[556] [557] an equitable title. The sale on execution against | in actual possession or not, claiming title to real It is possible that one who holds land under grant from the United States, who has done everything in his power to entitle him to a patent (which he cannot compel the United States to issue to him), and is deemed the legal owner, so far as to render the land taxable to him by the State in which it lies, may be considered as having sufficient title to sustain a bill in equity to quiet his right and possession. Carroll v. Safford, 44 U. S. 3 How. 441, 463 [11:671,681]; Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360, 370 [27: 201,204]; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 169 [29: 845,851]. But no such case is presented by the record before us. The necessary conclusion is that Spitley, not having the legal title of the lots in question, cannot maintain his bill for the purpose of removing a cloud on the title; he cannot maintain it for the purpose of compelling a convey. ance of the legal title, because Durant, in whom that title is vested, though named as a defendant, has not been served with process or appeared in the cause; and for like reasons Frost [558] and wife cannot maintain their cross bill. Decree reversed, and case remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to dismiss the ap pellee's bill, and the appellants' cross bill, without prejudice, the appellee to pay the costs in this court and in the Circuit Court. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. JOHN F. HARTRANFT, Collector of Cus [609] JOHN H. WIEGMANN ET AL., Trading as J. H. WIEGMANN & SON. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 609-616.) Duties-shells-removal of outer surfaces by In Stark v. Starrs, 78 U. S. 6 Wall, 402 [18: 925], the suit was founded on a Statute of Oregon, authorizing "any person in possession" to bring the suit; the court, after observing that "his possession must be accompanied with a claim of right, legal or equitable," held that the plaintiff proved neither legal nor equitable title; and consequently the question whether an equitable title only would have been sufficient to hand or by mechanism, does not necessarily make 1. The application of labor to an article, either by maintain the suit was not adjudged. In Rey-it a manufactured article, within the meaning of nolds v. Crawfordsville F. N. Bank, 112 U. Š. that term as used in the tariff laws. 405 [28: 733], the decision was based upon a Statute of Indiana, under which, as construed by the Supreme Court of that State, an equitable title was sufficient, either to support or to defeat the suit. Jefferson R. R. Co. v. Oyler, 60 Ind. 383; Burt v. Boules, 69 Ind. 1. See also Grissom v. Moore, 106 Ind. 296. A Statute of Nebraska authorizes an action to be brought "by any person or persons, whether acids or mechanical means does not constitute them [No. 242.] Argued April 20, 21, 1887. Decided May 2, 1887. INter for the Eastern District of Pennsyl- [610] The history and facts of the case appear in | posed, which presents that inner pearly ap Mr. Frank P. Prichard, for defendants in error. shells have had the outer layer ground off so as "Q. There is something here called the This is an action at law brought in a court of the State of Pennsylvania and removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, by the firm of J. H. Wiegmann & Son, against the Collector of Customs for the District of Philadelphia, to recover moneys alleged to have been illegally exacted by him as duties on imported merchandise. After a trial before a jury, the plaintiffs had a judgment for $55.29, and the defendant has brought a writ of error. The record contains the following statement of the result of the trial: "The jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths or affirmation aforesaid, respectively do say that they find as follows, to wit: "A. Well, I understand its nature. The shell happens to be of the kind which is very frequently imported and used as an ornament without any alteration whatever. The outer covering was taken off in the shape of letters, by first covering the letters with wax or grease, and then covering that with lime, having in the meantime eaten out the letters by acid or by etching. The object of taking off the epidermis is simply to show the internal beauty, for the purpose of ornament; and the object of taking off the second layer is the same, simply for the purpose of ornament. "The jury find that the regius murex, green ears, and white ears, are products of countries west of the Cape of Good Hope, as above testified, and that the discriminating duty on them amounted to $7.16, which, with interest to October 5, 1883, amounts to $7.72. Plaintiff imported into the United States "The testimony in regard to these shells was as follows: "Frederick W. Wiegmann. These shells were purchased in London. The merchants there obtain them from all parts of the world; they [G11] are cleaned and prepared for market there; the epidermis is first cleaned off, and then the shells are ground or polished for the market; they are cleaned by acid; they are ground on an emery wheel to expose the pearly interior; the purpose of both operations is to fit the shells for market; we sell them for ornaments; we import them for the sea shore, and sometimes we sell them for buttons, handles to penknives, etc., there is no difference in name and use between the shells ground on the emery wheel and those not ground; the Lord's-prayer shell is sold for the same purpose; there is no new use. scribed in the above testimony; that the duty "The jury also find that the Lord's prayers Recapitulation. $ 7 72 28 03 19 54 $55 29 "And the court reserved the following points: "1. If the court