(in the presence of the electors) with evil principles, inclina- CHAPTER III. tions, and intentions (t). And so also for charging a candidate with blasphemy and atheism, although not in the presence of the plaintiff's electors, but at a public meeting of another constituency (u). ments of a practice." By a recent statute (the "Corrupt and Illegal Practices False statePrevention Act, 1895") (x)-any person who, or the directors Candidate of any body or association corporate which, before or during an "illegal any parliamentary election, shall for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at such election, make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of such candidate, shall be guilty of an illegal practice within the meaning of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883. But no person shall be deemed to be guilty of such illegal practice if he can show that he had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, the statement made by him to be true. a club. Words uttered which induced, or contributed to induce, a Of a candidate majority of the members of a London club not to alter certain for election to rules, whereby the plaintiff was prevented from again seeking to be elected a member of the club (he having been previously rejected on a ballot for his election), were held not actionable (y). But if false and malicious statements are uttered which actually prevent a candidate from being elected a member of a club, such statements would be actionable, unless spoken on a privileged occasion. for office. Where the plaintiff had been elected to the office of Town of a Town Councillor, and soon after the election, and before he had made Councillor; imputation of the statutory declaration under the Municipal Corporations unfitness Act, or entered upon the duties of his office, the defendants spoke and published of him words imputing habitual drunkenness and unfitness for the office of Town Councillor. At the trial no special damage was proved; but the jury were directed that the words were actionable notwithstanding; and the jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, with separate damages against each defendant, it was held, by the Court of Appeal, that the office of Town Councillor, not being an office of profit, and the imputation not being one of misconduct in office, but of unfitness for office, the action was not maintainable, as the 64. (f) Prinn v. Howe, 1 Bro. P. C. (u) Pankhurst v. Thompson, 3 Times L. R. 199. (x) 58 & 59 Vic. c. 40, ss. 1 & 2. CHAPTER III. misconduct charged was not such as would justify removal from or deprivation of office (z). Of an Alderman of a Borough: imputation of misconduct in office. Of Clergymen. But where in an action of slander of the plaintiff, an alderman of a borough and chairman of the improvement committee of that borough, imputing dishonesty or malversation in office as such chairman, in negotiating the purchase, by the corporation, of land in which he was interested, at an exorbitant and unfair price; it was held, that the action would lie without proof of special damage, and whether or not there was a power of removal from the office for misconduct of the kind (a). The action extends to words spoken of clergymen and other ecclesiastical persons (b). But words spoken of a clergyman, as such, are not actionable, unless he holds some benefice or preferment, of which he might be deprived if the words were true. The reason usually given for supporting the action in such a case is, that the imputation would be a cause of deprivation (c). And accordingly it has been held, that no action. will lie for a verbal imputation of incontinency in a clergyman, unless he is beneficed, or holds some clerical office or employment of temporal profit (d). But if a clergyman of the Church of England be in the actual receipt of any professional temporal emolument, as preacher, under-lecturer, or even as an occasional reader, and the charge, if true, would be ground of degradation from holy orders or deprivation of office, the imputation would, it seems, in principle, be actionable. Where it was alleged that the plaintiff was chaplain to a peer, and that the defendant falsely said of him, that he had a bastard, whereby he lost the chaplainship; the action was held maintainable, on the express ground that the chaplainship was a temporal preferment (e). So, to say of a minister in office that he is an adulterer and has had two children by the wife of another man, is actionable (ƒ). And so also to charge a beneficed clergyman with immorality and misappropriation of the sacrament money (g). Slanderous words reflecting upon the plaintiff, a clergyman, in his office, by an imputation that he fraudulently obtained (5) Alexander v. Jenkins and another (1892), 1 Q. B. 797; 61 L. J. 634. (a) Booth v. Arnold (1895), 1 Q. B. (b) 3 Lev. 17; 1 Rol. Ab 58. (d) Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Ex. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78. (e) 1 Lev. 248. (f) Parrat v. Carpenter, 2 Cro. Eliz. 502. (g) Highmore v. Earl and Countess of Harrington, 3 C. B. N. S. 142. a bill of exchange from the defendant while stupefied with CHAPTER III. drugged wine, were also held actionable, on motion in arrest of judgment (h). tional But, to say of a Congregational minister, with reference to Of a Congregahis former occupations, that he is a rogue, and has been guilty Minister. of fraud and cheating; and that the defendant would so expose him that he should "not be able to hold up his head in the pulpit at T. nor in any other: " was held, in the absence of proof of special damage, to be no slander of the plaintiff in his office as such minister (i). and others. The action extends to words affecting a person in any Artist, particular art or lawful employment, by which he gains his Schoolmaster, livelihood; as of an artist, sculptor, architect, engineer, schoolmaster, schoolmistress, governess, &c., &c. or Tradesman. Butcher. Words tending to injure a merchant or tradesman in his of a Merchant business as such are actionable; whether they reflect upon the honesty of his dealings, his credit, or the commodity in which he deals. To say of a corn-factor, "You are a rogue Corn-factor. and a swindling rascal, you delivered me 100 bushels of oats, worse by sixpence a bushel than I bargained for," is actionable without proof of special damage (k). And so also, an of selling by action lies for words imputing to a tradesman that he uses or false weights. sells by false weights (1), or false measures (m); for such words obviously touch him in his trade (n). But, where the plaintiff, of fraud on a a butcher, having sold the defendant some meat; defendant afterwards called at the plaintiff's shop, and in the presence of several customers said, "I intended to have dealt with you, but shall not do so, for you changed the lamb that I bought of you for a coarse piece of mutton;" it was held, that the communication, if made bona fide, was privileged (o). And where a medical officer to a public school, in words spoken to the steward (whose duty it was to examine the meat supplied to the school) imputed that the plaintiff, a butcher, who of selling bad supplied the school with meat, sold bad meat: it was ruled, meat. in the absence of malice, a privileged communication (p). But where the plaintiff, an auctioneer and appraiser, had been of an Aucemployed by the defendant to value certain goods; the words complained of were, "He is a damned rascal, he has cheated (h) Pemberton v. Colls, 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403. (i) Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 273; 19 L. J. C. P. 94. (k) Thomas v. Jackson, 3 Bing. 104. (1) Stober v. Green, 1 Brownlow & F.S. Goldsb. 5. (m) Bray v. Ham, Ibid. p. 4. D tioneer. CHAPTER III. Stock-broker. me out of £100 on the valuation; " the words were held a slander of the plaintiff in his business (q). To say of a stock-broker, "he is a lame duck,'" is actionStock-jobber. able (r). But a stock-jobber, or outside dealer in the public funds, is not, it appears, considered as a known trader and possessing a character as such (8). Contractor. To impute to a contractor that he has used "the old materials" about certain work, is slanderous, if pointed by innuendo to the effect that, the plaintiff had been guilty of dishonesty in his trade in using old materials, when his contract Lessee of Tolls. was for new (t). But words spoken of a contractor or lessee of tolls (after he has ceased to be such), with reference to his conduct whilst such contractor or lessee, are not actionable as words spoken in the way of trade or business (u). Of a Gamekeeper. A mere casual employment not sufficient action. To say of a gamekeeper, in a fox-hunting district (who had been engaged on the terms and understanding that he was not to kill foxes), that he had "trapped three foxes in Riddler's wood," is actionable, as an imputation of a breach of duty in his employment as such gamekeeper (x). The humility of the employment or occupation is no objection to the action either in law or reason (y). It does not to sustain the appear to be necessary that the party should gain his living in the character to which the slander is applied; it is sufficient if he habitually act in that character, and derive emolument from it. The rule, however, does not seem to extend to representations, which affect nothing more than casual instances, in which the plaintiff has assumed such a character. As to the requisite degree of certainty and precision of the words. III. As to the degree of certainty and precision requisite to make the words actionable. The only question arising upon this is-Do the words in any degree prejudice the plaintiff in his office, profession, or employment? If they do, they are actionable; the quantum of damages being a mere question of fact for the consideration of the jury. Words that are not actionable in themselves, are not actionable when spoken of any one in office, profession, or trade, unless they touch him in such office (z). Words to be actionable (1) Bryantv. Loxton, 11 Moore, 344. (r) Morris v. Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284. ($) Ibid. (t) Babonneau v. Farrell, 15 C. B. 360; 24 L. J. C. P. 9. (u) Bellamy v. Burch, 16 M. & W. 590. (x) Foulger v. Newcomb, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169. (y) Vide Seaman v. Bigg, Cro. Car. 480; Perry v. Hooper, 1 Lev. 115. (*) Com. Dig. Ac. for Defam. D. 27; Doyley v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 835. as spoken of a man in his office, must be spoken of him in CHAPTER III. reference to his character or conduct in such office, and must impute to him the want of some qualification for, or misconduct in, his office (a). To impute want of integrity to any person who holds an Words imoffice of trust or profit is actionable: as to say of a judge, that puting want of integrity. "his sentence was corruptly given" (b). Or of a justice of the peace, "I have often been with him for justice, but could never get anything at his hands but injustice" (c). Or, Or, "He covereth and hideth felonies, and is not worthy to be a justice. of the peace" (d). trust and Where a person holds an office or situation, in which great Persons in trust and confidence are of necessity reposed in him, words offices of great which impeach his integrity generally, though they contain no confidence : express reference to his office, are actionable; since they must necessarily attach to him in his particular character, and virtually represent him as unfit to hold that office or situation (e). So, where the defendant said to the plaintiff, who was one of the attorneys or clerks of the Queen's Bench, and sworn to deal duly without corruption in his office, "You are well known to be a corrupt man, and to deal corruptly." Upon giving judgment for the plaintiff, it was said, quod sermo, relatus ad personam, intelligi debet de conditione persona (f). Solicitors. An attorney brought an action for the words, "I have taken Attorneys and out a judge's warrant to tax Phillips's (the plaintiff's) bill, I'll bring him to book, and shall have him struck off the roll." Lord Kenyon, C.J., ruled, at nisi prius, that the words were not actionable; and added,-had the words been, "He deserves to be struck off the roll," they would have been actionable (g). With respect to this distinction, it may be proper to suggest a doubt, whether the words in the case cited would not in common acceptation convey to the hearer the same meaning as the words which the learned judge is reported to have deemed to be actionable, since they seem as clearly to evince the opinion of the speaker, that the plaintiff deserved to be struck off the roll. Where the defendant said of an attorney, "he has defrauded his creditors, and has been horsewhipped off the race-course at (a) Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. 301. (b) Cro. Eliz. 305, (c) Cro. Car. 14. (d) 4 Rep. 16. (e) Howe v. Prinn, Holt, 652; 2 Mod. 159; Sir J. Harper v. Beau mond, Cro. Jac. 56; 4 Rep. 16; Cro. (f) 4 Rep. 16; Cro. Jac. 586. |