Van Antwerp v. Hulburd. The said bonds were deposited by said bank in pursuance of the National Banking Act, for the purpose of procuring circulating notes and to secure their redemption. The bank, having gone into liquidation, assigned its interest in said bonds to the plaintiff. WOODRUFF, J. The discovery and relief sought by the bill of complaint include an inquiry into, and a direct interference with the administration of the duties of the Comptroller of the Currency, and of the Treasurer of the United States, in respect of bonds deposited with such Treasurer, under the act of June 3d, 1864, to provide a National currency (13 U. S. Stat. at Large, 99), to secure the redemption of the circulating notes of a National bank. The bill assumes that this court has jurisdiction and authority to call those officers of the government to account for their official acts; to require them to state what, in their official capacity, they intend further to do; to restrain them by injunction from doing what is unjust or inequitable toward the plaintiff; and, by decree, to compel them to exercise their functions, in respect to such bonds, according to the law, as interpreted by the court, and to render justice and equity to the plaintiff. The action is not brought against them as individuals, to restrain or redress a wrong, which, as private persons, they are doing or threaten to do, to the private rights of the plaintiff; and, if it were, their residence at Washington would forbid any attempt to give this court jurisdiction, by the service of process of subpoena, unless they should be found and served within this district. The act of Congress relating to both the Circuit and District Courts is quite explicit, that no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts, against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ. Act of September 24th, 1789, § 11, 1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 78, 79. It is not claimed that this court has, by virtue of the statutes creating the court, any jurisdiction of the officers of the executive department at Washington, to review or control their official acts, or to prescribe rules for the administration of their officers, on allegations that, in such administration, they have violated, or are about to violate, the private rights of an individual, even though such public officers should be found in this district and be here served with process. I say nothing of private wrongs, committed without color of official authority, or even Van Antwerp v. Hulburd. with such color, if outside of the jurisdiction of such officers, but it would be a most extraordinary claim, that the Secretary of State of the United States, or the Treasurer of the United States, is liable to be sued in any district or districts of the United States where he may at any time, or from time to time, be found, by any individual who conceives himself aggrieved by his official acts, or who alleges a title to be paid moneys which have been paid into the Treasury of the United States, or to receive other property held by the last-named officer, as such Treasurer. The power of the Circuit Court in the District of Columbia, and, incidentally, the question whether the Circuit Courts of the United States, severally, had power to issue writs of mandamus to compel an officer of the United States to perform a ministerial act, were fully discussed in Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 524, and the cases there cited affirm, that even that power has not been conferred on the Circuit Courts within the States. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; McIntire v. Wood, 7 id. 504; McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598; Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272; United States v. Guthrie, 17 id. 284; United States v. The Commissioners, 5 Wall. 563. The present suit proceeds in this court as a court of equity, against the defendant Hulburd, as Comptroller of the Currency, and against the defendant Spinner, as Treasurer of the United States. It arraigns their acts in that capacity, and seeks to control their official acts in the future. It being conceded that they are inhabitants of the city of Washington, and the statute plainly forbidding that a civil suit should be brought against them in this district by the service upon them in Washington of subpoena to answer, the jurisdiction of this court over them is claimed to be conferred, and, as an incident, the right to summon them to appear here, by the special provisions of the act to provide a National currency, before referred to, and the acts amending the same. Deferring for the present the inquiry whether the proper mode of raising the question is by the plea which has been interposed on behalf of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Treasurer, I deem it proper to examine, first, the claim that the act, called, for convenience, the National Currency Act, confers the power and jurisdiction contended for. The sections of the act which are relied upon as conferring jurisdiction are the fifty-sixth and fiftyseventh. Van Antwerp v. Hulburd. The fifty-sixth section provides that all suits and proceedings arising out of the provisions of the act, in which the United States, or its officers or agents, shall be parties, shall be conducted by the district attorneys of the several districts, under the direction and supervision of the Solicitor of the Treasury. Obviously, this section neither expressly, nor by implication, affects the jurisdiction of any court. It assumes, it is true, that suits may be brought and proceedings instituted which have their foundation in the provisions of the act, and that the United States, or its officers or agents, may be parties to such suits, and declares, and only declares, that such suits and proceedings shall be conducted by the district attorney. If this section is not solely applicable to actions and proceedings instituted by or in the name of the United States, or its officers or agents, and may, by a liberal construction, be held to impose upon the district attorney any duty of conducting the defense of suits and proceedings to which third parties may see fit to make the United States, or its officers or agents, parties defendant, still this language cannot be held to authorize the institution of such suits, or to give jurisdiction to a court not