con

Contempts.

Summary process.

Contempts committed in the face of the

Court.

Proceedings by the Court itself as to.
No Appeal from adjudication for
Contempt.

Motion to commit for Contempt.
Caution to be exercised as to committal.
Costs in proceedings as to Contempts.

tempt.
Contempt, how cleared.

Where the application for attachment
is on the Civil side.

Crown Office Rules as to Contempts.
Punishment for Contempt.
Proceedings by Indictment, and by

Criminal Information for Contempt.
Proceedings of Colonial Courts as to
Contempts.

In the preceding chapter the jurisdiction of the various courts, as to their power to punish contempts of court, having been discussed in detail, and the different kinds of contempt classified and arranged under suitable heads or divisions, it will now be necessary to explain the procedure against offenders for contempts.

(h) Shaw v. Shaw, 31 L. J. P. & M. 35; 2 S. & T. 517.

(i) Lewis v. James, 3 Times L. R.

527, per Kay, J.

(k) Partridge v. Partridge, Vin. Abr. Contempt, A. 25.

CHAPTER

XXVIII.

CHAPTER
XXVIII.

The modes of procedure against offenders for contempts of court are various, depending in some respects on the class and The procedure nature of the offence; and are either—

against Offenders for Contempts.

Summary process.

Contempts committed in

the face of the

Court.

1. By summary process,-as by the immediate apprehension of the offender; or by ordering him to attend the court and answer his contempt; and by the imposition of a fine, or commitment to prison, or both.

2. By motion to the court to commit.

3. By attachment.

4. By indictment; and in some cases-
5. By criminal information.

It should be observed, that contempt of court being a criminal offence, no person can be punished for such unless the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated; and an opportunity given him of answering it (a). And this applies to every mode of procedure against offenders for contempt.

1. The summary process is in general founded upon contemptuous language and reflections applied to those who preside in courts of justice, and to their proceedings; and such contempts are either direct-as where a judge or magistrate is openly insulted in the execution of his office; or consequential,-where the offender, by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court, or its judges in their judicial capacity, reflects upon the authority by which they were appointed, and creates a prejudice against the administration of justice.

Where the insult is offered in the face of the court by the use of contumelious language, demonstrating the want of that respect and regard which is essential to the preservation of its authority, the offender may be instantly apprehended, fined, or imprisoned, at the discretion of the judge, without further examination (b). This doctrine appears to extend to all cases where contemptuous words are spoken in the presence of a magistrate in the actual discharge of his duty (c). And though the magistrate may elect to proceed in this summary mode, yet if he does not, the offender is liable to an indictment; since, wherever a justice may commit for a contempt, the party may be indicted for the misdemeanour (d).

(a) In re Pollard, L. R. 2 P. C. 106. (b) Cro. Eliz. 23; 2 Roll. Ab. 78; 4 Blac. Com. 286; Staunf. P. C. 13b; and see Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. Amer. Rep. 282; and S. C. in Court of

Error, Ibid., vol. 9, p. 395.

(c) I Str. 420; Salk. 697; 3 Mod. 139; 1 Bulst. 139, 140. (d) 1 Str. 420.

A defendant who is conducting his own defence before the court and a jury, on his trial for the publication of a blasphemous libel, may be fined for contempt of court, in persisting-after admonition and warning by the judge-in reviling the Christian religion (e). So also for persistently attacking the characters of persons not before the court (f). And for contemptuous expressions to the presiding judge, on being warned that if he persisted in such conduct he should feel compelled to restrain him; to which the defendant replied"My Lord, if you have your dungeon ready, I will give you the key" (g).

CHAPTER

XXVIII.

obedience to

And so also it has been held by the House of Lords, in a Defiant disScottish case, that when a judge, in the legitimate exercise of Judge. his jurisdiction, is defiantly disobeyed, he may commit the offender instantly to prison for contempt of court (h). And where a defendant on his trial for an assault, made use of violent expressions towards the prosecutor, the court ordered and adjudged him to find sureties for his good behaviour for two years, and to be imprisoned till such security given (i).

the Court

When the court itself takes notice of the contempt, the Proceedings by offending party will be ordered to personally attend the court and show cause why he should not be committed (k).

But when it appears that the party in contempt has been before a court of competent jurisdiction, which court has fined or committed him for a contempt, it is not competent to any other court to enter at all into the subject-matter (1).

The court is the judge as to whether or not it has been treated with contempt. And there is no appeal against the decision of the court adjudging an offender guilty of a contempt committed in the face of the court; unless the court. so adjudicating acted beyond its jurisdiction (m).

itself.

But it seems that where the jurisdiction of the court is Where the challenged, an appeal will lie; as in a case where a vacation Jurisdiction is

(e) The King v. Darison, 4 B. & Ald. 329, supra.

(f) Ibid.

(g) Ibid., p. 330.

(h) Watt v. Ligertwood and another, L. R. 2 Sc. Ap. (H. L.) 361.

(i) Rex v. Mahon, 4 A. & E. 576. (k) Martin's case, 2 Russ. & Myl. 674, n. (a); Re McGill, 2 Fow. Ex. Pr. 404; Lechmere Charlton's case, supra; In re The Sheriff of Surrey,

supra; Reg. v. Castro, Skipworth and
others, supra.

(1) Vide Carus Wilson's case, 7
Q. B. 1008; see also Er parte Fernan-
dez, supra, p. 400. O'Shea v. O'Shea
and another, In re Tuohy, 15 P. D. 59 ;
59 L. J. P. 47.

(m) Vide Ex parte Pater, 5 B. & S. 299; Reg. v. Jordan, 36 W. R. 797; S. C. Reg. v. C. C. Judge of Stafford, 57 L. J. Q. B. D. 483.

challenged.

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »