[427] machinery for elevating the stack for the pur-*** of elevating the stack of trays from a *** "The two machines, as will be manifested by the Grier patent in opening the stack at Now, here is undoubtedly a contrivance and device by which the novel and useful invention, first patented in the Reynolds patent, The specification of the plaintiff's patent The defendant introduced in evidence thres [428] [429] No. 108289, October 11, 1870, for an "improve- | H. C. SPEIDEL ET AL., Exrs. etc., of ELIAS [377] ment in fruit driers;" and one to Joel Orlando Button, No. 155286, September 22, 1874, for an "improvement in fruit driers." Their introduction was objected to by the plaintiff, because they were not set up in the answer. But they were receivable in evidence to show the state of the art, and to aid in the construction of the plaintiff's claim, though not to invalidate that claim on the ground of want of novelty, when properly construed. Vance v. Campbell, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 427, 430 [17:168, 172]; Railroad Co. v. Dubois, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 47, 65 [20: 265, 269]; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 41 [23: 200, 2011; Eachus v. Broomall, 115 U. S. 429, 484 [29:419, 421]. The Snyder patent and the Okey and Lehr patent show, each of them, in a fruit drier, a series of trays, arranged one above another so that the frames of the trays form the wall of the drier. The Button patent shows a fruit drier, within which is a movable frame, which carries racks that rest upon each other. The racks are inserted through a door immediately above the frame, one by one, and each one is separately elevated on the frame by cam levers till it is held by spring catches, which move back while a rack is being elevated, and as soon as it passes spring out and support it, while the frame is being lowered for another rack. Each rack goes up with the frame, and, having been inserted at the extreme bottom, it carries up the racks above it, when it reaches them, and so on until they can be successively taken out at the top. The frames of the trays, which thus rest on each other, constitute, in a measure and to a degree, the walls of a chamber in which the drying takes place. [430]. Movable trays, the outer walls of which constituted the drying chambers, being old, and apparatus having existed before to raise a tray or rack, and a column of racks above it and insert a fresh one at the bottom, and the two having been used in connection, the fourth claim of the plaintiff's patent must be limited to the mechanism described and shown. The circuit court made no reference to the Button patent. The plaintiff's patent describes and claims a suspending device, operating substantially as described.' The defendant has no such suspending device. The plaintiff has a crane, with suspended ropes, and his lowermost tray, while being raised, necessarily carries on it the weight of all the trays and fruit above it. In the defendant's apparatus each tray can be lifted independently of the others, and each tray is supported independently, so that the weight of the series of trays, and of the fruit on them, need not rest entirely on the lowermost tray. This result being different from that in the plaintiff's device, the mechanism is different and is not an equivalent of that of the plaintiff, any more than the plaintiff's is the equivalent of Button's. The fourth claim of the patent, if valid, cannot be construed so as to cover the defendant's apparatus. The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that Court, with a direction to dismiss the bill of complaint, with costs. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. SPEIDEL, Deceased, Appts., v. JACOB HENRICI ET AL., Trustees of HARMONY SOCIETY OF BEAVER COUNTY, PENN SYLVANIA. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 877-890.) Trusts—limitation of actions-bill by former member of Harmony Society-limitation of ac tion in equity. 1. Length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established, and express trusts are not within the Statute of Limitations; but time begins to run against a trust as soon as it is openly disavowed by the trustee, insisting upon an adverse right and interest which is clearly and unequivocally made known to the cestui que trust. less there has been a fraudulent concealment of 2. In case of an implied or constructive trust, unthe cause of action, lapse of time is as complete a bar in equity as at law. party has slept on his rights, and acquiesced for a 3. A court of equity will refuse relief where a great length of time. Society, an unincorporated association of indi4. A bill filed by a former member of the Harmony viduals living together as a community, claiming a share in its property, is held to be too late, more than fifty years having elapsed since the complainant ceased to be a member of the Society. [No. 92.] Argued Dec. 14, 1886. Decided Mar. 7, 1887. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Reported below, 15 Fed. Rep. 753. Affirmed. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Wm. Reinecke, George Hoadly, Edgar M. Johnson, Edward Colston, George Hoadly, Jr., for appellants: The Harmony Society is not a charity. It is an association for mutual assistance and support, physical, moral, and spiritual. Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362 (25: 813); Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574; Anon. 3 Atk. 277; Carne v. Long, 2 De Gex. F. & J.75; Re Clark's Trusts, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 497; Re Dutton, L. R. 4 Exch. Div. 54. The definition of a charity, given by Mr. Justice Gray, in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 556, has been generally accepted in this country. It is as follows: "A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature." As between trustee and cestui que trust, there is no such thing as an illegal trust. At least the fiduciary cannot set up illegality as against the beneficiary. Walden v. Bodley, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 156 (10: 398); Benjamin v. Gill, 45 Ga. 110; Wheeler v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 281; Great Eastern R. R. Co. v. Turner, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 149. [385] Whether, therefore, the trust in this case was a share in property in the hands of the Trustees. run. Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 157 (29: 339); Messrs. George Shiras, Jr., and O. 8. Both in England and the state and federal Maxwell v. Kennedy, 49 U. S. 8 How. 210 (12: 1051); Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201 (25: 431); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135 (25:807); Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391 (27: 219). This is not by any means the first or only case brought by recreant members against this venerable Society. In 1832, one Schreiber, who had left the Society, brought an action for an account in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County. That court refused to sustain the action, and its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Gibson. Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts, 362. In 1853 a bill was filed against the Trustees of the Harmony Society by Joshua Nachtrieb, who claimed to have been unjustly and violently excluded from the Society, and asked for an account. This bill was sustained by the Circuit Court of the United States, but its decree was reversed by this court. Baker v. Nachtrieb, 60 U. S. 19 How. 126 (15: 528). As a general rule, doubtless, length of time [386] is no bar to a trust clearly established, and express trusts are not within the Statute of Limitations, because the possession of the trustee is presumed to be the possession of his cestui que trust. Prevost v. Gratz, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 481, 497 [5: 311, 315]; Lewis v. Hawkins, 90 U. S. 23 Wall. 119, 126 [23: 113, 114]; R. R. Co. v. Du rant, 95 U. S. 576 [24: 391]. But this rule is in accordance with the reason on which it is founded, and, as has been clearly pointed out by Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Story, subject to this qualification: that time begins to run against a trust as soon as it is openly disavowed by the trustee, insisting upon an adverse right and interest which is clearly and unequivocally made known to the cestui que trust; as when, for instance such transactions take place between the trustee and the cestui que trust as would in case of tenants in common amount to an ouster of one of them by the other. Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 124; Robinson v. Hook, 4 Mason, 139, 152; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475, 486; Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U. S. 3 How. 333, 411 [11: 622, 657]; This qualification has been often recognized in the opinions of this court, and distinctly affirmed by its latest judgment upon the subject. Willison v. Watkins, 28 U. S. 3 Pet. 43, 52 [7: 596, 600]; Boone v. Chiles, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 177, 223 [9: 388, 404]; Seymour v. Freer, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 202, 218 [19:306, 311]; Bacon v. Rives, 106 U. S. 99, 107 [27: 69, 71]; Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151 [29:336]. In the case of an implied or constructive Chief Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: 5 388] adverse possessor. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 | selves and their families to do for the com- Independently of any statute of limitations, courts of equity uniformly decline to assist a person who has slept upon his rights and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them. "A court of equity," said Lord Camden, "has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the party slept upon his rights, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced; and therefore, from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in this court.' Smith v. Clay, 8 Bro. Ch. 640, note. This doctrine has been repeatedly recognized and acted on here. Piatt v. Vattier, 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 405 [9: 173]; McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U. S. 1 How. 161 [11: 86]; Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U. S. 1 How. 189 [11: 97]; Wagner v. Baird, 48 U. S. 7 How. 234 [12: 6811; Badger v. Badger, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 87 [17: 836]; Hume v. Beale, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 836 [21: 602]; Marsh v. Whitmore, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 178 [22: 482]; Sullivan v. Portland & K. R. R. Co. 94 U. S. 806 [24: 824]; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201 [25: 431]. In Hume v. Beale, the court, in dismissing, because of unexplained delay in suing, a bill by cestuis que trust against a trustee under a deed, observed that it was not important to determine whether he was the trustee of a mere dry, legal estate, or whether his duties and responsibilities extended further. 