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CHAPTER XI. to be printed and published there might be a libel in every line (8).

Placard libellous of an Overseer.

Publication by means of parish

And where the defendant published a placard, stating of the plaintiff, who was an overseer of the poor, that "when out of office he had advocated low rates, and when in office had advocated high rates, and that he (the defendant) would not trust him with £5 of his property": it was held actionable per se, without any innuendo (t).

Where the libel complained of was in the form of a notice, crier, of libel published and publicly cried and read in the parish, of which of an overseer. the plaintiff was overseer; charging him with oppressive conduct towards paupers, in compelling them to receive payment of their weekly parish allowance in orders for flour on a particular tradesman; it was held to be a libel, notwithstanding that the writer was mistaken in supposing that the alleged misconduct was an offence within the meaning of the statute law (u).

Unnecessary publication in

Newspaper of affairs defa-,

matory of individuals.

Incorporated

Company,

libel.

Where a shareholder of a railway company having summoned a meeting of shareholders, invited others, and especially the reporters for the public press, to attend; and at such meeting made defamatory comments on the conduct of the plaintiff (one of the directors), relating to the affairs of the company: it was ruled by Cockburn, L.C.J., that although a discussion of the matter before a meeting of shareholders would have been excused, there was no excuse for a publication to others than shareholders (x).

An incorporated company is liable to an action for a libel liability of for contained in a writing the publication of which is authorised. by the company, and which is in furtherance of the objects and business for which the company was incorporated. For if a corporation for its own benefit publishes that which is false and calculated to injure anyone, it is right that it should be held responsible (y).

Imputation of embezzlement by Clerk to Guardians,

made at Board Meeting.

At a meeting of a board of guardians, at which newspaper reporters were present, the defendant, a member of the board, in the course of a discussion about the plaintiff, who had

(*) Brown v. Croome, 2 Stark. R. 297; Lay v. Lawson, 4 A. & E. 795; Finden v. Westlake, 1 Moo. & Mal. 461.

(t) Cheese v. Scales, 10 M. & W.

488.

(u) Woodward v. Dowsing, 2 Man. & Ry. 74.

(1) Parsons v. Surgey, 4 F. & F. 247; and see Duncombe v. Daniell, supra, p. 145; Simpson and another v. Downs, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 391 ; Jackson v. Mayne, 19 L. T. (N. S.) 399.

(y) Nevill v. Fine Arts, &c., Insur ance Co., Ltd. (1895), 2 Q. B. 160, per Pollock, B.

recently resigned the office of clerk to the board, made certain CHAPTER XI defamatory statements imputing that the plaintiff had, during his clerkship, been guilty of embezzlement of public money. At the trial of an action for the slander, the jury found that "the words were spoken honestly in discharge of a public duty, without malice but carelessly," and they gave a verdict. for the plaintiff with 40s. damages. It was held that the occasion on which the words were spoken was privileged, and that the presence of the reporters at the board meeting did not, under the circumstances, deprive the defendant's statement of the privilege afforded to it by the occasion (z).

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by hearsay.

THE doctrine of justification, on the ground that the defen- CHAPTER XII dant has done no more than repeat the scandal which he has Earlier docheard from another, was formally permitted; but it rested on trine as to principles so dubious and has been so limited in its modern justification application, that it is clear that such a justification will not now be allowed to prevail as a defence, without reference to other circumstances, and the actual intention of the publisher.

the libel of

gave up

And accordingly it has been held, after much argument, and Plea that on examination of all the authorities, that in an action for Defendant had libel, it is not sufficient to plead that the defendant received another and the libellous statement from another, and that upon publica- author's name. tion he disclosed the author's name (a). He must also show that he repeated it on a justifiable occasion, and believed it to be true (b).

() Pittard v. Oliver, (1891) 1 Q. B. 474; 60 L. J. 219; and see Lawless v. The Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., Ltd., 10 B. & S. 226 ; L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129.

(a) De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5

Bing. 392.

(b) McPherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 270; Tidman v. Ainslie, 10 Ex. 63; and see Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 426 Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C.

247.

CHAPTER XII.

Existence of slanderous rumour, no

justification

for repetition.

When the originator of the rumour is

not liable for repetitions by

third parties.

These authorities have been confirmed in subsequent cases, and it may now be considered as well established, that the existence of a slanderous rumour does not justify the repetition of it, unless it can be shown that such repetition was made on a justifiable occasion, or that the rumour was true. It is no justification to show that the rumour did exist, and that the defendant merely repeated it as a rumour (c).

Where in an action for words spoken of the plaintiffs in their business as bankers, it appeared that A. B. met the defendant and said, "I hear that you say that the plaintiff's bank at M. has stopped. Is it true?" The defendant answered, "Yes, it is. I was told so. It was so reported at C., and nobody would take their bills, and I came to town in consequence of it myself." It was proved at the trial that C. D. told the defendant that there was a run upon the plaintiff's bank at M. It was held to be a question for the jury whether the defendant understood A. B. as asking for information, and whether he had uttered the words merely by way of honest advice to A. B. to regulate his conduct: and if they were of that opinion, then secondly, whether in so doing he was guilty of any malice in fact (d).

A person who receives information which, if true, is injurious. to the character of another, is not justified in publishing that information to the prejudice of him to whom it relates, merely Decause he believes it to be true (e).

