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THE STATE V. UTTERSON.

Criminal Case: NO ERROR FOUND.

Appeal from Polk District Court,-HON. JOSIAH GIVEN, Judge.

BECK, J.-The defendant was indicted and convicted of nuisance by unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, and now appeals to this court. The cause has been presented to us without appearance of counsel for either party, and no arguments or briefs have been filed. We have examined the case and find no errors in the record. judgment of the district court is

The

AFFIRMED.

THE STATE V. KEUHNER et al.

Criminal Case: NO ERROR FOUND.

Appeal from Polk District Court-HON JOSIAH GIVEN, Judge.

ROBINSON, J.-The appellants were convicted of the crime of nuisance committed by violating the law in regard to the sale of intoxicating liquors. The cause was submitted in this court, on a transcript of but a part of the record, without argument and without appearance for either party. We have carefully examined the transcript submitted, but do not find any error affecting the substantial rights of the appellants.

THE STATE V. ROBINSON.

AFFIRMED.

Criminal Case: NO ERROR FOUND.

Appeal from Council Bluffs Superior Court.

No appearance for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Attorney General, for the State.

ROTHROCK, J.-This cause was submitted to us upon a paper purporting to be a transcript from the superior court of Council Bluffs, from which transcript it appears that the defendant was convicted of the charge of unlawfully catching fish with a net or seine in the waters of this state. The evidence upon which the conviction was had is not set forth in the transcript and, so far as it appears therefrom, the defendant was rightfully adjudged guilty of the offense charged.

AFFIRMED.

THE STATE V. MCTIGH.

Criminal Case: NO ERROR FOUND.

Appeal from Polk District Court.-HON. JOSIAH GIVEN, Judge.

THE defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of keeping and maintaining a liquor nuisance. He appeals.

No appearance for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Attorney General, for the State.

ROTHROCK, J.-The appeal is presented upon a transcript without abstract or argument. The transcript contains the indictment, instructions to the jury, the motion for new trial and the judgment. We discover no error in the record.

AFFIRMED.

MCPHERRIN V. RUSSELL et al.

Contract: INTERPRETATION: EVIDENCE.

Appeal from Page District Court.—HON. H. E. DEEMER, Judge.

ACTION to dissolve a partnership between plaintiff and defendant Russell for the purchase and sale of lands in Kansas and to specifically enforce the conveyance of lands and transfer of contracts which he is required in equity to do. The relief prayed for in the petition was granted by the final decree of the district court. Defendants appeal.

James McCabe, J. E. Hill and Smith McPherson, for appellant.

W. W. Morsman, for appellee.

BECK, J.-I. The plaintiff and defendant Russell, entered into an arrangement for the purchase of school lands situated in Kansas, which, or their proceeds, were to be divided between them. The conditions of the contract and other matters connected with the transaction are not in dispute between the parties, except that defendant claims that the contract and arrangement was confined exclusively to school lands in Thomas county, to be bought by the parties, while plaintiff claims that the purchase of lands should be made anywhere in northwestern Kansas. The parties by agreement fixed the conditions of a decree dividing the lands in case plaintiff is successful in the action.

II. The sole question for our determination is one of fact, involving the locality of the land intended to be covered by the contract between the parties, which was entered into through correspondence. The defendant wrote to plaintiff soliciting the loan of money which he desired to invest in school lands in Kansas. Plaintiff afterwards wrote to defendant proposing to furnish the money to be invested on the joint

account of the parties. No counties were named in which the lands are situated which were to be bought. Plaintiff's proposition was accepted by letter or telegram, and the money was sent by him to defendant. The counsel of the defendant argue that the letters embodying the contract are to be so interpreted that they prescribe for the purchase of land in Thomas county, while plaintiff's counsel insist that under a proper interpretation the letters are to be understood as referring to school lands in northwestern Kansas.

The fact is that the letters fail to specify in what locality the lands to be bought shall be situated. In the correspondence between the parties quite a number of counties are mentioned as having school lands. It is probable that plaintiff most frequently mentions Thomas county. But it cannot be claimed that, by the language of the letters, the lands to be bought are restricted to any county. And we think that there is nothing appearing in the letters or in other evidence before us requiring such an interpretation to be put upon the contract. The evidence of the parties as to facts intended to bear upon the question of interpretation is conflicting. As the letters do not fix the locality of the lands to be purchased, the burden rests upon defendant to show that, in accord with his claim, they were to be selected in Thomas county. Unless it be so shown the contract will be held to apply to lands without regard to the county in which they are located.

