CHAPTER XI. thereof in their monthly circular: which was exhibited in the rooms allotted to their staff throughout their system in an action of libel against the Company for damages for such publication; it was held, that the occasion of the publication was privileged (d). Defamatory statements made at the the invitation, Where the publication of the defamatory matter was procured by the contrivance of the plaintiff, with a view to the foundarequest, or by tion of an action against the defendant; the communication of the plaintiff, may be privileged on the ground that the plaintiff himself was the voluntary author of the mischief complained of (e). And so where a plaintiff, knowing the character which his master will give, procures it to be given for the sake of founding an action upon it, he will not be allowed to recover (1). Official of two companies. Inquiry by person in treaty for purchase of House. Reply to inquiry as to solvency. And where the defendant was a director of two companies, and the plaintiff held office under both, the plaintiff was dismissed from one office for gross misconduct: the defendant afterwards communicated the fact of such dismissal to his codirectors of the other company; and in reply to inquiries stated, that one of the causes of his dismissal was obtaining money by false pretences; it was held a privileged communication, and that in the absence of direct proof of malice, the case should not have been submitted to the jury (g). As to communications in reply to inquiries other than those as to the characters of servants, the cases are numerous, and present a variety of circumstances; but the principles governing such communications are the same. So it has been ruled that the owner of a public-house could not maintain an action against a neighbouring publican, for giving a bad character of such house to a person who, being in treaty for purchasing it, applied to the defendant for information; provided there was some evidence, though slight, of the truth of the assertion (h). Where in reply to an inquiry by the plaintiff as to the solvency of a tradesman, the defendant makes defamatory observations, to the effect that the tradesman is not to be trusted if such observations are made bona fide and without malice, they are not actionable (i). : (d) Hunt v. G. N. Ry., 60 L. J. Q. B. 499; (1891), 2 Q. B. 189. (e) Weatherston v. Hawkins, 1 T. R. 110; Smith v. Wood, Camp. 323; Warr v. Jolly, 6 C. & P. 497. (ƒ) Per Lord Alvanley, C.J., 3 B. & P. 592; King v. Waring, 5 Esp. 14. (g) Harris v. Thompson, 13 C. B. 333. (h) Humber v. Ainge, per Abbott, L.C.J., West. 13 Feb. 1819. (i) King v. Watts, 8 C. & P. 615, per Lord Abinger, C.B. to fitness of office of a Where it was alleged that the plaintiff had been engaged as CHAPTER XI. probationary minister at a certain church or chapel, in order Reply to that if approved he should be appointed permanent minister; inquiries as and the defendant in a discourse with one G. B., imputed person seeking drunkenness to the plaintiff; whereby the congregation refused to appoint him permanent minister. It was ruled, that the occasion was privileged, unless the words were not spoken bona fide, and unless the defendant was actuated by malice, and the latter issue was for the plaintiff to establish (j). minister. matory Report Words spoken by a subscriber to a charity in answer to Communications in reply inquiries by another subscriber, respecting the conduct of a to inquiries medical man in his attendance upon the objects of the charity, by subscribers to Charity are not merely, on account of those circumstances, a privileged Societies. communication (k). But where the defendant, the secretary Charity to a charity organisation society, having for one of its objects Society, defathe repression of mendicity, instituted, at the request of the issued to inquirers, by society, inquiries as to the bona fides of certain statements Secretary. contained in letters written by the plaintiff to the subscribers, and others, soliciting pecuniary and charitable relief: the result of such inquiries were embodied by the defendant in a report containing defamatory imputations upon the plaintiff, to the effect that she was a confirmed begging-letter writer, that her letters contained misrepresentations, exaggerations, and untruths; and stating, that the society did not recommend assistance to be given to her. In an action by the plaintiff for libel in publishing the report; it appeared that the report was issued to anyone who applied for it or who professed to be interested in the matter: and it was held, that the inquiries and the result thereof having been bonâ fide made and embodied in a report by the defendant and published to inquirers in the discharge of his duty as secretary to the society, and without malice, were privileged (1). inquirer. A person who is the author of a slander aggravates the Re-assertion wrong by every reassertion or repetition of it. Where there- or repetition of slander, fore a slanderous report originates with the defendant, and in reply to thereby produces an inquiry by or on behalf of the person slandered, the repetition of the report, on such inquiry, is not privileged (m). But where the plaintiff invited the alleged slander of himself by questions to the defendant, the com (j) Worr v. Jolly, 6 C. & P. 497, per Alderson, B. (k) Martin v. Strong, 5 A. & E. 535. (1) Waller v. Loch, 7 Q. B. D. 619 ; 51 L. J. 274. (m) Smith v. Matthews, 1 Moo. & Rob. 152. previous state CHAPTER XI. munication in reply was ruled to be privileged (n). If the Acknowledgdefendant merely acknowledge a previous statement made by ment of him, such acknowledgment alone will not sustain an action; ment imputing though it may be used as evidence of such former statefelony. ment (o). But where A. having accused B. of stealing meat from his shop; a friend of B.'s to whom B. had mentioned the charge, called at A.'s shop, and inquired if he had accused B. of stealing a piece of meat; to which A. replied, "Yes, and I believe it to be true." It was held not a privileged communication (p). Inquiries made of plaintiff himself. Where the libel complained of arose out of a certain correat instigation spondence that was entered upon at the instigation of the plaintiff himself, with a view to the investigation of the truth of certain imputations that had been made upon him, it was held to be a privileged communication (7). Subsequent statements in relation to confidential inquiry. Defamatory