If the words spoken do not contain the charge of any definite crime or misdemeanour, and are not alleged to be spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his trade or business, so as to impute dishonesty to him in such trade, the words are not actionable per se, without special damage; and such special damage must be the direct consequence of defendant's speaking the words; for if he have merely spoken them to A., who afterwards repeats them to B., and the damage ensue through B.'s repeating them (as the words of the defendant) to another person, the damage is too remote, and the defendant will not be liable for the consequences of B.'s repetition of the slander (ƒ).

And where the defendant imputed adultery to the plaintiff's

(c) Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125.

(d) Bromage and another v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247.

(e) Botterill v. Whytehead, 41 L. T. 590, per Kelly, L.C.B.

(f) Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796. But see per Kelly, L.C.B., Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91 ; 45 L. J. 283; and per Bramwell, L.J., Bree v. Marescaux, 7 Q. B. D. 434 ; 50 I.. J. 677

wife, and she voluntarily repeated the slander to her husband, CHAPTER XII. in consequence of which he refused to cohabit with her; it was held, that an action for slander could not be maintained against the defendant (g). And where the defendant, in the presence of the plaintiff's mother, imputed unchastity to the plaintiff, the mother repeated the imputation to the plaintiff, who repeated it to the man to whom she was engaged to be married, and he thereupon broke off the engagement: there being no evidence that the defendant authorised or intended that the imputation should be communicated to the plaintiff's suitor; and such repetition not being the natural consequence of the defendant's utterance; it was held, that an action of slander could not be sustained (h).

slandered.

Where a person having heard a slanderous rumour of Exceptions to the rule; bonâ another, bona fide informs the other of the rumour, not with fide repetition the object of disseminating the slander, but with the honest to person motive of enabling the other to clear his character, or to take measures for redressing the grievance, the communication is privileged (i).

the slander is

liable and not the repeater.

And where an actual duty or moral obligation is cast upon When the the person to whom the slander is uttered, to communicate originator of what he has heard to some third person, as when a communication is made to a husband, such as, if true, would render the person who is the subject of it unfit to associate with his wife and daughters, the slanderer cannot excuse himself by saying, "True, I told the husband, but I never intended that he should carry the matter to his wife" in such a case the communication is an exception to the rule above referred to; and the originator of the slander, and not the bearer or repeater of it, is responsible for the consequences (k). So also, where the plaintiff was a governess, and whilst absent from her employment on a visit to her father, the defendant told her father that she had had a child by her master: her father then went to her master, repeated the charge, and asked if it was true: he replied that it was entirely untrue; and afterwards declined to receive the plaintiff into his service again. After verdict for the plaintiff, with damages, it was urged on motion to set aside the verdict, &c., that the repetition of the charge by the father to the plaintiff's employer had been the cause of the

(g) Parkins et ux. v. Scott et ux., H. & C. 153.

(h) Speight v. Gosnay, 60 L. J. Q. B.

1

(i) Daries v. Snead, infra, p. 200.
(k) Derry v. Handley, 16 L. T.
(N. S.) Q. B. 263.

CHAPTER XII. dismissal, and not the original communication of it by the defendant to the plaintiff's father, and that therefore the defendant was not liable, the special damage alleged being neither the legal nor the natural consequence of the words spoken. But the court held, that the repetition of the words by the plaintiff's father to her employer was the natural consequence of the speaking by the defendant, which was very different to the case of an idle repetition by an indifferent person; and notwithstanding that the plaintiff's employer knew the charge to be untrue, he was justified under the circumstances in afterwards refusing to keep the plaintiff in his service and upon the authority of the case Knight v. Gibbs (l), the court held that the dismissal was the legitimate and natural consequence of the imputation by the defendant; and the verdict was upheld (m).

Repetition of slanderous

rumour to one

of a charge

When a slanderous statement affecting two persons, jointly, is made to one of them only, under circumstances which, as to of two persons, such one, render the statement a privileged communication; affecting both. the statement is also privileged as to the other; who cannot maintain an action for the slander against such utterer (n). And where a person is so situated that it becomes right, in the interests of society, that he should inform another of a slanderous rumour respecting him and a third person; then if he do so bona fide and without malice, though in the absence of such third person, it is a privileged communication; and neither the person so informed, nor the absentee, can sustain an action against such informer (0).

Showing

anonymous letter.

Reproduction of privileged

statement.

And it has been held, that a man may be justified in showing to a bona fide inquirer as to the character of another, an anonymous letter he had received a year previously, containing matter highly defamatory of the party who was the subject of the inquiry (p).

The mere fact that defamatory statements were made in a place and on an occasion that gives them the protection of privilege, does not carry the privilege on to a person who repeats or reproduces them in print, by reference or

Supra, p. 180.

(m) Gillett v. Bullivant, 7 L. T. (0. S.) 490, per Lord Denman, C.J., and Williams. J.; and see Pope v. Coates, 16 Ir. C. L. R. 156, 165.

(n) Daries v. Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 608; 23 L. T. (N. S.) 126 and 609; 39

L. J. Q. B. 202.

(0) Ibid.; and see Waller v. Loch, 7 Q. B. D. 619; 51 L. J. 274; Clark v. Molyneux, supra, p. 181.

(p) Robshaw v. Smith, 38 L. T. (N. S.) 423, per Grove and Lindley, JJ.

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