[210]

8. 15 [Bk. 27, L. ed. 635].
longer open in this court.
is jurisdictional.

The question is no | Laundry Cases, 113 U. S. 27, 703 (Bk. 28, L. ed.
The statutory rule 923, 1145); 118 U. S. 356 (Bk. 30, L. ed. 220).

The plaintiff in error was, in 1881, unquestionably, if a person at all, a person within the jurisdiction of the State of New York. It is a part of the agreed statement of facts that the

FIRE ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELplaintiff in error had, by direct authority from

PHIA, Piff. in Err.,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 110-129.)

the State, uniformly maintained its agency within the State from 1872 down to the present time. It transacted its business there under the authority, implied and express, of the State, and under the usual certificate of authority from the State granted in such cases upon compliance with the prescribed conditions. It contributed yearly its quota, by taxation, to the rev

Jurisdiction-writ of error to state court-opin-enues of the State, and was in all respects, and

ion of state court-constitutional law-taxa-
tion of foreign corporation by State-State may
exclude or impose conditions when corpora-
tion is within jurisdiction of State.

1. Upon a writ of error to review a judgment en-
tered in the Supreme Court of New York in accord-
ance with a decision of the Court of Appeals of
that State, this court can examine the opinion of
the Court of Appeals, a copy of which, duly authen-
2. It appearing from that opinion that the state
court decided against a claim set up by the plaintiff
in error under the Constitution of the United
States, and that such decision was necessary to the
decision of the case, this court has jurisdiction to

ticated, is transmitted here with the record.

review that decision.

to every intent and purpose, within the jurisdiction of the State of New York. Thus it had, as a Corporation, a legal and actual existence within the State by virtue of the legislative authority of New York, and not by virtue of its Pennsylvania charter. While it is true that a corporation cannot migrate, that is, change its legal residence or citizenship, it is just as true that, in all other respects, in the transaction of its business it can, through the medium of its agents, move about with perfect freedom and, with the consent of the sovereign power, go "within the jurisdiction" of any State. It is possible for a foreign corporation 3. The Statute of the State of New York, provid- to come "within the jurisdiction" of the State. ing that when the laws of other States imposed If this be so, certainly there can be no better or upon insurance companies incorporated under the laws of New York, as a condition to their doing busi- higher evidence of the fact that such a corporaness in such States, greater burdens than were im- tion is actually within the jurisdiction than the posed by the laws of New York upon similar com- certificate which it, or its agents, receives from panies of such other States doing business in New York, then the same burdens should be imposed the State, authorizing it to transact business upon the companies of such other States doing bus- therein, and at the same time subjecting it to iness in New York as were by the laws of such the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts States imposed upon New York companies, is not contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the of that locality. Indeed, such a certificate is, Constitution of the United States providing that no under the Statutes of New York, the only eviState shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-dence that a foreign corporation is legally within the State. Such a certificate the plaintiff in error has received from year to year since 1872.

tion the equal protection of the laws."

4. A foreign corporation is not within the jurisdiction of the State of New York until it has complied with the laws of that State as to payment of license fees, taxes and the deposit of securities, etc. A corporation having complied with the law and received a license for a year is within the State for that year; but it is within the power of the State to change the conditions of admission at any time as to the future, and if it makes such a change for the future the foreign corporation is not within the State after the expiration of the year for which it was licensed, until it has complied with such changed conditions.

[No. 15.]

Argued Oct. 26, 1886. Decided Nov. 15, 1886.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State
of New York. Affirmed.
The case is stated by the court.
Mr. Joseph H. Choate, for plaintiff in

error:

That a corporation like the plaintiff in error
is a "person" within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, seems no longer debatable
since the announcement made by the learned
chief justice, in the case of Santa Clara Co. v.
Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 118 U. S. 396 (Bk. 30,
L. ed. 119), that all the members of the court
were of the opinion that the corporations in that
case, being railroad companies, were properly
within the terms of that description.