having, independently of this section, authority to entertain them. The most obvious meaning, intent and effect of this section are, to impose upon the district attorneys the duty of conducting suits and proceedings which may be necessary to carry into full effect the provisions of the act, whether such suits are brought in the name of the United States or of the Comptroller of the Currency, or in the name of, or by, the receiver of a banking association, and in whatever courts such suits may be prosecuted. In general, the language employed, that such suits and proceedings "shall be conducted," imports prosecution, either civil or criminal, and not defense, and, in the other provisions of the act, there are numerous cases contemplated, to which such use of the language applies. But, as already, in substance, said, this section, whether it is confined to the prosecution, or includes also the defense, in no wise purports to indicate when, where, or for what purpose such suits or proceedings may be instituted, or to give them any legality or efficiency. Such legality and efficiency must be determined by other provisions of law. This section can no more be said to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States either as to person or subject-matter, than it can to confer upon a State court a jurisdiction not possessed before the enactment. Van Antwerp v. Hulburd. How far is the plaintiff's position aided by the fifty-seventh section? That section enacts, that suits, actions and proceedings against any association under the act, may be had in any circuit, district or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases. It is not, and plainly it cannot be, claimed, that this affirmative enactment has any application to a suit against the Comptroller of the Currency or the Treasurer of the United States. Its terms are explicit, and the only suits, actions, or proceedings mentioned, are those against an association. But there is a proviso to the fifty-seventh section, which, it is claimed, warrants the present suit. That proviso is in these terms: "Provided, however, that all proceedings to enjoin the Comptroller under this act shall be had in a circuit, district or territorial court of the United States, held in the district in which the association is located." It is argued that, because the present suit is brought to obtain an injunction, and appertains to the alleged rights of the plaintiff to bonds deposited in pursuance of the act, therefore, this proviso declares that this suit shall be brought in this or some other Federal court, and, by necessary implication, gives this court jurisdiction to summon the Comptroller, if not also the Treasurer of the United States, to appear therein and answer. This is a violent construction, I think, to the language of a proviso which is in the form of limitation, not of affirmative authorization, and has, I think, no such meaning. What are the proceedings which may be had to enjoin the Comptroller" under this act ?" No section provides for or refers to such a suit as the present. The eighth section declares, that the association itself shall have power to sue, and may be sued, complain and defend in any court of law and equity, as fully as nat ural persons. Under this section, if the association should prosecute a suit of any nature against any defendants whomsoever in any court, all the conditions of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and of the subject-matter, must be satisfied. The fortysixth section relieves the association from the consequences of a refusal to redeem circulating notes, and of the protest of such notes, when the payment of such notes has been restrained by order of a "court of competent jurisdiction." This, of course, declares Van Antwerp v. Hulburd. nothing in respect to the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of any court. So, of that part of section 50 which makes the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction competent proof of claims against an association; and, also, of section 58, which authorizes the recovery by the association of the penalty for mutilating its bills; and, also, of the sections which declare counterfeiting the bills, or engraving plates for forging, a felony, or punishble by fine or imprisonment. Section 53 gives the circuit, district and territorial courts of the United States, jurisdiction of a suit brought by the Comptroller of the Currency, to obtain a judgment declaring a forfeiture of the franchises, etc., of an association, for violation of the provisions of the act. Section 50, however, provides a case in which the Comptroller of the Currency may be enjoined, and prescribes the mode in which he may be called upon to show cause why he should not be enjoined. By that section, the Comptroller, on becoming satisfied that any association has refused to pay its circulating notes, and is in default, is authorized to appoint a receiver to take possession of the books, records and property of the association, collect the debts, etc., of the association, and sell its real and personal estate, and pay over all money made or realized, to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency. But the proviso to the section declares, that, if such association shall deny its default, it may apply to the nearest circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States, to enjoin further proceedings, and that such court, after citing the Comptroller of the Currency to show cause why further proceedings should not be enjoined, and after a decision or finding that such association is not in such default, shall make an order enjoining such Comptroller, and any receiver he may have appointed. This proviso contemplates a proceeding (not necessarily a formal suit or action, but a proceeding summary in form) instituted by the association, to continue its own existence, preserve its property, and avoid an ex parte receivership, ordered by the Comptroller to have effect and operate upon the association and its property in the very place where it is located. Such receiver might be appointed upon erroneous information or mistaken evidence, and considerations of convenience required. that the association should have speedy and convenient means within its own district, and where the proofs must necessarily be, of rectifying a mistake and disproving the allegations upon which such |