should be of opinion that both the shells ground on an emery wheel and the shells etched with acids, in the manner found by the jury, were not liable to duty as manufactures of shells,' but were entitled to be admitted free, as 'shells unmanufactured,' then judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for fifty-five dollars and twenty-nine cents. "Dr. Joseph Leidy. [Regius murex shown "2. If the court should be of opinion that (612) [613] [614] criminating duty on shells found by the jury to | The defendant then moved for a new trial, The finding of the jury is not in the usual form of a special verdict, but the jury make certain findings, and the statement is that the court reserves the three points stated; and each point reserved is stated in one and the same form; namely, that if the court should be of opinion that the shells are dutiable thus and so, or are free from duty, then judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for a specified sum. As the circuit court, and the counsel for both parties in that court, appear to have treated the findings and the reservation as amounting to either a special verdict or an agreed statement of facts, we are disposed to overlook the irregularity, and to consider the case on its merits. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 423 [18: 756]. It is contended, on the part of the government, that the shells were dutiable under the following provision of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes, Schedule M, page 481, 2d edition: "Shells, manufactures of: thirty-five per centum ad valorem." On the other side, it is contended that the articles were free, under the following provision of section 2505, page 488, 2d edition, in regard to articles exempt from duty: "Shells of every description, not manufactured." The Collector levied a duty upon the shells of 35 per centum. The circuit court held that they were exempt from duty. The question is whether cleaning off the outer layer of the shell by acid, and then grinding off the second layer by an emery wheel, so as to expose the brilliant inner layer, is a manufacture of the shell, the object of these manipulations being simply for the purpose of ornament, and some of the shells being afterwards etched by acids, so as to produce inscriptions upon them. It appears that the shells in question were to be sold for ornaments, but that shells of these descriptions have also a use to be made into buttons and handles of penknives; and that there is no difference in name and use between the shells ground on the emery wheel and those not ground. It is contended by the government that the shells prepared by the mechanical or chemical means stated in the record, for ultimate use, are shells manufactured, or manufactures of shells, within the meaning of the statute. By the Act of March 2, 1861, chap. 68, section 22, 12 Stat. at L. 192, a duty of 30 per cent ad valorem was imposed on "manufactures of shell," and by the Act of July 14, 1862, chap. 163, section 13, 12 Stat. at L. 557, that duty was increased to 35 per cent ad valorem. By the Act of July 14, 1870, chap. 255, section 22, 16 Stat. at L. 268, "shells of every description, not manufactured," were exempted from duty. These enactments were carried into the Revised Statutes. It is stated in the brief on the part of the gov. ernment that the interpretation of these provisions by the treasury department has not been uniform. In April, 1872, it ruled that "Sheils which have merely been cleaned and polished with acids cannot fairly be classified as manufactures of shells." In July, 1876, it ruled that shells engraved by the application of acids were manufactured shells. In August, 1877, it ruled that where the manufacture of the shells consisted merely in polishing them and removing, by grinding or otherwise, a portion of the surface, the shells were exempt from duty, because their character and condition bad not been materially changed, and they still preserved their identity as shells. At a later date, in regard to shells that had been cleaned by the use of the emery wheel and buffer, and shells which had been polished by the use of acids, it held that they were dutiable at the rate of 35 per centum, as manufactures of shells, on the ground that they had been advanced, by cleaning, grinding and otherwise, to a condition beyond that of crude, unmanufactured shells. We are of opinion that the shells in question [615] here were not manufactured, and were not manufactures of shells, within the sense of the statute imposing a duty of 35 per centum upon such manufactures, but were shells not manufactured, and fell under that designation in the free list. They were still shells. They had not been manufactured into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use from that of a shell. The application of labor to an article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make the article necessarily a manufactured article, within the meaning of that term as used in the tariff laws. Washing and scouring wool does not make the resulting wool a manufacture of wool. Cleaning and ginning cotton does not make the resulting cotton a manufacture of cotton. In "Schedule M" of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes, page 475, 2d edition, a duty of 30 per cent ad valorem is imposed on "coral, cut or manufactured;" and, in section 2505, page 484, “coral, marine, unmanufactured," is made exempt from duty. These provisions clearly imply that, but for the special provision imposing a duty on cut coral, it would not be regarded as a manufactured article, though labor was employed in cutting it. In Frazee v. Moffitt, 20 Blatchf. 