See also San Mateo Case, 13 Fed. Rep. 722,
746-748, 758-762; Co. of Santa Clara Case, 18
Fed. Rep. 385, 397–404; Kentucky R. R. Tax
Cases, 115 U. S. 321 (Bk. 29, L. ed. 414); Chinese

See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How, 404 (59 U. S. bk. 15, L. ed. 451); Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369 (Bk. 24, L. ed. 853); R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 10-13 (Bk. 26, L. ed. 643-645); St. Clair v. Cox, 160, U. S. 850, 355 (Bk. 27, L. ed. 222, 224).

The question here presented is not as to the right of the State of New York to admit or exclude any or all foreign corporations, or even the particular Corporation here litigating. The State has not undertaken to exclude the plaintiff in error; it has admitted and recognized this Corporation as a part of its own business community, but now, after having got the Company within its territory and in its grasp, seeks to impose upon it an unequal tax, penalty, burden or condition, which is, as we claim, repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore a tax, penalty, burden or condition which is not within the power of the State to impose. It is on this point, we submit, that the learned judge who delivered the opinion in the court of appeals is clearly in error; that is, in contending that the plaintiff in error was not, at the time of the imposition of this unequal tax and burden, a person "within the jurisdiction of the State. He says that the Fourteenth Amendment "relates wholly to persons within the jurisdiction, already there

in fact and of right, and their treatment there- | privilege that they may be permitted to enjoy after; and not at all to the terms and conditions on which alone they can come in." People v. Fire A880, of Phila. 92 N. Y. 811, at p. 326.

on such terms as the legislative power may prescribe, and which may, in the discretion of the Legislature, be absolutely withheld.

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (38 U. S. bk. 10, L. ed. 274); Paul v. Va. 8 Wall. 168 (75 U. S. bk. 19, L. ed. 357); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass. 10 Wall. 566 (77 U. S. bk. 19, L. ed. 1029); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson,118 U.S. 727 (Bk. 28, L. ed. 1137).

But the plaintiff in error was already within the jurisdiction of the State of New York; already there in fact and of right, by permission of the State, from 1872 to 1881; and it is the "treatment thereafter" of which we complain. The State did not meet it at the threshold and Nor can the rule that it is within the scope of seek to exclude it, but admitted it on certain legislative power to impose a tax upon foreign conditions, the legality of which was not dis- corporations, as the price of the privilege of puted, and is not now; and afterwards, to wit, doing business within the State, be weakened after the passage by the State of Pennsylvania, by the attempted distinction between the cases in 1873, of its Act aimed at foreign corpora- of corporations desiring to enter a State to do tions, the State of New York sought to impose business and those already carrying on business upon the plaintiff in error, already there in fact therein at the time of the imposition of an inand of right, the unequal, and therefore unlaw-creased tax. No such distinction exists in the ful, burden which it did not impose upon any law. The power to impose a license tax exists, insurance companies within its limits from other States than Pennsylvania.

and has always existed, whether exercised or not. The State waived no right by the fact that the agents of the Corporation were not actually met on the border by an agent of the State with a schedule of conditions. When the Corporation crossed the boundary lines it

The plaintiff in error came into the State of New York in the year 1872, and complied with all the conditions then in force therein. Although the Law of 1865 was then upon the statute books, yet it did not really create or pro-was chargeable with knowledge of the existence vide for any tax or condition, as to this Pennsylvania Corporation, for the contingency, the happening of which alone gave life and force to that law, as against Pennsylvania corporations; namely, the passage of a law by the State of Pennsylvania imposing a tax upon foreign corporations greater than that imposed upon such companies by the laws of New York did not come to pass until 1873. On April 4, 1873, the State of Pennsylvania passed such an Act. On that day, therefore, and not before, the Act of 1865 sprang into existence as against the plaintiff in error. When it came into the State there was not, so far as it was concerned, any such condition or tax in existence. It had been "within" the jurisdiction of the State an entire year, 1872-1873, before this tax was imposed. Not only so, but if the Act of 1865 is unconstitutional and void, it never was a law of the State of New York, and under no circumstances was the plaintiff in error obliged to recognize it as such. "An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law."

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 876 (Bk. 25, L. ed. 719).