17 Wall. 348 [605]. See also Bright v. Legerton, 29 Beav. 60, and 2 De Gex, F. & J.606. When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer. Maxwell v. Kennedy, 49 U. S. 8 How. 210 [12: 1051]; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 567 [25:815]; Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391 [27:219]. The allegations of this bill, so far as they are material to the defense of laches, are in substance as follows: The Harmony Society is a voluntary association, formed in 1805 by the plaintiff's parents and other heads of families, who had emigrated from Germany under the leadership of one Rapp, and become subject to his control in both spiritual and temporal affairs. In that year Rapp, for the purpose of acquiring absolute dominion over their means and mode of living, falsely and fraudulently represented to them that they could not be saved from eternal damnation, except by renouncing the plan of a separate home for each family, yielding up all their possessions, as had been done by the early Christians, and laying them at the feet of Rapp as their apostle, to be put into a common fund of the Society, and thenceforth living as a community under his control, receiving in return only the necessaries of life; and they, induced by and relying on his false and fraudulent representations, immediately yielded up all their possessions to the common fund of the Society, and placed the fund in his keeping as their trustee, and thenceforth lived as a community or common household, submitted them avails thereof to form part of the common fund. and relinquished to him and his successors in the leadership of the community the management of the trust fund and the control of their own persons and those of their wives and children, and received only the necessaries of life in return. Rapp received and accepted the trust fund, and all the accretions to it by the work of the inhabitants of the community or otherwise, not as his own, but in trust for the members of those families and the contributors to the fund, and for their common benefit; and always, up to his death in 1847, recognized and acknowledged said trust, and disclaimed any greater interest in the fund than that of any other contributor, and any other right to its management and control than by virtue of his leadership of the community. In 1807 Rapp obliged his followers to abjure matrimony, and thenceforth did not permit them to marry in the community, and compelled anyone about to marry to leave it. The plaintiff was born in the community in 1807, and was reared in and as a part of it, under Rapp's teachings and control, and faithfully worked for it from the age of twelve to the age of twenty-four years, and allowed the avails of his work to become part of the common fund, and received in return nothing but the necessaries of life, which were of far less value than the avails of his work; and in 1831, being about to marry, had to leave and did leave the community. The trust fund so received and accepted by Rapp, with its profits, interest and accretions, now amounts to $8,000,000, and yields an annual income of $200,000, and is held by the defendants on the same trust on which Rapp held it in his lifetime; and neither Rapp nor the defendants ever rendered any account to the plaintiff or to the beneficiaries of the fund, although the plaintiff, before bringing this suit in May, 1882, demanded of the defendants an account and a settlement of his share. The trust on which Rapp, and the defendants as his successors, held the common fund of the Harmony Society, is described in one place in the bill as " for the members of said families and the contributors of said fund, and for their common benefit," that is to say, as is clearly explained by what goes before, in trust for their common benefit as a community, living together in the community, working for the community, subject to the regulations of the community, and supported by the community. This was the "said trust" which, as the bill afterwards alleges, Rapp, up to his death, and his successors, until the bringing of this suit, "always recognized and acknowledged." The constant avowal of the Trustees, that they held the trust fund upon such a trust, is wholly inconsistent with and adverse to the claim of the plaintiff that they held the fund in trust for the benefit of the same persons as individuals, though withdrawn from the community, living by themselves, and taking no part in its work. The plaintiff, upon his own showing, withdrew from the community in 1831, and never returned to it, and for more than fifty years took no step to demand