We find that the contract between the parties does not prescribe that the lands to be bought by defendant shall be in Thomas county, and that an interpretation to that effect cannot be put upon the letters passing between the parties. We cannot be expected to recite the evidence and enter upon a discussion thereof, in order to support this conclusion. It would occupy time and space in the reports, without profit to the parties or profession. No other questions demand consideration. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

BRANHARD V. SCOTT et al.

Partnership: ACCOUNTING.

Appeal from Ringgold District Court.-HON. J. W. HARVEY, Judge. FILED, JANUARY 25, 1889.

Askren & Spence, for appellants.

Laughlin & Campbell, for appellees.

GRANGER, J.-This is a proceeding in equity for the settlement of partnership accounts between the plaintiff and the defendant Scott. The firm was organized in 1883, the business first being the sale of merchandise, which was afterwards changed by a transfer of the stock to the operations of a mill and elevator, principally.

The abstract is voluminous, and the case involves mainly questions of fact. The court below, with much painstaking, accompanies his

76 774 102 135

conclusion with an elaborate finding of facts and an itemized accounting. This finding of facts and statement of account has been of material aid to this court in reaching a conclusion. To undertake to give the reasons for our conclusions upon the numerous items, with even a synopsis of the testimony, would occupy more space than the importance of the case as a precedent would justify. It is understood that the quoting of testimony in equity causes and comments thereon by the court serves no useful purpose, The record in this case has been carefully examined. It would not be expected that in a case involving such a conflict of testimony on so many different points, any two persons making separate investiga tions would reach the same result precisely.

It is proper to say that no member of this court, in his examination, has reached a result more favorable to the appellant than the court below.

We do not think, from the testimony, that the appellee, during the partnership business, had such a control and management of the business as to impose on him the burden of accounting for funds as claimed by appellant.

While our computations and findings do not in all respects agree with those below, nor with the final result as announced, it is not more favorable to the appellants. The appellees say they do not appeal, and are satisfied with the judgment and decree as it now stands, and hence we do not disturb it. The judgment below is

AFFIRMED.

GOODNOW V. WELLS et al.

Taxes: ERRONEOUS PAYMENT ON ANOTHER'S LAND: RECOVERY BY
PAYER FROM OWNER: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Appeal from Webster District Court.

ACTION in equity to recover taxes paid under the same circumstances substantially stated in Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa, 555. There was judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appeals.

Theo. Hawley, for appellant.

Geo. Crane, for appellee,

PER CURIAM.-The facts in this case are the same as in Goodnow v. Stryker, 61 Iowa, 261, and following that case the judgment of the district court must be affirmed.

There are members of the court who think the cited case was incorrectly decided, but, under the well-settled rule of stare decises, they think we must adhere thereto, especially so because of the many peculiar facts and many cases which have been determined by this court based on the subject-matter upon which this action is grounded AFFIRMED.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

OF HOMESTEAD. See Judgments, 5.

ABSTRACT OF RECORD.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, passim.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

See SWAMP LANDS, 3.

ADMINISTRATORS.

DISCHARGE: SUBSEQUENT ACTION AGAINST. Where, after the discharge
of administrators, they are made defendants in an action involving
the title to the decedent's real estate, no judgment can be entered
against them. Richardson v. Haney, 101.

1.

2.

3.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

See REAL ESTATE, 1, 4; TRUSTS, 6.

AGENCY.

The

OF INSURANCE COMPANY: AUTHORITY LIMITED BY CONTRACT.
defendant company employed an agent, designated as general dis-
trict agent for a certain specified territory, and he was empowered
to solicit and forward applications for insurance, and for his servi-
ces in that business he was to receive a designated compensation.
Held that he was not authorized to bind the company for the price
of furniture purchased by him for the furnishing of an office for
the transaction of his business. Beebe v. Equitable Mut. Life &
End. Ass'n, 129.

: ACTS IN EXCESS OF AUTHORITY: ESTOPPEL.

In such case

the company was not estopped from denying the agent's authority
on the ground that he held himself out as a general agent of the
company; because there was no evidence that the company knew,
before the agent purchased the goods, that he was assuming to
transact any business in its name not authorized by his contract of
employment. Id.

:

: RATIFICATION. In such case, the fact that the com-
pany advanced to the agent money to pay certain debts incurred,
including this one, without knowing that he had assumed to
bind it by the purch ase, was not a recognition of his authority
to make the purchase in its name, nor a ratification of his act.
Id.

See CONVERSION, 1; EVIDENCE, 10; INSURANCE, 1, 7, 10; MORTGAGES,

6; NEGLIGENCE, 1.

(775)

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