Mr. Denis O'Brien, Atty-Gen. of New York, for defendants in error:

of power and the possibility and probability of its future exercise. The State, as a State, could not take cognizance of the unimportant fact that the plaintiff in error had come within its jurisdiction to carry on the business of making insurances. To say that the State cannot now exercise its inherent and inalienable power, after the Corporation has set up its business, is tantamount to saying that by its coming into the State, the Corporation deprived the State of a portion of its sovereign powers. The State can not only prevent foreign corporations from coming into its jurisdiction, but it has also the power to drive them therefrom after they have come in and established a business therein. The Wisconsin cases, arising upon the statute requiring foreign corporations to stipulate not to transfer suits to the federal courts, are illustrative in the present case. The State Supreme Court held such stipulation binding and constitutional.

Morse v Home Ins. Co. 30 Wis. 496.

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the state court and denied the constitutionality of the Act and the binding force of the stipulation.

Supreme Court had awarded an injunction against the Secretary of State to prohibit such an act.

See 20 Wall. 445 (87 U. S. bk. 22, L. ed. 365). The tax imposed upon the plaintiff in error un- Thereupon a citizen of Wisconsin applied for der the Act of 1865 is in the nature of a license a mandamus against the Secretary of State, to fee. It is within the scope of the power of the compel him to annul the leave granted the Legislature of the State of New York to impose company to do business. A writ was awarded upon foreign corporations a tax as the price of by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the late the privilege of doing business within the State. Chief Justice Ryan, in a very able opinion, It is well settled that the State can prohibit a for- holding the stipulation valid and that manda eign corporation from coming within its jurisdic-mus must issue, even though the United States tion, or it may admit it on such terms as the Legislature shall see fit to impose; and a corporation availing itself of the privilege to do business here must comply with the conditions exacted. Corporations have no legal existence beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty by which they were created. They are, it is true, ordinarily permitted to make contracts and trans-220. act business in other sovereignties, but this provision is due entirely to the comity of States and not to any absolute right. It is a mere

State, ex rel. Drake, v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175. A mandamus compelling the license was denied.

State, ex rel. Continental Co. v. Doyle, 40 Wis.

The contention came again before the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal from a judgment of the United States Circuit

Court directing an injunction against the Sec- State, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
retary of State, to prevent him from revoking Amendment? Yet such is the relation which
the license. The supreme court reaffirmed the a corporation, through its agencies, assumes to
unconstitutionality of the act, on the ground the jurisdiction and laws of States other than
that the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United that in which it is organized, except that the
States could not be impaired even by stipula-privileges of a corporation are special and
tion, but that the State of Wisconsin might en- limited to the objects named in its charter,
force the penalty by exclusion, and reversed while the individual is the possessor, by in-
the judgment.
herent and inalienable rights, of the power
and privilege to do everything which lies within
the scope of his volition, subject only to the re-

Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535 (Bk. 24, L. ed 148).

And this court, in pronouncing that judg-straints of general and universal law. ment, said: "The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by a State is always revocable." The Act of 1865 and the tax imposed upon the plaintiff in error, thereunder, are not repugnant to the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The plaintiff in error is not to be regarded as a person within the jurisdiction of the State of New York, within the meaning of the Amendment. A corporation can have no legal existence out of the sovereignty by which it was created. It must dwell in the place of its creation and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.

Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court:

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, supra; Runyan v. Coster's Lessee, 14 Pet. 122 (39 U. S. bk. 10, L. ed. 382); Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 233 (61 U. S. bk. 15, L. ed. 898). They are the creatures of local law and have not even the right of recognition in other States, except through comity. They cannot make a valid contract outside the State of their origin without the sanction of the foreign State, expressed or implied. Cases cited last above.

Paul v. Va. supra, R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 11 (Bk. 26, L. ed. 643, 644)

Only within the State of their origin, and there only in a restricted sense, are they to be regarded as citizens; and that restricted sense does not include them within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution which declares that citizens of cach State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.

Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass. and Paul v. Va.

supra.

The franchise of a corporation cannot be taxed outside of the State which granted such franchise; nor can any State tax the property of a foreign corporation, except such portion thereof as is actually within its jurisdiction.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 430 (17 U. S. bk. 4, L. ed. 697); State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (82 U. S. bk. 21, L. ed. 179).

