CHAPTER II. opinion. The name of it is Ward v. Reynolds, Pasch. 12 Ann. B. R., and it is as follows:-The defendant said to the plaintiff, I know you very well! How did your husband die ? ' The plaintiff answered, 'As you may, if it please God!' The defendant replied, 'No; he died of a wound you gave him!' On not guilty, there was a verdict for the plaintiff; and on a motion in arrest of judgment, the court held that the words were actionable, because, from the whole frame of them, they were spoken by way of imputation; and Parker, C.J., said, 'It is very odd, that after a verdict, a court of justice should be trying whether there may not be a possible case in which words spoken by way of scandal might not be innocently said; whereas, if that were in truth the case, the defendant might have demurred, or the verdict would have been otherwise.' So here, if shown to be innocently spoken, the jury might have found a verdict for the defendant; but they have put a contrary construction upon the words as laid, and have found that the defendant meant a charge of murder." This ruling was adopted in a subsequent case, where it was held, that, to impute that a person murdered his wife by administering improper medicines to her is actionable, and any doubtful interpretation of the words is cured by the verdict of the jury (a). Modern rules of construction, as to words of doubtful meaning. Where the words impute, that a reputed married woman is the wife of another man, it is for the jury to say whether the defendant does not mean by such imputation that she has committed the crime of bigamy (b). In an action for words, whether written or spoken, the ordinary sense of those words will be understood to be the meaning of the utterer, unless they are explained to import something different to their obvious meaning, by previous occurrences, conversations, or other matters having been introduced (c). The question is not what the party using them considered their meaning by any secret reservation in his own mind, but what he meant to have understood as their meaning by the party to whom he uttered them (d). In The King v. Watson and others, Buller, J., observed "Upon occasions of this sort, I have never adopted any other rule than that frequently stated by Lord Mansfield to juries, desiring them to read the (a) Ford v. Primrose, 5 Dowl. & Ry. 287. (b) Heming and wife v. Power, 10 M. & W. 564; and see. Delany v. Jones, 4 Esp. 191. (c) Daines and another v. Hartley, 3 Ex. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81. (d) Per Denman, L.C.J., in Read v. Ambridge, 6 C. & P. 308. paper stated to be a libel, as men of common understanding, and say, whether, in their minds, it conveys the sense imputed "(e). In Roberts v. Camden (f), which was an action for words alleged by the plaintiff to contain an imputation of perjury; after verdict for the plaintiff, on a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the words did not impute the crime with sufficient certainty, Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in delivering judgment, observed, "The question simply isWhether the words amount to such a charge? that is, whether they are calculated to convey to the mind of an ordinary hearer an imputation on the plaintiff of the crime of perjury. The rule which at one time prevailed, that the words are to be understood in mitiori sensu, has been long ago superseded; and words are now construed by Courts, as they always ought to have been, in the plain and popular sense in which the rest of the world naturally understand them." CHAPTER II. of crime is If a man, in jest, conveys an imputation of a crime against Where an another, he does so at his peril. It is no defence that he imputation spoke the words jocularly. The defendant said of the plaintiff, said to have been spoken “he was detected in taking dead bodies out of the church-yard. in jest. He was in confinement and fined £20 for stealing and sending dead bodies to England:" the judge directed the jury that if they believed the words to have been spoken jocularly they should find for the defendant: aliter if spoken maliciously. Held, a wrong direction. The charge being ambiguous, it was a question for the jury whether the words, as used, did not convey to the minds of the hearers an imputation on the plaintiff of the crime of body-snatching (g). questions for the Judge, and what for the Jury. And in subsequent cases it has been held, that words uttered What are must be construed in the sense which hearers of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them, even though particular individuals better informed on the matter alluded to, might form a different judgment on the subject. And it is for the Court to construe the sense of all ordinary English words but where the words used do not necessarily imply the commission of any indictable offence punishable by law; or where they are of a cant or slang character, it is a question of fact for the jury whether or not they have acquired by use a meaning which imputes an indictable offence (h). And if () 2 T. R. 206. (1) 9 East, 96. (g) Donoghue v. Hayes, Hayes Ir. Ex. R. 265. (h) Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M. & W. 445; Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 412. F.S. CHAPTER II. the words complained of have two meanings, one imputing suspicion, and the other actual guilt, the question in which sense the words were used is for the jury; but a witness to whom the words were addressed cannot be asked in what sense he understood them (i). Result of authorities as to the construction of words of double import. As to the From these cases, containing the opinions of some of the most enlightened judges of their own or any times, it may be collected-1st. That where words are capable of two constructions, in what sense they were meant is a matter of fact to be decided by the jury. 2ndly. That the jury are to be guided in forming their opinion by the impression which the words or signs used were calculated to make on the minds of those who heard them, as collected from the whole of the circumstances. 3rdly. That such words will, after a verdict for the plaintiff, be considered by the Courts to have been used in an actionable sense. The charge, to be actionable, must in general, as already degree of cer stated, impute to the plaintiff an act of a criminal or indictable tainty requisite to render the nature. charge actionable. Meaning of defendant a question for the jury. It must therefore appear, I. That some act was imputed by the defendant. II. That such act is of a criminal or indictable nature, and III. That it was meant to be imputed to the plaintiff. I. That some act was imputed by the defendant.