267, it was held that hay pressed in bales, ready for market, was not a manufactured article, though labor had been bestowed in cutting and drying the grass and baling the hay. In Law rence v. Allen, 48 U. S. 7 How. 785 [12:914], it was held that India Rubber shoes, made in Brazil, by simply allowing the sap of the India Rubber tree to harden upon a mold, were a manufactured article, because it was capable of use in that shape as a shoe, and had been put into a new form, capable of use and designed to be used in such new form. In United States v. Potts, 9 U. S. 5 Cranch, 284 [3:102], round copper plates turned up and raised at the edges from four to five inches by the application of labor, to fit them for subsequent use in the manufacture of copper vessels, but which were still bought by the pound as copper for use in making copper vessels, were held not to be manufactured copper. In the case of United States v. Wilson, 1 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 167, [616] transfer ticket-instructions. Judge Betts held that marble which had been | Street railroads-ejection from car-mistake in (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 616, 617.) Argued April 20, 21, 1887. Decided May 2, 1887. In an action against a street railroad company to fendant's car, after the tender by the plaintiff of a recover damages for the forcible ejection from de transfer ticket which was intended for use on another line, it is held: that the instructions are not the evidence and the charge together, it is clear that open to objections by the plaintiff, and that, taking the jury found for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff himself was mainly in fault in regard to the mistake in the transfer ticket; and that no unnecessary force or violence was used in ejecting him from the car. [No. 262.] Submitted April 22, 1887. Decided May 2, 1887. IN to the Suprememe. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. C. C. Cole and W. L. Cole, for plaintiff in error: "Where the conduct of the defendant is wanton and willful, or where it indicates that degree of indifference to the rights of others which may be justly characterized as recklessness, the doctrine of contributory negligence has no place whatever, and the defendant is responsible for the injury he inflicts, irrespective of the fault which placed the plaintiff in the way of such injury.' Cooley, Torts, 674; Shearm. & Redf. Neg. SS 2, 37; Davis v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 546; Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill, 282; New Haven Steamboat Trans. Co. v. Vanderbilt, 16 Conn. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United 420; Trow v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co. 24 Vt. States for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-487; Toung v. Fr. In R. 10. Cent. Rep. 848. vania. Affirmed. With the exceptions noted in the opinion this case is the same as the preceding case of Hartranft v. Wiegmann, ante. Mr. G. A. Jenks, Solicitor-Gen. for plaintiff in error. Mr. Frank P. Prichard, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action by Anton Winters, brought in the state court of Pennsylvania and removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the Collector of Customs for the District of Philadelphia. The proceedings in it, and the questions arising, are in all respects the same as those in the case of Hartranft v. Wiegmann, just decided, the only difference being that in this case there were no shells called " snails" or "mottoes" or "Turk's caps" or "mag green pies" or "trocus," and that there were shells [617] called "rose murex," "motto cowries," "banded snails," Japan ears," turbo shells," "red ears," and "pearl snails." 46 The same conclusion is arrived at as in the True copy. Test: The conduct of the defendant's agents in this case was the more reckless and wanton, because they were bound to observe towards the plaintiff the utmost caution and vigilance for his protection while he was a passenger upon the defendant's cars. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451 (26:141). The evidence tends to show that the plaintiff paid his fare and became entitled to ride on the car from which he was forcibly ejected. The evidence also tends to show that he made an effort in good faith to comply with the regula tion of the defendant as to procuring a transfer ticket. That he obtained the wrong ticket may or may not have been his error under the circumstances. That was for the jury to determine. But the defendant having knowledge of the mistake immediately after it occurred, and when it might have been corrected, and refusing to make any effort to rectify the error, and such reckless disregard of a passenger's right forcibly ejecting the plaintiff from the car, is as to make the defendant responsible for the injuries inflicted. Messrs. Enoch Totten and W. D. Davidge, for defendant in error: He A conductor of a car has no discretion. must collect the fare or receive a ticket. If the agent happens to give the passenger the the fare or leave the car. He has his remedy at law for the breach of contract. James H. McKenney, Clerk Sup. Court, U. & Wrong ticket, it is the passenger's duty to pay 474] JAMES N. CARPENTER, Plff. in Err., Townsend v. N. Y. Cent R. R. Co. 56 N. Y. 295; Yorton v. Milwaukee etc. R. Co. 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 322: Hall v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 348; Mosher v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. 