These cases cited, both in direct declaration and by clear implication, unmistakably establish the doctrine that in the estimation of the law a corporation cannot leave the State under whose laws it was organized. The business of the plaintiff in error carried on in the State of New York was done solely through insurance agents. Can it be said that a man who sends his money for investment to an agent in another State comes within the jurisdiction of that State, and by virtue of his investments there can claim to be a "person within the jurisdiction" of that

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Under the provisions of section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, the People of the State of New York and the Fire Association of Philadelphia, a Pennsylvania corporation, being parties to a [111] question in difference which might be the subject of an action, agreed upon a case containing a statement of the facts on which the controversy depended, and presented a written submission of it to the Supreme Court of New York, so that the controversy became an action. The material facts set forth in the case are these:

"The defendant, the Fire Association of Philadelphia, is a corporation created and organized in the year 1820, by and under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, for the transaction of the business of fire insurance, and having its principal place of business in the City of Philadelphia. In the year 1872 it established an agency in the State of New York, which it has ever since maintained. No question is here raised but that it has uniformly complied with all the requirements and conditions imposed by the laws of this State upon fire insurance companies from other States establishing and maintaining agencies in this State except the payment of the tax now in dispute, upon premiums received by it in 1881 upon risks located within the State of New York, and which is the subject of this controversy-and has received from year to year certificates of authority from the Superintendent of the Insurance Department of this State, as provided to be issued under the Act, chapter 466 of the Laws of 1853, and the subsequent Acts amendatory thereof.

The Act of the People of the State of New York, passed May 11, 1865, three fifths being present, being chapter 694 of the Laws of 1865, entitled 'An Act in Relation to the Deposits Required to Be Made, and the Taxes, Fines, Fees, and Other Charges Payable by Insurance Companies of Sister States,' as amended by the Act of 1875, chapter 60, provides as follows, viz.: Whenever the existing or future laws of any other State of the United States shall require of insurance companies, incorporated by or organized under the laws of this State, and having agencies in such other States, or of the agents thereof, any deposit of securities in such State for the protection of policy holders or otherwise, or any payment for taxes, fines, penalties, certificates of authority, license fees, or otherwise, greater than the amount required for such purposes from similar companies of 1112] other States by the then existing laws of this State, then, and in every such case, all com

113]

panies of such States establishing, or having to the plaintiffs for any amount, insisting, first,
heretofore established, an agency or agencies in that the said Act of 1865, as amended by the
the State shall be and are hereby required to Act of 1875, is unconstitutional and void, and
make the same deposit for a like purpose in the not a legitimate exercise of legislative power,
Insurance Department of the State, and to pay and making further claims as to the amount
the superintendent of said department for taxes, due from it if the Act in question is valid; that
fines, penalties, certificates of authority, license"The question submitted to the court for de-
fees, and otherwise, an amount equal to the cision upon the foregoing statement of facts is
amount of such charges and payments imposed whether the defendant is liable to pay to the
by the laws of such State upon the companies plaintiffs, or to the superintendent, the whole,
of this State and the agents thereof; and the or any, and if any what, part of the" $1,848.45;
Superintendent of the Insurance Department is and that judgment is to be entered according to
hereby authorized to remit any of the fees and its decision.
charges which he is required to collect by ex-
isting laws, except such as he is required to
collect under and by virtue of this Act; Pro-
vided, however, that no discrimination shall be
made in favor of one company over any other
from the same State.'