—Where the terms of the communication are indirect, it may be laid down as a general rule that, wherever words are used, calculated to impress upon the minds of the hearers a suspicion of the plaintiff's having committed an indictable offence, such an inference may and ought to be drawn, whatever form of expression may have been adopted. It seems to be properly a question for the jury, whether the defendant, though he used words of suspicion only, did not mean, in effect, to impute the substantive offence to the plaintiff. In the case of Tempest v. Chambers (k), it appeared that the defendant, having obtained a warrant for the apprehension of the plaintiff (which had been improperly issued upon an information before the magistrate of facts which amounted to no more that a mere trespass), on meeting Salmon, an agent of the plaintiff's, said, "I have got a warrant for Tempest, I will advertise a reward of twenty guineas to apprehend him; I shall transport him for felony." Lord (i) Simmons v. Mitchell, 6 App. Cas. 156; 50 L. J. P. C. C. 11. (k) 1 Starkie's C. 67. Ellenborough, C.J., left it to the jury to say whether the CHAPTER II. defendant was speaking with reference to the warrant which had been improperly issued, or whether he meant substantively to impute a charge of felony. absolute one of mere A distinction is to be taken between an imputation which Distinction. conveys an absolute charge of Felony, and one which implies a between an mere suspicion of Felony. The defendant said "I have a charge of suspicion that you and B. have robbed my house; and there- felony, and fore I take you into custody;" it was held, that the plaintiff suspicion. was not entitled to a verdict unless the jury found that the words spoken imputed a direct charge of Felony, as distinguished from a mere suspicion (l). Where the words complained of were-"Have you not heard that Charles Simmons is suspected of having murdered one V., his brother-in-law? A proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of the murderer is now in my office, and there is only one link wanting to complete the case." At the trial the learned judge having offered the plaintiff a nonsuit, which was declined, directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the words were not actionable, being words of suspicion only. It was held, that taken in their natural sense, and without a forced or strained construction, the words meant that there was a case of strong suspicion against the plaintiff, but of suspicion only; and that, therefore, the court could not say that the learned judge was wrong in withdrawing the case from the jury (m). Where a verdict and damages had been recovered in an action of slander for the words following-"I will take him to Bow Street upon a charge of Forgery" (innuendo that the plaintiff had been and was guilty of Forgery). Upon error assigned, that the words did not import any express or precise imputation of the plaintiff having committed forgery, but merely a suspicion, the judgment was reversed. But the case was not argued, as no one appeared for the plaintiff (n). From words of interrogation (o). As where the defendant Words of said, "When wilt thou bring home the nine sheep thou stolest interrogation, from J. N.? (p) So an action lies for saying, "Did you hear imputation of (1) Tozer v. Mashford, 6 Ex. 539; 20 L. J. Ex. 225. (m) Simmons v. Mitchell, 6 App. Cas. 156; 50 L. J. P. C. C. 11. (n) Harrison v. King, 4 Price, 46. general, see Mo. 418, pl. 573; 2 Rol. (p) Hunt v. Thimblethorpe, Mo. conveying crime. CHAPTER II. that J. S. is guilty of treason?" (q) A. the wife of B. was asked by C., "Wherefore will your husband hang J. S.?" She answered, "For breaking our house in the night, and stealing our goods." The words were held to be actionable, for though they were spoken in answer to a question, they amount to a charge of stealing goods (1). Alternative words. Inferential words, generally. Charge of crime conveyed by words of repugnancy. The defendant said, "She had a child, and either she or somebody else made away with it!" And three Judges, against the opinion of Bridgman, C.J., adjudged, that the words were not actionable (s). But in a subsequent case this decision was overruled (t). And next, the imputation of an act may be inferred from any statement, which virtually includes or assumes the commission. of the principal act, or a strong suspicion of it. As where the defendant said, "He is under a charge of prosecution for perjury; G. W. had the Attorney-General's instructions to prosecute." It was held that the words were actionable, as being calculated to convey the imputation of perjury (u). And so also where the defendant said of the plaintiff, "His character is infamous: he would be disgraceful to any society. Whoever proposed him must have intended it as an insult; I will pursue him and hunt him from all society. If his name is enrolled in the Royal Academy, I will cause it to be erased, and will not leave a stone unturned to publish his shame and infamy. Delicacy forbids me from bringing a direct charge; but it was a male child of nine years old who complained to me" (x). So where the defendant said, "I dealt not so unkindly with you, when you stole my sack of corn" (y). Where the act charged is, in legal strictness, impossible. Where a criminal charge is conveyed by the defendant's expressions, the liability to make reparation cannot be affected by any impropriety in the terms of the communication, whether legal or grammatical; for the loss of character, and its probable consequences, constitute the ground of action, without reference to the means employed. The contrary doctrine, indeed, at one time prevailed; for it appears to have been held, that if a married woman say, "You have stolen my goods," the words, (q) Earl of Northampton's case, 12 Rep. 134. (r) Hayward v. Naylor, 1 Rol. Abr. 50; and see Simmons v. Mitchell, supra. (8) Cart, 55, 56; and see Stirley v. Hill, Cro. Car. 283. (t) Harrison v. Thornborough, 10 Mod. 196. (u) Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93. (x) Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East. 463. (y) Cooper v. Hawkswell, 2 Mod. 58. |