17 Fed. Rep. 880; [475] [476] Mosher v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 23 Fcd. | see to it that the plaintiff was provided with a Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant in error, the Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company, is a street railroad company doing business in the City of Washington, its road having two branches, crossing each other at right angles at the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue and Seventh Street. Passengers who had paid their fare on either branch of the road, upon arriving at this crossing, were entitled to receive a transfer ticket which permitted them, without further payment, to take the other branch in the continua tion of their journey. proper transfer, and that if the mistake had been made the responsibility therefor rested upon the Company and not upon the plaintiff. "And the court further instructed the jury that if, upon the other hand, they believed that the conduct of the agents of the Company was wanton and malicious, and that they had purposely given him the wrong transfer, and that they had maliciously and wantonly ejected him from the car because of personal dislike or animosity, that then the plaintiff was entitled to recover and in assessing damages, in that view of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to recover not only compensatory but vindictive damages; and to this latter branch of the instruction the defendant, by its counsel, then and there objected, and the objection was overruled and an exception was duly noted. The plaintiff in error, James N. Carpenter, who was also the plaintiff below, who testified to taking his passage on the Seventh Street branch of this road, got off at this crossing, received a ticket from the agent, who was stationed at that point for the purpose of delivering transfer tickets to passengers who wished to change cars, and took his seat in a car on the Pennsylvania Avenue branch going east toward the capitol. When the conductor of the car came around to collect tickets, it was found that Carpenter had a transfer ticket which was intended for use on the Seventh Street branch and not on Pennsylvania Avenue. The conductor refused to accept this ticket, and demanded of Carpenter the usual fare charged for riding on that road. After some altercation, Carpenter peremptorily refusing to pay the fare demanded or get off when requested so to do, the car was stopped and the conductor and driver put him off forcibly. He then brought suit against the Company. Upon a trial before a jury, a verdict was rendered for the defend-agents of the defendant Company at the crossant, and the judgment on this verdict, on appeal to the Supreme Court of the District in bank, was affirmed. "The court thereupon further instructed the jury that if the jury were satisfied fro.n the evidence that the plaintiff did not get off from the Seventh Street car, as related by him, but that he came from the west-bound Avenue car, with the passengers from that car and presented himself, with those passengers, to the transfer agent of the defendant, and that the plaintiff received the Seventh Street transfer without objection or remark, and undertook to ride up- [477] on it on a Pennsylvania Avenue car, that the defendant was entitled to a verdict." This whole charge, it seems to us, was eminently favorable to the plaintiff. The first point made in it was that if the jury believed from the evidence that the agent of the defendant had made a mistake in giving to the plaintiff a Seventh Street instead of a Pennsylvania Avenue transfer ticket, that then the plaintiff was entitled to recover. It is obvious from the verdict of the jury, which was against the plaintiff, that they did not believe that the ing were responsible for the mistake that had been made there; because in the same connection the court instructed the jury that if they were satisfied from the evidence that the plaint The entire testimony is embodied in a bill of as related by him, but that he came from the west-bound Avenue car, with the passengers from that car, and presented himself, with those passengers, to the transfer agent of the defendant, and that the plaintiff received the Seventh Street transfer without objection or remark, and undertook to ride upon it on a Pennsylvania Avenue car, that the defendant was entitled to a verdict. There were, however, some exceptions taken to the charge of the court, as well as to the refusal to give instructions prayed for by plaintiff. We think, however, that the charge given Taking these two charges together, in conby the court sua sponte, when taken in connec- nection with the testimony, it is evident that tion with the verdict of the jury, contains all the jury founded their verdict upon the bythat need be considered. That charge is empothesis contained in the latter; namely, that bodied in the fifth bill of exceptions, and is as follows: "And thereupon the court instructed the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the agents of the defendant had made a mistake in giving to the plaintiff a transfer ticket, and instead of giving him a Pennsylvania Avenue transfer had given him a Seventh Street transfer, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and that in assessing the damages the plaintiff was entitled to have reasonable damages, compensatory for the treatment which he had received, and that the defendant Company was bound to either he did not get off from the Seventh Street car, but came from the west-bound Avenue car, or that he came with the passengers from that car and presented himself with them to the agent of the defendant in a way to lead him to believe that he came from the Avenue car and desired to proceed on the Seventh Street car, which was confirmed by his taking without objection or remark the Seventh Street car transfer ticket. The testimony also showed that Carpenter had traveled a great deal on the cars of the defendant Corporation, was familiar with the manner of transferring passengers, |