charge made under mistake, in reply to inquiries. When a confidential relation is established between two persons, with regard to an inquiry of a private nature, whatever takes place between them, relevant to the same subject, though at a time and place different from those at which the confidential relation began, may be entitled to protection as well as what passed at the original interview; and it is a question for the jury whether any further conversation on the same subject, though apparently casual and voluntary, did not take place under the influence of the confidential relation already established between them; and therefore entitled to the same protection (r). Where the defendant was surveyor to the owner of an estate, to which estate he also acted as steward. The owner having directed him to make inquiries as to the alleged existence of a house of ill-fame on the estate; the defendant, in the course of his inquiries, was referred to the house of the plaintiff as the house in question; but, doubting the accuracy of his information, made further inquiries, and in so doing repeated the previous information he had received as to the plaintiff's house. The defendant subsequently ascertained that a (n) Palmer v. Hummerston, 1 Cab. (0) Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297. (4) Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; (r) Beatson v. Skene. 5 H. & N. 838 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 430. And see Daris v. Reeves, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 79, where it was held that a person's general attorney, though not then employed in any legal proceedings for him, is one from whom a party is entitled to expect all information material to his interest; and a communication by him, to such client, though defamatory of third parties, is a privileged communication, if made bona fide. mistake had been made with reference to the plaintiff's CHAPTER XI. house it was held that in the absence of any evidence of express malice the occasion was privileged (s). communica Although a letter containing defamatory matter be marked Confidential private and confidential," it may nevertheless be libellous. tions. Where a letter is written upon information given "confidentially"; if it contains matter defamatory of a third person, the fact that it is marked "confidential" will be no protection to the writer. communication Where W. went to inquire of defendant for the plaintiff's Question for jury as to address; the plaintiff having previously been tenant to the bona fides defendant. In the course of the inquiry, defendant spoke of confidential disparagingly of the plaintiff, when W. told him he did not or inquiry. come to inquire into his character, as he had done business with him before, but merely came to ask where he had removed to: the defendant however notwithstanding the observation of W., continued to speak disparagingly of the plaintiff, and imputed in certain words that he was a swindler, adding at the same time that he spoke in confidence. In consequence of the communication, W. declined to trust the plaintiff with goods and it was held to be no misdirection to have left it to the jury to say whether or not they believed it was a bonâ fide confidential communication made by the defendant for the purpose of putting people on their guard against the plaintiff (t). tion as to And where the plaintiff, a trustee of a charity, asked his Communicaemployer, C., to obtain signatures to a protest against his fitness of being turned out of the trusteeship. C. applied to the defen- person for trusteeship: dant for his signature, which the defendant refused; and on being pressed to give his reasons said, that he would never sign to keep a big rogue like the plaintiff in the trust; and explained as the reason for his opinion, that the plaintiff had left the parish under discreditable circumstances and without settling with his creditors, of whom the defendant was one ; and added, that he was surprised that C. kept such a man on with his son. In consequence of these statements, C. dismissed the plaintiff from his employment as a farm bailiff; which was the special damage alleged. The jury found that the defendant acted without malice; and it was held, that assuming the words to have been bonâ fide spoken, with reference to the propriety of taking steps to retain the plaintiff in the trusteeship, as they were pertinent to the question whether he was fit to be trusted or not, they were to be regarded as (8) Brett v. Watson, 20 W. R. 723. (t) Picton v. Jackman, 4 C. & P. 257. as to fitness for office of arbitrator. CHAPTER XI. privileged by the occasion (u). And where the plaintiff had been proposed as arbitrator in a matter between the defendant and another person, the defendant refused to submit the matter to the plaintiff; and being afterwards applied to for payment of part of the remuneration for the attendance of the plaintiff as arbitrator, wrote a letter in reply, in which he repudiated the demand, and stated as his reason for not submitting the matter to the plaintiff as arbitrator that he, the defendant, had discharged the plaintiff from his employment for intemperance. It was held, that in the absence of malice the communication was privileged (x). Voluntary communica tions in discharge of social and Class 2.—And secondly, as to Voluntary Communications, or such as are made without any inquiry, but in the discharge of some duty (public or private) which the ordinary exigencies other duties. of society, the interest of the party making the communication, or the interest of the party to whom it is made, or even that of another, called upon him to perform. Rule of law as to. The rule of law as to cases falling under this head, is thus stated in a leading case on the subject:-"In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publications malicious, unless fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. In such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the law draws from unauthorised communications, and affords a conditional defence depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits" (y). And so also, according to another well recognised legal canon-a communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty; although it contain defamatory matter, which without that (u) Cowles v. Potts, 34 L. J. Q. B. 247. (x) Hobbs v. Bryers, Ir. L. R. 2 Ex. D. 496. (y) Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C. M. & R. 193. |