The agreed case having been heard by the supreme court in general term, as required by law, it rendered a judgment to the effect that the defendant was not liable to pay any part of such amount claimed by the superintendent. Two of the three judges holding the court concurred in that judgment. The third dissented. The opinions of the majority and minority accompany the record. The majority held that the Statutes of New York in question were void because in conflict with the Constitution of New York, and did not discuss any question arising under the Constitution of the United States. The dissenting judge differed with the majority as to the question adjudged by them, and further said: Nor can I agree with the claim that this statute is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

The State of Pennsylvania, by an Act passed April 4, 1873, and ever since in force, enacted as follows, viz.: 'Section 10. No person shall act as agent or solicitor in this State of any insurance company of another State, or foreign government, in any manner whatever relating to risks, until the provisions of this Act have been complied with on the part of the company or association, and there has been granted to said company or association, by the commissioner, a certificate of authority, showing that the company or association is authorized to transact business in this State, and it shall be the duty of every such company or association, The plaintiffs having appealed to the Court authorized to transact business in this State, to of Appeals of New York, that court reversed make report to the commissioner in the month the judgment of the supreme court, and renof January of each year, under oath of the pres- dered judgment for the plaintiffs for $1,848.45, ident or secretary thereof, showing the entire with interest and costs, and remitted the record amount of premiums of every character and to the supreme court, where a judgment to that description received by said company or asso-effect was entered, to review which the defendciation in this State, during the year or fraction of a year ending with the thirty-first day of December preceding, whether said preminms were received in money or in the form of notes, credits or any other substitute for money, and pay into the state treasury a tax of three per centum upon said premiums; and the commissioner shall not have power to grant a renewal of the certificate of said company or association until the tax aforesaid is paid into the state treasury.'

ant has brought a writ of error. The court of appeals, in its decision (92 N. Y. 311), after overruling the view taken by the majority of the judges of the supreme court as to the validity of the statute under the Constitution of New York, proceeds to consider its constitutionality under that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which commands that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' "It holds that that clause has no apIn the year 1881, the defendant, through its plication to the rights of the defendant, because authorized agents in the State of New York, being a foreign Corporation, it was not within received for insurance against loss or injury by the jurisdiction of New York, until it was adfire, upon property located within the State of mitted by the State, upon a compliance with New York, premiums to the aggregate amount the conditions of admission which the State of $196,170.22. The Superintendent of the In-imposed and had the right to impose. surance Department of New York claimed that the defendant ought to pay, as a tax, for the year 1881, $1,848.45 with proper interest, being the amount arrived at by deducting from $5,885.10 (which would be a tax of three per cent on $196,170.22.), the sum of $4,036.65, which the defendant as a Pennsylvania Corporation had paid as a tax on premiums, during 1881, under laws of New York in force in 1881, other than the Act of 1865, as amended by the Act of 1875. The case then states that "The controversy between the parties is as to whether the defendant is liable to pay any tax to the Superintendent of the Insurance Department of the State, upon the said premiums received by it in the year 1881, and if any what amount;" that "The defendant claims that it is not liable

[114]

[115]

The defendant claims here the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment; and a question has occurred as to whether the record presents that point for our review. There being no pleadings, the obvious place to look for the claim would be the agreed statement of facts. But all that is there said is that the defendant insists that the statute is "unconstitutional and void and [116] not a legitimate exercise of legislative power." The question was considered in both the supreme court and the court of appeals, as to the validity of the statute, under the Constitution of New York, as being a law made to depend for its operation on the legislation of a foreign State, and thus an illegitimate exercise of legislative power. This contention is fairly within the words of the agreed statement, and if it

[117]

depended wholly on that statement to de- without such license. A person having acted
termine whether the 'record raises a federal as such agent without a license, and been con-
question, some doubt might exist. But in view victed and fined under the statute, this court
of what was said in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 held that there had been no violation of that
Wall. 590,633 [87 U. 8. bk. 22, L. ed. 429, 443], clause of article 4, section 2, of the Constitu-
in Gross v. U. S. Mortgage Co. 108 U. S. 477 tion of the United States, which provides that
[Bk. 27, L. ed. 795], and in Adams Co.v. Bur. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
lington & Mo. R. R. Co. 112 U. S. 123 [Bk. 28, all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
L. ed. 678], we think that we are at liberty to several States;" nor any violation of the clause
look into the opinion of the court of appeals, in article 1, section 8, giving power to Congress
a copy of which, duly authenticated by the "To regulate commerce with foreign nations
proper officer, is transmitted to us with the and among the several States." The view an-
record, in compliance with our Eighth Rule, for nounced was that corporations are not citizens
the purpose of aiding in determining what was within the clause first cited, on the ground that
decided by that court. From that opinion it the privileges and immunities secured to the
appears that the court not only decided against citizens of each State in the several States
the defendant all the questions other than fed- are those which are common to the citizens of
eral which were raised, including two under of the latter States, under their Constitutions
the Constitution of New York, but also decided and laws, by virtue of their being citizens; and [118
against it the federal question referred to. If that, as a corporation created by a State is a
the court had decided in its favor any one of mere creation of local law, even the recognition
the other questions which went to the whole of its existence by other States, and the enforce-
cause of action, there would have been no ne- ment of its contracts made therein, depend
cessity for considering the federal question. purely on the comity of those States—a com-
But as it was, the decision of that question be-ity which is never extended where the ex-
came necessary to the disposition of the case,
and was fully considered, not sua sponte, but as
a point presented by the defendant.

