perfectly aware, that it is wholly impossible to meet the arguments in favor of the doctrine of Christian Perfection as actually presented by its advocates, and that there is but one form of evasion to which they can resort with even a show of argument on their part. Hence with one mind they have agreed in evading the real question at issue, and evading it in precisely the same manner. If our readers, or even our op ponents themselves can furnish us with any other solution of this question, we shall rejoice to present it to the public through our columns.

ARTICLE LII.

An Examination,

By PROF. C. G. FINNEY,

Of the Review of Finney's Systematic Theology published in the Biblical Repertory, Princeton, N. J., June, 1847.

THIS Review is so very miscellaneous in its character that to reply to it, in extenso, were but little less than to re-write the volume reviewed. Every one familiar with the work criticised by the reviewer, will perceive upon an attentive perusal that the reviewer had not made himself well acquainted with the work in question, and that, almost without an exception, a complete answer to his objections might be quoted verbatim from the work itself. I have read and re-read his review, and every time with increasing wonder that the reviewer could pass over, so apparently without reading or consideration, the full and complete answer to nearly all his objections which is found in the book he was reviewing.

This consideration has led me seriously to question the propriety of replying at all to his remarks, since to do so in the best manner, would be little more than to quote page af ter page from the work reviewed.

There is nothing new or unexpected in the review except it be some of his admissions, and it is upon the whole just what might be expected from that School, and probably the best that can come from that quarter.

Were it allowable I should publish the above named article entire. But since this is not the case, I must content myself with making such quotations as will fairly exhibit the writer's views of the work in question, and with a brief reply to his strictures.

The great object of the reviewer seems to have been to fasten upon New School men what he esteems to be the errors of Oberlin and to sustain the peculiarities of Old Schoolism. Hence I am not flattered by his so fully endorsing and eulogizing my logic, because it was essential to his purpose to

show that my conclusions follow by a rigorous logic from what he supposes to be the two fundamental errors of New Schoolism.

He however admits the great and even fundamental importance of the principles and conclusions of the work if they are true.

He assumes, as we shall see, the Old School dogma of original sin or constitutional moral depravity, and the head and front of the offending of my work is that it denies and disproves that doctrine with its consequences.

The reviewer refuses to argue the questions at issue but says, "We promised not to discuss Mr. Finney's principles. We propose to rely upon the reductio ad absurdum and make his doctrines the refutation of his principles."

In several instances he misapprehends my meaning and of course misrepresents me. This he also does by quoting and applying passages out of their proper connection. But I do not complain of intentional misrepresentation. I can easily perceive, that with his views, those misapprehensions and consequent misrepresentations of my views are natural.

His admissions have greatly narrowed the field of debate. I am happy that this is so; for I hate the spirit and dread even the form of controversy. In the compass of a reply to his review I can not follow the reviewer through the whole train of his miscellaneous remarks, nor is it proper that I should. Our readers would not thereby be edified. I care not for masteries. If I know my heart I am willing and anxious to have the errors of the work under consideration detected and exposed, if errors there be in it. As the interests of truth are concerned only with the discussion and settlement of the main positions of the work and their legitimate consequences I shall content myself with the examination of these, only prefacing the discussion with a few words of explanation.

EXPLANATIONS.

The reviewer complains that I do not in my work name the understanding as distinct from the reason, though he affirms that I proceed under the direction of it in my investigations. To this I would only reply that I designed in my work to enter as little into Psychology as was consistent with rendering myself intelligible to common readers. In speaking of the intellect, it was not important and therefore not intended by me so much as to name all its departments or functions. I propo

sed to proceed in my investigations so much under the guidance of scripture and the reason or intuitive faculty that I considered it foreign to my purpose to name and define all the functions and departments of the intellect. I therefore said nothing of the understanding as distinct from the reason. Nor did I name the judgment, the memory, the imagination &c. It did not occur to me that a philosopher could fail to see why I named and defined only the reason, conscience, and self-consciousness. Of these I should have frequent occasion to speak in a manner that might require explanation. To avoid prolixity and embarrassing the common reader I avoided entering into a fuller account of the intellect.

Philosophers who understand the distinction between the reason and the understanding, can judge as well as we whether his criticism upon this subject is of any value. It were not difficult to point out some remarkable inconsistencies in this part of the review; but I forbear, as it is not important to the trial of the issues between us.

The reviewer strangely misapprehends my reasons for so often closing up my argument under the different heads by an appeal to scripture. From this fact he strangely infers that I undervalue the testimony of the Bible. One might have expected that a student and a philosopher would better appreciate the design of presenting evidence and argument in that order. I did not wish to present my weakest argument or my least conclusive evidence last, but first. I therefore appealed, as I proceeded, and as was natural, and as I thought philosophical, first to natural and lastly to revealed theology; inquiring first, what light we can get from reason, and then bringing in the sure testimony of the Bible to confirm and put beyond debate the positions I aimed to establish. It did not once occur to me that any reasoner could fail to see the propriety of this course. I must confess myself a little surprised that so sensible a man as this reveiwer should have inferred from such a fact that I undervalued the testimony of the blessed Bible.

I have read his review carefully and prayerfully several times, with an eye upon the questions, wherein do we agree? and wherein do we differ? For edification's sake I waive the notice of several points in which he has done me at least unintentional injustice, and confine my reply to the statement of the points wherein we agree and the discussion of the points wherein we differ. But before I proceed to this task I inust not fail to notice some striking peculiarities of this review.

The reviewer has taken a most extraordinary course. He sat down to review a book of which he says,

"The work is therefore in a high degree logical. It is as hard to read as Euclid. Nothing can be omitted; nothing passed over slightly. The unhappy reader once committed to a perusal is obliged to go on, sentence by sentence, through the long concatenation. There is not one resting place: not one lapse into amplification, or declamation, from the beginning to the close. It is like one of those spiral staircases, which lead to the top of some high tower, without a landing from the base to the summit; which if a man has once ascended, he resolves never to do the like again. The author begins with certain postulates, or what he calls first truths of reason, and these he traces out with singular clearness and strength to their legitimate conclusions. We do not see that there is a break or a defective link in the whole chain. If you grant his principles, you have already granted his conclusions,"

The same in substance he repeats elsewhere. Now what course does this reviewer take in the review before us? Does he take issue upon the premises from which he admits that the conclusions irresistably follow? Does he meet argument with argument? Does he attempt by argument to show that either the premises or the conclusions of the book before him are unsound? O, no indeed. This were a painful and hopeless task. He therefore assumes the correctness of the peculiarities of what is called Old Schoolism; to wit, constitutional sinfulness, physical divine influence, physical regeneration, natural inability; that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of moral obligation; that moral obligation does not imply ability; that moral obligation extends beyond the sphere of moral agency to the substance of the soul and body, and that therefore these can be and are sinful in every faculty and part; that the involuntary states of the intellect and the sensibility are virtuous in a higher degree than benevolence or good will to being is-I say he assumes the correctness of these and sundry other similar dogmas; and finding that the conclusions in the work before him conflict with these, he most conveniently appeals to the prejudices of all who sympathize with him in those views, and without one sentence of argument, condemns the work because of its conclusions. He says, p. 257,

"We promised, however, not to discuss Mr. Finney's principles. We propose to rely on the reductio ad absurdum and make his doctrines the refutation of his principles."

Again he says, p. 263,

"We consider this a fair refutation. If the principle that obligation is limited by ability, leads to the conclusion that moral character is confined to intention, and that again to the conclusion that when the intention is right, nothing can be morally wrong, then the principle is false. Even if we could not detect its fallacy, we should know it could not be true."