an account of the Trustees, or to follow up the rights which be claimed in this bill. [389] If he ever had any rights, he could not assert erate the State. By the Act of February 20, 1865, it [390] them after such a delay; not on the ground of was provided that the Company might issue bonds to secure the means with which to pay its indebtan express and lawful trust, because the ex-edness to the State, the liens of which were to be press trust stated in the bill, and constantly released and passed over to the holders of the new avowed by the Trustees during this long period, bonds to be issued under the Act. The Company having notified the Governor of its desire to exerwas wholly inconsistent with any trust which cise the authority conferred by said Act, the Act of would sustain his claim; not on the ground March 26, 1881, was enacted, providing for the disthat the express trust stated in the bill was un- position of the money due the State when paid in. Subsequently, the Company paid to the State lawful and void, and therefore the Trustees held $3,090,000, being the principal and interest then due. the trust fund for the benefit of all the contrib- As the bonds issued by the State were not due and utors in proportion to the amounts of their could not be redeemed, the state officers claimed contributions, because that would be an im- that the Company was still liable for the amount required to meet the interest on said bonds. Upon plied or resulting trust, and barred by lapse of a bill filed to enjoin the enforcement of the liens time. In any aspect of the case, therefore, if of the State because of nonpayment of interest; and to secure from the Governor the assignment of it was not strictly within the Statute of Limita- said liens provided for by the Act of 1865, it is held tions, yet the plaintiff showed so little vigi- that, under the Act of 1865, if payment was made lance and so great laches that the circuit court in money, it should be of a sum, if any, in addition rightly held that he was not entitled to relief to the face of the bonds, which would enable the State to take up and cancel an equal amount of its in equity. other 6 per cent indebtedness then outstanding; and that the Act of 1881 was a direction to the state officers to accept the money when offered by the Company, and to use it as fast as needed in the payinent of the general indebtedness of the State; such payment, when made, to operate as a dis charge of the Company from all liability for the payment of either principal or interest of an equal amount of the bonds which had been issued for its benefit. 2. The Acts of 1865 and 1881 are not in conflict with the provisions of the Missouri Constitution which require the enforcement of the lien held by the State upon any railroad, and prohibit its release or alienation, or the release or extinguishment of any indebtedness to the State. The payment of the obligation in advance of its maturity, with a view to the use of the money so paid, in taking up other debts of the State at maturity, is the legal It is proper to add that this decision does not rest in any degree upon the judgments of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and of this court, in the cases cited at the bar, in favor of the Trustees of the Harmony Society in suits brought against them by other members, because each of those cases differed in its facts, and especially in showing that the Society had written articles of association, which are not disclosed by this bill. Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts, 351; Baker v. Nachtrieb, 60 U. S. 19 How. 126 [15: 528]. Decree affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. equivalent of a payment of the liability of the [390] ROSEWELL G. ROLSTON ET AL., Trustees, AND THE HANNIBAL AND ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appts., V. THOMAS T. CRITTENDEN, Governor; CRITTENDEN ET AL., Fund Commission ers of the STATE OF MISSOURI THOMAS T. CRITTENDEN, Governor; บ. Company in accordance with the original terms on which it was created. 3. What occurred between the Company and the officers of the State in connection with said payment by the Company is immaterial, as said officers could only do what was authorized by the statutes. 4. A suit against a state officer to compel him to do what a statute requires of him is not a suit against the State, within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. [Nos. 68, 213.] Argued Dec. 1, 2, 1886. Decided March 7, 1887. APPEALS from the Circuit Court of the States for the Western District of Missouri. Reversed in_part, affirmed in part. Reported below, as Ralston v. Crittenden, 10 Fed. Rep. 254; 3 McCrary, 332. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. John F. Dillon and Elihu Root, for plaintiffs. Messrs. D. A. DeArmond and John B. Henderson, for defendants. ROSEWELL G. ROLSTON ET AL., Trustees, Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin This was a suit in equity brought by Rose- property under prior statutory mortgages in favor of the State, on the ground that the liability for which the earlier liens were created had been satisfied, and that they, as Trustees, were entitled to an assignment of those liens. The material facts are these: 721 |