The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, which went into effect in July, 1868, is that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The first question which arises is whether this Corporation was a person within the jurisdiction of the State of New York, with reference to the subject of controversy and within the meaning of the Amendment.

istence of the corporation or the exercise of its
powers is "prejudicial to their interests or re-
pugnant to their policy." And the court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Field, said: "Having
no absolute right of recognition in other States,
but depending for such recognition and the
enforcement of its contracts upon their assent,
it follows, as a matter of course, that such as-
sent may be granted upon such terms and con
ditions as those States may think proper to im-
pose. They may exclude the foreign corpora-
tion entirely, they may restrict its business to
particular localities, or they may exact such se-
curity for the performance of its contracts with
their citizens as in their judgment will best
promote the public interest. The whole matter
rests in their discretion." As to the power of
Congress to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral States, the court said that, while the power
conferred included commerce carried on by
corporations as well as that carried on by indi-
viduals, “issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce. This decision only
followed the principles laid down in the earlier
cases of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519,
588 [38 U. S. bk. 10, L. ed. 274, 307], and La-
fayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 [59 U.
S. bk. 15, L. ed. 451].

"

The defendant, on the assumption that if it
was within the jurisdiction of the State of New
York, it was, though a foreign Corporation, a
person," and so entitled to the benefit of the
Amendment, contends that it was within such
jurisdiction. The argument is, that it estab-
lished an agency within the State in 1872, which
it had ever since maintained; that it complied,
from year to year, with all the requirements and
conditions imposed by the laws of the State on
foreign fire insurance companies doing business
in the State; that it received from year to year
certificates of authority from the Superintend-
ent of the Insurance Department, as provided
by statute; that, under those circumstances, it
was legally within the State and within its ju-
risdiction; that, being in the State, by permis-
sion of the State, continuously from 1872 to
1882, the State imposed on it, while there, in
1882, an unequal and unlawful burden; and
that the New York Act of 1865 did not come
into effect as to Pennsylvania corporations un-acting business within her jurisdiction being
til the Pennsylvania Act of 1873 og passed, at
which time the defendant had already been a
year in the State.

But we are unable to take that view of the case. In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 [75 U. S. bk. 19, L. ed. 357], at December Term, 1868, a Statute of Virginia required that every insurance company not incorporated by Virginia, should, as a condition of carrying on business in Virginia, deposit securities with the state treasurer, and afterwards obtain a license; and another statute made it a penal offense for a person to act in Virginia as agent for an insurance company not incorporated by Virginia,

The same rulings were followed in Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410 [77 U S. bk. 19, L. ed. 972], where it was said that the power of a State to discriminate between her own corporations and those of other States desirous of trans

clearly established, it belonged to the State to
determine as to the nature or degree of discrim-
ination, "subject only to such limitations on
her sovereignty as may be found in the funda-
mental law of the Union."

Other cases to the same effect are Liverpool
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566 [77 U.
S. bk. 19, L. ed. 1029]; Doyle v. Continental
Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535 [Bk. 24, L. ed. 148], and
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727 [Bk.
28, L. ed. 1137].

As early as 1853, the State of New York, by
a statute (chap. 466), required of every fire in-
surance company incorporated by any other

[11