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its provisions or to act withont regard to them under the act of 1863. After they did so act, the State and other qualified stockholders had no right to insist upon a representation in the stock of the bank. The qualified stockholders were, however, entitled to such a distribution of the assets as they would have been entitled to if the affairs of the bank had been wound up, or its assets sold bodily in the market, that is, a full share of all the assets or avails of the sale ; and they could not be required to accept par and interest for their stock. A court of equity could enforce these rights.
This case has been omitted from this volume because it was decided on a state of facts so peculiar as to render it quite improbable that the case would ever be useful as a precedent.
STATE V. HARTFORD BANK.
(34 Connecticut, 240.) In this case it was held that a bank which has assumed to in1 clude the State and other qualified stockholders as equals in a new organization under the National Banking Act, without pursuiing strictly and technically the provisions of the State act of 1864, is in no condition to insist on the exclusion of such stockholders, on the ground that the latter have not complied technically with the provisions of the act of 1864. The act of the bank in including qualified stockholders in its organization certificate, without previously ascertaining, in the mode pointed out by statute, whether they assented or not, was substantially an assumption that they assented, and a waiver of the provision of the statute as to notice and dissent, so far as made for their benefit. The action of the bank in soliciting the assent of the State treasurer, acting upon the knowledge that he intended to elect, and including the State in the organization certificate, and publishing that certificate as embracing the State, was calculated to mislead the treasurer and induce him to believe that his assent would be assumed unless he dissented, and to neglect to make any response to the notice given by the bank; and under such circumstances the State will not be held to a forfeiture.
This case has been omitted for the same reason as the preceding case.
CRAFT V. TUTTLE,
(27 Indiana, 332.) In this case it was held that under the then existing statutes of 1 Indiana no tax could be imposed for municipal purposes on shares of stock in National banks.
The statute construed was afterward repealed, and provision made for taxing such shares. See 1 Davis' Statş. of Indiana, 90, $ 70.
CITY OF EVANSVILLE V. BAYARD.
(39 Indiana, 450.) MHIS case was to the same effect, and has been omitted for the
T same reason as the foregoing.
STILTZ V. TUTEWILER.
(1 Wilson, 507.) FFIRMED, 48 Ind. 600; on the decision in City of Richmond
v. Scott, ante, p. 445.
HUBBARD V. SUPERVISORS OF JOHNSON
(23 Iowa, 130.) TN this case it was held that under the law of Iowa as it then was, I no tax could be levied on the shares of stock in National banks. A statute was subsequently passed providing for such taxation. Laws 1868, ch. 153. See Morseman v. Younkin, ante, p. 460.
SECOND NATIONAL BANK v. NATIONAL STATE BANK.
(10 Bush, 387.) National banks can acquire no lien on their own stock to secure indebtedness
of stockholders. THE only part of the opinion relating to National banks was as I follows:
“ The claim of the Louisville bank to a lien on the stock under and by virtue of its articles of association or by-laws cannot be
maintained. This question is settled beyond all controversy by the two cases of the Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369; and Bullard v. Bank, 18 id. 589. No banking association organized under the National Currency Act of 1864 can create or hold such liens.”
CASE, Receiver, v. BERWIN.
(22 Louisiana Annual, 321.) The receiver of a National bank, appointed by the Comptroller of the Cur. rency, may take all necessary legal proceedings to collect debts due the
bank. THE following is the only part of the judgment relating to
National banks: “The statute of the United States, providing a National currency, directs that when the Comptroller shall be satisfied that any association has refused to pay its circulating notes, and is in default, he may appoint a receiver, who, under the direction of the Comptroller, shall take possession of the books, records, and assets of every description, of such association, and collect all debts, dues and claims belonging to the association. Statutes at Large, 1864, 114, $ 50. The power to collect debts embraces the right to use all necessary means to obtain the object of the agency. The exception was correctly overruled.”
ABBOTT V. CITY OF BANGOR.
(54 Maino, 840.) IT was herein decided that the statutes of Maine, as they existed 1 in 1865 and 1866, taken in connection with the act of Congress of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, S8 40 and 41, did not authorize the assessors of a city or town, in which a National bank was located, to assess taxes for State, county and municipal purposes, upon the stock of such bank owned by non-residents.
PACKARD V. THE CITY OF LEWISTON.
.(55 Maine, 456.) MHE word “place," as used in the proviso in § 41, ch. 106, of
I the act of Congress of June 3, 1864, refers to the location of the bank and not to the State authority under which the tax is to be assessed. See Austin v. Board of Aldermen, post.
ABBOTT y. INHABITANTS OF BANGOR.
(56 Maine, 310.) MHIS was a decision as to the validity of a tax on shares of stock
1 in a National bank under a statute which has been since repealed.
SHOEMAKER V. THE NATIONAL MECHANICS' BANK.
(31 Maryland, 396.) An injunction will not be granted to restrain a National bank from prosecating
a suit to collect securities given as collateral to a loan, on the ground that such loan was in excess of one-tenth of the capital stock of the bank. CUINCE the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Union D Gold Hill Mining Company v. Rocky Mountain National Bank, ante, 151, there has been no possible question as to the validity of loans by National banks in excess of one-tenth of the capital stock.
AUSTIN v. BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF Boston.
(14 Allen, 359.) In this case it was held that a State may tax shares held in NaT tional banks organized therein under U. S. Statute of 1864, ch. 106, and may authorize the assessment of such tax in the city or town within the same State, where the owner resides.
The principal question in this case, the place of taxation, was settled by the act of Congress approved February 10, 1868, which provided that “the words ' place where the bank is located and not elsewhere in section 41 ” of the National Banking Act should be construed to mean “the State within which the bank is located.”
The above decision was affirmed, though on other grounds, by the United States Supreme Court. See Austin v. Aldermen, ante, p. 15.
SMITH V. FIRST NATIONAL Bank.
(17 Michigan, 479.) In this case it was held a special tax on the capital of National banks was
invalid. MHE court said, “ this case is too plain for argument,” and cited
1 Van Allen v. Assessors, People v. Commissioners, Bradley v. People, ante.
SMITH V. WEBB.
(11 Minnesota, 500.) TT was held in this case that under the law of Minnesota as it I was in force in 1865, no tax could be levied on National bank shares. The law has since been amended. See ante, p. 529.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MEMPHIS V. KIDD.
(20 Minnesota, 204.) TT was held in this case that a copy of the organization certificate 1 of a National bank, certified and sealed by the Comptroller of the Currency, is sufficient evidence of the corporate existence of a National bank.
The opinion simply refers to Laws U. S. 1864, ch. 106, § 6, as conclusive on that point.
· CURTIS v. WARD.
(58 Missouri, 295.) In this case it was held that shares of stock in a National bank I were taxable, though owned by a non-resident of the State, and the judgment was based solely on Lionberger v. Rouse, ante, p. 41, and Tappan v. Merchants National Bank, ante, p. 100.
Young v. Vough.
(8 C. E. Green, 325.) IT was held in this case that a National bank could by a by-law 1 prevent the transfer of shares by a stockholder indebted to the bank. The Supreme Court of the United States has since held otherwise. Bullard v. Bank, ante, p. 93.
BOWEN V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MEDINA.
(34 Howard, 408.) IT was held in this case that National banks are foreign corpora
tions, and liable to attachment under a statute authorizing attachments in actions against “corporations created by or under the laws of any other State, government or country.”
In 1873, March 3, the 53d section of the National Banking Act was amended so as to forbid attachment, etc. See ante, p. 331.